

**Child Support Payments to TANF Families:
A Review of the Evidence on Full Pass-Through Policies**

February 2025

NYC Department of Social Services

OFFICE OF RESEARCH AND POLICY INNOVATION

Office of Evaluation and Research

Angela Ghesquiere

We would also like to acknowledge Dee Dee Kong for her contributions to the literature review and report content.

Background

The federal Child Support Enforcement (CSE) program was established in 1975 under title IV-D of the Social Security Act, on the premise that both custodial and noncustodial parents have a responsibility to support their children financially. While state structures for administering the CSE program vary widely, all programs share the same primary responsibilities to locate noncustodial parents, establish paternity, establish child support orders, and enforce those orders through collections and enforcement actions (Congressional Research Service, 2023).

Child support payments provide critical support to the largely low-income families who participate in the title IV-D program (Congressional Research Service, 2024; Sorensen, 2010). However, not all of the funds collected from noncustodial parents are passed on to their children. A key goal of the CSE program from the beginning has been cost-recovery for cash welfare payments made to custodial families, initially through Aid to Families with Dependent Children (AFDC) and now through the Temporary Assistance for Needy Families (TANF) program (Congressional Research Service, 2024). Families receiving recurrent cash assistance are required to cooperate with the child support program and turn over their rights to the support received from NCPs to the state, to reimburse both the state and the federal government for their benefit costs. Complex guidelines determine how child support collections are distributed between families and governments, but, essentially, child support paid while families are receiving TANF is withheld by the state and shared with the federal government based on the state's Medicaid federal matching rate. Once families leave TANF, they receive the child support paid on their behalf, although certain collections on arrears owed may continue to be withheld by the state (Center on Budget and Policy Priorities, 2024; CLASP, 2006; Turetsky, 2005). Any child support that was owed but not paid during the TANF enrollment period is still owed to the government (Turetsky, 2005). In 2023, state and federal governments kept \$896 million in child support payments (Turetsky & Azevedo-McCaffrey, 2024). This represents only a small percentage of all child support distributed, however: In Federal Year 2023, the Office of Child Support Services collected \$29.6 billion, 97 percent of which went to families (both TANF non-TANF-enrolled) (Office of Child Support Services, 2023).

At the same time, recent years have seen an evolution in the child support program's goals, away from government reimbursement and toward supporting families. Under the 1996 Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act (PRWORA) that established TANF, states were given discretion to determine whether to pay ("pass-through") a portion of the child support collected for TANF families directly to them, although states were still required to pay the federal government their full federal share of the collection

(CLASP, 2006).¹ In 2005, the Deficit Reduction Act (DRA) incentivized states to distribute more child support to families on TANF by allowing them to pass-through up to \$100 of child support for one child and \$200 for two or more children without owing the federal government share on that portion of the collection (Wheaton & Sorensen, 2007; CLASP, 2006; Congressional Research Service, 2023; The Deficit Reduction Act of 2005, 2006). States also have the option to “disregard” the passed-through child support from counting towards the household income when calculating eligibility for and amount of TANF benefits (Smith & Hall, 2021). When there is a pass-through but not a disregard, there may be an incentive for parents to collaborate to avoid formal paternity establishment and orders, so the CP does not lose TANF benefits (Waller & Plotnick, 2001).

TANF child support pass-through policies vary state to state: about Half do not provide any pass-through to families currently on TANF, most of the rest—including New York State—pass through and disregard a portion of the child support (typically \$50-100 for one child, and \$100-200 for two or more children), and just a few states have a “full” pass through and disregard policy, with all child support going to the family (Congressional Research Service, 2024; Aspen Institute, 2023; National Conference of State Legislatures (NCSL), 2023). Note that states could also choose to pass-through child support payments without disregarding them, such that the family’s TANF amount is reduced by the amount of child support passed through (Solomon-Frears & Falk, 2007), but currently, all states with a pass-through also have a disregard (NCSL, 2023).

While the potential impact of a *partial* child support pass-through for current TANF families has been fairly well-studied (both in practice and in estimated models), less research has been done on full pass-through policies. Findings on the impact of a partial pass-through are mixed. Some studies have found an increase in the number of families receiving child support and in the amount collected (Wheaton & Sorensen, 2007), and a decrease in need for other benefits such as SNAP (Solomon-Frears & Falk, 2007; CLASP, 2006; Smith and Hall, 2021). Other studies, however, have found little or no impact in child support program participation or amount collected (e.g., Passarella & Hall, 2021; Smith and Hall, 2021).² In theory, a full pass-through should have more positive outcomes for families compared to a partial pass-through because more money goes directly to the household. A full cost-benefit analysis

¹ This is also a change from the ADFC program, under which the federal government required states to pass-through to families the first \$50/month in child support received and disregard that \$50 in calculating the family’s benefit. Moreover, several states received federal waivers to pass-through all ongoing child support to families. The pass-through cost was shared between the state and federal governments based on each state’s Federal Medical Assistance Percentage (FMAP). The FMAP is calculated by the U.S. Department of Health and Human Services annually by comparing state per capita income to U.S. per capita income (Sorenson, 2016).

² While we did not identify any outcomes research specifically on New York’s partial pass-through policy, an internal DSS analysis from OER explored the potential cost to the City and financial benefit to families of two partial pass-through models on shelter clients in NYC and found that both options would result in a net gain of resources for families (OER, 2015).

would need to weigh these outcomes against the increased costs to the State. To better understand the implementation and potential impact of a full child support pass-through, the DSS Office of Evaluation and Research (OER) conducted a brief literature review. Findings can potentially inform future policies in New York.

Notably, pass-through policies typically only apply to *current* child support payments; unpaid child support owed from before a pass-through policy was in place would still go to the government, once paid (Meyer & Cancian, 2001; Petek, 2022). Overall, it has been estimated that recoupments for former cases are higher than for current cases: In 2023, state TANF child support recoupments for current TANF recipients were \$386 million, while for former TANF cases, recoupments were \$510 million (U.S. Office of Child Support Services, 2024). However, policy advocates have argued for expanding pass-throughs for former TANF families (e.g., Veritas HHS, 2017; Turetsky & Azevedo-McCaffrey, 2024) and, interestingly, the DRA allows states to pass through all child support to former TANF recipients without penalty (Veritas HHS, 2017). Despite this aspect of the DRA, only a few states fully pass through collections applied to assigned arrearages for former TANF cases: Illinois, New Mexico, Wisconsin, and Wyoming, and, most recently (as of May 2024), California (Turetsky & Azevedo-McCaffrey, 2024; Colusa, Sutter, Yolo Regional Child Support Agency, n.d.).³ This policy allows former TANF families to receive any owed amounts if paid, instead of those funds being used to pay back the government for the cash assistance they had previously received. We could not identify any research on outcomes from these former TANF recipient pass-through policies, though. Therefore, OER's review focuses on research on a full pass-through for *current* TANF families only.

