

# Use of Force Report

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## 2022



**NYPD**  
New York City Police Department



# Use of Force Report

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2022

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# POLICE COMMISSIONER'S MESSAGE

Each and every day, the members of the New York City Police Department work tirelessly to fulfill our vital public-safety mission. Our officers have a sworn duty to put the safety of others above their own, in a collective effort to drive down crime, quell disorder, and ensure public confidence in the safety and well-being of our community. We are committed to building trust and understanding with those we serve through professionalism, transparency, and accountability.

The Annual Use of Force Report, a comprehensive detailing of the application of force by our members in the performance of their duty, was born of this commitment. From the physical restraint of a suspect to a firearms discharge, the NYPD thoroughly documents and investigates all force usage to further ensure the confidence of the people we serve. The report also details incidents of force used against members of the NYPD who, despite the complex and varied challenges such encounters often entail, remain steadfast in their service and devotion to the citizens of New York City.

Over its history, the NYPD has made remarkable advancements in strategy, training, and technology – and our crime-fighting efforts continue to progress and evolve. But the true driver of positive change has always been our members: the men and women who dedicate their lives to keeping others safe. Their dedication and commitment to our city and its people are unmatched, and their highest purpose is to protect. That is the foundation upon which all of our officers' actions must be built, and the regular, thorough review of those actions will only strengthen our ability to provide fair and effective public safety for all.

All department policies surrounding the use of force must be clear, accessible, and equitable. They must be carefully considered and regularly evaluated, and always rooted in respect for the law. And through it all, the NYPD's dedication to the safety of every New Yorker, in every New York City neighborhood, will never waver.



Edward A. Caban  
Police Commissioner

*Fidelis Ad Mortem*



*In Memory of  
Detective First Grade Jason Rivera  
32 Precinct*

*Fidelis Ad Mortem*



*In Memory of  
Detective First Grade Wilbert D. Mora  
32 Precinct*



# EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

## EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

This text is the seventh annual Use of Force Report presented by the New York City Police Department. Since its creation in 2016, this report has reflected the department's determination towards enhancing the accountability and transparency of the use, reporting, and investigation of force utilized by members of the service. The New York City Police Department (NYPD) recorded 62 police firearms discharges in 2022, an increase from the previous year. The increase in firearms discharges in 2022 coincided with significant annual increases that the department experienced in calls for service, total arrests, and in arrests for weapons possession, including gun arrests. Force used both by and against members of the service increased in 2022. This report seeks to provide a detailed accounting of all aspects of force, from the lowest level of physical force up to and including the intentional discharge of a firearm in adversarial conflicts that involved members of the service during the past year.

The NYPD accounts for every firearm discharge by members of the service, whether intentionally or unintentionally, except for discharges that occur during firearms training or a discharge into a firearms safety station within an NYPD facility, a Department of Correction facility, or a Health and Hospitals Corporation facility. In 2007, the NYPD began to publicly release the Annual Firearms Discharge Report, the precursor to this report, that offered a full classification of all shooting incidents, including the number of subjects killed and wounded, the number of innocent bystanders killed and wounded, animal shootings, unintentional discharges, unauthorized uses of department firearms, and police suicides with firearms. This data collection and analysis has become an essential component of the department's commitment towards the continued evaluation and enhancement of both policy and procedure.

In 2016, the NYPD replaced the Annual Firearms Discharge Report and introduced the Use of Force Report as a result of transformation to force policies and reporting structures. The annual Use of Force Report has advanced beyond the data captured by the firearms discharge reports to include an accounting of all other reportable uses of force by members of the service, allowing for a more complete analysis of the use of force by and against members of the NYPD. Documenting the how, when, where, and why force is utilized by members of the service provides a valuable context that strives to keep the department and the public thoroughly informed. Additionally, the enhanced transparency provided by such a report proves itself an invaluable tool towards minimizing force incidents and injuries in situations where force, despite any and all efforts of prevention, remains unavoidable.

The department's use of force policies and procedures are found in the Department Manual. The manual, along with the NYPD Force Dashboard, are publicly available on-line at the NYPD website, [www.nyc.gov/nypd](http://www.nyc.gov/nypd). The dashboard is a dynamic consolidation of the department's use of force data and is highly transparent, interactive, and user-friendly, providing users with data visualizations to explore the characteristics of force incidents. This includes, but is not limited to, data regarding members of the service, subjects, types of force, locations, the basis for an encounter, and injuries. Additionally, the dashboard includes legal context, insight on data collection, and details on department policy.

The department publicly releases, as appropriate, body-worn camera video and other extrinsic evidence to provide context and understanding of a critical incident, which often involve a firearms discharge by a member of the service or a use of force that results in the death or serious physical injury of a subject. These videos may be found at [www.youtube.com/nypd](http://www.youtube.com/nypd).

As has been detailed in previous Use of Force Reports, from 2016-2019, the types of force utilized by NYPD personnel were separated into three levels. As of October 2019, however, the department added a fourth category, making the 2020 report the first text to fully integrate the current four-level use of force policy structure.

Level 1 force consists of hand strikes, foot strikes, forcible takedowns, discharging Oleoresin Capsicum (OC) spray, discharging conducted electrical weapons (CEWs) in cartridge mode, and using mesh restraining blankets to secure subjects. Level 2 force includes the intentional striking of a person with any object (including a baton, other equipment, etc.), police canine bites, or using CEWs in “drive-stun” mode. Level 3 force consists of the use of physical force that is readily capable of causing death or serious physical injury, except for firearms discharges. Level 4 force consists of any discharge of a firearm by a member of the service or from a firearm belonging to a member of the service. Level 4 classification, though added to policy in October 2019, was not included in the 2019 Use of Force Report in order to arrange the data in a coherent manner for public consumption. Any Level 4 incident in 2019 was presented under the previous designation from the three levels of force classification system formerly in place. Due to this modification within both policy and data collection, the department may, going forward, adjust the manner in which comparisons of certain historical force data is made.

Directly incorporated into current NYPD force policy is a comprehensive mechanism which includes a component of both oversight and investigation. Department policy requires all levels of force to be documented on Threat, Resistance or Injury (TRI) Reports. Level 1 force incidents, the lowest level of force, are investigated by the member’s immediate supervisor. Level 2 force incidents are investigated by department executives in the rank of captain or above. Level 3 force incidents, where physical force capable of causing death or serious physical injury was used but the subject’s injuries are not life-threatening, fall under the investigative lead of the Internal Affairs Bureau (IAB). The most serious incidents, Level 4 force occurrences, those of which involve police firearms discharges, and cases in which a subject dies or is seriously injured and likely to die, are investigated by the Force Investigation Division (FID). Prior to the October 2019 policy modifications, Level 4 force incidents fell within the Level 3 classification.

Any incident involving the use of force may be, and likely is, a complex event that may involve numerous individuals, including members of the service and subjects. The highest level of force used by any member of the service involved, or the most severe injury sustained by any subject involved, determines the incident’s level classification along with the subsequent reporting and investigative requirements. The challenge to innovate and enhance force practice and policy has been embraced within the department and it remains a critical aspect of the NYPD’s diligence to uphold best practices, evolve policy for compliance on both the city and state level, and to improving transparency and community trust in an effort to collaboratively police the city in which this department serves.

## FIREARMS DISCHARGES

Though current discharge data continues to highlight the historical decline in discharges and related force data dating back to the onset of the department’s official recordkeeping, 2022 saw an increase in firearms discharge incidents. In 2022, the department recorded 62 firearm discharge incidents, a 19.2% increase from the previous year. While this marks the second highest annual total since this report commenced in 2016, it is higher than only five other annual discharge totals recorded by the department in more than the last five decades. This increase also corresponded with the department experiencing an annual increase in calls for service, arrests, and arrests for weapons and firearms.

Forty discharge incidents in 2022 were intentional discharges by members of the service in the course of adversarial conflicts with criminal subjects, an increase from 36 in 2021. Two members of the service were shot and killed and four members were shot and injured by subject gunfire during adversarial conflict incidents. Twenty-eight subjects were struck by police gunfire in 2022; 13 sustained fatal injuries and 15 sustained non-fatal injuries. In 11 adversarial conflict incidents, subjects discharged firearms directly at members of the service. Three intentional firearms discharge incidents in 2022 were animal attacks, a decrease from five the previous year. Unintentional discharges increased from four in 2021 to 11 in 2022. Eight firearms discharge incidents in 2022 were categorized as unauthorized uses of NYPD firearms, an increase from seven in 2021, and of these discharges, three were member suicides, a total that equals the previous year.

## CONDUCTED ELECTRICAL WEAPONS


There were 1,308 CEW discharge incidents in 2022, a 9.6% increase from the 1,193 incidents in 2021. Of these 1,308 discharge incidents, 1,238 were intentional discharges which include 608 that occurred during crime in progress situations and 375 deployments occurring as members were seeking control of an emotionally disturbed person. No fatalities were connected with the use of CEWs in 2022. The remaining discharges occurred in such situations as wanted suspect incidents, vehicle stops, violent prisoner interactions, and during the investigations of past crimes. The utilization of CEWs were deemed effective in 825, or 66.6%, of the 1,238 intentional CEW discharge incidents. Ineffective CEW discharges were attributed to various causes including probes falling out of the subject, discharges failing to subdue the subject, probes being too far from the surface, or probes missing the subject.

## OBSERVATIONS IN NYPD USE OF FORCE

In 2022, there were 8,270 total reportable force incidents— 93.6% were classified as Level 1, 4.4% as Level 2, 1.4% as Level 3, and 0.6% as Level 4. Of the 8,270 reportable force incidents, 6,717 incidents — 81.2% of the total — involved the minimal amount of reportable physical force (e.g., hand strikes, foot strikes, and forcible takedowns of subjects). Uses of force also included 128 uses of OC spray, 53 uses of impact weapons, and 3 uses of mesh restraining blankets. The 8,270 total reportable force incidents represents an increase of 28.4% from the 6,440 total reportable force incidents in 2021.

Members of the service utilized force in 1,740 encounters with emotionally disturbed persons, which represents approximately 1.0% of the 176,314 radio runs concerning emotionally disturbed persons. Crimes/violations in progress were the most commonly recorded type of incident in which members used force, encounters that often resulted in arrest; however, arrests where force was used represent approximately just 3.4% of the total number of arrests effected by members of the NYPD. Situations involving emotionally disturbed persons were the second most commonly recorded type of force encounter. Since the inception of this report in 2016, these two incident types, crimes/violations in progress (which includes arrests) and emotionally disturbed persons, have been the two most common situations, annually, in which members of the service utilize force.

Substantial injuries are generally those that require treatment at a hospital. Serious injuries are generally those that require admission to a hospital. In 2022, a total of 10,692 individuals were subjected to police use of force. Of those subjects, approximately 96.8% sustained no injuries or minor injuries. One hundred and twenty four subjects, approximately 1.2%, were substantially injured, and 220, approximately 2.1%, were seriously injured. A total of 24,904 members of the service were involved in force incidents in 2022, of which 4,777, approximately 19.2%, were injured. Of that number, 323, or 6.8%, NYPD personnel injured during force incidents in 2022 were substantially or seriously injured.







# NYPD USE OF FORCE POLICY

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## LEGAL STANDARDS

Police officers, in New York State and nationwide, are authorized to utilize a reasonable amount of force when they encounter specific circumstances. Federal and state law define the standards of these circumstances and determine the amount of reasonable force.

Two Supreme Court cases, *Tennessee v. Garner*, 471 U.S. 1 (1985) and *Graham v. Connor*, 490 U.S. 386 (1989), established the constitutional standards for police use of force. *Garner* sets forth the standard governing use of deadly force, namely that officers may use deadly force when there is probable cause to believe that the suspect poses a threat of death or serious physical injury. *Graham* established that the review of an officer's use of force must be conducted with an objective reasonableness standard. The Court wrote that "the 'reasonableness' of a particular use of force must be judged from the perspective of a reasonable officer on the scene, rather than with 20/20 hindsight."

"Reasonableness" as a standard is also recognized at the state level where it was central to the case of *People v. Benjamin*, 51 NY2d 267 (1980). In this case, the New York State Court of Appeals observed that "it would, indeed, be absurd to suggest that a police officer has to await the glint of steel before he can act to preserve his safety." *Benjamin*, similar to *Graham*, acknowledges the stress under which officers make life or death use of force decisions when determining the appropriateness of an officer's use of force.

Further direction on the use of force comes from New York State Penal Law §35.30. This section allows that police officers may use force when they "reasonably believe such to be necessary" to protect life and property, to effect arrests, and to prevent escape from custody.

## NYPD POLICY

Protecting human life, including the lives of individuals being placed into police custody, is the primary duty of every member of the service. Departmental policy emphasizes the value of human life, the use of reasonable force, and the utilization of less lethal alternatives. NYPD policy prioritizes, whenever possible, the employment of de-escalation techniques to safely gain voluntary compliance from a subject to reduce or eliminate the necessity to use force. Members of the service remain responsible and accountable for the proper use of force, the application of which must be consistent with existing law and with departmental policy, the latter of which is more restrictive and holds its members to a higher level of restraint than both federal and state law. As an example, state law allows the use of deadly physical force in the protection of property, a use of force that is strictly prohibited under department policy. Additionally, the utilization of deadly physical force against a person, as outlined in Patrol Guide 221-01, is permitted to “protect members of the service and/or the public from imminent serious physical injury or death.” Therefore, it is perceivable that an incident could occur when the application of force would be permissible under New York State and/or federal law, yet violate department policy.

Department policy maintains that “force may be used when it is reasonable to ensure the safety of a member of the service or a third person, or otherwise protect life, or when it is reasonable to place a person in custody or to prevent escape from custody” (Patrol Guide 221-01). In accordance with this standard of reasonableness, any application of force that is deemed to be “unreasonable under the circumstances...will be deemed excessive and in violation of Department policy” (Patrol Guide 221-01). In this context, while the use of force is broadly defined to incorporate an array of force options a member may utilize to gain compliance or control of a subject, excessive force will not be tolerated. Members of the service who use excessive force may be subject to criminal sanctions and civil liability and “members of the service who use excessive force will be subject to department discipline, up to and including dismissal” (Patrol Guide 221-01).

The goal in any police encounter is compliance, most often achievable through the simple use of verbal commands. However, when such commands are insufficient or when a subject opts to ignore instructions or resist, members may employ an assortment of force options to compel a subject to submit to lawful authority. NYPD policy directs that “when appropriate and consistent with personal safety, members of the service will use de-escalation techniques to safely gain voluntary compliance from a subject to reduce or eliminate the necessity to use force. In situations in which this is not safe and/or appropriate, members of the service will use only the reasonable force necessary to gain control or custody of a subject” (Patrol Guide 221-01). These force options include physical force, less-lethal options (e.g., OC Spray, conducted electrical weapons, or impact weapons), and even, when justified by the threat of violence, deadly physical force. Moving sequentially from one level of force to the next is not a requirement as members may, as an incident develops, escalate from verbal commands to drawing a CEW or de-escalate from the threatened or actual use force to employing verbal commands.

The framework of the NYPD firearms policy is built atop a strategic approach towards the safe and effective utilization of force. These strategies include a comprehensive training curriculum that encompasses, but is not limited to, tactical communications, crisis intervention, and de-escalation techniques in addition to enhanced oversight, and a lucid definition of an authorized discharge. While this approach has proven to make a positive impact on the department’s application of force over the last five decades, most notably when comparing the current annual totals to historical data in categories such as member discharges, subjects shot, subjects killed, and rounds discharged, the 62 NYPD firearm discharges in 2022 does, however, represent a 19.2% increase in discharges from the year prior.

The development of the department’s policy with regard to the documentation of force used by, and against, members of the service was instituted in 2016 and has evolved significantly in the years since. The policy, originally comprising three levels of force that has now since expanded to the current establishment of four levels including, deadly physical force, defines the manner of reporting or investigation that must occur after every incident of force, regardless of the force level utilized. Modifications to the shape of the policy have been instituted in order to enhance user interface, improve accuracy, and to clearly define oversight responsibilities. These policy modifications may, however, have a bearing on the comparison between contemporary and historical force data.

## LEVELS OF FORCE

### Level 1

#### (Physical Force/Less-Lethal Device)

Level 1 includes the use of hand strikes, foot strikes, forcible takedowns, wrestling/grappling with an actively resisting subject, the discharge of OC spray, the discharge of a CEW in “cartridge mode,” and the use of mesh restraining blankets to secure subjects.

### Level 2

#### (Use of Impact Weapon/Canine/Less-Lethal Device)

Level 2 includes the use of any object as an impact weapon, a police canine bite, and the discharge of a CEW in “drive stun” mode.

### Level 3

#### (Use of Deadly Physical Force, except Firearm Discharge)

Level 3 includes the use of physical force that is readily capable of causing death or serious physical injury, except for firearms discharges.

### Level 4

#### (Firearm Discharge)

Level 4 includes any discharge of a firearm by a member of the service or from a firearm belonging to a member of the service. Level 4 was not included in the reporting data previous to 2020.

2022 Levels of Force





Figure 1



### **Non-Reportable Uses of Force**

Actions that are not reportable uses of force include: ordering a person to lie on the ground; guiding them to the ground in a controlled manner; or the mere use of equipment such as Velcro straps or polycarbonate shields to restrain subjects, unless an injury is sustained.

## **INJURIES AND FORCE CATEGORIES**

The degree to which a subject or bystander sustains an injury, as a result of police action, can elevate the categorization of the incident and determine its classification and investigation as a Level 1, Level 2, Level 3, or Level 4 use of force.

Physical injuries to subjects such as minor swelling, contusions, lacerations, abrasions, and complaints of substantial pain are categorized as Level 1 force incidents.

Physical injuries that are consistent with the application of Level 2 force (e.g., unconsciousness, the loss of a tooth, lacerations requiring stitches or staples) will elevate an incident to Level 2. An allegation or suspicion of excessive force with no injury, the attempted suicide of a prisoner resulting in no injury or a minor physical injury, or the use of any prohibited act, other than the alleged or suspected use of a chokehold or prohibited method of restraint, will also result in a Level 2 classification.

Serious physical injuries that result in a Level 3 classification include, but are not limited to: broken/fractured bones, injuries requiring hospital admission, heart attacks, strokes, aneurysms, or other life-threatening/serious illnesses and injuries. Alleged or suspected use of a chokehold or a prohibited method of restraint, alleged or suspected excessive force accompanied by serious physical injury or attempted suicide of a prisoner that causes a serious injury elevate an incident to a Level 3 classification.

