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## **DOI'S OFFICE OF THE INSPECTOR GENERAL FOR THE NEW YORK CITY POLICE DEPARTMENT ("OIG-NYPD") ISSUES TWELFTH ANNUAL REPORT ON 26 PUBLICLY ISSUED REPORTS**

Today, the Department of Investigation's ("DOI") Office of the Inspector General for the New York City Police Department ("OIG-NYPD") released its Twelfth Annual Report, as required by Local Law 70, which established the OIG-NYPD as part of DOI. This Annual Report discusses the 25 public reports and one statement of findings issued by OIG-NYPD between 2015 and December 31, 2025. The Report also discusses the status of 275 recommendations that were issued by OIG-NYPD and responded to during that period by the New York City Police Department ("NYPD"). To date, NYPD has fully implemented 159 recommendations, or approximately 57.82 percent; partially implemented or accepted in principle 53 recommendations, or approximately 19.27 percent; and rejected 47 recommendations, approximately 17.09 percent. NYPD continues to consider seven recommendations, or approximately 2.55 percent. As of March 1, 2026, nine recommendations, or approximately 3.27 percent, are no longer applicable due to a change in technology or procedure by NYPD. Two additional recommendations to the Civilian Complaint Review Board ("CCRB") during a previous review cycle have been implemented. Some recommendations made in late 2025 are not assessed in this Report. A copy of the Report is attached to this release and can be found at the following link: <https://www.nyc.gov/site/doi/oignypd/web/report.page>

Acting DOI Commissioner Christopher Ryan said, "The Twelfth Annual Report by DOI's Office of the Inspector General for the NYPD demonstrates the array of issues examined in 25 public reports and one statement of findings issued over the past 11 years. This Report also catalogues the 275 recommendations issued to NYPD and the two recommendations issued to the CCRB, demonstrating OIG-NYPD's consistent follow up, which has resulted in more than 75 percent of the recommendations being implemented, partially implemented, or accepted in principle."

This year's Annual Report highlights the release in 2025 of OIG-NYPD's two systemic investigative reports: "An Assessment of NYPD's Use of Social Media" issued in January 2025 and an "Update on NYPD's Implementation of DOI's 2023 Criminal Group Database Recommendations" issued in October 2025.

➤ [An Assessment of NYPD's Use of Social Media](#)

This report reviewed NYPD and Citywide policies concerning both the police department and elected officials' use of social media. The investigation reviewed several social media posts and conversations made by NYPD executives on X (formerly Twitter), between January 2022 and August 2024, using the handles @NYPDChiefofPatrol, @NYPDDaughtry, and @NYPDnews, as well as members of City Council, journalists, and members of the public to which NYPD engaged with. Following the investigation, OIG-NYPD determined that NYPD's policies and practices did not fully comply with the Citywide Social Media Policy and NYPD did not provide sufficient oversight of posts made on executive accounts.

OIG-NYPD issued six recommendations to NYPD that included advising NYPD to memorialize in writing an internal review and approval process for posts on executive accounts; review the Citywide

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Social Media Policy and ensure NYPD is in compliance with all of its requirements; assign Digital Communications Officers to all social media accounts, and train all staff that use official agency social media as to the requirements of the Citywide Social Media Policy, the Department's social media policy, and best practices. NYPD accepted the six recommendations on April 28, 2025, and OIG-NYPD determined that NYPD has implemented five of them. The recommendation to train all staff using official agency social media regarding the Citywide Social Media Policy, the Department's social media policy, and best practices, is considered partially implemented until OIG-NYPD confirms all staff, including executives with access to social media accounts, have been trained.

➤ [Update on NYPD's Implementation of DOI's 2023 Criminal Group Database](#)

In October 2025, OIG-NYPD issued an update to its 2023 report that focused on the NYPD's Criminal Group Database ("CGD") and made 17 recommendations, of which NYPD accepted 11, rejected five, and placed one under consideration. The October 2025 report assessed NYPD's implementation of eight of the 11 accepted recommendations. OIG-NYPD found that NYPD needed to revise its Impact and Use Policy ("IUP") for the CGD; more clearly define the activation, renewal, and deactivation processes of CGD; explain the nature and extent of the evidence required to satisfy the entry criteria; and specify, by name, the law enforcement and two additional external entities with which NYPD could share information about the individuals included in the CGD. In its October 2025 report, OIG-NYPD also issued 13 new recommendations focused on training personnel on the requirements of the IUP, updating the IUP and Chief of Detective's Memo, conducting quarterly internal reviews and audits of the database to ensure accuracy; and improving data collection and publication. According to NYPD's 90-day response, issued on January 13, 2026, the Department accepted all 13 recommendations. These recommendations have been accepted in principle preliminarily until a full implementation status can be assessed during the 2026 annual report cycle.