Key Findings

OER's literature review found that just a few states have implemented a full pass through and disregard of child support payments for current TANF families, with some positive and some mixed effects. The most robust evidence comes from experimental research conducted in Wisconsin, with some additional (although less rigorous) research from Minnesota and Colorado. In brief, impact findings include:

- *Child support receipt and participation:* A full pass-through and disregard appears to have a small positive impact on both the collection of any child support from NCPs and the amount of child support received. There are indications that this is because NCPs change their payment behavior when they know funds will go to their children, rather than the government. However, the increase is not that large (about a 3% increase in number of NCPs paying support), potentially because many NCPs are low-income themselves and therefore limited in their ability to pay. Impact on paternity establishment was also mostly positive, but inconsistent.

³ There have been some additional developments since the review conducted for this report, and some other states may have policies that could not be identified in public sources.

- *Benefit receipt:* The effect of a full pass-through on receipt of other benefits (such as SNAP) was mixed, with positive findings in Colorado and in some years in Wisconsin but not others. Researchers posit that the difference in the amount of child support received may be not substantial enough to change benefit eligibility for many.
- *Parent behaviors:* There is some evidence that a full-pass-through increases paternity establishment (compared to a partial pass-through). The evidence of an effect on other behaviors, such as increases in CP and NCP employment or earnings, decrease in NCP/CP conflict, or CP household composition is mixed. Factors other than child support receipt likely have a larger impact.
- *Child outcomes:* The effect of a full pass-through on child educational and health outcomes is somewhat promising but also mixed. It is likely that child support receipt through a full pass-through does not have as large an impact on children as other factors. One study, however, found lower child maltreatment claims in families receiving a full pass-through and disregard compared to those receiving a partial pass-through.

Finally, while a full pass-through by its nature adds costs to state governments, an in-depth cost-savings estimate of Wisconsin’s randomized controlled trial which compared a partial to a full pass-through over two years that savings might result in other areas (such as reduced need for other benefits), resulting in a total cost similar to that of a partial pass-through.

Methods

The goal of OER’s literature review was to provide a broad overview of major findings related to a full *current* child support pass-through for TANF families; as such, we did not include the extensive literature on the benefits of child support receipt more generally (for a summary see Sorensen, 2016). We used online searches to identify peer-reviewed research literature, online reports, policy briefs, and conference presentations using keywords including “child-support and full pass-through” and “child support pass-through outcomes OR impact.” Once relevant sources were identified, we also reviewed and drew from their references. We found that of the few states that allow (or have allowed) a full pass-through, almost all also allow a full disregard. Therefore, findings primarily focus on the impact of *both* a full pass-through and a full disregard. As we identified findings in states with a full pass-through but not a full disregard, we note them. A full list of sources is included in the References section.

We first cover how full-pass-throughs for TANF families are implemented in states that have them, then summarize findings on outcomes of full pass-through policies. We also briefly discuss research on costs.

Findings

State Implementation of Full Pass-Through Policies

At the time of this report, based on what OER could identify publicly at the time, only three states (Colorado, Minnesota, and Illinois) had a full pass-through of child support payments in place for current TANF families (NCSL, 2023; The Aspen Institute, 2023). In addition, while Wisconsin currently only allows a 75 percent pass-through (NCSL, 2023), they had a full pass-through in place for several years, which was extremely well-researched using an experimental design (e.g., Meyer & Cancian, 2001). Connecticut and Vermont also had full pass-throughs in the past (as of 2007) (Solomon-Frears & Falk, 2007), but no longer do, and we could not identify details on their past policies or any outcomes research on them. Finally, a full pass-through for current TANF cases was recently considered in California (Turetsky & Azevedo-McCaffrey, 2024), but we could not identify information on its implementation

In Colorado, Illinois, and previously in Wisconsin, all pass-through income from the current pass-through is/was disregarded in calculating TANF benefit eligibility. In Minnesota, the first \$100 per month of the full pass-through amount is disregarded for one child or \$200 for two or more children. Connecticut and Vermont only allowed a disregard of \$50 when their full pass-throughs were in place. Below, we describe how full pass-throughs function(ed) in each state for which information was available.

Colorado

Colorado's full pass-through and full disregard of child support for current TANF recipients has been in place since 2017 (Aspen Institute, 2023) but planning began as early as 2013 (Venohr, 2013). The Colorado General Assembly appropriates funding annually to cover state child support operating costs that otherwise would have been covered by child support retained, as well as the federal share of child support collected. Notably, in Colorado, the counties operate the child support programs, so after the Federal share is distributed, most of the remaining funds go to county government (rather than state government, which only keeps a small portion for overall program administration). During any year in which the General Assembly does not appropriate the amount of funding needed, the program will theoretically need to be shut down (Zolot et al, 2020). Specifically, the General Assembly must appropriate funds covering at least 90 percent of the county and federal share for the prior fiscal year (Zolot et al., 2020).

Minnesota

In 2001, Minnesota implemented a full pass-through policy for current TANF families (Aspen Institute, 2023), which initially had a zero disregard policy (that is, all passed through funds would reduce, dollar for dollar, the amount of TANF funds received) (Venohr et al., 2002). Minnesota adjusted the disregard to \$100 for one child or \$200 for two or more children in 2014 (NCSL, 2023). Past that amount, Minnesota families that receive TANF and child

support are subject to reduced TANF benefits (Aves, 2015). This means that families receive the same total dollar amount in TANF plus child support that they would under a \$100/\$200 pass-through and disregard policy—although the family may benefit in other ways from seeing the full amount that the NCP is paying. The state pays the Federal government for their required portion of child support out of other state resources.

Illinois

Beginning in July 2024, all child support collected on behalf of current *or* former TANF recipients in Illinois is being fully passed through and disregarded (Illinois Public Act 102-1115). After families stop receiving TANF, they will continue to receive all current and past-due child support in full. The state budget includes an increased appropriation to cover the funds lost from no longer retaining child support (Illinois.gov, 2024; Turetsky & Azevedo-McCaffrey, 2024).