Any death or serious injury with a likelihood of death to a subject or bystander will result in a Level 4 classification.

## **FORCE INVESTIGATION AND REVIEW**

The department's force review process includes robust internal oversight processes. The NYPD's use of force oversight and management controls include:

### **Immediate Supervisor**

The immediate supervisor is an available supervisor, not involved in the incident, assigned to the same command as the member involved in a force incident. The immediate supervisor must be at least one rank higher than all involved members. In the event that a supervisor in an appropriate rank is not available, the duty captain will determine who will assume the responsibilities of the immediate supervisor. Level 1 uses of force are investigated by immediate supervisors.

### **Duty Captain**

The duty captain is the front-line executive, supervising all personnel performing duty within a patrol borough, during hours when commanding officers/executive officers are not present. In the absence of the commanding officer/executive officer of a command, the duty captain will investigate Level 2 uses of force.

### **Duty Chief**

The duty chief is the principal operations commander of the NYPD, when no other department executive of a higher rank is present, who acts as a representative of the Chief of Department and responds to serious incidents within New York City, including police-involved firearms discharges and deaths in police custody. The duty chief may assist in force investigations during hours when command and borough executives are not present.

### **Borough/Bureau Investigations Units**

Investigations units, assigned to bureau and borough commands, investigate instances of non-criminal violations of department regulations and lesser misconduct, as well as domestic incidents and certain criminal incidents involving members of the NYPD. The duty captain may call upon the investigations units to assist on Level 2 force investigations.

### **First Deputy Commissioner**

The First Deputy Commissioner, the second highest ranking member of the department, oversees numerous units, including those with a direct association with the review and/or investigation of force. These include the Force Investigation Division, responsible for investigating the most serious force incidents, the Department Advocate's Office, which prosecutes administrative disciplinary cases, and the Deputy Commissioner, Trials, which presides over the NYPD's internal discipline trials.

The First Deputy Commissioner also chairs the Use of Force Review Board, which reviews the most serious force cases and renders determinations and recommendations with regard to the actions of members of the department during force encounters.

### **Internal Affairs Bureau (IAB)**

IAB serves as the recipient of all allegations of misconduct involving members of the service and seeks to combat police corruption by analyzing allegations, examining trends, and conducting comprehensive investigations that ensure the highest standards of integrity. All Level 3 use of force incidents fall under the investigative responsibility of IAB.

### **Force Investigation Division (FID)**

All Level 4 incidents, defined as incidents involving firearms discharges by members of the service and incidents in which subjects have died or are seriously injured and likely to die, are investigated by FID. This unit also reviews the tactics employed in each incident to derive tactical lessons learned and to make both general training recommendations and training recommendations specifically for the individual members of the service involved in discharge incidents.

### **Professional Standards Bureau (formally known as Risk Management Bureau)**

The Professional Standards Bureau works with the city's inspector general and other governmental agencies to collaboratively improve policing and community relations. This bureau is responsible for ensuring the complete and proper implementation of court-ordered reforms. The Professional Standards Bureau also assesses compliance with NYPD policies, identifies and develops programs to minimize risk to the department, monitors use of force data and the quality of force investigations, and provides oversight of the NYPD's performance monitoring programs. Sub-units of this bureau include the Quality Assurance Division, the Enterprise Risk Management Division, and the Compliance Division. The Professional Standards Bureau and the First Deputy Commissioner's Office lead force review meetings every month with borough and bureau personnel. The purpose of these meetings is to assess compliance with use of force policies and to ensure that use of force investigations are both thorough and timely.

### **Deputy Commissioner, Department Advocate**

The Department Advocate's Office administratively prosecutes all employees of the New York City Police Department for violations of the department's rules, regulations, and procedures, and makes recommendations to the First Deputy Commissioner concerning suspensions and restorations to duty of department personnel. Attorneys provide legal guidance to investigative units, analyze department investigations, draft charges and specifications, negotiate and submit case dispositions for the Police Commissioner's review, and litigate disciplinary matters before the Deputy Commissioner of Trials.

### **Deputy Commissioner, Trials**

The Deputy Commissioner of Trials presides over the administrative trials of department disciplinary cases, and renders written findings of fact and recommendations to the Police Commissioner consistent with department rules, policies, and applicable statutes and case law.

### **Use of Force Review Board**

The Use of Force Review Board is an oversight mechanism for maintaining the integrity of the department's force policy. Composed of executive staff members, the board reviews the most serious force cases and renders determinations regarding the actions of members of the department during force encounters.

## **Training**

Department training serves as the foundation that provides an enhanced capacity towards the critical decision making that members employ on a daily basis. Training curricula are evaluated and, if necessary, revised due to the analysis of use of force data, modifications in city or state legislation, tactical enhancements, and innovations within the technological field.

### **Training Bureau**

The Training Bureau oversees NYPD training and educational programs, providing recruits, uniformed members, and civilian members with the latest academic, tactical, and technological training available. In-service training for members of the service includes sessions on the most recent tactical and de-escalation strategies, Crisis Intervention Team training, changes in the law and department procedure, and the means in which to positively interact and collaborate with the community.

Additionally, all uniformed members of the service complete rigorous firearms training as recruits, and are required to re-qualify for the use of their service and off-duty weapons semi-annually for the entirety of their careers in the department. This training, encompassing the functional knowledge and mechanical proficiency necessary for the safe and competent use of firearms and less lethal weapons, seeks to develop the foundation that enables members to minimize force while maximizing safety. Members of the service assigned to specialized units, such as the Emergency Service Unit or the Strategic Response Group, also receive additional specialized firearms training.

Department firearms training emphasizes the principal goal of every member of the NYPD, which is to protect life, including the lives of bystanders, victims, subjects, and other members of the service. Patrol Guide 221-01 instructs members that “the use of deadly physical force against a person can only be used to protect members of the service and/or the public from imminent serious physical injury or death.” At times though, it may be necessary to protect life by using deadly physical force. When determining whether to use deadly force and how, members of the service rely on their judgment, situational ability, existing law, department policy, and most significantly, training. NYPD personnel are trained to utilize deadly physical force to “stop the threat,” which means putting an end to a subject’s ability to threaten imminent death or serious physical injury. To achieve this in the midst of a dynamic shooting situation, members are trained to shoot at the center mass of the subject, the largest target available. A subject’s arms and legs are less certain targets as both are often smaller and less static. Striking a subject in these extremities is also less likely to stop the subject’s potentially deadly actions.

Use of force training, encompassing academic lessons, physical training, and tactical instruction begins while recruits attend the Police Academy. Academically, recruits are required to successfully complete the Use of Force chapter of the Academy’s Law curriculum. This chapter focuses on the justifiable use of force as specified in the New York State Penal Law and the professional standards reflected in department policy. Recruits apply this lesson and its emphasis on circumstances requiring force, de-escalation, and approved force options into realistic situations during Scenario Based Training in order to illustrate proper tactics and to evaluate techniques. The consolidation of existing legal issues and department policy with the progression of best practices and tactics provides an optimal learning experience to recruits who, upon graduation, will likely serve in a patrol capacity which includes a high volume of public engagement and interaction.

Recruits also experience a physical and tactical training curriculum that includes several force-related courses of instruction. Among them are the Use of Force course, which trains recruits on force options under varying circumstances and Use of Force Case Law, which provides recruits with the ability to streamline use of force decision making. Additionally, recruits are trained and certified in the use of both firearms and less lethal weapons and receive approximately 50 hours of physical training that encompasses an assortment of force tactics including strikes, takedowns, defensive drills, handcuffing, and critical decision making.

The department also remains committed to providing recurrent in-service training in an effort to introduce fresh concepts, update practices, and to expand the existing knowledge and skillset. Training regularly consists of tactical refreshers, modifications to policy, legislative changes, and recertification of firearm and less lethal weapon qualifications.



# FIREARMS DISCHARGES

## OVERVIEW

Any use of force by a member of the NYPD, the most significant of which is a police firearms discharge, is a matter of considerable concern to the department and the public alike. Events such as these—abrupt, dynamic, and fraught with the potential for trauma and volatility—can have a long-lasting impact on members of the service, the community, and the fundamental relationship between the two.

Beyond the more than 7.1 million calls for service, there are countless more encounters, some dangerous and others more amiable, between members of the service and the public. These encounters consist of planned events, such as enhanced community collaborations and engagement, and spontaneous occurrences, such as a casual conversation or the request for directions. Interactions further include, among others, the immersion of the Neighborhood Policing philosophy within our communities, and enhanced patrol strategies. Yet despite innumerable encounters on multiple fronts between members and the public, the vast majority of 2022's interactions did not involve any use of force by a member of the service.

In 2016, the department initiated this report to encapsulate all aspects of force used by, and against, members of the service. However, it was in 1971 that the department began to officially track the number of police firearm discharge incidents annually. From a historical high of 994 in 1972, to a record low of 35 in 2018, the

department has long strived to provide a transparent accounting of all firearm discharges by its members.

The 62 firearms discharge incidents in 2022 represents a 19.2% increase from the 52 discharges recorded during 2021. Despite this, the department remains committed to the continuous advancement of effective policing that emphasizes de-escalation in conjunction with strong departmental policies and innovative training to maintain our members' commitment to safety, restraint, and the value of human life.

Every firearm discharge incident, regardless of the category or circumstance, is thoroughly investigated and analyzed by the department. This serves to improve overall insight as well as to develop realistic and relevant training, adapt policy, implement technology, and increase the safety of New York City. The discharge data in this report has been compiled from preliminary investigation worksheets, medical examiner's reports, arrest and complaint reports, Force Investigation Division reports, Use of Force Review Board findings and recommendations, quarterly and annual publicly reported data tables, the NYPD Force Dashboard, and previous Annual Firearms Discharge Reports. While the department values the progressive exploration and examination of all police firearms discharges, the relatively small amount of discharges the department experiences on an annual basis may limit the scope of conclusions that may be elicited or trends that may be forecasted.

Even when an intentional firearm discharge by a member of the service is deemed justifiable in a court of law, the department conducts a comprehensive review of the incident for procedural violations, tactical deviations, and any factors that may suggest modifications, either to policy or procedure, are necessary. If, upon review, a determination is made to impose discipline with regard to a discharge incident, the discipline may not necessarily result from the actual discharge of the firearm, but from a violation of other department procedures within the scope of the event.

All members who discharge their firearm in a discharge incident are required to attend a firearms tactical review session conducted by the Training Bureau’s Firearms and Tactics Section, regardless of the circumstances of the discharge.

Historical Snapshot 2016-2022							
	2016	2017	2018	2019	2020	2021	2022
<b>Adversarial Conflict</b>	37	23	17	25	25	36	40
<b>Animal Attack</b>	11	9	4	6	2	5	3
<b>Unintentional Discharge</b>	14	12	8	8	10	4	11
<b>Unauthorized Discharge</b>	10	8	6	13	6	7	8
<b>Total Discharges</b>	<b>72</b>	<b>52</b>	<b>35</b>	<b>52</b>	<b>43</b>	<b>52</b>	<b>62</b>

Figure 2

The NYPD classifies police firearms discharges utilizing the following categories:

**Intentional Discharge-Adversarial Conflict (ID-AC)**

When a member of the service intentionally discharges a firearm during a confrontation with a subject. There were 40 intentional discharges in adversarial conflict incidents in 2022.

**Intentional Discharge-Animal Attack (ID-AA)**

When a member of the service intentionally discharges a firearm to defend against an animal attack. There were three intentional discharge incidents in the course of an animal attack in 2022.

**Unintentional Discharge**

When a member of the service unintentionally discharges a firearm. There were 11 unintentional discharge incidents in 2022.

**Unauthorized Discharge**

When a member of the service intentionally discharges a firearm outside the scope of their employment, or when another person illegally discharges a member’s firearm. There were eight unauthorized discharge incidents involving NYPD firearms in 2022, three of which were member suicides.

**Additional Discharge Categories**

The department may also classify a discharge incident into either of the following two categories:

**Mistaken Identity**

When a member of the service intentionally fires on another member of the service in the mistaken belief that the other member is a criminal subject. Mistaken identity cases do not include crossfires, when a member of the service accidentally strikes a fellow member of the service while firing at another subject.

**Intentional Discharge–No Conflict**

When a member of the service discharges a firearm to summon assistance.

No discharge incidents were classified as either a mistaken identity or an intentional discharge–no conflict in 2022. Due to the rarity of these types of discharges—the last of which occurred in 2009 and 2016, respectively—both categories have typically been excluded from this report.

### Adversarial Conflicts, 2016-2022




Figure 3

### Animal Attacks, 2016-2022




Figure 4

### Unintentional Discharges, 2016-2022




Figure 5

Unauthorized Discharges, 2016-2022




Figure 6

Total Discharges, 2016-2022




Figure 7

## NYPD Firearms Discharge Incidents 1971-2022




Figure 8

## INTENTIONAL DISCHARGE – ADVERSARIAL CONFLICT

In 2022, 73 uniformed members of the service intentionally discharged their weapons in an adversarial conflict. These 73 members, approximately 0.2% of the department’s 2022 average of 34,501 uniformed members, represent the first annual increase in this category since 2019. This increase, up from the 50 members that intentionally discharged firearms in adversarial conflicts in 2021, coincides with the fourth consecutive annual decline in the department’s uniformed staffing figures.

Since 2016, the inception of this report, the department has averaged 29 intentional discharge-adversarial conflict (ID-AC) incidents annually. Within these incidents during that period, approximately 0.1% of the department’s annual average of approximately 35,680 uniformed members of the service, intentionally discharged their weapons in adversarial conflicts.

Calls for service increased for the second consecutive year, topping more than 7.1 million in 2022, a 10.4% increase from the previous year and the highest annual total in the history of this report. Only once since 2016 has the department experienced an annual decrease in calls for service requiring police response, which occurred in 2020 amidst the challenges of the COVID-19 pandemic. Calls involving weapons totaled 76,708 in 2022, a 6.6% increase from the previous year and the highest annual amount on record since this report began. 2022’s arrests totaled 189,774, a 22.0% increase from 2021, and included 36,378 arrests for weapons possession. Of these arrests for weapons possession, 4,660 were gun arrests, a 6.8% increase from the 4,363 gun arrests in 2021, and the highest annual total since this report began. While the significance of the NYPD’s dedication to identifying and arresting armed subjects cannot be overstated, members of the service are routinely tasked with an evolving set of responsibilities and each year members experience thousands of additional interactions with the public, many fraught with unpredictable risks and the potential for volatility. These include investigative encounters, vehicle stops, responding to calls for a person in crisis and then safely escorting thousands of such persons to hospitals and care facilities. In the overwhelming majority of encounters with the public, including incidents in which uniformed members placed an armed subject or a person in crisis into custody, members of the service did not discharge their weapons.

In 2022, there were 40 ID-AC incidents involving 73 uniformed members of the service who discharged their firearms. These adversarial conflicts involved 46 subjects. In 11 separate ID-AC incidents, subjects discharged firearms directly at members of the service. Within the 40 ID-AC incidents occurring in 2022, 28 subjects were shot, of whom thirteen died. As a consequence of the 40 ID-AC incidents in 2022, two members of the service were shot and killed and four members shot and injured by subject gunfire.

While these were the first ID-AC-related member fatalities since 2019, the four members shot and injured is a 42.9% decrease from the prior year’s total and reverses the trend of the previous three years which saw an annual increase, from 2019 through 2021, in this type of member injury. While the amount of members shot and injured by gunfire has fluctuated annually since the department began tracking such data—from a high of 50 members in 1973, to a low of zero in 2009—2022 marks just the second time the department has experienced an annual decrease in this category since the inception of this report in 2016.



Figure 9



## MEMBERS OF THE SERVICE DEATHS

Two members of the service were shot and killed as the result of an ID-AC incident in 2022. Then-Police Officers Jason Rivera and Wilbert Mora, along with then-Police Officer Sumit Sulan responded to a 911 call of a domestic dispute. After interviewing the complainant, Officers Rivera and Mora were attempting to interview the subject when they were ambushed as the subject opened fire and struck both officers. In response, Officer Mora discharged his firearm as did Officer Sulan, whose discharge struck the subject and ultimately caused his demise. Police Officer Rivera succumbed to his injuries a short time after the incident. Police Officer Mora died four days later from his injuries. The incident is described in further detail in Appendix B.

## MEMBERS OF THE SERVICE INJURIES

Ten members of the service—including four members shot by subject gunfire—were injured in eight separate ID-AC incidents in 2022. While this equals the total number of uniformed members of the service injured in ID-AC incidents during the previous year, it is a 42.9% decrease in the amount of members that were shot and injured. In four separate ID-AC incidents, four members of the service were shot and injured during an exchange of gunfire with armed subjects. In three separate incidents, three members were injured after being struck by a subject's vehicle. In the final incident, three members of the service were injured after the subject struck each of them with a machete.

## SUBJECT DEATHS

Though the total number of subjects killed each year by members of the service during adversarial exchanges has varied since the inception of this report, an average of nine subjects have been shot and killed in ID-AC incidents annually since 2016. In 2022, a total of 13 subjects were killed by police firearm discharges during ID-AC incidents. While 13 subjects is an increase from 2021's total of six subjects killed, it indicates that a subject fatality occurred in 32.5% of ID-AC incidents in 2022, a percentage that comparably corresponds to ID-AC subject fatalities occurring annually from when this report began in 2016. Since then, 31.0% of all ID-AC incidents have resulted in a subject killed by member of the service.

Of the 13 subjects killed by police gunfire during ID-AC incidents in 2022, all 13 possessed a weapon that appeared to be capable of causing death or serious physical injury. Eleven subjects possessed firearms, one subject possessed two prop firearms, and one subject possessed an imitation firearm (all of the 13 ID-AC incidents in which subjects were killed are further described in Appendix B).

## SUBJECT INJURIES

There were 15 subjects shot and injured as a result of police firearm discharges in 2022, an amount that equals the previous year's total for subjects shot and injured during ID-AC incidents. While slightly higher than the department's average of approximately 13 subjects shot and injured annually since the inception of this report, these 15 subject injuries occurred among 13 separate incidents and falls below the 20-year average of approximately 17 subjects shot and injured yearly by police firearm discharges.

## ID-AC Incidents Subject Injuries and Deaths, 2016-2022




Figure 10

Of the 15 subjects shot and injured in ID-AC incidents in 2022, six were armed with firearms, five were armed with cutting instruments, and three were operating vehicles in a manner that threatened imminent serious physical injury or death to the members of the service or others on scene. The remaining subject utilized physical force against a member during the commission of a burglary at that member's private residence.

