To subscribe to receive the monthly BenchNOTES newsletter by email, click here.
ALJ Joycelyn McGeachy-Kuls recommended dismissal of disciplinary charges against a correction officer who failed to report for duty on 15 occasions. The Department, seeking a 30-day suspension, alleged that the officer did not have authorization for these absences. The officer did not dispute her absences but testified that she requested personal emergency leave on each occasion in accordance with Department procedure due to a lack of childcare for her seven-year-old daughter. For five of the officer’s absences, the ALJ dismissed the misconduct charges because the Department’s own evidence established that the Department granted the officer’s leave requests for those days. For the remaining ten absences, the ALJ found that the officer proved she followed Department procedure for requesting personal emergency leave through her presentation of extensive credible evidence that she called her command to request leave before each absence and submitted written documentation upon her return. Because the officer’s compliance with Department procedure went undisputed, the Department had to establish why the officer’s leave requests were denied to prove misconduct. The ALJ held that the Department did not make this showing and that it failed to inform the officer that it denied her requests and provide reasons for the denials. As a result, the ALJ found that the Department failed to prove the charges and recommended dismissal. The ALJ’s recommended decision was issued and sent to the Department on April 4, 2025. The Department of Correction Commissioner fully adopted the ALJ’s findings on August 11, 2025. Dep’t of Correction v. Lee, OATH Index No. 3152/24 (Apr. 4, 2025), adopted, Comm’r Dec. (Aug. 11, 2025).
ALJ Charlotte E. Davidson recommended revocation of a respondent’s Taxi & Limousine Commission (“TLC”) Driver License after he tested positive for cocaine at his annual TLC drug test. At trial, respondent raised the affirmative defense of innocent ingestion and testified that his positive result was due to his twice-daily consumption of coca leaf tea in the weeks leading up to his drug test. Respondent testified that, the month before his drug test, he was given a six-week supply of loose, unmarked coca-leaf tea bags by a stranger who was shopping at the Costco where respondent worked. The stranger asked for nothing in return, and respondent never saw him again. Respondent’s uncorroborated account of the unlikely circumstances under which he claims to have received coca leaf tea was insufficient to establish the affirmative defense of innocent ingestion. Taxi & Limousine Comm’n v. Ahmed, OATH Index No. 1412/25 (Aug. 21, 2025).
ALJ Jonathan Fogel recommended granting a protected occupancy application after finding that petitioners resided in the unit with the consent of the respondent landlord and occupied the unit as their primary residence. The ALJ rejected respondent’s argument that petitioners were not protected occupants because they did not have consent to reside in the unit on the application filing date, noting that the Loft Board rules only refer to “consent” in the past tense and allowing respondent landlords to revoke consent before tenants invoke Loft Law rights would thwart the remedial nature of the Loft Law. Respondents also argued that the Loft Board rules are preempted by New York State Real Property Actions & Proceedings Law (“RPAPL”), which allows landlords to evict tenants. The ALJ disagreed because the Multiple Dwelling Law, a state law, has authorized the Loft Board to issue rules and regulations governing compliance with the Loft Law. The ALJ analogized the Loft Board rules to New York City rent stabilization laws, which also restrict landlord’s eviction powers under authority granted by a state statute, and noted that Courts have consistently upheld the tenant protections under such laws when challenged by landlords seeking to evict under the RPAPL. The ALJ held that the Loft Board rules should not be treated differently and therefore, RPAPL does not preempt the relevant Loft Board Rule. Matter of Leddington & McAuliffe, OATH Index No. 2956/24 (Aug. 28, 2025).
ALJ Kara J. Miller recommended granting a rent adjustment application in part. The parties agreed on the base rent but disputed the types and cost of escalators, or additional charges, that should be included in the total rent. The tenants did not dispute the currently charged sprinkler escalator and acknowledged that the owner is entitled to increases for meeting two legalization deadlines. The owner conceded that it may not charge a garbage escalator to a residential tenant and that real estate taxes should be excluded because it was never previously charged as part of the rent. The ALJ rejected the tenants’ argument that the water escalator should be calculated as a use-based escalator based on the wording of the Loft Board regulations and decades of prior case law. As for electricity, owner’s proposition that tenants pay the electric bill for the entire floor, including portions that they did not occupy and were not covered by the Loft Law, was without merit. The tenants correctly argued that electricity is a use-based escalator and the ALJ agreed that tenants’ electric charges should be assessed starting in 2023, when an electrical submeter was installed to measure the tenants’ usage. Although the electrical submeter included a storage closet that was not part of the tenants’ covered unit, ALJ Miller found that it should continue to be included in tenants’ electric bill since they used the closet for storage, the amount of electricity used was negligible, and the tenants agreed to pay the extra amount. Matter of Nourse, OATH Index No. 1556/21 (Aug. 5, 2025).
ALJ Julia Davis determined that the Police Department may retain a vehicle seized as an alleged instrumentality of a crime. Respondent, the vehicle owner, was recognized by a police officer from a wanted card for an earlier assault. Respondent fled in his vehicle, almost striking the officer and causing a collision. Three days later, respondent was arrested after a foot chase and charged with unlawful fleeing from an officer in a motor vehicle, reckless driving, and assault, among other charges. His vehicle was seized, and an inventory search found controlled substances and a firearm. Respondent conceded that probable cause existed for his arrest but argued that petitioner did not prove probable cause for the vehicle search and seizure because respondent was not arrested in it, no warrant had been obtained, and the search did not comport with the “plain view” doctrine. The ALJ disagreed, finding that the vehicle was properly seized as arrest evidence because it was used in the charged crimes that involved his vehicle and the search was a properly conducted inventory search. The ALJ also found that petitioner showed it was likely to prevail at a civil forfeiture proceeding because the evidence established that respondent used the vehicle to flee from police, which he admitted, and drove the vehicle recklessly. Lastly, the ALJ found that the circumstances of the crime and respondent’s criminal history established a heightened risk to public safety if the vehicle were released. Accordingly, the ALJ found that petitioner proved it had a proper basis to seize respondent’s vehicle. Police Dep’t v. Cortes, OATH Index No. 150/26 (Aug. 27, 2025).