Wisconsin

While Wisconsin currently passes through 75 percent of the child support payments (NCSL, 2023), when TANF was first implemented in 1997, Wisconsin selected a full child support pass-through and full disregard for current TANF families. This policy was allowed as part of a federal waiver. The waiver also allowed Wisconsin to pay the federal share of passed through child support using savings generated by previous state reforms (Meyer & Cancian, 2001). As a condition of the waiver, the federal government required a random assignment evaluation, called the Child Support Demonstration Evaluation (CSDE). The CSDE operated from October 1997 through June 2002 and utilized an experimental design, with random assignment of custodial parents into experimental and control groups (Institute for Research on Poverty n.d.; Cancian, Slack, & Yang, 2010).⁴ The experimental group received the full child support pass-through while the control group received either a partial pass-through of \$50 or 41 percent of any child support payment (whichever was larger, with the remainder kept by the government). Random assignment ended in July 2000, after which all *new* cases received the full pass-through and disregard. And starting in July 2002, *all* cases (including those initially assigned to the control group), received the full pass-through and disregard (Meyer & Cancian, 2003). Wisconsin's child support pass-through and disregard policy changed in January 2006, when Federal waiver that permitted the CSDE expired, and the full pass-through was phased out gradually (Institute for Research on Poverty, n.d.). The full pass-through policy was replaced with the current 75 percent pass-through in 2009 (Wisconsin Joint Committee on Finance, 2009).

⁴ Random assignment of new entrants continued through July 9, 1998, when a code error in the administrative data system discontinued the assignment of any incoming W-2 cases in Milwaukee to the control group. Random assignment in Milwaukee was restarted on January 1, 1999. However, only cases that entered before July 9, 1998, are considered part of the "original cohort," and are the focus of many analyses.

Impact of a Full Child Support Pass-Through

Research has identified positive associations between a full child support pass-through for current TANF families and several outcomes, although many findings are mixed. We summarize the theory and research on impact of a full child support pass-through for current TANF recipients in the four key outcome domains that have been studied to date: child support receipt and participation; benefit receipt; parental behaviors; and child outcomes. Research on Wisconsin is by far the most extensive and high-quality and should therefore be weighed most heavily in interpreting findings. To our knowledge, this is the only full pass-through program to be studied in an experimental design, and multiple longitudinal evaluations have been conducted comparing outcomes of the full and partial pass-through policies for TANF recipients (e.g., Meyer & Cancian, 2001; Meyer & Cancian, 2003; Cook & Caspar, 2006). We identified one study on the Colorado full pass-through, which compared child support payment and receipt outcomes to those from a previous period when a no pass-through policy was in place (Zolot et al. 2020). We also identified a conference poster abstract from the same research team evaluating the program, but details were limited (Martinez-Schiferl, Zolot, & Desbien, 2019). One descriptive study was identified on the impact and costs of the Minnesota full pass-through when the zero disregard policy was still in place, examining both trends in cases and results of surveys with staff administering the program, CPs, and NCPs (Venohr et al., 2002). No evaluation could be identified on the current Minnesota policy in which they only disregard a portion of the pass-through in their TANF benefit calculations, such that the economic impact for families is equivalent to a partial pass-through policy. Because Illinois' program is new, it has not yet been studied.

Child support participation and receipt

In theory, a full pass-through and disregard policy would increase the likelihood of the NCP paying child support (or paying more) because they know that the funds will go directly to the children. Even without a full disregard (that is, even if their payments are offset by reduced TANF benefits), knowing that the custodial parent sees the full amount of their payments might incentive NCPs to pay (more). For example, when Minnesota had a full pass-through but zero disregard, even though the total income received by families is the same, families received a separate check for child support payments made on their case, making them aware of payments for the first time (Venohr et al., 2002). Prior to the passthrough, TANF recipients were generally unaware of child support payments because the State retained most support (Venohr et al., 2002). Paternity establishment could also increase if both parents were incentivized to cooperate by the prospect of the custodial household receiving more funds (Bartfeld & Sandifur, 2001). There is some evidence that the use of child support payments matters to NCPs; for example, in a 1990s study of over 2,000 NCPs who were behind on their child support, 32 percent said that “the child support money goes to welfare or the state, not the children” was a good reason not to pay child support (Bloom & Sherwood, 1994). That said, other factors may be more influential; in the same study, other

reasons for not paying support were endorsed more often, particularly the NCP being unemployed (85%), feeling the child support order was too high (47%), and disagreement with the CP over how the money was spent (44%) (Bloom & Sherwood, 1994).

Overall, research mostly confirms the theory that a full pass-through with disregard leads to an increase in paternity establishment, NCP payments, and CP child support receipt (Table 1). Evidence of an association with paternity establishment with a full pass-through is fairly positive, with a statistically significant effect found in Wisconsin in the first year of the program as well as in some later cohorts (Meyer & Cancian, 2001; Meyer & Cancian, 2003; Cancian, Meyer, & Caspar, 2008; Barteld & Sandifur, 2001), but non-significant associations in other cohorts (Cook & Caspar, 2006; Cancian, Meyer, & Caspar, 2008; Meyer & Cancian, 2003). In Minnesota, NCPs agreed on surveys that they would be more likely to establish paternity with the institution of a full pass-through, but precise data on paternity establishment was not reported (Venohr et al., 2002).

There is more consistent evidence that a full pass-through and disregard lead to an increase in the likelihood of NCPs paying any child support, although the magnitude of the impact is modest (about 3 percentage points different from a partial or no pass-through) (Meyer & Cancian, 2001; Cancian, Meyer, & Caspar, 2008; Zolot, 2020). The amount of child support received by custodial families was also consistently higher (Meyer & Cancian, 2001; Meyer & Cancian, 2003; Cancian, Meyer, & Caspar, 2008; Cook & Caspar, 2006). This was in large part a mechanical effect of the policy, which by its nature increases the amount families received. However, the amount of child support NCPs paid was also often larger for NCPs in the full pass-through group than in partial or no pass-through groups (Meyer & Cancian, 2003; Zolot et al., 2020; Martinez-Schiferl, et al., 2019). In Wisconsin, overall, the larger effect seems to be on the percentage of NCPs paying at all, rather than the amount paid (Cancian, Meyer, & Caspar, 2008). This may be because much payment happens through automatic income withholding when NCPs work in the formal employment sector (Bartfeld & Meyer, 2003). In any case, it appears that these outcomes are only present when the full pass-through is combined with a full disregard, as research in Minnesota (which had no disregard at the time of the evaluation), did not find a difference in payment of support or amount paid (Table 1; Venohr et al., 2002). Finally, effects on child support receipt and participation in Wisconsin (the only state in which we identified subgroup analyses) were especially strong when the CP was new to TANF, had received a high amount of support in the past, and had a child support order in place upon entry to the TANF program (Table 1) (Meyer & Cancian, 2001).