These 15 subject injuries occurred during 13 separate incidents. Four of the incidents consisted of subjects armed with a firearm, including two incidents in which subjects discharged firearms at members of the service and were shot as a result of an exchange of gunfire with members. These incidents also resulted in two members of the service who were shot and injured.

Of the four incidents during which subjects were armed with firearms, one occurred as members, who were executing a search warrant, discharged their firearms at the subject who discharged a firearm, shooting and injuring a member of the service. One incident occurred as four subjects discharged firearms in the vicinity of a house party, injuring a bystander. In response, members of the service on scene engaged the subjects, discharged their service weapons and injured three of the subjects. One incident took place when the subject, while fleeing from a member of the service, reached for his waistband while turning towards the pursuing member. In the last incident, the subject, while resisting arrest, produced a firearm and shot and injured a member of the service. Responding members encountered the subject and an exchange of gunfire ensued.

Five incidents occurred as subjects were shot and injured while armed with cutting instruments. The first incident occurred when an off-duty member

of the service discharged their firearm at a subject armed with a knife who, just prior during a dispute, had stabbed another individual. One incident occurred when a member discharged their firearm as a subject advanced towards the member while brandishing a machete. Two separate but similar incidents took place when the subjects, while both were brandishing two knives, advanced towards the members at the time of discharge. The final incident occurred when, in response to the subject striking and injuring three members of the service with a machete, the member discharged their firearm at the subject.

Of the remaining four incidents that subjects were shot and injured by member discharges, three involved vehicles. The first vehicle incident occurred when members at the scene conducted a car stop. The subject placed his vehicle in reverse, striking a department vehicle, then accelerated forward in the direction of another member of the service. As a result, members discharged their firearms at the subject. One incident occurred as members approached a vehicle operated by a subject who had committed multiple traffic infractions and subsequently struck two civilian vehicles. The subject accelerated toward a member of the service, striking the member as the member discharged their firearm at the subject. In the third incident involving a vehicle, the operator was fleeing apprehension, had struck a member at the scene and was driving towards another member at the time of discharge. The injured subject was a passenger in the vehicle.

The final incident in which a subject was shot and injured occurred as an off-duty member was the victim of physical force by the subject during the commission of a burglary at the member's residence.

## BYSTANDER INJURIES

Bystanders, unfortunately, may be injured as a direct result of, or incidental to, police action during an ID-AC incident. In 2022, one bystander was shot and injured by subject gunfire during an ID-AC incident. This occurred as four subjects discharged firearms in the vicinity of a house party, injuring a bystander. In response, members of the service on scene engaged the subjects, discharged their service weapons and injured three of the subjects.

## OTHER CONSIDERATIONS

An actual or perceived weapon or dangerous instrument was involved in 39 of the 40 ID-AC incidents in 2022. In 25 incidents, the weapon or dangerous instrument utilized was a firearm, 20 of which were semiautomatic pistols, one was a revolver, one was a prop firearm, and another was an air pistol, defined in this report as an imitation firearm. In the two remaining incidents, the subjects fled and the firearms were not recovered thus limiting the determination of the firearm type. In 23 of the 25 incidents, the firearms were determined to be loaded and capable of discharging live rounds at the time of the incident. This includes the prop firearms and one of the unrecovered firearms, as substantiated by ballistic evidence collected on scene. The remaining two incidents include, as previously mentioned, the other unrecovered firearm incident and the imitation pistol incident.

In nine incidents, ID-AC subjects operated a vehicle in a manner capable of causing serious physical injury to members of the service and/or bystanders on the scene.

Five ID-AC incidents involved subjects in possession of cutting instruments, three incidents in which the subject possessed knives and two in which subjects possessed machetes. In the remaining incident, the discharging member was the victim of physical force used by the ID-AC subject.

There were a total of 46 subjects involved in ID-AC incidents in 2021; 38 known subjects and eight unknown subjects. Of the 38 known subjects, all were male and ranged in age from 17 to 60 with a median age of 31. Of all the known ID-AC subjects, 57.9% were between the ages of 21 and 39, 23.7% were aged 40 or over, and 18.4% were under 21 years of age. Otherwise stated, 22 subjects were between the ages of 21 and 39, nine were aged 40 or over, and seven were under 21 years of age.

Threat Type in ID-AC Incidents, 2022




Figure 11

## Gunfire in New York City, 2022




Figure 12

The race and ethnicity of the 38 known subjects was determined by eyewitness reports, the subject’s self-identification, existing government-issued documentation, racial/ethnic physical characteristics, medical examiner reports, and other available sources. Of the 38 known subjects involved in ID-AC incidents, 25 were Black, 12 were Hispanic, and one was White. Expressed as percentages, 65.8% were Black, 31.6% were Hispanic, and 2.6% were White. The racial and ethnic composition of the ID-AC subjects generally corresponds to the 991 known criminal shooting suspects associated with the 1,294 criminal shooting incidents that occurred in New York City during 2022. Among the 991 identified criminal shooting suspects, approximately 71.0% were Black, 26.6% were Hispanic, 1.3% were Asian, and 1.1% were White. Among the known 1,565 criminal shooting victims in 2022, approximately 68.4% were Black, 26.8% were Hispanic, 2.7 % were Asian, 2.0% were White, and 0.1% were American Indian.

## Race/Ethnicity of Known Criminal Shooting Suspects vs. Known Criminal Shooting Victims vs. Known ID-AC Subjects, 2022




Figure 13

In 2022, 73 members of the service intentionally discharged their weapons during ID-AC incidents. Of these 73 members, 70, or 95.9% were male, and two, or 2.7%, were female. The remaining one, or 1.4% represents the undercover member of service involved in an ID-AC who, for the purpose of this report, will not be identified by sex, age, race, ethnic composition or any other defining manner. The uniformed staff of the NYPD, taken as an average over the course of 2022, was approximately 19.6% female, 80.3% male and less than 0.1% non-binary. Of the members of the service involved in ID-AC incidents in 2022, 47.9% were White, 39.7% were Hispanic, 9.6% were Black, 1.4% were Asian, and 1.4%, as previously detailed, will remain unidentified.

### Race/Ethnicity of Members in ID-AC Incidents, 2022




Figure 14

Within the rank structure of the NYPD, members serving in the rank of police officer account for almost two-thirds of the entire department. Members of the service in this rank, and those members with fewer years of service, are among the likeliest members to be serving in a patrol capacity. This assignment, whether through public encounters, response to calls for police service, enforcement activities, or preservation of the quality of life, has a high volume of engagement and interaction with the community. Additionally, this assignment has an elevated possibility to encounter situations that may lead to adversarial conflicts.

### Rank of Members in ID-AC Incidents vs. Department Staffing, 2022




Figure 15

### Rank of Members in ID-AC Incidents, 2016-2022




Figure 16

Of the 40 ID-AC incidents that took place in 2022, approximately 65%, or 26, occurred in relation to a member’s performance on patrol. Of the remaining 14 ID-AC incidents, five occurred while the members involved were off-duty. Of these five incidents, two took place in Manhattan, two in Queens, and one in Suffolk County. Eight ID-AC incidents occurred in relation to the member’s performance of an investigation (not patrol-related) and one ID-AC occurred during the attempt to effect a warrant. Forty-nine members of the service discharged their firearms within the 26 patrol-related ID-AC incidents in 2022, representing 67.1% of all discharging members in adversarial conflicts. Of these 49 members, those in the rank of police officer accounted for 85.7%—42 of 49 discharging members—and of these 42 members, 92.9% had 10 years of service or less at the time of their respective discharge incident.

Overall, within 2022’s 40 ID-AC incidents, over 61% of the members discharging their firearms—45 out of 73—held the rank of police officer. This is consistent with historical trends since this report began in 2016, as members in the rank of police officer have accounted for approximately two-thirds of the total uniformed staff and comprised over 71% of members who discharged their firearms in ID-AC incidents.

Detectives, who accounted for the second largest segment, approximately 15.1%, of uniformed staffing in 2022, represented 27.4% of ID-AC discharging members during that same period, above this rank’s approximate average of 12% of ID-AC discharging members annually since 2016. Representing more than 12% of uniformed members in 2022, members in the rank of sergeant accounted for 6.8% of discharging members in that same time, which fell below that rank’s annual average of approximately 13% of discharging members in ID-AC’s since 2016. Three members in the rank of lieutenant discharged a firearm in an ID-AC in 2022, representing the remaining amount, slightly more than 4%, of discharging members and comparative to the annual average of approximately 3% annually for members in that rank since 2016. No member of the service in the rank of captain or above discharged a firearm in an ID-AC in 2022.

Of all the 73 members who discharged their firearms in an ID-AC incident in 2022, 65.8%, 48 members, had 10 years or less of service at the time of their discharge. Forty-two of these members held the rank of police officer, five held the rank of detective, and one held the rank of sergeant.

Of the 40 ID-AC incidents in 2022, 21 incidents involved only members in the rank of police officer. Ten incidents involved members solely in the rank of detective and one incident included members in the rank of police officer as well as detective. Five ID-AC incidents included members in the rank of sergeant in some capacity: two incidents only involved a sergeant, two incidents involved a sergeant and police officers, and one incident involved a sergeant and a detective. Three of the ID-AC incidents included a member in the rank of lieutenant, one with police officer, one with detectives, and one without any other involved members.

Among all ID-AC incidents in 2022, twenty-four, 60.0%, involved only a single discharging member of the service. In nine instances, 22.5%, two members discharged their firearms, and in four incidents, 10% of the 2022 total, four members discharged their firearms. In the remaining three incidents, one involved three discharging members, one involved five discharging members, and one included seven discharging members of the service.

Of the six members of the service shot during ID-AC incidents in 2022, four were shot during three separate incidents, each of which involved two discharging members. This includes one incident in which two members were shot and killed. The remaining two members of the service shot in ID-AC incidents in 2022 occurred during two separate incidents, one involving four discharging members and one involving just a single discharging member of the service.

In 25 of the 40 ID-AC incidents in 2022, all involved members were attired in a uniform and, in the remaining 15 incidents, all members were attired in plainclothes. Of the members involved in an ID-AC incident, 48 were attired in a uniform, all of whom were performing patrol-related functions. The remaining 25 members of the service, five of whom were off -duty, were attired in plainclothes at the time of their ID-AC incident. The on-duty plainclothes members in ID-AC incidents included 17 detectives, one police officer, one sergeant, and one lieutenant. Four of these plainclothes members were attempting to effect a search warrant, and all the remaining members were performing an assortment of investigative functions.

In 2022, 65.8%, 48 of the 73 members who discharged their firearms during ID-AC incidents were assigned to the Patrol Services Bureau. Of the remaining 25 discharging members in ID-AC incidents, 23 were assigned to the Detective Bureau, one member was assigned to the Housing Bureau, and one member was assigned to the Intelligence Bureau.

### Member Assignment, ID-AC Incidents, 2022




Figure 17

Twenty-one ID-AC incidents in 2022 occurred during the third platoon, between the hours of 3:31 p.m. and 11:30 p.m.; 11 took place during the first platoon, between the hours of 11:31 p.m. and 7:30 a.m.; and eight incidents occurred on the second platoon, between the hours of 7:31 a.m. and 3:30 p.m. Since the inception of this report, the third platoon has experienced the highest annual amount of ID-AC incidents in all but one year (2017) and, overall, more than 48% of all adversarial discharge incidents have occurred during this platoon within that same timeframe.

Thirty-eight of the 40 adversarial conflicts that occurred in 2022 (95.0%) took place within four of the five counties of New York City. Brooklyn led all boroughs with 12 incidents, which represents 30.0% of the annual total, followed by the Bronx with ten occurrences, 25.0%, then Manhattan and Queens, which both experienced eight incidents for the year, each accounting for 20.0% of the yearly total. Of the remaining two incidents, 5.0% of the overall total, one occurred in Staten Island and one took place in Suffolk County, beyond the confines of New York City. Overall, the Bronx was the only borough to experience a decrease in the overall number of ID-AC incidents as compared to the year prior, falling by one from 2021's total of 11 incidents. Both Manhattan and Queens experienced an increase in their incident totals, rising by one and four respectively, as compared to 2021. Both Brooklyn and Staten Island remained unchanged, each matching their respective totals of ID-AC incidents from the previous year.




Figure 18

### ID-AC and Criminal Shooting Incidents by Geographic Borough, 2022




Figure 19

In 2022, ID-AC incidents occurred in 29 separate precincts throughout New York City, a 3.6% increase from the 28 precincts in 2021 and the highest total amount of precincts experiencing an ID-AC incident during a calendar year in the history of this report. The previous high, 28 precincts, occurred twice, first in 2016 and again in 2021. Seven precincts experienced multiple ID-AC incidents in 2022, a 40.0% increase from the five precincts in which that occurred in the prior year. Every borough except Staten Island had a precinct with more than one ID-AC incident including three—the Bronx, Brooklyn, and Queens—that had two separate precincts with more than one incident. From 2016 through 2021, the highest number of ID-AC incidents in any precinct during a single calendar year has been three, which occurred seven times in six different precincts. During that time frame, never had there been more than two commands that experienced three separate incidents in a calendar year. In 2022, however, three precincts, the 42nd and 43rd Precincts in the Bronx and the 60th Precinct in Brooklyn, each experienced three ID-AC incidents. In addition, four precincts also experienced two ID-AC incidents apiece in 2022; the 34th Precinct in Manhattan, the 69th Precinct in Brooklyn and the 100th and 105th Precincts in Queens.

Since the creation of this report in 2016, the highest percentage of ID-AC incidents, approximately 34%, occurred in Brooklyn followed by the Bronx with 27.6%, Queens with 16.2%, Manhattan with 15.8% and Staten Island with 3% of all incidents. The remaining 3.4% of incidents occurred in various locations beyond the confines of New York City.


Over the same period, 17 separate precincts did not experience an ID-AC and another 17 precincts experienced just one incident each, including six precincts that, in the history of this report, experienced their first ID-AC in 2022. Together, these 34 precincts represent more than 44% of the NYPD's overall total of 77 precincts. Since 2016, six precincts, Brooklyn's 67th, 73rd, and 75th, Precincts, and the Bronx's 42nd, 43rd, and 47th Precincts have accounted for more than 21% of all ID-AC incidents within the five boroughs of New York City. Additionally, four more precincts, the 40th, 41st, 44th, and 52nd, all located in the Bronx accounted for almost 12% of the total adversarial conflict incidents during this time. These ten precincts, while responsible for approximately a third of the department's ID-AC incidents over the last seven years, also have a strong geographical correlation with the criminal shooting incidents that occurred during that same period.

Police firearms discharges within adversarial conflicts tend to occur in the vicinities of New York City where greater levels of criminal gun violence takes place. Since 2007, when this report's predecessor, the Annual Firearms Discharge Report, began to map police and criminal shootings, the, "Criminal Shooting Incidents vs. NYPD Intentional Discharges-Adversarial Conflicts," maps have demonstrated a common geographical consistency that highlights the correlation between police adversarial discharges and criminal gun violence. As shown on the map on page 44, the frequency and locations of 2022's ID-AC incidents are comparable to New York City's criminal gun activity and criminal shooting incidents.





## Criminal Shooting Incidents vs. NYPD Intentional Discharges - Adversarial Conflicts, 2022



Produced by the Analysis and Mapping Section - OMAP - 03/07/23

In 2022, a total of 458 rounds were discharged by uniformed members of the service during ID-AC incidents. Representing an approximate increase of 63% from the 281 rounds discharged in 2021, this total marks the second consecutive annual increase in this category and the third time since 2016 that this total has increased as compared to the prior year. The department has, since 2016, recorded an approximate annual average of 266 rounds discharged in ID-AC incidents, and while the 2022 total is pointedly higher, it is largely the result of five incidents that together accounted for 281 rounds discharged—equal to the entire total from the year previous. These five incidents, which represent 61.4% of ID-AC rounds discharged and 31.5% of discharging members in an ID-AC incident in 2022, also account for one member of the service shot and injured, one subject shot and injured, and four subjects shot and killed. In each of these five incidents, the subjects were armed with a firearm, including four subjects who directly fired upon members of the service.

Within the majority of 2022’s ID-AC incidents, 27 in all, the total number of rounds discharged by members were between one and five. These incidents, accounting for a total of 69 discharges by 31 members of the service, represent 67.5% of ID-AC incidents for the year and comparatively corresponds with the precedent set since the inception of this report in 2016. Since then, ID-AC incidents involving between one and five rounds discharged by members of the service have amounted to 60.1% of all adversarial incidents.

Rounds Discharged per ID-AC Incident, 2022




Figure 21

Rounds Discharged per Member in ID-AC Incidents, 2022




Figure 22

### OBJECTIVE COMPLETION RATE

The “objective completion rate” is the means by which the department, when discussing ID-AC incidents, determines the effectiveness of a police firearms discharge. When a uniformed member properly and lawfully perceives a threat serious enough to necessitate the use of a firearm and discharges a firearm properly and lawfully at a specific threat, the most relevant measure of success is whether the member ultimately stops the threat. This is the objective completion rate, and it is determined irrespective of the number of rounds discharged at a particular subject. The objective is considered to be completed when the actions of the subject, specifically those actions that threaten imminent serious physical injury or death, are stopped by a member’s use of deadly physical force. The objective completion rate is used for statistical and informational purposes, and is not a factor considered in the investigation of individual incidents. The department does not calculate a “hit percentage” when describing an ID-AC incident, in part because the percentages are sometimes unknown (for example, in cases when a subject flees) and also because of the widely differing circumstances in individual incidents.

## Objective Completion Rate, 2016-2022



Figure 23

In 2022, uniformed members of the service, by discharging their firearms and striking at least one subject, successfully stopped the threat in 26 of 40 ID-AC incidents for an objective completion rate of 65%. This is a 12% increase from the previous year and marks the second consecutive annual increase in this category. Additionally, as the subjects in seven incidents fled and were not apprehended, the objective completion rate for 2022 may be higher than reported.

### SHOOTING DISTANCE

Post-shooting investigations determined the distance of 68 discharging members from the respective subjects during ID-AC incidents. Twenty members discharged their weapons at a distance of 15 feet or less from their target subjects, including three members who discharged their weapon from five feet or less. Forty-eight members were at a distance of more than 15 feet. Though each uniformed member of the service is trained to discharge their weapon at a target from a distance as far away as 75 feet, close-contact adversarial conflicts such as these intensify the seriousness and immediacy of a situation that, irrespective of the distance, already requires instantaneous, life-or-death decisions by each discharging member of the service.