In addition to its investigations, OIG-NYPD conducted outreach in 2025 that included regular attendance at NYPD CompStat and conducting quarterly presentations for newly assigned Internal Affairs staff at NYPD's Internal Investigation Course at the Police Academy.

The Twelfth Annual Report was prepared by Deputy Inspector General Lesley Bedeau in DOI's Office of the Inspector General for the NYPD and supervised by Acting Inspector General Christina Soto and Special Counsel to the Inspector General Maria Kostel.

*DOI is one of the oldest law-enforcement agencies in the country and New York City's corruption watchdog. Investigations may involve any agency, officer, elected official or employee of the City, as well as those who do business with or receive benefits from the City. DOI's strategy attacks corruption comprehensively through systemic investigations that lead to high-impact arrests, preventive internal controls and operational reforms that improve the way the City runs.*

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New York City Department of Investigation

Office of Inspector General for the  
New York City Police Department



# 2026 OIG-NYPD Twelfth Annual Report

Acting Commissioner Christopher Ryan  
Acting Inspector General Christina Soto

April 2026



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## Introduction

The mission of the Office of the Inspector General for the New York City Police Department (“OIG-NYPD” or “OIG”) is to enhance the effectiveness of the New York City Police Department (“NYPD” or “the Department”), increase public safety, protect civil liberties and civil rights, and increase the public’s confidence in NYPD. This report summarizes OIG-NYPD’s work over the past year and continues to highlight the breadth, scope, and impact of OIG-NYPD’s reports that reflect the Office’s continued commitment to independent oversight and promotes police accountability and transparency within the NYPD.

OIG-NYPD is mandated under Section 803(c)(1) of the New York City Charter (“Charter”) to “investigate, review, study, audit, and make recommendations relating to the operation, policies, programs, and practices, including ongoing partnerships with other law enforcement agencies of the new york city police department with the goal of enhancing the effectiveness of the department, increasing public safety, protecting civil liberties and civil rights, and increasing the public’s confidence in the police force, thus building stronger police-community relations.”<sup>1</sup>

This Annual Report, issued pursuant to section 803(e)(3) of the Charter, summarizes the Office’s work as it relates to section 803 (c)(1) by April 1 of each year and summarizes the Office’s work including the following:

- (a) a description of all significant findings from the investigations, reviews, studies, and audits conducted in the preceding year;
- (b) a description of the recommendations for corrective action made in the preceding year;
- (c) an identification of each recommendation described in previous annual reports on which corrective action has not been implemented or completed; and
- (d) the number of open investigations, reviews, studies, or audits that have been open, as of the close of the preceding calendar year, for the following periods:
  - 1) six months up to and including one year,
  - 2) more than one year up to and including two years,
  - 3) more than two years up to and including three years, and
  - 4) more than three years.
- (e) the subject matter of each investigation, review, study, or audit relating to the police department that has been open, as of the close of the preceding calendar year, for more than three years;
- (f) the number of incidents where the police department did not give access to information requested by the commissioner in the performance of the duties described in paragraph 1 of subdivision c of this section, in (1) closed investigations and (2) investigations that have been open for more than three years; and

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<sup>1</sup> N.Y.C. Charter ch. 34, § 803 (2025), <https://codelibrary.amlegal.com/codes/newyorkcity/latest/NYCcharter/0-0-0-2404>

(g) the number and subject of matters of investigations, reviews, studies and audits relating to the police department that were closed without issuing a report during the preceding calendar year.

### **Online Report Availability**

Each of the reports discussed in OIG-NYPD's 2026 Annual Report are available online on the Department of Investigation's Office of the Inspector General for the NYPD website.

All OIG-NYPD reports are available [here](#).

## **Background**

This year's Annual Report highlights the release of OIG-NYPD's two systemic investigative reports, "An Assessment of NYPD's Use of Social Media" and an "Update on NYPD's Implementation of DOI's 2023 Criminal Group Database Recommendations" released in January and October 2025, respectively, which include a combined 19 recommendations aimed at improving NYPD. Summaries of these reports, along with an assessment of the implementation status of six recommendations related to NYPD's use of social media, are provided below.<sup>2</sup>

This report also identifies NYPD's implementation of 159 recommendations, including sub-recommendations, issued across 25 OIG-NYPD reports and one statement of findings released between 2015 and 2025, for a total of 26 systemic reports.<sup>3</sup> This includes 21 recommendations, or approximately 13.21% of implemented recommendations, that were implemented during this report's review cycle.