Table 1. Impact of a Full Pass-through on Paternity and Child Support Payment/Receipt

Potential Impact	Evidence For	Evidence Against
Increase in paternity establishment	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • WI: Paternity establishment increased in full compared to partial pass-through groups in first year and in some later cohorts. <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ➢ Effects larger for CPs new to TANF; with a child support order at entry; or with high past amounts of child support. • MN: ~75% of NCPs agreed that full pass-through policy increased likelihood to establish paternity. 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • WI: No significant difference in paternity establishment after first year between those in a full vs. partial pass-through and for some cohorts. No difference for those who later moved from a partial to full pass-through vs. those staying.
Increase in likelihood of CP receiving <i>any</i> child support	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • WI: Over program’s first four years, CPs in full pass-through were more likely to receive (and NCPs to pay) child support than in partial pass-through group (by about 3%). <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ➢ Effects larger for CPs new to TANF; with support order at entry; with history of higher support amounts; or who had been married to NCP. • CO: After two years, there was a 3.5% increase in cases receiving any child support payment, compared to previous no pass-through policy. And in program’s first 18 months, number of established cases with funds owed increased 13%. 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • MN: (which had a zero disregard policy at the time), no difference in percentage of NCPs paying child support compared to when there was a partial pass-through.
Increase in child support payment amount made and received	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • WI: NCPs in full pass-through group <i>paid</i> higher amounts (6-19% more) than NCPs in partial pass-through group over three years. • WI: CPs in full pass-through group <i>received</i> 12-28% more child support/year than partial pass-through group. Similar in cases going from partial to full pass-through. 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • MN: After implementation of the full pass-through (with zero disregard at the time), staff did not observe an increase in payments, which they attributed to low parent awareness of the policy.

	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • CO: In two years following full pass-through implementation, increase of 8% in amount of support paid, compared to previous no-pass-through policy. Monthly collections also rose 76% over program's first 18 months. 	
--	---	--

Benefit receipt

Proponents of a full child-support pass-through for TANF families argue that the resulting increase in income could reduce the need for families to receive TANF and/or other means-tested benefits, such as Food Stamps/SNAP⁵ and Medicaid (e.g., Sorensen, 2016). Indeed, there is evidence from the general population that higher child support payments decrease need for various benefits (Huang, Garfinkel, & Waldfogel, 2004; Miller, Farrell, Cancian, & Meyer, 2005; Barnow, Dall, Nowak, & Dannhausen, 2000). In the research on a full pass-through, findings were mixed (Table 2). In Wisconsin, the first cohort receiving the full pass-through left TANF sooner than those in the partial pass-through group. This effect did not continue in later cohorts, however (Meyer & Cancian, 2003). In Minnesota, a 2002 study found that TANF amounts decreased because of the nature of their zero disregard policy at the time, which reduced TANF benefit amounts by the amount passed through (Venohr et al., 2002).

Turning to other public benefits, the evidence is mixed (Table 2). There was a decrease in Food Stamp/SNAP participation in Colorado (compared to a no pass-through group; Zolot et al., 2020). But Wisconsin analyses that compared the full pass-through to a partial pass-through group did not find statistically significant reductions in Food Stamps, in health care costs, or in childcare subsidies (Meyer & Cancian, 2001; Meyer & Cancian, 2003; Cook & Caspar, 2006). Researchers posit that the difference in the amount of child support received may be not substantial enough to change benefit eligibility for many recipients; food assistance and public healthcare receipt was near-universal for both full and partial pass-through groups (Meyer & Cancian, 2003).

⁵ We use both terms because the name of the program changed over the period in which was research was conducted.

Table 2. Impact of a Full Pass-Through on Public Benefit Receipt

Potential Impact	Evidence For	Evidence Against
Declines in TANF enrollment or receipt	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • MN: As expected with a the zero disregard in place at the time of the evaluation, TANF funds paid decreased in proportion to the increase in child support received. • WI: In first year and first cohort only, families with full pass-through had a fewer TANF payments. Effect highest when CP received > \$1,000/year from NCP. 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • MN: Decrease in families exiting TANF following the year of full pass-through implementation, likely due to a recession. • WI: One later cohort was actually more likely to enroll in TANF in the full pass-through than partial pass-through group.
Declines in other benefits enrollment or receipt	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • CO: TANF families on SNAP receiving full pass-through had average decrease in SNAP benefits of \$28.14/month over two years, while SNAP cases not receiving pass-through had average decrease of only \$2.63/month. 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • WI: Food Stamp payments only decreased \$150 in the full pass-through group over the first two years of the program. • WI: No difference in government costs for public healthcare (Medicaid and a state program) between partial and full pass-through groups (high enrollment for both (>98%)). • WI: No difference in childcare subsidy costs between full and partial pass-through groups. • WI: No differences in receipt of Food Stamps, medical care, or childcare over two years for households moving from a partial to full pass-through vs. staying with partial pass through.

Parental behavior

Research has also identified some association between a full pass-through and parental behavior changes, beyond formal child support payments (Table 3). In theory, formal child support payments could support increases in informal transfers (i.e., payments made in cash or in kind, such as for groceries or diapers) as well, in that a greater willingness to provide the former could generalize to a willingness to provide the latter—especially if they lead to an improved CP-NCP relationship (and perhaps more NCP time with children). Alternately,

formal support could act as a substitute, taking the place of informal transfers (Meyer & Cancian, 2001). There was mixed evidence of higher value informal transfers made by NCPs in the full pass-through group in Wisconsin (compared to a partial pass-through group; (Meyer & Cancian, 2001), but there were no differences in whether informal transfers were made, or in the type made (Table 3; Meyer & Cancian, 2001). Relatedly, a full pass-through could support improved relationships between CPs and NCPs, and findings from a few studies did suggest a decrease in parental conflict (compared to a partial pass-through; Venohr et al., 2002; Meyer & Cancian, 2001; Hutson, 2007). Moreover, Wisconsin analyses found that the more child support a CP received, the higher the amount of contact between CPs and NCPs (Hutson, 2007). In Minnesota, however, the full pass-through was associated with an increase in parental conflict over money. The authors did not offer an explanation for this trend (which was reported on surveys), except to note that many factors unrelated to child support payments lead to conflict and the trend may not be meaningful (Venohr et al., 2002). It is also true, though, that the policy allowed CPs to more clearly see when NCPs were *not* providing expected levels of support (Venohr et al., 2002), which could have increased conflict.