### ID-AC Distance to Target by Discharging Member, 2022




Figure 24



## INTENTIONAL DISCHARGE-ANIMAL ATTACK

Among the many challenges that members of the service face in the performance of duty is responding to incidents that include the unpredictability of an animal. Although members of the service respond to thousands of service calls annually specifically to an animal or an animal condition, the Intentional Discharge-Animal Attack (ID-AA) incidents in 2022 occurred within incidents that members responded to for reasons other than animal calls or conditions.

Department policy permits uniformed members of the service to intentionally discharge their firearms at a dog or other animal only to protect themselves or others from imminent physical injury and when there is no opportunity to retreat or other reasonable means to eliminate the threat. Members are equipped with less-lethal options that may counter an animal attack, including batons and OC spray, but these options may not be feasible or effective in every circumstance.

There were three ID-AA incidents during 2022, two less than in 2021, for an annual decrease of 40.0%. Three ID-AA incidents also represent the second lowest number of this discharge category since the inception of this report, and it is a 72.7% decrease from the highest annual total, 11, of ID-AA incidents that occurred during that same time. All three incidents in 2022 involved on-duty members of the service responding to situations unrelated to an animal or an animal condition. Two of 2022's ID-AA incidents occurred as the result of a dog aggressively advancing on members of the service and one incident transpired when two dogs aggressively attacked and bit a member of the service.

The three ID-AA incidents in 2022 involved four members, all males in the rank of police officer and assigned to patrol duty, who discharged a total of five rounds, a 54.5% decrease from the 11 rounds discharged in the previous year. Of these four members, three discharged a single round each and one member discharged a total of two rounds. These four members also represent a decrease of one member when compared to the previous year's total of five members who discharged their firearm in ID-AA incidents.

### Rounds Discharged per Member in ID-AA Incidents, 2022




Figure 25

### Rounds Discharged per ID-AA Incident, 2022




Figure 26

ID-AA Incidents by Platoon, 2022




Figure 27

ID-AA Incidents by Borough, 2022




Figure 28

Two members of the service were injured during 2022's ID-AA incidents, one as the result of a bite from an aggressive dog and one as the member backed into a tree while attempting to maintain a distance from the advancing dog. One dog was killed as the result of an ID-AA in 2022, a 50.0% decrease from the total in 2021.

Two incidents occurred on the second platoon (between 7:31 a.m. and 3:30 p.m.), and one incident occurred on the third platoon (between 3:31 p.m. and 11:30 p.m.). The first platoon (between 11:31 p.m. and 7:30 a.m.), did not record an ID-AA incident in 2022. As compared to the previous year, this is a 100% decrease of incidents for the first platoon and a 50% decrease in occurrences on the third platoon. The second platoon's 2022 total matched that of 2021's ID-AA incidents during the second platoon.

The Bronx, Brooklyn, and Staten Island each experienced one ID-AA incident apiece in 2022. For the third consecutive year, Manhattan and Queens did not record an ID-AA incident.

### UNINTENTIONAL DISCHARGES

For the year 2022, the NYPD recorded 11 unintentional discharge incidents, an increase of seven from the previous year's total of four incidents, which remains the lowest annual total recorded since the inception of this report. For the third consecutive year, there were no reported injuries to any member of the service, subject, or bystander as a result of an unintentional discharge. Each incident involved one member of the service unintentionally discharging a single round with all but one incident resulting in minimal property damage.

Of the 11 unintentional discharges, nine occurred while the members were on-duty, a 200% increase when compared to the three that occurred the previous year. Five of these incidents transpired within department facilities, two took place within the private residence of a subject, one occurred inside a secured locker area in a central booking facility, and one incident occurred on a public street.

Two incidents occurred while the discharging member was off-duty, an increase of one when compared to such instances in 2021. Both of the off-duty incidents

took place within the private residence of the discharging member.

Seven incidents involved members discharging their own firearms, of which five were their service pistols, one was an off-duty pistol, and the remaining was a privately owned rifle. Two incidents included members who discharged the firearm of another member of the service, one incident when a member discharged a department owned firearm they had been issued for training purposes, and the remaining incident occurred when a member discharged a firearm recovered from a subject as the result of an arrest.

Eight of the members of the service that unintentionally discharged firearms in 2022 held the rank of police officer, two held the rank of detective, and one held the rank of sergeant. Four members were assigned to the Patrol Services Bureau, three were assigned to the Special Operations Division, two were assigned to the Training Bureau, one member was assigned to the Detective Bureau, and the remaining member was assigned to the Housing Bureau.

## Rank, Unintentional Discharge vs. Department Staffing, 2022




Figure 29

### Years of Service

Four members of the service that unintentionally discharged firearms in 2022 had less than five years of service with the department. Another four members had between six to nine years of service, one member had 15 years of service, and the remaining two members had between 16 to 18 years of service.

## Years of Service, Unintentional Discharge vs. Department Staffing, 2022




Figure 30

### Handling

Ten of the unintentional discharge incidents in 2022 occurred as the result of a member mishandling a firearm unrelated to the actions of loading/unloading or holstering. Of these ten, three incidents occurred as members mishandled firearms while taking police action and two occurred when members mishandled firearms within department training facilities. One incident occurred as a member inspected their firearm within the gun locker room of a central borough court section facility, one when a member mishandled the firearm of another member of the service within a department office, and one as a member mishandled a firearm recovered from a subject as the result of an arrest. The remaining two incidents occurred when members mishandled firearms within their respective private residences.

### Loading

The remaining one unintentional discharge incident in 2022 occurred when a member, while within a department facility, was loading the firearm of another member of the service.

## UNAUTHORIZED DISCHARGES

Eight firearms discharge incidents in 2022 were categorized as unauthorized, a 14.3% increase from 2021 and the second consecutive year that the department has experienced an annual increase in this type of discharge. All of 2022's unauthorized discharge incidents occurred while the involved member was off-duty and three of the incidents were completed suicides by members of the service, the same annual total of suicides by firearm that occurred in each of the two previous years.

When disaggregating unauthorized discharges by suicide and non-suicide incidents, 2022's five non-suicide incidents are the second highest annual total of this specific incident type dating back to the creation of this report in 2016. The members involved in these five occurrences, one female and four males, all held the rank of police officer and were assigned to patrol-related functions in five separate commands within the Patrol Services Bureau at the time of their respective incidents. Four of the members had 15 or more years of service and

the remaining member had just one year of service with the department.

Of the five incidents, one incident involved a member who, during an off-duty dispute, discharged a firearm, shooting and injuring a subject. That member was arrested and suspended from duty. In three separate incidents, a single member of the service discharged a firearm during an off-duty dispute. There were no reported injuries in any of these three incidents which included the arrest of two of the involved members and the suspension from duty for all three involved members. The last unauthorized discharge incident was the result of a non-member of the service gaining access to an off-duty member's firearm and discharging one round during a dispute. That member was suspended from duty.

Since 2016, the inception of this report, members in the rank of police officer have accounted for more than three-quarters of unauthorized discharge incidents. Similarly during that same time, males, regardless of rank, represent more than three-quarters of all members involved in these such types of discharge incidents. Both of these amounts, the rank and gender of members involved in unauthorized discharge incidents, comparatively correspond to the rank and gender demographics of the department throughout the same time period.



## UNIFORMED MEMBERS OF THE SERVICE SUICIDES BY FIREARM

In 2022, three uniformed members of the service, all males, died by suicide using a firearm. Two of these members held the rank of detective and one held the rank of police officer. At the time of their respective incidents, one member had seven years of service, one member had ten years of service, and one member had 17 years of service. Two incidents occurred within the residence of the respective member, and one incident occurred outdoors in a parking lot.

In two of the incidents, there were no reported injuries beyond those to the member of the service. In one incident, prior to the fatal injury sustained by the member of the service, the member had discharged their firearm and killed a third-party victim following a domestic dispute.

All three incidents in 2022 occurred while the members were off-duty. The three member suicides by firearm in 2022 matches the annual total in 2021, and prior to that, in 2020, and is a 66.6% decrease from the nine members who died by suicide by firearm in 2019, the highest annual total since the inception of this report.

UMOS Suicides by Firearm by Year, 2016-2022




Figure 31

Since 2016, of the 30 members of the service who have died by suicide by firearm, approximately 87% were male and 13% were female, percentages that correlate considerably with both the demographics of the department as well as with national suicide statistics. When viewed by race and gender collectively, white males represent the highest percentage of these member suicides, a statistic that again, strongly mirrors the comparative race and gender data of the department and of suicides nationwide. Members in the rank of police officer, who account for more than half of the department, similarly accounted for more than half of suicides by firearm. Additionally, 40.0% of members who died by suicide by firearm had between six to ten years of service, more than half were between the ages of 31 to 40, and the majority were assigned to patrol-related functions.


## HEALTH AND WELLNESS

Members of the service, throughout the course of their assigned duties, navigate a wide range of stressors, including incidents with the potential for varying levels of emotional and psychological trauma. Recognizing this, the department has dedicated itself to the well-being and resiliency of its members, both professionally as well as personally, through numerous internal and external resources. Internally, these include the Employee Assistance Unit, the Counseling Services Unit, the Chaplain's Unit, the NYPD Helpline, Peer Support, the Early Intervention Program, and the Psychological Evaluation Unit. External services include Police Officers Providing Peer Assistance (POPPA), Finest Care, the Police Self Support Group, NYC Well, Lifeline, and the Crisis Text Line.

Established in 2019 to encourage and support the physical and mental health of members of the service, the Health and Wellness Section (HWS) offers a host of resources, many available 24 hours a day, seven days a week. Among the resources offered by HWS include Finest Care, a free and confidential counseling service for all uniformed members of the service provided through a partnership with Northwell Direct and the Critical Incident Stress Management Program, implemented to support members in the wake of a critical, high stress, or traumatic incident. Another resource is the Peer Support Program, consisting of more than 250 volunteer peer representatives embedded in commands citywide who, while maintaining their normally assigned positions, voluntarily provide co-workers with confidential, informal support and guidance. This includes imparting information on mental and physical health, including suicide prevention, and overcoming the stigma that a member may associate with seeking help. The department also maintains publicly available Health and Wellness social media pages, in addition to a nutritional needs phone application, and a Health and Wellness phone application, both of which are available on all department smartphones. Moreover, the Health and Wellness Section works to steadily enhance and update, as necessary, department policy and training with the intention of improving the physical, mental, and emotional health and well-being of members of the service.

Since 2020, as an array of unprecedented challenges in both health and civil matters began to impact the department and the city it serves, the NYPD proactively adapted, seeking alternative methods to supporting the well-being of its members. Through the Health and Wellness Section, the department began a virtual focus, assuring that members have multiple and easily accessible avenues in which to seek support, by offering webinars on topics such as mental health, grief support, fitness, nutrition, resiliency, finance, and retirement planning. Recognizing the overall impact that member wellness has on the department, the NYPD consistently evaluates the causative circumstances of the stress endured by its members to further strengthen and adapt support services and resources.

In 2022, with the intent to benefit the members within this department as well as colleagues in law enforcement nationwide, the NYPD began to contribute data to the Federal Bureau of Investigation's Law Enforcement Suicide Data Collection (LESDC). This data, intended to better understand the factors related to law enforcement officer suicides, may help to form additional methods in which law enforcement agencies work to prevent and better understand the factors surrounding law enforcement suicides.





# CONDUCTED ELECTRICAL WEAPONS

## CONDUCTED ELECTRICAL WEAPONS

Conducted electrical weapons (CEWs) are a less-lethal force option for law enforcement personnel. Often referred to as tasers or electronic control weapons/devices, CEWs are intended to augment members' force options while also providing an enhanced margin of safety, for both subjects and members, during a confrontational situation. Department policy instructs that a CEW should only be used against persons who are actively resisting, exhibiting active aggression, or in order to prevent individuals from physically injuring themselves or other person(s) actually present. Its use is also prohibited in situations that do not require the use of physical force.

A CEW may be deployed in two separate modes: "cartridge" mode and "drive-stun" mode. Cartridge mode, also referred to as "probe deployment" is the primary mode of operation and qualifies as a Level 1 force incident in department policy. Drive stun mode, which, as department policy states, should not be the primary method of use unless exceptional circumstances exist, is much less utilized and qualifies as a Level 2 force incident. Members are instructed that, in an effort to mitigate the risk of weapons confusion, CEWs are to be worn on the gun belt on the support side, opposite the member's firearm. This is just one example of how, absent a national standard for CEW use within law enforcement, NYPD policy remains largely in line with the best practices recommended by nationally recognized independent bodies, including the Police Executive Research Forum, the International Association of Chiefs of Police, and the National Institute of Justice.

CEWs use replaceable cartridges that contain compressed nitrogen to propel two small probes that are attached to the handheld unit by insulated conductive wires. The wires transmit short controlled pulses of electricity in five-second cycles that stimulate the skeletal muscles of the human body. These short electrical pulses affect the sensory and motor functions of the peripheral nervous system causing temporary incapacitation by preventing coordinated muscular action, without affecting vital organs. Once the five-second cycle is complete, an immediate recovery occurs. CEWs collect and store data regarding each use for post-incident review.

In 2022, a total of 26,133 uniformed members of the service were trained and authorized to use CEWs, and 8,780 CEWs were deployed to personnel on a rotating deployment basis. While the number of actual CEWs deployed is an increase of 15.8% from 2021, the total number of members trained and authorized represents a decrease of 9.8% from the previous year and just the second time in the history of this report that this total has experienced a decrease. The reduction in members trained in CEW usage was impacted in part by an overall reduction of uniformed personnel, and by challenges that affected training schedules and CEW certification opportunities.

Though the number of members trained and authorized in CEW usage decreased in 2022 from the previous year, it still represents a 138% increase from 2016 when, at the inception of this report, just 10,979 uniformed members of the service were CEW-trained and authorized. Overall this represents an increase of members trained and authorized from approximately one-third of the department's uniformed members in 2016 to more than three-quarters of all current uniformed members of the service department-wide.

When utilized in cartridge mode, a CEW deployment is a force option that allows members of the service to engage a non-compliant and/or aggressive subject from a distance. This distance may allow members the benefit of additional time to communicate as well as to develop and employ a tactical solution in situations that are unique, dynamic and often hostile. Furthermore, as control and compliance remains the goal in any encounter, CEWs often help to facilitate this in a rapid manner, thereby minimizing the likelihood of injury or fatal consequences to either a member or a subject. However, in situations where a subject presents an imminent threat of serious physical injury or death to a member or another person on scene, the utilization of a CEW may not be an appropriate or reasonable force option.

For the year 2022, there were 1,308 CEW discharge incidents, which involved 1,550 individual discharges. It should be noted that multiple CEW discharges may occur during a single incident and there may be CEW discharges that occurred during incidents that were ultimately classified under a higher level of force, such as in a firearms discharge incident when a CEW was also utilized. CEW discharge incidents and individual discharges both experienced an increase in 2022, rising by 9.6% and 4.2% respectively, from the previous year. This increase in CEW discharge incidents and individual CEW discharges may be attributable to the significant rise in calls for service and in arrests, increases of 10.4% and 22.0% respectively, which occurred in 2022 as compared to the previous year.

### 2022 CEW Discharge Incidents, Event Type




Figure 32

The significant majority, approximately 75.2%, of all CEW discharge incidents in 2022, occurred during situations when members encountered a crime in progress or where members were attempting to subdue an emotionally disturbed person (EDP). This number comparably correlates to the percentage total for the same two incident types recorded annually since 2016, as approximately 78% of all CEW discharge incidents were for arrests (which includes the category of crimes in progress) or EDP situations. Of the 1,308 CEW discharge incidents in 2022, 608 occurred during crime in progress situations while another 375 occurred as members were attempting to bring an EDP into custody. The remaining CEW discharge incidents occurred in situations that among them included: wanted suspects, vehicle stops, past crime investigations, and suspicious activities.

NYPD Patrol Guide 221-13 defines an emotionally disturbed person as “a person who appears to be mentally ill or temporarily deranged and is conducting themselves in a manner that a uniformed member of the service reasonably believes is likely to result in serious injury to himself or others.” A majority of encounters with EDPs are not arrest-related situations. Consistent with New York State Mental Hygiene Law—which spells out the conditions under which a person can be involuntarily removed to a hospital for examination or treatment —members of the service are directed by department policy to take an EDP into protective custody for the subject’s safety and the safety of the public, and to ensure that medical and psychiatric evaluation can take place.

Often, especially upon initial contact, members of the service often do not know the emotional and/or psychological status of a subject. Members are, however, trained to recognize situational and behavioral cues to properly approach, interact, and respond to EDPs, including the utilization of all necessary time and de-escalation tactics. Regardless of the situation, members are instructed to use only the reasonable force necessary to gain control or custody of a subject and when there is time to negotiate, all the time necessary to ensure the safety of all individuals will be used. Despite these efforts, there are situations when verbal directions fail and a subject exhibits active aggression, a CEW discharge often remains one of the safer options for both the subject and members of the service. Among the 176,314 service calls classified as an EDP call in 2022, just a fraction of a percent, 375 in total, included a CEW discharge incident. The overwhelming majority of these types of service calls were handled by members without any need to utilize a CEW or force in any manner.

### CEW DEPLOYMENT MODE

Conducted electrical weapons, as indicated earlier, can be deployed in two separate modes: “cartridge” mode and “drive-stun” mode. The primary method of deployment, as per department policy, is cartridge mode, also referred to as probe mode. When a CEW is utilized in this mode, two metal probes are propelled by the CEW’s cartridge toward a subject across an intervening space. This mode, which may cause neuromuscular incapacitation and effectively immobilize a subject, is beneficial in that it provides a member adequate separation from the intended subject.

Of the 1,308 CEW discharge incidents in 2022, 1,027, approximately 78.5%, were cartridge mode

deployments. While more than 84% of all CEW discharge incidents citywide starting from 2016 have been cartridge mode deployments, this method has shown an annual decrease since 2018, percentage-wise, among overall CEW discharge incidents each year. From 88.0% in 2018, 86.5% in 2019, 83.3% in 2020, 81.1% in 2021, to the current total, 78.5%, of all discharges in 2022.

The second method of deployment, drive-stun mode discharges, totaled 215 in 2022, accounting for approximately 16.5%, of all discharge incidents during the year. In this deployment mode, the CEW is brought into direct contact with the subject’s body or clothing, without a cartridge or after a cartridge has been discharged. A discharge of this type does not, by itself, achieve the immobilizing effects of probe deployment as this mode does not generally cause neuromuscular incapacitation. Whereas cartridge mode has decreased, percentage-wise, annually since 2018, drive-stun mode has seen a percentage increase from 5.6% in 2018, 7.7% in 2019, 12.0% in 2020, 13.9% in 2021, to the current 16.5% of all discharge incidents in 2022.