Further, it has been posited that increased income from child support might impact CP household structure. One possibility is that the increased economic independence for CPs would reduce their incentive to cohabit with partners who are not related to their children (Cancian & Meyer, 2006). On the other hand, a full pass-through may increase CP marriage rates, either through reunification with the NCP due to a better relationship, or because the income from child support makes them a more attractive marriage partners to others (Cancian & Meyer, 2006). There was a slight association between the full pass-through and reduced CP cohabitation with men who are who are not fathers of their children in Wisconsin (Cancian & Meyer, 2006), but no difference between full and partial pass-through groups in marriage rates. Moreover, although CPs and NCPs are generally separated (or there shouldn't be a child support case), the NCP may also at times live with the CP and child for economic, relationship, or other reasons (Loprest, 2011; Cross-Barnet, Cherlin, & Burton, 2011). There were not differences between pass-through groups in whether/how long the NCP cohabitated with the CP (Cancian & Meyer, 2006; Meyer & Cancian, 2001).

Finally, in theory, NCPs might be more motivated to work, or work in the formal sector, if they think that income will go directly to their children (Meyer & Cancian, 2001). The potential impact of a full child-support pass-through on CP employment could go either direction. CPs may be able to use increased child support income for childcare, resulting in increased employment rates or more job opportunities (resulting in higher earnings). On the other hand, the increased funds from child support might decrease CPs' need to work or earn more (Meyer & Cancian, 2001). Findings on the impact of a full pass-through on both CP and NCP employment or earnings were mixed. Analysis of the Wisconsin experience found higher

wages among the subgroup of CPs receiving the full pass-through who had a child support order in place prior to TANF enrollment (Meyer & Cancian, 2001). Evidence from Wisconsin also suggested an association between the full pass-through and lower levels of informal employment among NCPs, but increases in formal employment were found only for certain NCP subgroups (Meyer & Cancian, 2001; Meyer & Cancian, 2003). Moreover, there was no statistically significant overall effect on CP or NCP employment or total earnings (Meyer & Cancian, 2001; Meyer & Cancian, 2003; Cook & Caspar, 2006). That said, receiving the full pass through does *not* seem to disincentivize work for CPs (Cuesta & Cancian, 2017).

Table 3. Impacts of a Full Child Support Pass-Through on Parental Behavior

Potential Impact	Evidence For	Evidence Against
Increase in informal transfers from non-custodial parent	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> WI: CPs in full pass-through group more likely to receive informal transfers worth at least \$500 than in partial pass-through group. Most likely among families with a history of higher child support payments. 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> WI: No significant difference between full pass-through and partial pass-through groups in whether CPs received any informal transfers or in types of informal transfers.
Cohabitation or marriage changes in custodial parent	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> WI: CPs in full pass-through group less likely than partial pass-through group to cohabit with men who are not fathers of any of their children, over about six years. 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> WI: No changes in marriage rates for CPs over about six years. WI: No differences in pass through groups in whether the NCP lived with CP for 7-12 months/year, over two years.
Improved relationship between custodial and non-custodial parent.	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> MN: CPs receiving full pass-through reported slight decrease in conflict with NCP on parenting issues. WI: CPs and NCPs in full pass-through group less likely to report high conflict levels than in partial pass-through group. WI: For every \$100/month in child support paid, likelihood of any contact between NCP and CP increased 2.5 times. 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> MN: NCPs reported an increase in conflicts with CP regarding money after full pass-through.
Increased NCP employment and earnings	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> WI: NCPs in full pass-through group had lower levels of informal employment than in partial pass-through group. 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> WI: No difference between pass-through groups in overall NCP formal employment or earnings, including across different

	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • WI: When CP had not recently been on TANF, NCPs in the full pass-through group had a higher probability of any earnings. 	cohorts and those moving from partial to full pass-through.
Increased CP employment and earnings	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • WI: CPs in full pass-through group had slightly higher mean hourly wages than in the partial pass-through group. <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ➤ Effects highest among CPs with support order in place at entry. • WI: Labor force participation and hours did not <i>decrease</i> for CPs receiving full pass-through. 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • WI: No differences by full vs. partial pass group in percentage of CPs employed, months or hours worked, or total earnings. Same trends across cohorts and in those moving from partial to full pass-through.

Child outcomes

By definition, a full child support pass-through and disregard for TANF families would increase the resources available to low-income families. In turn, improved economic could improve other child outcomes by, for example, increasing access to health care and healthy foods (Meyer & Cancian, 2001). There is evidence from the general population that higher child support payments are associated with better child health (e.g., Baughman, 2017), but in the research on a full pass-through for TANF families, the only positive outcome found was a slightly reduced number of reported child health limitations (Table 4; Meyer & Cancian, 2001).

In theory, a full child support pass-through could also improve parenting practices through reducing economic stress and allowing for increased time with children, which might in turn improve children’s school attendance and performance (Meyer & Cancian, 2001). Research did not find much impact on CP parenting practices (e.g., whether they read to preschool age children, attendance at PTA meetings; Table 4) (Meyer & Cancian, 2001). One study, however, did find a decrease in child maltreatment claims in families receiving a full pass-through and disregard (Cancian, Slack, & Yang, 2010). This is consistent with a large body of research showing that increased economic support is associated with lowered levels of child welfare system involvement (Weiner, Anderson, & Thomas, 2021).

In the full pass-through evaluations we reviewed, there was mixed evidence of impact on the amount of time NCPs spent with their children: There were some encouraging trends in Minnesota and in certain subgroups (but not the full sample) in Wisconsin (Meyer & Cancian, 2001; Cancian & Meyer, 2006). No differences were found in perceived parenting quality of NCPs by CPs (Meyer & Cancian, 2001; Cancian & Meyer, 2006). There was also limited evidence of a small impact on child educational outcomes, as measured by GPA and school

attendance, but these trends were not consistent across subgroups or time periods (Meyer & Cancian, 2001). CPs receiving a full pass-through group were more satisfied with their childcare arrangements than those receiving a partial pass-through (Meyer & Cancian, 2001). Interestingly, one study in Wisconsin found a long-term impact on child earnings (though not employment rates); this implies that increased child support through the full pass-through could affect children even many years later (Kong et al., 2024). However, overall, it is likely that child support receipt through a full pass-through does not have as large an impact on children as other unmeasured factors (such as home or school environment or specific parenting skills).

Table 4. Impact of a Full Child Support Pass-Through on Children

Potential Impact	Evidence For	Evidence Against
Health improvements	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • WI: Fewer health limitations in children in families with full pass-through over two years, with a strong effect when CPs had a child support order in place at entry. 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • WI: No differences in proportion of the children in full vs. pass-through who report fair or poor health over two years. • WI: No differences in proportion of CPs in full vs. pass-through who report children’s health had improved a year.
School performance improvements	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • WI: Very small difference in mean grade-point average in favor of children living in full pass-through-group families. Impact higher for those whose CPs worked full time, and for girls in Milwaukee. • WI: Children in full pass-through families had fewer absences in first year of program. 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • WI: No significant differences in overall GPA, receipt of special education, or school attendance between children in partial and full pass-through groups.

Improved relationship with non-custodial parent	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • MN: NCPs slightly increased amount of time spent with their children with institution of full pass-through. • WI: Among families with a history of higher child support only, NCPs in full pass-through group spent average of 19 days more with children than in partial group. 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • WI: No differences overall between households getting full pass-through vs. partial in the NCP spending time with children, or average days spent. • WI: No differences between pass-through groups in likelihood that non-resident NCPs would look after children so CP could do other tasks; their perceived involvement in decisions about children's lives; or in whether CP thought NCP a good parent.
Improved custodial parent parenting practices	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • WI: CPs in full pass-through group were more satisfied with their childcare arrangements than in partial group; fewer would change to another arrangement if no cost. 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • WI: No differences between pass-through groups in whether CPs read to child daily. • WI: No differences between pass-through groups in CP PTA meeting attendance.
Decrease in child abuse and neglect	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • WI: Two years after program entry, full pass-through group CPs 10% less likely to have a child with a screened-in report for child maltreatment than partial pass-through group. 	
Improved child long-term employment	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • WI: In long-term follow up of recipients of the original experiment (children aged 6-16 at the time), children full pass-through group had higher earnings as adults (by about \$800/year) than in partial pass-through group. 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • WI: In long-term follow up of child recipients, no difference in employment rates by group.

Government costs

While not the focus of OER's review, it is worth noting that several evaluations have considered the impact of a full pass-through with disregard on government expenditures. Under current federal policy, implementing a full pass-through by definition incurs costs for state governments: They no longer retain child support payments to offset program costs, *and* must reimburse the federal government for its share of the child support above the \$100/\$200 monthly limit (for 1 child/2+children) out of state revenues. Moreover, if coupled with a full disregard, a full pass-through would not necessarily lead to savings in TANF

benefits, although there could theoretically be TANF savings if the added income from child support decreased families' need for assistance. An analysis comparing the partial to full pass-through in Wisconsin found a non-significant difference in costs primarily for this reason (Meyer & Cancian, 2001).⁶

On the other hand, with a zero or minimal partial disregard, the *federal* government *saves* money on a full pass-through because they are still getting funds from the State, and they automatically pay less in TANF funds. Indeed, an analysis of Minnesota's past full pass-through with zero disregard found a net balance of zero in 2001. The \$15.2 million in child support passed through that year was carried entirely by the state government (between paying the required federal share and lost child support payments that would have otherwise been retained), while the federal government saved that entire \$15.2 million (between the funds received from the state and paying less in TANF benefits (Venohr et al., 2002)). The policy in California that allows any past-due child support (i.e., arrears) owed to the state for former TANF families to go to families instead of the government was estimated to cost the state \$105 million a year. California has also considered a full pass-through for current TANF families of current payments and estimated that at an additional \$150 million in costs to the state a year (Petek, 2022).

Finally, reports have also raised the possibility of cost savings on government processes enabled by a full pass-through. Currently, many state governments use older computer systems to monitor and collect child support and follow often-complex distribution rules, and there are other costs around attempting to establish paternity and engaging both CPs and NCPs in child support programs. In theory, a full pass-through could simplify processes considerably because distribution rules would no longer apply (CLASP, 2006); according to one estimate, this could save 6 to 8 percent of all child support program expenditures (Turetsky & Azevedo-McCaffrey, 2024). In practice, though, this impact would likely vary based on existing state procedures and technological systems. Overall, then, while it is difficult to know costs for certain (especially in New York specifically), a full pass-through and disregard might not be as cost burdensome as it first appears. More analysis is needed to determine whether the longer-term savings due to increased child support payments and benefits reduction would compensate for the shorter-term loss of child support retained by government while families receive TANF.

⁶ Note that this analysis focused primarily on benefits costs and savings. The authors acknowledge that it was limited, as they did not have sufficient data to show income and payroll tax collections, expenditures under the Earned Income Tax Credit, administrative costs, payments to employers through Trial Jobs, payments to clients for transportation, or housing subsidy costs.

Conclusions

To date, implementation and evaluation of a full child support pass-through is limited to just a few states, and findings are mixed. In the most well-designed and extensive research on Wisconsin, a full pass-through and disregard appears to increase the likelihood of receipt of any child support by families, and to increase the amount of child support paid and received. The hypothesis that NCPs will pay more (when their income allows) when they know funds go to their children, rather than the government, thus appears to have some basis. At the same time, these impacts have been modest in size, likely reflecting the limited financial ability of low-income NCPs to increase their payments. There is also some evidence that a pass-through and disregard can increase cooperation of both CPs and NCPs with the child support system, including paternity establishment. There is also some promising evidence of secondary effects—such as decrease in parental conflict, changes in CP and NCP employment, and child educational and health outcomes—but findings are mixed.