Additionally, circumstances may arise in which both modes, cartridge and drive-stun, are used in concert. As an example, in instances when only one probe penetrates a subject or when the distance between probes may be insufficient, the use of a CEW in drive-stun mode is necessary to “complete the circuit” to achieve neuromuscular incapacitation. In 2022, both cartridge and drive-stun modes were utilized in 5.0% of all CEW incidents. Since 2018, the overall percentage of deployments in which both modes were utilized, has remained comparatively similar, averaging close to 5.0% annually.

CEW Deployment Mode, 2022




Figure 33

## CEW EFFECTIVENESS

The goal of each and every application of force by a member of the service, CEW discharges included, is to safely gain control of violent, actively resistant, and/or aggressive subjects without the need for any further use of force. Since October 2019, NYPD Patrol Guide 221-08 defines CEW effectiveness as: “Any immediate reaction, even if momentary, that causes a change in an actively aggressive subject’s or emotionally disturbed person’s physical actions and/or psychological behavior as the result of a pre-deployment verbal warning, activation, laser warning, warning arc, or discharge of a CEW.” It should be noted that the majority of these actions —verbal warning, CEW activation (to arm the CEW by releasing the safety), laser warning, and warning arc —are all actions that could occur prior to the actual CEW discharge.

A thorough review of 2022 force data indicates that 825 CEW discharge incidents were categorized as effective in gaining rapid control of the subject. Of the 1,308 discharge incidents in 2022, 1,238 were intentional, of which 66.6% were deemed effective.

### Effectiveness of CEW Discharges, 2022




Figure 34

A single ineffective discharge incident may have multiple, and at times, simultaneous causes. Ineffective discharge incidents in 2022 were attributed to such circumstances as the probes falling out of the subject, the subject fighting through the pain, probes being too far from the surface area, or the probes missing the subject.

## DISCHARGING PERSONNEL

In 2022, members in the rank of police officer and sergeant accounted for 90.3%—1,400 of 1,550—of all individual CEW discharges. Additionally, these two ranks also represent 89.8% the discharging personnel, accounting for 1,175 of 1,308 CEW discharge incidents during 2022. Unlike members serving in an investigative capacity or members serving in a higher rank, police officers and sergeants assigned to patrol-related functions have an increased likelihood to be first on scene at an incident that may result in a CEW discharge and have an elevated probability overall to encounter, and ultimately engage in, a hostile interaction with a subject. As such, since 2017, personnel in the rank of police officer have accounted for the highest proportion of both individual discharges, as well as overall discharge incidents, annually.

### CEW Discharges by Rank, 2022




Figure 35

## TIME AND PLACE OF CEW DISCHARGES

Since 2017, CEW discharge incidents have occurred most frequently on the third platoon, (3:31 p.m. to 11:30 p.m.), a trend that continued in 2022 with 600 instances, representing 45.9% of all discharge incidents, taking place during this platoon. The second platoon (7:31 a.m. to 3:30 p.m.) recorded the next highest total, 402 incidents, which represent approximately 30.7% followed by 306 incidents on the first platoon (11:31 p.m. to 7:30 a.m.), approximately 23.4%, of all of 2022's discharge incidents.

A higher total of CEW discharge incidents characteristically occur in geographic boroughs that account for a higher amount of service calls, with Brooklyn, the Bronx, and Manhattan consistently among the top three boroughs in both CEW discharge incidents and the number of service calls annually.

Brooklyn led the five boroughs in CEW discharge incidents in 2022, accounting for 30.3% of all discharge incidents and marking the second time since 2018 that Brooklyn led the city in discharges. The Bronx, which has led the city five times since 2016, came next with approximately 26.0% of the city's discharge incidents. Manhattan followed, accounting for 21.0%, Queens with 18.0%, and Staten Island responsible for 4.7% of the annual CEW discharge incidents. Since 2016, Brooklyn has led the city twice in annual CEW discharge incidents, first in 2018 and again in 2022. In every remaining year over that same period, the Bronx accounted for the highest total of CEW discharges by borough annually.

In 2022, Brooklyn and Manhattan, as has been consistent since the inception of this report, led New York City as the respective top two boroughs with regard to 911 calls for service.

### CEW Discharge Incidents by Platoon, 2022




Figure 36



### CEW Discharges by Geographic Borough, 2022




Figure 37

### 911 Calls for Service by Geographic Borough, 2022




Figure 38

# GENERAL USES OF FORCE


## GENERAL USES OF FORCE

All members of the service are responsible and accountable for the proper use of force. Current New York State law allows that a law enforcement member may use force to effect an arrest, prevent escape, and protect life and property. Any force used by members of the NYPD must be in compliance with both state and federal law, as well as with departmental policy. In all circumstances, any application or use of force by a member of the service must be the reasonable amount necessary to gain compliance. While members of the service, when appropriate and consistent with personal safety, do seek to gain voluntary compliance in order to reduce or eliminate the necessity of force, such compliance is not always achievable and some interactions may result in the use of force.

Historically, in the years prior to the inception of this report, the occurrence of NYPD force incidents were documented through paperwork such as Arrest Reports, Medical Treatment of Prisoner Forms, Aided Reports, and Line-of-Duty Injury Reports. While use of force data was captured, it lacked a centralized repository and did not adequately provide a comprehensive accounting of any such force incident. The department recognized this deficiency and, in June of 2016, introduced the Threat, Resistance or Injury (TRI) Report. The TRI Report sought to enhance accountability, advance efforts towards distinguishing deficiencies in training, and improve oversight by recording data regarding the aspects of a force incident, including, but not limited to: the type(s) of force utilized, the demographic information of individuals subjected to force, the members of the service who used force and/or were subjected to force, any injuries inflicted and/or sustained, and other circumstances surrounding use of force incidents.

The TRI Report is the primary manner by which members of the NYPD document use of force incidents, whether force was used by, or against, a member of the service. The TRI Report process is fully digitalized, highly intuitive, and operates in continuance of the department's goals to enhance accountability and transparency.

### Threat, Resistance or Injury Reports, 2022



\* This figure does not include the unauthorized discharge incident when a non-member of the service discharged a member's firearm during a dispute outside the confines of New York City. The discharge is not attributed to a member of the service, therefore not captured in the TRI data. The incident is, however, included in the yearly discharge total and covered in the Unauthorized Discharge section.

Figure 39

In 2022, members of the service completed 10,041 TRI Reports, documenting 8,270 reportable use of force incidents. Among these completed TRI Reports, 1,771 were for incidents that, although reportable under the department’s force policy, did not involve the use of force by a member of the service. As an example, if a subject in department custody were to be assaulted by another subject also in custody, a TRI Report would be prepared though not be categorized as a use of force incident. Similarly, the suicide of a subject in police custody is reportable by a TRI Report, though not considered a use of force incident. Additionally, incidents in which a subject assaults a member of the service, without any force utilized by a member of the NYPD, would also generate a TRI Report. Though these types of incidents do not involve any application of force by a member of the service, such occurrences do elicit a thorough oversight mechanism governed by the department’s force investigation policy.

### Force Reporting Levels, 2022




Figure 40

Under the four level force classification rubric utilized by the department, force incidents in 2022 consisted of 93.6% Level 1 use of force, 4.4% Level 2 use of force, 1.4% Level 3 use of force and 0.6% Level 4 use of force.

By comparison, 2021’s force incidents consisted of 93.7% Level 1 use of force, 4.6% Level 2 use of force, 1.0% Level 3 use of force and 0.7% Level 4 use of force. In 2019, the department revised the TRI Report, improving user interface and accuracy in addition to the bifurcation of the Level 3 category by creating the Level 4 category and the framework to the updated policy currently in existence. Within the history of this report, 2020 was the first year that applied the redefined use of force policy, four levels of force as opposed to three levels, in annual reporting.

While this change in department policy does not allow a wholly compatible historical comparison of force level data, the vast majority of force incidents, since the creation of this report in 2016, involved the minimum amount of physical force by a member of the service.

Similarly, the majority of the 8,270 force incidents in 2022 involved just the minimum amount of physical force by a member of the service. Physical force, defined to consist of actions that include forcible takedowns, hand strikes, and foot strikes, totaled 6,717 incidents and represents approximately 81.2% of all force incidents for the year. The next highest force utilized, CEWs, represented 15.8% of force incidents, of which 1,238, more than 94%, were intentional discharge incidents.

The remaining force incidents by equipment or force option included: 128 uses of OC spray (1.5%), 61 firearms discharges (0.7%), 53 uses of impact weapons (0.6%), and three uses of mesh restraining blankets (0.04%). There were no incidents of canine bites in 2022, the first time since this report began that no incidents of this type occurred. Overall, 2022 saw an increase from the previous year in the cumulative amount of four specific less-lethal force incidents; impact weapons, mesh restraining blankets, OC spray, and canine bites. Combined, these incidents totaled 184 force incidents in 2022, a 20.3% increase from the 153 incidents in 2021. While this marks the first time in the history of this report that the department experienced a cumulative increase in these categories, 2022’s 184 incidents still represent the second lowest cumulative total since the creation of this report. The overall cumulative increase of these four less-lethal incidents during 2022 was driven by a rise in two categories, OC Spray incidents and mesh restraining blankets, both of which had, in 2021, recorded their lowest annual totals since this report began. There was also, for the second consecutive year, an increase in CEW discharge incidents, similar to the trend the department experienced from 2016 through 2019, that saw an annual increase in this category of incidents over that time.

In 2022, incidents involving the use of less-lethal force options, including CEWs, increased by approximately 11.1% as compared to 2021. While the increase is largely attributable to the rise in both CEW and OC Spray incidents, which experienced increases of 9.6% and 32.0% respectively, the other incidents remained somewhat constant from the previous year. Incidents involving mesh restraining blankets increased by just one occurrence, three incidents as compared to two in 2021, impact weapon use remained unchanged, recording the same amount as the previous year, and canine bite incidents fell to zero occurrences for the year.

## Type of Encounter in Which Police Used Force, 2022




Figure 41

Of the 8,270 force incidents recorded on TRI Reports during the year 2022, approximately 60.5%, or 5,001 incidents, occurred during four arrest-related categories: crimes in progress, prisoner interactions, wanted suspect investigations, and past crime/violation investigations. When combined with incidents involving emotionally disturbed persons, these five incident types account for approximately 81.5% of all NYPD uses of force. Force was used in approximately 3.4% of total arrests (6,360 of 189,774) effected by members of the department in 2022. Although this is a slight increase from 2021, when force was used in 3.0% of total arrests, the amount of arrests in 2022 represent a 22% increase from the 2021's total. Of the remaining force incidents, the highest remaining categories involving the use of force include vehicular summons enforcement at 4.3% of incidents, suspicious activity at 1.9% of incidents, and crowd control accounting for 1.7% of the total force occurrences during 2022.

### Force Used During Arrests by Subject Race, 2022




Figure 42

### Total Arrests by Subject Race, 2022




Figure 43

Of the uniformed members of the service that utilized force in 2022, the race and ethnicity of these members largely parallels the racial and ethnic breakdown of the department’s uniformed staff as a whole. Of the subjects of police force in 2022, the race and ethnicity of these subjects largely reflects the racial composition of the violent criminal population in the city, as measured by overall arrests, subjects who resist arrest, and information provided from crime victims that include the descriptions of assault suspects, robbery suspects, and shooting suspects.

### Uniformed Member’s Race Using Force, 2022




Figure 44

### Violent Crime and Force Used to Effect Arrest, 2022




Figure 45

Consistent during the history of this report, the highest percentage of individuals subjected to police force have been between the ages of 16 and 35. Since 2016, this age group represented approximately two-thirds of individuals subjected to force and, similarly in 2022, this age group accounted for approximately 64.1% of individuals subjected to force. Of individuals subjected to force between the ages of 16 and 25, 56.0% were Black, 31.0% were Hispanic, 4.3% were White, and the remaining 8.7% were Asian or other ethnicities. Of the subjects between the ages of 26 and 35, 55.3% were Black, 27.5% were Hispanic, 8.2% were White, and the remaining 9.0% were Asian or other ethnicities. Of the individuals subjected to force between the ages of 36 and 59, 55.2% were Black, 24.6% were Hispanic, 10.5% were White, and the remaining 9.7% were Asian or other ethnicities. Of subjects ages 60 and older, 46.5% were Black, 16.3% were Hispanic, 18.1% were White, and the remainder, 19.1%, were Asian or other ethnicities.

### Subjects of Force by Age/Race, 2022




Figure 46

### Force Reporting by Subject Race, 2022




Figure 47

### Subjects of Force by Age, 2022




Figure 48

The highest percentage of force, geographically in 2022, occurred in Brooklyn, accounting for 28.7% of citywide uses of force. The Bronx (23.9%) and Manhattan (23.6%) followed and combined, these two boroughs accounted for 47.5% of force. Queens (19.0%) and Staten Island (4.8%) accounted for the remaining 23.8% of force used in each geographic borough by members of the service. Across all five boroughs, use of force incidents in 2022 occurred most often on the third platoon, 48.0%, from 3:31 p.m. to 11:30 p.m., followed by 29.0% on the second platoon, from 7:31 a.m. to 3:30 p.m., and 23.0% occurring on the first platoon, from 11:31 p.m. to 7:30 a.m. The use of force in these two groupings, by borough and by tour, largely parallels the data reported annually in recent years within the same categories. Brooklyn has, since this report began, consistently accounted for the highest percentage of force by borough annually followed by Manhattan which recorded the second highest percentage in five different years. Additionally, in all but one year since the creation of this report, the third platoon has recorded the highest percentage of force reported by platoon followed by the second platoon, which recorded the second highest percentage in 2022 as well as the four previous years.

Force Reporting by Geographic Borough, 2022




Figure 49

Force Reporting by Platoon, 2022




Figure 50

### CIVILIAN FORCE COMPLAINTS

Force complaints received by the Civilian Complaint Review Board (CCRB) experienced a 17.9% increase in 2022, the first increase since 2019. While the 1,424 complaints received in 2021 represented the lowest total on record during the history of this report, the 1,679 force complaints received in 2022 represents the third lowest total in the history of this report. In 2022, there was a rise in the total number of force allegations substantiated by CCRB, from 127 in 2021 to 354 in 2022. It should be noted that the disposition of a complaint may, due to the investigative process, occur at a timeframe distinctive from when the complaint was reported, meaning a disposition in any given year may be for a complaint reported in a previous year. In 2022, a significant portion of dispositions stemmed from complaints received during the two years prior as CCRB worked through the backlog of open complaints that had accumulated as a result of the COVID-19 pandemic.

Historical CCRB Force Complaints vs. Substantiated Force Allegations, 2016-2022




Figure 51

In the course of responding to the millions of calls for service that are received in New York City annually, members of the service consistently come in direct contact with victims, witnesses, suspects, and other civilian bystanders. The vast and overwhelming majority of these calls for service and public interactions occur without any police use of force or an complaint of unnecessary force. During 2022, as members of the service responded to more than 7.1 million calls for service, just a fraction of such calls and interactions resulted in force complaints against a uniformed member of the service. The ratio of calls for service to force complaint cases in 2022 is approximately 4,271 to 1. The ratio of calls for service to substantiated allegations is approximately 20,258 to 1. The ratio of force incidents to substantiated force allegations 23 to 1.

### FORCE USED AGAINST MEMBERS OF THE SERVICE

Police work, by nature, is inherently dangerous, a fact that is solemnly understood by members of the service who go about their duties with the realization that, at any given moment, an event, encounter, or interaction may ultimately turn violent. While the goal in any incident is to achieve voluntary compliance, the reality is that, regardless of the efforts of members of the service, this is not always possible. Encounters, at times, may become contentious, some becoming violent, and lead to injuries to both subjects and to members of the service.

In 2022, there were 8,253 incidents recorded by the NYPD during which subjects used force against members of the service. Though incidents of force against members often occur during occasions in which members themselves use force, for analytical purposes, force used by members and force used against members are viewed independently of one another. More than 60% of incidents in which force was used against NYPD

personnel occurred during four categories of arrest-related situations: crime/violation in progress, wanted suspect investigations, prisoner interactions, and past crime investigations. Additionally, 21% of incidents in 2022 during which force was used against a member occurred during encounters with emotionally disturbed persons. Annually since this report began, these arrest-related situations, along with encounters with EDPs, have consistently represented the highest percentages of incident types that have resulted in force against a member of the service. Other categories that represented significant percentages of force incident against members in 2022 include VTL infractions (4.3%), suspicious activity (approximately 2%), and crowd control (1.7%). Physical force without weapons, similar to the annual totals since the creation of this report, represented the vast majority, 97.7%, of all force types used against members of the service. In the remaining 2.3% of incidents, a weapon was used or displayed by a subject at a member of the service.

Force Used Against Members by Event Description, 2022




Figure 52

## Type of Force Used Against Members, 2022



Figure 53

Brooklyn, as it has in five of the previous six years, led the city as the geographical borough responsible for the highest percentage of force incidents, 28.8%, against members of the service in 2022. The Bronx was next, representing 23.9% of incidents followed by Manhattan at 23.6%, Queens at 19.0%, and lastly Staten Island, who accounted for 4.7% of such incidents. The first platoon, from 11:31 p.m. to 7:30 a.m. accounted for almost half, 48.0%, of all incidents where force was used against members, followed by 29.0% of instances on the third platoon from 3:31 p.m. to 11:30 p.m., and the remaining 23.0% on the second platoon, from 7:31 a.m. to 3:30 p.m. As referred to previously, force incidents against members, along with their related data, often correlates with that of the use of force by members of the service.

In 2022, of the 10,692 subjects of police force, 10,348 individuals, 96.8%, sustained no injuries or minor injuries. A total of 344 subjects sustained substantial or serious physical injuries. During the 8,253 incidents in which force was used against members of the service, 4,777 members of the department sustained injuries, 323 of which were deemed substantial or serious. Substantial injuries are generally those that require treatment at a hospital. Serious injuries are generally those that require admission to a hospital.

## Force Used Against Members by Platoon, 2022




Figure 54

### Force Used Against Members by Geographic Borough, 2022




Figure 55

### Use of Force Related Injuries (Subject vs. Members), 2022




Figure 56



An aerial, high-angle photograph of Times Square in New York City at night. The scene is illuminated by the city's lights, including the iconic red, white, and blue billboards on the buildings. A large crowd of people is visible on the streets, and a large, glowing spherical light fixture is prominent in the lower center. The word "APPENDICES" is overlaid in large, white, bold, sans-serif capital letters across the middle of the image.