Overall, while withholding child support collections generates revenue to offset public assistance and child support enforcement costs in the short run, it may have a negative long-term impact on paternity establishment and family income. In recent years, a bipartisan consensus has been emerging in support moving away from using child support for government cost-recovery (Turetsky & Azevedo-McCaffrey, 2024). If a full child support pass-through and disregard for cash assistance clients were to be considered in New York, in-depth cost estimates (and potential areas of savings) would be necessary, along with a plan for covering the lost state revenue that would be paid to the federal government. Successfully implementing a full pass-through and disregard would also require updating existing procedures around child support distribution and cash assistance eligibility/payment amounts and ensuring that CPs and NCPs are aware of the new policies via education and outreach. Finally, policy makers would need to determine whether to institute a full pass-through for current TANF recipients, former TANF recipients, or both.

References

- The Aspen Institute (2023). *Ensuring families receive child support payments: Child support policy fact sheet*. <https://ascend.aspeninstitute.org/resources/ensuring-families-receive-all-child-support-payments/>
- Aves, L. (2015). *Minnesota's child support laws: An overview*. <https://www.house.mn.gov/hrd/pubs/chldsupp.pdf>
- Barnow, B. S., Dall, T. M., Nowak, M. W., & Dannhausen, B. E. (2000). *The potential of the child support enforcement program to avoid costs to public programs: A review and synthesis of the literature*. Final report prepared for the U.S. Department of Health and Human Services. Contract No. HHS-100-97-0007.
- Bartfeld, J., & Meyer, D. R. (2003). Child support compliance among discretionary and nondiscretionary obligors. *Social Service Review*, 77, 347–372.
- Bartfeld, J. & Sandefur, G. (2001). *Paternity establishment and child support orders among W-2 participants*. In W2 child support demonstration evaluation phase I: Final report, vol II. Madison, WI: Institute for Research on Poverty, University of Wisconsin–Madison. <https://www.irp.wisc.edu/wp/wp-content/uploads/2022/10/csde-p1v2-full-report.pdf>
- Baughman, R. A. (2017). The impact of child support on child health. *Review of Economics of the Household*, 15(1), 69–91.
- Bloom, D. & Sherwood, K. (1994). *Matching opportunities to obligations: Lessons for child support reform from the parents' fair share pilot phase*. MDRC. <https://eric.ed.gov/?id=ED373270>
- Cancian, M. & Meyer, D.R. (2006). *Effects of the full child support pass-through/disregard on marriage and cohabitation*. Institute for Research on Poverty. <https://www.irp.wisc.edu/research1/childsup/csde/publications/cancian-meyer-choi-i.pdf>
- Cancian, M., Meyer, D.R. & Caspar, E. (2008). Welfare and child support: Complements, not substitutes. *Journal of Policy Analysis and Management*, 27(2), 354–375.
- Cancian, M., Meyer, D.R., & Roff, J. (2006). *The effects of child support pass-through and disregard policies*. Institute for Research on Poverty. <https://www.irp.wisc.edu/publications/dps/pdfs/dp133007.pdf>
- Cancian, M., Slack, K.S.S., & Yang, M.Y. (2010). *The effect of family income on risk of child maltreatment*. Institute for Research on Poverty. <https://www.irp.wisc.edu/resource/the-effect-of-family-income-on-risk-of-child-maltreatment/>
- Center for Law and Social Policy (CLASP) (2006). *More child support dollars to kids: Using new state flexibility in child support pass-through and distribution rules to benefit government and families*.

- <https://www.clasp.org/sites/default/files/public/resources-and-publications/files/0305.pdf>
- Center on Budget and Policy Priorities (2024). *Understanding TANF cost recovery in the child support program*. <https://www.cbpp.org/research/income-security/understanding-tanf-cost-recovery-in-the-child-support-program>
- Colusa, Sutter, Yolo Regional Child Support Agency (n.d.). *New payments on former CalWORKs cases*. <https://www.colusasutteryolochildsupport.gov/receive-support/calworks-and-child-support/payments-for-former-calworks-cases>
- Congressional Research Service (2023). *The child support enforcement program: Summary of laws enacted since 1950*. <https://crsreports.congress.gov/product/pdf/R/R47630>
- Congressional Research Service (2024). *The Temporary Assistance for Needy Families (TANF) block grant: A legislative history*. <https://crsreports.congress.gov/product/pdf/R/R44668>
- Cook, S. & Caspar, E. (2006). *Difference-in-difference evaluation of the Wisconsin full child support pass-through policy: Final report*. Institute for Research on Poverty. <https://www.irp.wisc.edu/wp/wp-content/uploads/2022/10/csde3-T-B2.pdf>
- Cross-Barnet, C., Cherlin, A., & Burton, L. (2011). Bound by children: Intermittent cohabitation and living together apart. *Family Relations*, 60(5), 633–647.
- Cuesta, L. & Cancian, M. (2015). *The effect of child support on the labor supply of custodial mothers participating in TANF*. *Children and Youth Services Review*, 54, 49-56. <https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0190740915001553>
- Huang, C., Garfinkel, I., & Waldfogel, J. (2004). Child support enforcement and welfare caseloads. *Journal of Human Resources*, 39, 108–134.
- Hutson, R. A. (2007). Child support and parental conflict in low-income families. *Children and Youth Services Review*, 29(9), 1142-1157.
- Illinois.gov (2024). *Pritzker Administration announces child support pass-through payment rule change takes effect this month*. <https://www.illinois.gov/news/press-release.30230.html>
- Illinois Public Act 102-1115. (n.d.). <https://www.ilga.gov/legislation/publicacts/102/PDF/102-1115.pdf>
- Institute for Research on Poverty (n.d.). *Child Support Demonstration Evaluation (CSDE)*. <https://www.irp.wisc.edu/research/child-support/csde/>
- Kong, J., Riser, Q., Cancian, M., & Meyer, D. R. (2024). The long-term effects of formal child support. *Journal of Marriage and Family*, 86(4), 1034–1052. <https://doi.org/10.1111/jomf.1299>
- Loprest, P. (2011). *Disconnected families and TANF*. Washington, DC: The Urban Institute. *Temporary Assistance for Needy Families Program—Research Synthesis Brief, 2*.
- Martinez-Schiferl, M., Zolot, T. & Desbien, L. (2019). *Effects of child support full pass through on Colorado families in need*. Poster presentation at the 41st Annual Fall Research