# APPENDICES

**Appendix A:  
NYPD Use of Force Documentation  
and Investigation Process**

**NYPD Use of Force Documentation and Investigation Process**

In all use of force incidents, an immediate supervisor responds to the scene to assess the circumstances. The supervisor must determine the level of force and/or type of injury in order to clarify the appropriate reporting and investigative requirements. All reportable uses of force by members of the service are investigated, including those determined to be within department guidelines.

**LEVEL 1**

Use of hand strikes; foot strikes; forcible take downs; wrestling/grappling; O.C. spray; mesh restraining blanket; CEW (cartridge mode)

**OR**

A physical injury to a non-member of the service resulting from police action (unless consistent with use of higher level of force)

**LEVEL 2**

Use of any object as an impact weapon; police canine bite; CEW (drive stun mode); any prohibited act (excluding the alleged or suspected use of a chokehold, or prohibited method of restraint, or those that result in a serious physical injury, or those related to a firearm discharge)

**OR**

Alleged/suspected excessive force (no injury/physical injury); attempted prisoner suicide (excluding serious physical injury)

**OR**

A physical injury to a non-member of the service consistent with use of Level 2 force; unconsciousness; loss of tooth; application of stitches/staples

The **Member of the Service** completes the **Threat, Resistance or Injury (TRI) Interaction Report.**

The **Immediate Supervisor** conducts the investigation, completes the **TRI Incident Report**, and closes the incident unless any further investigation is warranted.

The **Member of the Service** completes the **(TRI) Interaction Report.**

The **Duty Captain** conducts the investigation and completes the **TRI Incident Report.**

The **Patrol Borough Investigations Unit** may assist in the investigation.

All reports and follow-up investigations are reviewed by the members' **Immediate Supervisor.**

All reports and follow-up investigations are reviewed by the members' **Commanding Officer.**

**\*FID or IAB may respond to any force incident or subject injury and may assume responsibility of the investigation based on the circumstances of the incident.**

**LEVEL 3**

Use of: force readily capable of causing death or serious injury, except firearm discharges  
**OR**  
Alleged or suspected use of a chokehold or prohibited method of restraint  
**OR**  
Alleged/suspected excessive force (serious physical injury); attempted prisoner suicide (serious physical injury)  
**OR**  
A serious physical injury to a non-member of the service

**LEVEL 4**

**ALL** police firearm discharges  
**OR**  
Any discharge of a member of the service's firearm fired by someone *other* than the member  
**OR**  
A non-member of the service dies, or is seriously injured and likely to die

The **Member of the Service** completes the **TRI Interaction Report** unless superseded by the investigative authority of the **Force Investigation Division**.  
  
The **Internal Affairs Bureau (IAB)** conducts the investigation and completes the **TRI Incident Report**.

The **Force Investigation Division (FID)** conducts the investigation and completes the **TRI Interaction Report** and the **TRI Incident Report**.

All reports generate an Internal Affairs Case. Follow-up investigations are reviewed by **IAB** investigators, supervisors and executives before being closed.

The **NYPD's Use of Force Review Board** reviews all cases for which a member of **FID** is the investigating supervisor. Additionally, any violations of force prohibitions at any level may be reviewed on a per-case basis to determine whether, under the circumstances, the actions were reasonable and justified.

Figure 57

## **Appendix B: Subjects Killed During Intentional Discharge-Adversarial Conflict Incidents**

Disclaimer: In some cases, factual information is based on preliminary findings of ongoing investigations. Additional information may develop as the department's investigation progresses and/or related court or grand jury proceedings are conducted.

## ***Subjects Killed During Intentional Discharge-Adversarial Conflict Incidents***

In all intentional discharge-adversarial conflict (ID-AC) incidents where a subject's toxicology report is available, the results of the report are included in the summary.

### **Incident 1 – 69th Precinct (Male/Black/45) – 01/04/2022**

On January 4, 2022, at approximately 1659 hours, officers responded to a 911 call of a perpetrator from the past. Upon arrival, officers encountered the subject in the vestibule of the location and a physical struggle immediately ensued. During the struggle, the subject produced a firearm from his jacket pocket and discharged two rounds. In response, one officer discharged his service weapon, striking the subject. The subject was removed to the hospital where he was pronounced deceased. A Taurus Spectrum .380 caliber firearm was recovered on scene.

### **Incident 2 – 47th Precinct (Male/Hispanic/27) – 01/20/2022**

On January 20, 2022, at approximately 1351 hours, officers responded to a 911 call of a burglary. During a search of the location, officers encountered the subject armed with a firearm pressed against his head. The officers engaged the subject, directing him to drop the weapon. The subject refused and began to approach the officers, at which time one officer deployed a CEW, which was ineffective at disarming the subject. The officers tactically retreated and continued to issue verbal commands for the subject to drop his firearm. Shortly thereafter, two gunshots were heard from the rear of the apartment before the subject fled through a window into an adjacent park. Additional responding officers pursued the subject on foot and issued numerous verbal commands for the subject to drop the firearm. The subject refused and, in response, officers discharged their service weapons, striking the subject. The subject was removed to the hospital where he was pronounced deceased. A SCCY Industries CPX2 9mm firearm was recovered on scene.

### **Incident 3 – 32nd Precinct (Male/Black/47) – 01/21/2022**

On January 21, 2022, at approximately 1821 hours, officers responded to a 911 call of a family dispute. Upon arrival and after speaking with the complainant, two officers attempted to speak with the subject who was located in a rear bedroom. The officers were in the hallway approaching the bedroom door when the subject exited the bedroom, armed with a firearm, and began discharging multiple rounds, striking both officers. In response, one of the struck officers discharged their service weapon and a third officer on scene discharged their service weapon, which struck the subject. Both struck officers were removed to the hospital by department vehicles. Both officers succumbed to their injuries and were pronounced deceased. The subject was removed to the hospital via ambulance where he was pronounced deceased. A Glock 21 .45 caliber firearm was recovered on scene and, pursuant to a search warrant, an assault rifle was also later recovered.

### **Incident 4 – 42nd Precinct (Male/Black/25) – 05/10/2022**

On May 10, 2022, at approximately 2244 hours, officers encountered the subject and attempted to stop him when he fled on foot. One officer pursued the subject on foot while another officer followed in a department vehicle. As the subject continued his flight, he produced a firearm and discharged it in the direction of the officers, striking an officer and causing a non-life threatening injury. In response, the officers discharged their service weapons, striking the subject. The subject was transported to the hospital and was later pronounced deceased. A Glock 48 9mm firearm was recovered on scene.

### **Incident 5 – 41st Precinct (Male/Hispanic/51) – 05/13/2022**

On May 13, 2022, at approximately 1901 hours, while conducting an investigation unrelated to the subject, a plain-clothes officer observed the subject engaged in a verbal dispute with a group of individuals. During the dispute, the subject made reference to obtaining a firearm before departing the location in his vehicle. Other officers located the subject's vehicle and observed the subject exit the vehicle brandishing a firearm in his hand. Officers issued verbal commands before discharging their service weapons, striking the subject. The subject was transported to the hospital and was later pronounced deceased. A Byrna HD air pistol was recovered on scene. The toxicology report indicated the presence of ethanol in the subject's system at the time of death.

#### **Incident 6 – 113th Precinct (Male/Black/60) – 07/09/2022**

On July 9, 2022, at approximately 1822 hours, officers responded to a 911 call where the caller/subject identified himself and was threatening to shoot members of the service. Upon arrival, officers observed the subject emerge from the front of the location at which time they issued verbal commands for the subject to show his hands. Ignoring the officers' commands, the subject removed a firearm from his person and discharged it in the direction of the officers. In response, the officers discharged their service weapons, striking the subject multiple times. The subject was transported to the hospital where he was pronounced deceased. A .380 caliber Walther PK380 handgun was recovered on scene.

#### **Incident 7 – 88th Precinct (Male/Black/19) – 07/09/2022**

On July 9, 2022, at approximately 1942 hours, officers conducted a stop of a vehicle for a traffic infraction. After questioning, the officers requested that the four occupants of the vehicle exit the vehicle. One by one the occupants exited the vehicle, including the subject, who then fled on foot and was immediately pursued by an officer, also on foot. The officer issued multiple verbal commands for the subject to stop, which the subject ignored. As the subject continued to flee, he produced a firearm and discharged it at the pursuing officer. In response, the officer discharged his service weapon, striking the subject. The subject was transported to the hospital and pronounced deceased. A SCCY 9mm firearm was recovered on scene. The toxicology report indicated the presence of THC, 11-OH-THC, THC-COOH, and methamphetamine in the subject's system at the time of death.

#### **Incident 8 – 34th Precinct (Male/Hispanic/29) – 10/16/2022**

On October 16, 2022, at approximately 0257 hours, officers observed individuals involved in a physical dispute. Officers approached and observed the subject and another individual struggle for possession of a firearm. Ignoring the officers' commands to put the gun down, the subject and the individual continued to struggle for possession of the firearm when officers discharged their service weapons, striking the subject multiple times. The subject was transported to the hospital where he was pronounced deceased. A Ruger EC9s 9mm handgun was recovered on scene.

#### **Incident 9 – 52nd Precinct (Male/Black/21) – 11/03/2022**

On November 3, 2022, at approximately 1130 hours, while conducting surveillance of a location, officers observed the subject, unrelated to their investigation, discharge a firearm at another individual. The officers exited their vehicle in an attempt to intervene as the subject continued to discharge his firearm at the individual, who sustained a graze wound to the head as a result of the subject's discharge. In response, the officers discharged their service weapons, striking the subject. The subject was transported to the hospital where he was pronounced deceased. A North American Arms NAA22 .22 caliber revolver was recovered on scene.

#### **Incident 10 – 60th Precinct (Male/Black/42) – 11/10/2022**

On November 10, 2022, at approximately 2218 hours, officers responded to a ShotSpotter activation and encountered the subject armed with a firearm. As the officers exited their vehicle, the subject discharged his firearm in their direction, striking the windshield of their vehicle. In response, officers discharged their service weapons, striking the subject multiple times. The subject was pronounced deceased on scene. A Century Arms Canik TP9 Elite SC 9mm handgun was recovered on scene.

#### **Incident 11 – 34th Precinct (Male/Black/24) – 11/18/2022**

On November 18, 2022, at approximately 2037 hours, officers were engaged in a recovery operation of a large quantity of narcotics when the subject discharged his firearm in their direction. In response, officers discharged their service weapons, striking the subject multiple times. The subject was pronounced deceased on scene. A second subject was apprehended on scene without incident. A Polymer80 Inc. PF9SS handgun, a Taurus Millennium G2 9mm handgun, and a quantity of narcotics were recovered on scene at the time of this report.

#### **Incident 12 – 44th Precinct (Male/Hispanic/39) – 12/04/2022**

On December 4, 2022, at approximately 0011 hours, officers were canvassing for a stolen vehicle when they located it unoccupied. While searching for the occupants of the vehicle, one officer and a subject exchanged gunfire. Officers responding to the gunfire observed the subject lying on his stomach in a wooded area. As he rose from a prone position while brandishing a firearm in his hand. In response, officers discharged their service weapons, striking the subject multiple times. The subject was transported to the hospital and where he was pronounced deceased on the following day. An Atak Arms Limited 9mm PAK handgun and an EKOL Jackal Dual 9mm PAK handgun were recovered on scene.

**Incident 13 – 101st Precinct (Male/Black /31) – 12/29/2022**

On December 29, 2022, at approximately 2003 hours, as officers attempted to approach a group of individuals in the lobby of a residential apartment building, the subject fled upon sight of the officers, blading his body and holding his waistband. Officers pursued on foot, catching up to the subject at which time a physical struggle ensued. During the struggle, an officer discharged his service weapon striking the subject. The subject was transported to the hospital where he was pronounced deceased. A Smith and Wesson .40 caliber firearm was recovered on scene.

## **Appendix C: Other Death Investigations Conducted by the Force Investigation Division**

Disclaimer: In some cases, factual information is based on preliminary findings of ongoing investigations. Additional information may develop as the department's investigation progresses and/or related court or grand jury proceedings are conducted.

# ***Death in Custody***

In all death in custody incidents where a subject's death certificate and/or toxicology report are available, the results of the reports are included in the summary.

Death in custody incidents typically occur after the restraint of a particular subject. The term "in custody" refers to a subject whom officers have either decided that there was probable cause to arrest or that restraint was necessary for the safety of the subject or other persons present. During death in custody situations, subjects may be located anywhere (e.g., at the scene of an incident, at a hospital, at a police facility, or in a courthouse awaiting arraignment), and death may occur due to intervening circumstances beyond police control. Such intervening circumstances include: medical crises such as a heart attack or stroke; suicides; drug-related deaths from substances taken or ingested prior to custody; and injuries inflicted prior to custody during accidents or assaults by persons other than the involved parties. In 2022, there were nine death in custody incidents.

## **Incident 1 – Medical/No Police Force Used – 102nd Precinct (Male/Black/24) – 03/07/2022**

On February 26, 2022, the male subject was involved in a motor vehicle collision. Upon arrival, officers were informed of .45 caliber Glock 30 firearm recovered from within the subject's vehicle. The subject was placed under arrest and removed to the hospital where, due to his injuries, he was admitted. On March 7, 2022, while in the hospital, the subject succumbed to his injuries and was pronounced deceased. According to the subject's death certificate, the cause of death was multiple blunt impact injuries.

## **Incident 2 – Medical/No Police Force Used – 102nd Precinct (Male/Black/30) – 03/14/2022**

On March 13, 2022, officers responded to a 911 call of an emotionally disturbed person and, upon arrival, encountered the subject being restrained by two security guards. The subject, who was kicking his legs and yelling incoherently, was handcuffed and transported by EMS to the hospital. The subject arrived at the hospital in cardiac arrest, was resuscitated and admitted. On March 14, 2022, while still in the hospital, the subject suffered another cardiac episode and was pronounced deceased.

## **Incident 3 – Medical/No Police Force Used – 32nd Precinct (Male/Black/26) – 06/04/2022**

On June 4, 2022, officers attempted to stop the subject when he fled on foot. After conducting a brief canvass, officers located the subject engaged in a dispute with two unknown people. As the officers attempted to engage the subject, the subject again fled on foot, running alongside a moving taxi and grabbing onto the vehicle's roof rack. The subject hung from the taxi, which remained in motion, for approximately a block and a half before falling from the vehicle. Officers apprehended the subject and requested the response of EMS before the subject lost consciousness. The subject was transported to the hospital where he was pronounced deceased. According to the subject's death certificate, the cause of death was cardiac dysrhythmia complicating altered mental status of unknown etiology.

## **Incident 4 – Medical/No Police Force Used – 84th Precinct (Male/Black/50) – 07/25/2022**

On July 25, 2022, the subject, while lodged in Brooklyn Central Booking awaiting arraignment, was found unconscious in the holding pen. The subject was transported by EMS to the hospital where he was pronounced deceased.

## **Incident 5 – Medical/No Police Force Used – 72nd Precinct (Male/Hispanic/29) – 09/22/2022**

On September 22, 2022, the subject, while lodged inside the precinct holding pen, was found unconscious and unresponsive. The subject was transported to the hospital where he was pronounced deceased. According to the subject's death certificate, the cause of death was multiple drug intoxication of fentanyl, acetylfentanyl, P-flourofentanyl, heroin, diazepam, and alcohol.

## **Incident 6 – Medical/No Police Force Used – 13th Precinct (Male/Black/37) – 09/25/2022**

On September 24, 2022, officers responded to a 911 call of a male struck by a subway train. The subject was transported by EMS to the hospital where he was placed into custody after an investigation revealed five active bench warrants. The subject's condition deteriorated and he was pronounced deceased on September 25, 2022. According to the subject's death certificate, the cause of death was blunt trauma of the torso with multiple rib and pelvis fractures. The toxicology report indicated the presence of methadone, EDDP, cocaine, benzoylgonine, ethanol, and a presumptive positive of cannabinoids in the subject's system at the time of death.

**Incident 7 – Medical/No Police Force Used – 19th Precinct (Male/White/29) – 10/12/2022**

On October 12, 2022, the subject approached an officer, stating that he was suicidal and had ingested sodium nitrate. The officer requested the response of EMS and while awaiting their arrival, the subject surrendered a 9mm Springfield semi-automatic handgun and a pocketknife to the officer. The subject was placed into custody and transported to the hospital where he was pronounced deceased. According to the subject's death certificate, the cause of death was methemoglobinemia. The toxicology report indicated the presence of methemoglobin and nitrate in the subject's system at the time of death.

**Incident 8 – Medical/No Police Force Used – 109th Precinct (Male/White/70) – 11/17/2022**

On November 14, 2022, the subject was attempting to cross the street when he was struck by a motor vehicle. While receiving aid from the responding Emergency Medical Technicians (EMTs), the subject physically assaulted one of the EMTs and was placed into custody by responding officers. The subject was transported to the hospital for the injuries he sustained as a result of being struck by the motor vehicle. On November 15, 2022, the subject's medical condition deteriorated and was pronounced deceased on November 17, 2022. According to the subject's death certificate, the cause of death was blunt force trauma to the head.

**Incident 9 – Medical/No Police Force Used – 13th Precinct (Male/Black/40) – 12/04/2022**

On November 30, 2022, officers responded to a 911 call of a harassment/dispute and, upon arrival, placed the subject under arrest for assault. The subject was removed to the precinct stationhouse where, shortly after arrival, he lost consciousness. EMS responded and transported the subject to the hospital. While admitted to the hospital, the subject's medical condition deteriorated and he was pronounced deceased on December 4, 2022.

# ***Death Preceding Custody***

In all death preceding custody incidents where a subject's death certificate and/or toxicology report are available, the results of the reports are included in the summary.

Death preceding custody incidents typically occur immediately before the intended restraint of a particular subject, after officers have either decided that there was probable cause to arrest or that restraint was necessary for the safety of the subject or other persons present, but had not, in fact, established control of the person. Fourteen cases investigated by the Force Investigation Division in 2022 are categorized as death preceding custody.

## **Incident 1 – Fleeing Subject – 18th Precinct (Male/Black/29) – 02/06/2022**

On February 6, 2022, officers attempted to conduct a vehicle stop for a traffic infraction. Refusing to stop, the subject vehicle accelerated and the officers lost sight of the vehicle. As the officers continued to canvass for the subject vehicle, they observed a vehicle collision involving the subject vehicle and two unoccupied parked vehicles. The operator of the subject vehicle fled on foot prior to the officers' arrival and was later discovered in the rear courtyard of a building with injuries consistent with a fall from an elevated height. The subject was transported to the hospital where he was later pronounced deceased. According to the subject's death certificate, the cause of death was blunt impact injuries of the head and torso. The toxicology report indicated the presence of ethanol and a presumptive positive of cannabinoids in the subject's system at the time of death.

## **Incident 2 – Suicide – 110th Precinct (Male/Hispanic/33) – 02/09/2022**

On February 9, 2022, officers responded to a 911 call of an assault in progress. Upon arrival, officers were informed by a family member that the subject, who was bi-polar and schizophrenic, attempted to strike him with a closed fist before fleeing into the stairwell of the building. Officers conducted an interior patrol of the building and located the subject on the rooftop landing, straddling the ledge of the roof. As officers attempted to establish a dialogue with the subject, the subject jumped from the roof, falling to the ground below. The subject was transported to the hospital by EMS where he was later pronounced deceased. According to the subject's death certificate, the cause of death was multiple blunt injuries. The toxicology report indicated the presence of bupropion, etomidate, buprenorphine, and naloxone in the subject's system at the time of death.

## **Incident 3 – Suicide – 40th Precinct (Male/Black/35) – 02/27/2022**

On February 27, 2022, officers responded to a 911 call of a dispute. Upon arrival, officers attempted to establish a dialogue with the subject who had barricaded himself within a bedroom. Upon hearing a gunshot emanate from within the bedroom, the officers exited the location and requested the response of additional units. After isolating the subject in the bedroom, four additional firearm discharges were heard by the officers on scene. After making entry into the bedroom, members of ESU discovered the subject lying on the floor with an apparent self-inflicted gunshot wound to his head. The subject was transported to the hospital where he was pronounced deceased. According to the subject's death certificate, the cause of death was a gunshot wound of the head. The toxicology report indicated the presence of ethanol, amphetamine, methamphetamine, cotinine, and a presumptive positive of cannabinoids in the subject's system at the time of death.

## **Incident 4 – Suicide – 109th Precinct (Female/Asian/35) – 04/30/2022**

On April 30, 2022, officers responded to a 911 call of an emotionally disturbed person. Upon arrival, officers encountered the subject sitting on the railing of an elevated stairwell at the Long Island Rail Road train station. Officers attempted to establish a dialogue with the subject when the subject released her grip from the railing and fell to the platform below. The subject was removed to the hospital where she was pronounced deceased. According to the subject's death certificate, the cause of death was blunt impact to the head and torso.

## **Incident 5 – Suicide – 23rd Precinct (Female/White/58) – 05/02/2022**

On May 2, 2022, officers responded to a 911 call of an emotionally disturbed person. Upon arrival, officers encountered the subject standing on the fifth story ledge of an apartment window. As the officers attempted to establish a dialogue with the subject, the subject leaned forward and leapt from the window ledge, falling to the ground below. The subject was transported to the hospital where she was pronounced deceased. According to the subject's death certificate, the cause of death was blunt force injuries.

#### **Incident 6 – Fleeing Subject – 69th Precinct (Female/Black/20) – 05/09/2022**

On May 9, 2022, officers attempted to stop a subject operating a vehicle at a high rate of speed on the Belt Parkway. The subject fled and subsequently collided with an uninvolved vehicle, causing the subject's vehicle to strike a guard-rail, overturn, and come to a rest on its roof. The subject was removed to the hospital where she was pronounced deceased. According to the subject's death certificate, the cause of death was blunt impact injury of the torso and upper extremity. The toxicology report indicated the presence of ethanol, fentanyl, acetylfentanyl, p-flourofentanyl, 4-ANPP, THC, 11-OH-THC, and THC-COOH in the subject's system at the time of death.

#### **Incident 7 – Fleeing Subject – 94th Precinct (Male/White/26) – 06/28/2022**

On June 28, 2022, officers responded to a 911 call of an emotionally disturbed person and, upon arrival, encountered the subject on the roadway of the Brooklyn-Queens Expressway. As the officers exited their vehicle, the subject fled to the edge of the roadway, climbed over the wall, and fell to the ground below. The subject was transported to the hospital where he was pronounced deceased. According to the subject's death certificate, the cause of death was blunt impact to the head and torso.

#### **Incident 8 – Fleeing Subject – 108th Precinct (Male/Hispanic/22 and Male/Hispanic/18) – 08/19/2022**

On August 19, 2022, officers attempted to conduct a stop of two all-terrain vehicles being operated on public roadways. The all-terrain vehicles fled, subsequently proceeding through steady red lights when one all-terrain vehicle, with an operator and a passenger, collided with another vehicle. One subject was pronounced deceased on the scene by EMS. The second subject was transported to the hospital where he was pronounced deceased. According to their death certificates, the cause of death for the operator was blunt impact of the head, torso and lower left extremity and, for the passenger, blunt impact of torso. The operator's toxicology report indicated the presence of THC, 11-OH-THC, and THC-COOH in the subject's system at the time of death. The passenger's toxicology report indicated that there was neither alcohol nor controlled substances in the subject's system at the time of death.

#### **Incident 9 – Fleeing Subject – 52th Precinct (Male/Hispanic/21) – 09/13/2022**

On September 13, 2022, officers responded to a 911 call of a male with a firearm on an elevated subway platform. Upon arrival, officers were approached by an individual who pointed to a group of four male subjects at the location and stated that they had just robbed him. The four subjects fled on foot with one lowering himself onto the roadbed between two train cars. That subject was subsequently discovered on the roadbed where he was pronounced deceased. A Sig Sauer P365 .177 caliber CO2 air pistol was recovered on scene.

#### **Incident 10 – Suicide – 84th Precinct (Male/Black/38) – 09/30/2022**

On September 30, 2022, officers responded to a 911 call of an emotionally disturbed person and, upon arrival, encountered the subject on the Manhattan Bridge. While officers were attempting to establish a dialogue with the subject, the subject leapt from the bridge and fell to the ground below. The subject was pronounced deceased by EMS at the scene. According to the subject's death certificate, the cause of death was multiple blunt impact injuries.

#### **Incident 11 – Suicide – 72nd Precinct (Male/Hispanic/52) – 10/14/2022**

On October 14, 2022, officers responded to a 911 call for help and, upon arrival, encountered the subject who refused to open the door, informing the officers that no one called 911. Officers canvassed the building and while speaking to a resident of the apartment one floor below the subject's apartment, the officers were informed by the resident that she heard a loud noise from outside the fire escape prior to the officers knocking on her door. Upon investigation, the officers discovered the subject lying motionless on the ground below. After making a forced entry into the subject's apartment, officers discovered a female victim inside of the apartment with multiple stab wounds. Responding members of EMS pronounced both the subject and female victim deceased on scene. According to the subject's death certificate, the cause of death was multiple blunt force trauma.

#### **Incident 12 – Suicide – 70th Precinct (Male/Black/31) – 10/15/2022**

On October 15, 2022, officers responded to a 911 call of an emotionally disturbed person. Upon arrival, officers were met by the subject's family member who escorted them to the subject's apartment. As the subject caught a glimpse of the officers, he fled into his bedroom and jumped out of a window, falling to the ground below. The subject was transported to the hospital where he succumbed to his injuries. According to the subject's death certificate, the cause of death was blunt force injuries of the head and torso.

**Incident 13 – Suicide – 19th Precinct (Male/Hispanic/25) – 10/26/2022**

On October 26, 2022, officers responded to a 911 call of a burglary and, upon arrival, observed the subject on the stairwell of the location, approximately two floors above their position. The officers ascended the stairwell and located the subject on the roof, seated on the ledge facing the street. As officers attempted to establish a dialogue with the subject, the subject leaned his body forward and fell to the ground below. The subject was transported to the hospital where he was pronounced deceased.

**Incident 14 – Suicide – 114th Precinct (Female/Asian/26) – 11/15/2022**

On November 15, 2022, officers responded to a 911 call of an emotionally disturbed person and, upon arrival, encountered the subject on the exterior guardrail of the Robert F. Kennedy Bridge. As the officers attempted to establish a dialogue with the subject, the subject released her grip and fell to the water below. The subject was removed from the water by the Harbor Unit and transported to the hospital where she was pronounced deceased. According to the subject's death certificate, the cause of death was multiple blunt trauma and drowning.

# ***Death No Custody Contemplated***

In all death no custody contemplated incidents where a subject's death certificate and/or toxicology report are available, the results of the reports are included in the summary.

Death no custody contemplated occurs when a person becomes deceased during a police interaction, and that person was not taken into police custody, nor did the police contemplate taking them into custody. In 2022, the Force Investigation Division investigated four cases categorized as death no custody contemplated.

## **Incident 1 – Fleeing Subject – 77th Precinct (Female/Black/18) – 02/06/2022**

On February 6, 2022, officers attempted to conduct a vehicle stop for a traffic infraction. The subject vehicle fled at a high rate of speed, disobeyed a steady red light, and entered an intersection where it collided with another civilian vehicle. A passenger in the subject vehicle was transported to the hospital where she was pronounced deceased. According to the subject's death certificate, the cause of death was multiple blunt force trauma. The toxicology report indicated the presence of ethanol, oxycodone, oxymorphone, and a presumptive positive of cannabinoids in the subject's system at the time of death.

## **Incident 2 – Collision – 77th Precinct (Male/Black/53) – 04/07/2022**

On April 7, 2022, officers were transporting prisoners to Brooklyn Central Booking in a marked NYPD van when the vehicle struck a pedestrian walking in the painted median in the center of the roadway. The pedestrian was transported to the hospital where he was pronounced deceased. According to the subject's death certificate, the cause of death was blunt force injuries of the head, neck, and torso. The toxicology report indicated the presence of cocaine, benzoylecgonine, and cotinine in the subject's system at the time of death.

## **Incident 3 – Fleeing Subject – 81st Precinct (Female/Black/68) – 06/25/2022**

On June, 25, 2022, officers attempted to conduct a vehicle stop for a traffic infraction when the subject vehicle fled at a high rate of speed. During its flight, the subject vehicle disobeyed multiple traffic control devices, struck three pedestrians, one bicyclist, and another civilian vehicle. One of the struck pedestrians was pronounced deceased on the scene. According to the subject's death certificate, the cause of death was blunt trauma of the head, neck, torso, and extremities. The subject's toxicology report indicated that there was neither alcohol nor controlled substances in the subject's system at the time of death.

## **Incident 4 – Fleeing Subject – 44th Precinct (Female/Hispanic/69) – 08/25/2022**

On August 25, 2022, officers attempted to conduct a vehicle stop for a traffic infraction. The subject vehicle fled at a high rate of speed, disobeyed a steady red light and entered an intersection where it collided with another vehicle. The operator of the other vehicle was removed to the hospital where she was pronounced deceased. According to the subject's death certificate, the cause of death was blunt force trauma of the head, neck, and torso. The toxicology report indicated that there was neither alcohol nor controlled substances in the subject's system at the time of death.



**Appendix D:  
2022 Firearm Discharge Incidents  
by Precinct/Location of Occurrence**

Precinct/Location	Adversarial Conflict	Animal Attack	Unintentional	Unauthorized/ Suicide	Total
013 Precinct	1	0	0	0	1
MTN Precinct	1	0	0	0	1
023 Precinct	1	0	0	0	1
024 Precinct	1	0	0	0	1
025 Precinct	1	0	0	0	1
032 Precinct	1	0	0	0	1
034 Precinct	2	0	0	0	2
040 Precinct	0	0	1	0	1
041 Precinct	1	0	0	0	1
042 Precinct	3	0	0	0	3
043 Precinct	3	0	0	0	3
044 Precinct	1	0	0	0	1
045 Precinct	0	0	2	0	2
047 Precinct	1	0	1	0	2
048 Precinct	0	1	0	0	1
052 Precinct	1	0	0	0	1
060 Precinct	3	1	0	0	4
063 Precinct	1	0	0	0	1
069 Precinct	2	0	1	1	4
075 Precinct	1	0	0	1	2
076 Precinct	1	0	0	0	1
079 Precinct	1	0	0	0	1
081 Precinct	1	0	0	0	1
088 Precinct	1	0	0	0	1
094 Precinct	1	0	0	0	1
100 Precinct	2	0	0	1	3
101 Precinct	1	0	1	0	2
102 Precinct	0	0	1	0	1
103 Precinct	1	0	0	0	1
105 Precinct	2	0	0	0	2
106 Precinct	0	0	1	0	1
107 Precinct	0	0	1	0	1
113 Precinct	1	0	0	0	1
114 Precinct	1	0	0	0	1
121 Precinct	1	0	0	0	1
122 Precinct	0	1	0	0	1
Nassau County	0	0	2	0	2
Suffolk County	1	0	0	2	3
Orange County	0	0	0	1	1
Putnam County	0	0	0	1	1
Outside of NYS	0	0	0	1	1
<b>Total</b>	<b>40</b>	<b>3</b>	<b>11</b>	<b>8</b>	<b>62</b>

Figure 58

## **Appendix E: Historical Data on Police Firearm Discharges**

### Members of the Service Shot and Killed by Subjects, 1971-2022




Figure 59

### Members of the Service Shot and Injured by Subjects, 1971-2022




Figure 60

### Subjects Shot and Killed by Members of the Service, 1971-2022




Figure 61

### Subjects Shot and Injured by Members of the Service, 1971-2022




Figure 62

### Total Rounds Discharged by Members of the Service, 1971-2022




Figure 63



## **Appendix F: Use of Force Incidents by Members' Command**

Command/Precinct	Firearm	Electrical Weapon	Impact Weapon	Police Canine	OC Spray	Restraining Mesh Blanket	Physical Force	Total
001 PRECINCT	0	12	0	0	0	0	39	51
005 PRECINCT	0	7	0	0	1	0	27	35
006 PRECINCT	0	11	0	0	1	0	50	62
007 PRECINCT	0	8	0	0	0	0	53	61
009 DET SQUAD	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	1
009 PRECINCT	0	3	0	0	0	0	77	80
010 PRECINCT	0	8	1	0	1	0	47	57
013 DET SQUAD	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	1
013 PRECINCT	0	15	0	0	0	0	45	60
014 PCT-MIDTOWN SO. PCT	0	10	1	0	0	0	120	131
017 DET SQUAD	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
017 PRECINCT	0	5	0	0	0	0	25	30
018 PCT-MIDTOWN NO. PCT	0	7	0	0	1	0	39	47
019 PRECINCT	0	5	0	0	0	0	57	62
020 PRECINCT	0	6	0	0	0	0	34	40
023 PRECINCT	1	10	0	0	1	0	49	61
024 PRECINCT	0	5	0	0	0	0	40	45
025 DET SQUAD	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	1
025 PRECINCT	0	11	0	0	1	0	55	67
026 PRECINCT	0	0	1	0	0	0	13	14
028 PRECINCT	0	29	0	0	0	0	64	93
030 DET SQUAD	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
030 PRECINCT	1	18	2	0	0	0	34	55
032 PRECINCT	1	9	0	0	1	0	49	60
033 DET SQUAD	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
033 PRECINCT	0	20	0	0	1	0	40	61
034 PRECINCT	1	15	2	0	1	0	47	66
040 DET SQUAD	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	1
040 PRECINCT	1	35	1	0	1	0	142	180
041 DET SQUAD	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
041 PRECINCT	0	10	1	0	1	0	66	78
042 DET SQUAD	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	1
042 PRECINCT	2	11	0	0	0	0	140	153
043 DET SQUAD	0	0	0	0	0	0	2	2
043 PRECINCT	1	19	0	0	0	0	100	120
044 PRECINCT	0	50	1	0	0	0	110	161
045 PRECINCT	0	9	1	0	1	1	50	62
046 DET SQUAD	0	0	0	0	0	0	2	2
046 PRECINCT	0	47	2	0	1	0	284	334

Command/Precinct	Firearm	Electrical Weapon	Impact Weapon	Police Canine	OC Spray	Restraining Mesh Blanket	Physical Force	Total
047 DET SQUAD	1	0	0	0	0	0	3	4
047 PRECINCT	1	39	1	0	0	0	109	150
048 PRECINCT	1	20	0	0	2	0	89	112
049 PRECINCT	0	8	0	0	1	0	56	65
050 PRECINCT	0	10	0	0	0	0	40	50
052 DET SQUAD	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	1
052 PRECINCT	0	29	0	0	1	0	91	121
060 PRECINCT	4	8	0	0	0	0	71	83
061 PRECINCT	0	7	1	0	3	0	53	64
062 DET SQUAD	0	0	0	0	0	0	2	2
062 PRECINCT	0	7	0	0	1	0	56	64
063 DET SQUAD	0	0	0	0	0	0	2	2
063 PRECINCT	2	8	2	0	1	0	50	63
066 DET SQUAD	0	0	1	0	0	0	0	1
066 PRECINCT	0	2	0	0	0	0	24	26
067 DET SQUAD	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
067 PRECINCT	0	36	0	0	1	0	127	164
068 PRECINCT	0	7	1	0	0	0	35	43
069 DET SQUAD	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	1
069 PRECINCT	1	19	0	0	2	0	52	74
070 PRECINCT	0	11	0	0	2	0	95	108
071 PRECINCT	0	12	0	0	2	0	55	69
072 PRECINCT	0	10	0	0	1	0	74	85
073 PRECINCT	0	28	0	0	3	0	105	136
075 DET SQUAD	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	1
075 PRECINCT	1	46	0	0	1	0	139	187
076 DET SQUAD	0	0	0	0	0	0	2	2
076 PRECINCT	0	3	0	0	0	0	17	20
077 DET SQUAD	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	1
077 PRECINCT	0	13	1	0	0	0	42	56
078 DET SQUAD	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
078 PRECINCT	0	3	0	0	0	0	38	41
079 DET SQUAD	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	1
079 PRECINCT	1	14	1	0	1	0	67	84
081 PRECINCT	0	17	0	0	0	0	80	97
083 PRECINCT	0	13	0	0	1	0	65	79
084 PRECINCT	0	7	0	0	0	0	45	52
088 PRECINCT	1	13	0	0	0	0	41	55
090 DET SQUAD	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	1
090 PRECINCT	1	26	0	0	2	0	59	88