- Conference of the (APPAM). Denver, CO.
<https://appam.confex.com/appam/2019/webprogram/Paper30963.html>
- Meyer, D.R. & Cancian, M. (2001). *W-2 Child Support Demonstration Evaluation, phase 1: Final report*. Institute for Research on Poverty. Report to the Wisconsin Department of Workforce Development, Madison, WI. <https://www.irp.wisc.edu/wp/wp-content/uploads/2022/10/csde-p1v1-full-report.pdf>
- Meyer, D.R. & Cancian, M. (2002). *W-2 Child Support Demonstration Evaluation, report on nonexperimental analyses*. Institute for Research on Poverty. Report to the Wisconsin Department of Workforce Development, Madison, WI. <https://www.irp.wisc.edu/wp/wp-content/uploads/2022/10/csde-nonexp-v1-full-report.pdf>
- Meyer, D.R. & Cancian, M. (2003). *W-2 Child Support Demonstration Evaluation, phase 2: Final report*. Institute for Research on Poverty. Report to the Wisconsin Department of Workforce Development, Madison, WI. <https://www.irp.wisc.edu/wp/wp-content/uploads/2022/10/csde-p2-full-report.pdf>
- Miller, C., Farrell, M., Cancian, M., & Meyer, D. R. (2005). *The interaction of child support and TANF: Evidence from samples of current and former welfare recipients*. MDRC. <https://www.mdrc.org/work/publications/interaction-child-support-and-tanf>
- Minnesota Department of Human Services (2022). *Interplay between child support and public assistance*. https://www.dhs.state.mn.us/main/idcplg?IdcService=GET_FILE&dID=96612&dDocName=MNDHS-061090&allowInterrupt=1
- National Conference of State Legislatures (NCSL). (2023). *Child support pass-through and disregard policies for public assistance recipients*. <https://www.ncsl.org/human-services/child-support-pass-through-and-disregard-policies-for-public-assistance-recipients>
- Office of Evaluation and Research (OER), New York City Human Resources Administration (November 2015). *Piloting a proposed child support pass-through policy with families in shelter: Modeling impact on family resources*. Presentation.
- Passarella, L. L., Hall, L. A. (2021). *Child support pass-through early outcomes in Maryland*. <https://www.ssw.umaryland.edu/media/ssw/fwrtg/child-support-research/cs-initiatives/Child-Support-Pass-Through,-Early-Outcomes.pdf?&>
- Petek, G. (2022). *The 2022-23 budget: Analysis of child support program proposals*. California Legislative Analyst's Office. <https://lao.ca.gov/Publications/Detail/4550>
- The Deficit Reduction Act of 2005. (2006, February 8). *Public Law 109-171*. <https://www.govinfo.gov/content/pkg/PLAW-109publ171/pdf/PLAW-109publ171.pdf>
- Solomon-Frears, C. & Falk, G. (2007). *The financial impact of child support on TANF families: Simulation for selected states*. Congressional Research Service (CRS). <https://crsreports.congress.gov/product/pdf/RL/RL34105>

- Sorensen, E. (2010). *Child support plays an increasingly important role for poor custodial families*. The Urban Institute.
<https://www.urban.org/sites/default/files/publication/29421/412272-Child-Support-Plays-an-Increasingly-Important-Role-for-Poor-Custodial-Families.PDF>
- Sorensen, E. (2016). *The child support program is a good investment*. Office of Child Support Services.
https://www.acf.hhs.gov/sites/default/files/documents/ocse/sbtn_csp_is_a_good_investment.pdf
- Smith, H. & Hall, L.A. (2021). *Maryland's child support pass-through policy: Exploring impacts on TCA families*.
<https://www.ssw.umaryland.edu/media/ssw/fwrtg/welfare-research/work-supports-and-initiatives/Pass-Through-Impacts-on-TCA-Families.pdf>
- Turetsky, V. & Azevedo-McCaffrey, D. (2024). *Directing child support payments to families, not government, would help families afford basic needs and thrive*. Center on Budget and Policy Priorities. <https://www.cbpp.org/sites/default/files/10-8-24tanf.pdf>
- Turetsky, V. (2005). *In everybody's best interests: Why reforming child support distribution makes sense for government and families*. Center for Law and Social Policy.
<https://www.clasp.org/wp-content/uploads/2022/01/0241.pdf>
- U.S. Office of Child Support Services. (2024). *Preliminary report FY 2023*.
https://www.acf.hhs.gov/sites/default/files/documents/ocse/fy_2023_preliminary_report.pdf
- Venohr, J., Price, D.A., Van Wert, L., & Anders, C. (2002). *Child support passthrough in Minnesota: A process and outcomes evaluation*.
<https://www.leg.mn.gov/docs/2005/other/050408.pdf>
- Venohr, J. (2013). *Exploring a child support pass-through option for Colorado*.
<https://centerforpolicyresearch.org/publications/exploring-a-child-support-pass-through-option-for-colorado-2/>
- Waller, M., & Plotnick, R. (2001). Effective child support policy for low-income families: Evidence from street level research. *Journal of Policy Analysis and Management*, 20, 89–110.
- Weiner, D., Anderson, C., & Thomas, K. (2021). *System transformation to support child and family well-being: The central role of economic and concrete supports*. Chapin Hall at the University of Chicago. <https://www.chapinhall.org/research/economic-supports-child-welfare/>
- Wheaton, L., Sorensen, E. (2007). *The potential impact of increasing child support payments to TANF families*. The Urban Institute.
<https://www.urban.org/sites/default/files/publication/33011/411595-The-Potential-Impact-of-Increasing-Child-Support-Payments-to-TANF-Families.PDF>

- Veritas HHS (2017). *A proposal for modernizing TANF distribution in the child support program*. https://www.veritas-hhs.com/_files/ugd/50e240_413d85fdbe77422195d39412c3b56eaf.pdf
- Wisconsin Joint Committee on Finance (2009). Legislative Fiscal Bureau. *Child support pass-through (DCF -- child support)*. https://docs.legis.wisconsin.gov/misc/lfb/budget/2009_11_biennial_budget/103_budget_papers/243_children_and_families_child_support_pass_through.pdf
- Zolot, T., Martinez-Schiferl, M., Desbien, L., Kauffmann, M. (2020). *Dollar for dollar: Why the child support pass-through makes sense*. <https://www.thefreelibrary.com/Dollar+for+Dollar%3A+Why+the+Child+Support+Pass-Through+Makes+Sense.-a0652591389>