Command/Precinct	Firearm	Electrical Weapon	Impact Weapon	Police Canine	OC Spray	Restraining Mesh Blanket	Physical Force	Total
094 DET SQUAD	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
094 PRECINCT	0	6	0	0	0	0	48	54
100 PRECINCT	1	2	0	0	3	0	34	40
100TH DET SQUAD	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
101 PRECINCT	2	15	0	0	0	0	99	116
101ST DET SQUAD	0	0	0	0	0	0	3	3
102 PRECINCT	0	4	0	0	2	0	73	79
103 PRECINCT	1	27	3	0	1	0	172	204
103RD DETECTIVE SQUAD	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	1
104	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	1
104 PRECINCT	1	12	1	0	1	0	69	84
104TH DET SQUAD	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
105 PRECINCT	0	17	1	0	1	0	67	86
105TH DET SQUAD	0	0	0	0	0	0	2	2
106 PRECINCT	0	15	0	0	1	0	82	98
107 PRECINCT	0	10	0	0	0	0	66	76
108 PRECINCT	0	7	0	0	0	0	61	68
109 PRECINCT	0	12	0	0	0	0	51	63
109TH DET SQUAD	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	1
110 PRECINCT	0	12	0	0	0	0	67	79
110TH DET SQUAD	0	0	0	0	0	0	3	3
111 PRECINCT	0	1	0	0	0	0	15	16
111TH DET SQUAD	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
112 PRECINCT	0	8	0	0	1	0	39	48
112TH DET SQUAD	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	1
113 PRECINCT	1	30	1	0	1	0	72	105
113TH DET SQUAD	0	0	0	0	0	0	4	4
114 PRECINCT	1	15	0	0	2	0	120	138
114TH DET SQUAD	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	1
115 PRECINCT	1	15	0	0	0	0	37	53
115TH DET SQUAD	1	0	0	0	0	0	1	2
120 DETECTIVE SQUAD	0	0	0	0	0	0	3	3
120 PRECINCT	0	35	0	0	2	0	124	161
121 DETECTIVE SQUAD	0	0	0	0	0	0	2	2
121 PRECINCT	0	8	1	0	1	0	73	83
122 DETECTIVE SQUAD	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	1
122 PRECINCT	1	8	0	0	1	0	40	50
123 PRECINCT	1	2	0	0	0	0	23	26
AUTO CRIME	0	0	0	0	0	0	5	5
BKLYN ROBBERY SQ	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0

Command/Precinct	Firearm	Electrical Weapon	Impact Weapon	Police Canine	OC Spray	Restraining Mesh Blanket	Physical Force	Total
BRONX COURT SECT	0	0	0	0	0	0	7	7
BRONX EAST SCHOOL SAFETY	0	0	0	0	0	2	16	18
BRONX WEST SCHOOL SAFETY	0	0	0	0	0	0	3	3
BROOKLYN COURT SECTION	0	1	0	0	0	0	12	13
CANDIDATE ASSESSMENT DIVISION	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	1
CENTRAL PARK PRECINCT	0	2	1	0	0	0	1	4
CHIEF OF DEPARTMENT OFFICE	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
CHIEF OF DEPT INV REVIEW SECT	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	1
COMMUNICATIONS DIV	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	1
COUNTERTERRORISM DIVISION	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	1
CRIMINAL ENTERPRISE INVEST SEC	0	0	0	0	0	0	2	2
CRITICAL RESPONSE COMMAND	0	0	0	0	0	0	4	4
CT BUR LOWER MAN SECURITY INIT	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	1
DA SQUAD QUEENS	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	1
DET BORO BRONX OPER	0	0	0	0	0	0	3	3
DET BORO BX HOMICIDE SQ	0	0	0	0	1	0	1	2
DET BORO QNS SOUTH OPER	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
DET BORO QUEENS SOUTH	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	1
DET BORO QUEENS ZONE #16	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
DET BORO STATEN ISLAND	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
DET BUREAU	0	0	0	0	0	0	2	2
DISORDER CONTROL UNIT	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
DRUG ENFORCEMENT TASK FORCE	0	0	0	0	0	0	6	6
EMER SERV SQ 01	1	1	0	0	0	0	1	3
EMER SERV SQ 02	0	0	0	0	0	0	2	2
EMER SERV SQ 03	1	0	0	0	0	0	6	7
EMER SERV SQ 04	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
EMER SERV SQ 05	0	3	0	0	0	0	3	6
EMER SERV SQ 06	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
EMER SERV SQ 07	0	4	1	0	0	0	3	8

Command/Precinct	Firearm	Electrical Weapon	Impact Weapon	Police Canine	OC Spray	Restraining Mesh Blanket	Physical Force	Total
EMER SERV SQ 08	0	1	0	0	0	0	5	6
EMER SERV SQ 09	0	0	0	0	0	0	5	5
EMER SERV SQ 10	0	1	0	0	0	0	1	2
EMER SERV UNIT	1	3	1	0	0	0	7	12
FINANCIAL CRIMES TASK FORCE	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	1
FIREARMS & TACTICS SECTION	1	0	0	0	1	0	1	3
FIREARMS SUPPRESSION SECTION	1	0	0	0	0	0	2	3
FORCE INVESTIGATION DIVISION	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
GRAND LARCENY DIVISION	0	0	0	0	0	0	3	3
GUN VIOL SUPP DIV Z1 (BK,Q,SI)	0	0	0	0	0	0	6	6
HB BRONX/QUEENS RESPONSE TEAM	0	1	0	0	0	0	1	2
HB BROOKLYN RESPONSE TEAM	0	0	0	0	0	0	2	2
HB MANHATTAN RESPONSE TEAM	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	1
HEADQUARTERS SECURITY UNIT	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
HIGHWAY UNIT NO 1	0	0	0	0	0	0	3	3
HIGHWAY UNIT NO 2	0	1	0	0	0	0	1	2
HIGHWAY UNIT NO 3	0	1	1	0	0	0	3	5
HIGHWAY UNIT NO.5	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	1
HOUSING BOROUGH BROOKLYN	0	0	0	0	0	0	4	4
HOUSING BOROUGH BX/QNS	0	0	0	0	0	0	3	3
HOUSING BOROUGH MANHATTAN	0	0	1	0	0	0	4	5
HOUSING PSA 1	0	5	0	0	0	0	14	19
HOUSING PSA 2	0	13	0	0	0	0	82	95
HOUSING PSA 3	0	17	3	0	2	0	79	101
HOUSING PSA 4	1	4	1	0	1	0	25	32
HOUSING PSA 5	0	1	0	0	0	0	49	50
HOUSING PSA 6	0	6	0	0	0	0	18	24
HOUSING PSA 7	0	11	1	0	1	0	52	65
HOUSING PSA 8	2	12	1	0	0	0	44	59
HOUSING PSA 9	1	10	0	0	0	0	16	27
HUMAN RESOURCES DIVISION	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0

Command/Precinct	Firearm	Electrical Weapon	Impact Weapon	Police Canine	OC Spray	Restraining Mesh Blanket	Physical Force	Total
HWY DST COLLISION INV SQD	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	1
INFO TECHNOLOGY SERVICES DIV	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	1
INTEL OPER AND ANALYSIS SECT	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
INTEL-CRIMINAL INTEL SECTION	2	8	0	0	0	0	33	43
INTEL-MSS-UNIFORMED OPERATIONS	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	1
INTERNAL AFFAIRS BUREAU	0	0	0	0	0	0	2	2
JOINT TERRORIST TASK FORCE	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	1
JUVENILE CRIME SECTION	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	1
LATENT PRINT SECTION	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	1
LEGAL BUREAU	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
LICENSE DIVISION	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
MAN COURT SECTION	0	0	1	0	0	0	33	34
MANH ROBBERY SQUAD	0	0	0	0	0	0	2	2
MEDICAL DIVISION	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	1
MGMT ORDERS & DIRECTIVES SECT	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
MILITARY & EXTEND LEAVE DESK	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
MTS DET SQUAD	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	1
NARC BORO BRONX	1	1	0	0	0	0	40	42
NARC BORO BROOKLYN NORTH	0	0	1	0	0	0	14	15
NARC BORO BROOKLYN SOUTH	0	0	0	0	0	0	3	3
NARC BORO MANHATTAN NORTH	0	0	0	0	0	0	23	23
NARC BORO MANHATTAN SOUTH	0	0	0	0	0	0	3	3
NARC BORO QUEENS NORTH	0	1	0	0	0	0	9	10
NARC BORO QUEENS SOUTH	1	0	0	0	0	0	10	11
NARC BORO STATEN ISLAND	1	0	0	0	0	0	5	6
OFFICE OF MGMT ANALYSIS & PLAN	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	1
OTHER	1	0	1	0	0	0	13	15
PATROL BORO BKLYN NORTH	0	0	0	0	0	0	5	5

Command/Precinct	Firearm	Electrical Weapon	Impact Weapon	Police Canine	OC Spray	Restraining Mesh Blanket	Physical Force	Total
PATROL BORO BKLYN SOUTH	0	0	0	0	0	0	7	7
PATROL BORO BRONX	2	2	0	0	0	0	18	22
PATROL BORO MAN NORTH	0	0	0	0	0	0	9	9
PATROL BORO MAN SOUTH	0	7	0	0	0	0	40	47
PATROL BORO QUEENS NORTH	0	0	0	0	0	0	4	4
PATROL BORO QUEENS SOUTH	0	0	0	0	0	0	7	7
PATROL BORO STATEN ISLAND	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
PATROL SERVICES BUREAU	0	2	0	0	0	0	4	6
PBBN SCHOOL SAFETY	0	0	0	0	0	0	9	9
PBBN SPECIALIZED UNITS	0	0	0	0	0	0	11	11
PBBS SCHOOL SAFETY	0	0	0	0	0	0	10	10
PBBS SPECIALIZED UNITS	0	1	0	0	0	0	4	5
PBBX SPECIALIZED UNITS	1	3	0	0	0	0	13	17
PBMN SCHOOL SAFETY	0	0	0	0	0	0	6	6
PBMN SPECIALIZED UNITS	0	0	0	0	1	0	26	27
PBMS SCHOOL SAFETY	0	0	0	0	0	0	6	6
PBMS SPECIALIZED UNITS	0	8	0	0	0	0	25	33
PBQN SCHOOL SAFETY	0	0	0	0	0	0	7	7
PBQN SPECIALIZED UNITS	0	1	0	0	0	0	2	3
PBQS SCHOOL SAFETY	0	0	0	0	0	0	8	8
PBQS SPECIALIZED UNITS	1	5	2	0	0	0	20	28
PBSI SCHOOL SAFETY	0	0	0	0	0	0	12	12
PBSI SPECIALIZED UNITS	0	5	0	0	1	0	33	39
POLICE ACADEMY	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	1
PROPERTY CLERK DIV	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	1
QNS COURT SECTION	0	0	0	0	0	0	2	2
QUEENS ROBBERY SQUAD	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	1
RECRUIT TRAINING SECTION	0	0	1	0	0	0	1	2
RMB COMPLIANCE DIVISION	0	0	1	0	0	0	0	1
SPECIAL INVESTIGATIONS DIV	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	1
SPECIAL VICTIMS DIV ZONE 2	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
SPECIAL VICTIMS DIV ZONE 3	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	1

Command/Precinct	Firearm	Electrical Weapon	Impact Weapon	Police Canine	OC Spray	Restraining Mesh Blanket	Physical Force	Total
SPECIAL VICTIMS DIVISION	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
SPECIALIZED TRAINING SECTION	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
STAFFING ADMINISTRATION SEC	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
STRATEGIC RESP GRP 1 MANHATTAN	0	1	2	0	0	0	13	16
STRATEGIC RESP GRP 2 BRONX	0	1	0	0	0	0	12	13
STRATEGIC RESP GRP 3 BROOKLYN	0	1	0	0	0	0	9	10
STRATEGIC RESP GRP 4 QUEENS	0	1	0	0	0	0	3	4
STRATEGIC RESP GRP 5 SI	0	1	0	0	0	0	6	7
STRIKE FORCE	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	1
TB ANTI TERRORISM UNIT	0	1	0	0	3	0	28	32
TB CITYWIDE VANDALS TASK FORCE	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	1
TB SPECIAL OPERATIONS DIVISION	0	0	0	0	2	0	12	14
TECH. ASSIST. & RESPONSE UNIT	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	1
TRAINING BUREAU	1	0	0	0	0	0	1	2
TRANSIT BORO BKLN TASK FORCE	0	0	0	0	0	0	3	3
TRANSIT BORO BROOKLYN	0	0	0	0	0	0	9	9
TRANSIT BORO BX/QNS TASK FORCE	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	1
TRANSIT BORO MANH TASK FORCE	0	0	0	0	1	0	10	11
TRANSIT BORO MANHATTAN	0	0	0	0	0	0	2	2
TRANSIT BUREAU DISTRICT 1	0	2	0	0	3	0	29	34
TRANSIT BUREAU DISTRICT 11	0	6	0	0	1	0	15	22
TRANSIT BUREAU DISTRICT 12	0	6	1	0	1	0	43	51
TRANSIT BUREAU DISTRICT 2	0	12	0	0	7	0	41	60
TRANSIT BUREAU DISTRICT 20	0	7	0	0	1	0	23	31
TRANSIT BUREAU DISTRICT 23	0	1	0	0	0	0	4	5
TRANSIT BUREAU DISTRICT 3	0	1	1	0	1	0	32	35

Command/Precinct	Firearm	Electrical Weapon	Impact Weapon	Police Canine	OC Spray	Restraining Mesh Blanket	Physical Force	Total
TRANSIT BUREAU DISTRICT 30	0	5	0	0	3	0	36	44
TRANSIT BUREAU DISTRICT 32	0	1	1	0	9	0	38	49
TRANSIT BUREAU DISTRICT 33	0	9	0	0	21	0	48	78
TRANSIT BUREAU DISTRICT 34	0	2	0	0	0	0	15	17
TRANSIT BUREAU DISTRICT 4	0	7	1	0	7	0	44	59
TRB BROOKLYN TRAFFIC ENF UNIT	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	1
TRB CITYWIDE TRAFFIC T/F	0	0	1	0	0	0	3	4
TRB HIGHWAY DISTRICT	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
TRB MANHATTAN SUMMONS ENF SEC	0	0	0	0	0	0	4	4
TRB QUEENS TRAFFIC ENF UNIT	0	0	0	0	0	0	3	3
TRB SOUTH INTERSECTION CONTROL	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	1
VICE ENFORCEMENT DIV ZONE 1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
VICE ENFORCEMENT DIV ZONE 2	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	1
WARRANT SECTION	2	28	0	0	0	0	67	97
WORLD TRADE CENTER COMMAND	0	0	0	0	0	0	6	6
YOUTH STRATEGIES DIVISION	0	0	0	0	1	0	1	2
<b>TOTAL</b>	<b>61*</b>	<b>1308</b>	<b>53</b>	<b>0</b>	<b>128</b>	<b>3</b>	<b>6717</b>	<b>8270</b>

Figure 64

\* This figure does not include the unauthorized discharge incident when a non-member of the service discharged a member's firearm during a dispute outside the confines of New York City. The discharge is not attributed to a member of the service, therefore not captured in the TRI data. The incident is, however, included in the yearly discharge total and covered in the Unauthorized Discharge section.

## **Appendix G: Report Implications and Recommendations**

Every use of force incident involving a member of the service is thoroughly documented and includes a comprehensive mechanism of both oversight and investigation. In addition to an annual summation within this report, force data is also publicly available on the NYPD Force Dashboard, in quarterly and annual use of force data tables on the department's webpage, through the release of body-worn camera footage on the department's Youtube page, and often in press releases and media briefings. It is recommended that the department continue to utilize force data to evaluate and update practice and policy as well as to ensure proper personnel deployment. This is outlined in the department's 2023 Strategic Plan and should further include the formation of departmental working groups to address any deficiencies in the effectiveness of the department's force policies and the accuracy in reporting structure. Also, a focus on the causation and training remedies for incidents that may deviate from policy, such as firearm discharges at fleeing vehicles, is recommended. Incidents such as these have experienced an increase over the last two years as compared to the four years previous. It is also recommended that the department continue its ongoing review of the force documentation process to further streamline the reporting platform, update resources, and enhance user-friendliness.

The department will continue its emphasis on use of force training in a variety of facets including recruit training at the police academy, supervisory promotional instruction, and in-service training that is mandatory to all active members of the service. This training commitment is reflected in the department's 2023 Strategic Plan as a critical goal to the success of the NYPD's mission, vision, and values. While this goal seeks to strengthen the department's personnel by promoting wellness and providing effective training, it can further be utilized to identify and focus on force related aspects, including practice, resources, and tactics, to further enhance de-escalation strategies, crisis intervention skills, subject safety, and member wellness.

Firearm discharge incidents, including ID-AC incidents, have experienced an annual increase in each of the last two years. Beyond the correlation between this increase in discharge incidents and the increase in calls for service, arrests, and arrests for weapons and firearms, the department should explore any other factors that could influence discharge incidents and use of force occurrences in general. Internally, this may include training, tactics, policy, deployment, communication, and departmental equipment. Externally, factors could include collaborative partnerships and community relations, and it is recommended that the department continue to strengthen its coordination and cooperation with other city, state, and federal agency partners.

The department should also continue to develop and enhance programs such as the Citizens Police Academy, the Summer Youth Police Academy, the Options Program, the Commander's Advisory Council, and the newly introduced public-facing Compstat Community Forum. These programs build community awareness and provide the public with a deeper understanding of how NYPD members, and the department as a whole, operate on both a micro and macro scale.

Additionally, programs such as these may be utilized to provide the community with insight into various aspects of force-related incidents. This includes offering hands-on tactical exercises, such as role playing scenarios, to community members that allow them to experience an incident from the perspective of a member of the service, in an effort to further support an interactive and transparent dialogue between the department and the community about the use of force.

Though the number of members of the service that died by suicide using a firearm has remained the same annually in each of the three last years, the department will continue efforts to heighten opportunities and accessibility for mental, emotional, and physical health services available to all members of the service. These services include, but are not limited to, Finest Care, the Critical Incident Stress Management Program, and the Peer Support Program. Additionally, with 2022's increase in unintentional discharges, it is recommended that the department continue to review and evaluate such incidents for prospective tactical and training improvements with regard to the mishandling of a firearm.

With the department's increased emphasis on enhanced communication and de-escalation tactics, the department will continue to assess less lethal force options. This includes a 2022 pilot program regarding the deployment of an updated version of the department's conducted electrical weapon (CEW) within a select precinct. This program also features the formation of an evaluation committee to provide input on the performance and benefits of this CEW model with consideration towards a possible department-wide transition and deployment.

While current force policy, resources, and tactics have been effective and correspond with national best practices, the department remains committed to a consistent improvement of policing through innovation. This includes an adaptive and continuous advancement in the department's methods and technologies to increase effective policing, lessen crime, and enhance the safety of our members and the community that we serve.