The implementation statuses of the OIG-NYPD's recommendations are classified into the following categories: Implemented (I), Partially Implemented (PI), Accepted in Principle (AIP), Under Consideration (UC), Rejected (R) or No Longer Applicable (NLA).<sup>4</sup> Only reports

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
<sup>2</sup> This report does not include an assessment of the 13 recommendations made in the "Update on NYPD's Implementation of DOI's 2023 Criminal Group Database Recommendations" report, for which the Department's 90-day response was received on January 13, 2026, accepting the 13 recommendations. These 13 recommendations have been accepted in principle, and their implementation statuses will be assessed within the Office's 2027 Thirteenth Annual Report.

<sup>3</sup> Overall, OIG-NYPD has issued 277 recommendations between 2015-2025, with two of these recommendations issued to the CCRB in the Complaints of Biased Policing in New York City report. Of the 275 recommendations issued to the NYPD, 159 have been implemented, 27 have been partially implemented, 26 have been accepted in principle, 7 are under consideration, 47 have been rejected, and 9 are no longer applicable.

<sup>4</sup> Implemented or Partially Implemented (I or PI): NYPD has accepted and implemented these recommendations completely or in part. Accepted in Principle (AIP): NYPD has agreed with the general intent of these recommendations but has not yet implemented them. Under Consideration (UC): NYPD has not yet decided whether to adopt or reject these recommendations. Rejected (R): NYPD does not agree with the recommendations and will not implement them. No Longer Applicable (NLA): Due to a change in technology or procedure by NYPD, these recommendations are no longer relevant.

with recommendations that have changed in status to implemented are discussed within the body of this report. The appendix details the status of recommendations from all 26 systemic reports issued to date.

As depicted in the table below, NYPD has implemented approximately 57.82% of OIG-NYPD recommendations, partially implemented approximately 9.82%, and accepted in principle approximately 9.45% of these recommendations. While approximately 2.55% are under consideration and approximately 17.09% have been rejected, the Office is committed to working with the Department to find ways to implement recommendations that remain relevant. As of March 1, 2026, approximately 3.27% of the recommendations issued to NYPD are no longer applicable.



# OIG-NYPD Twelfth Annual Report

## An Assessment of NYPD's Use of Social Media (January 2025)

In January 2025, OIG-NYPD released, "An Assessment of NYPD's Use of Social Media," which reviewed NYPD and citywide policies concerning both the police department and elected officials' use of social media. The investigation reviewed several social media posts and conversations made by NYPD executives on X (formerly Twitter), between January 2022 and August 2024, using the handles @NYPDChiefofPatrol, @NYPDDaughtry, and @NYPDnews, as well as members of City Council, journalists, and members of the public with whom the NYPD engaged.

Following the investigation, OIG-NYPD determined that NYPD's policies and practices did not fully comply with the Citywide Social Media Policy and NYPD did not provide sufficient oversight of posts made on executive accounts.

Specifically, OIG-NYPD made the following findings:

1. Certain X posts by NYPD's executive staff on official City accounts were unprofessional and fostered unproductive public discourse, violating Department policies on being courteous and civil. The violations raised the question with respect to whether the discourse may be deemed prohibited engagement in political activity by City employees; however, DOI did not reach a conclusion on this matter.
2. Several of NYPD's practices regarding social media were not in compliance with the Citywide Social Media Policy which is applicable to all City agencies.
3. NYPD's official use of social media policy (dated December 2, 2022) had not been updated to include all the requirements of the most recent Citywide Social Media Policy that was issued in June 2023. Also, NYPD's use of social media policy did not provide guidelines on what content and language is appropriate for posts from an official Department account.
4. NYPD executives managed their individual social media accounts with limited oversight and without supervision from the Office of NYPD's Deputy Commissioner of Public Information.
5. NYPD did not offer formal training to executives with individual social media accounts on appropriate content for social media posts or the potential public impact of social media communications.

Based on those findings, OIG-NYPD made the following six recommendations:

1. Memorialize in writing an internal review and approval process for posts on executive accounts.
2. Update all relevant Patrol Guide Procedure and Administrative Guide Procedure sections to align with the requirements of the Citywide Social Media Policy.

3. Review the Citywide Social Media Policy and ensure NYPD complies with all of its requirements.
4. Update the Department’s social media use policy to include rules and guidance about appropriate content and language for posting on official Department social media accounts.
5. Assign Digital Communications Officers to all social media accounts, including at the executive level, to ensure that social media posts are consistent with citywide and department policy, and memorialize this requirement in writing.
6. Provide training to all staff using official social media regarding the Citywide Social Media Policy, the Department’s social media policy, and best practices.

In NYPD’s 90-day response to the report, issued on April 28, 2025, the Department accepted the six recommendations and expressed appreciation to the Office for its review of the policies, practices, and procedures governing the Department’s use of social media. Below is a list of each recommendation, along with the implementation status of each recommendation. A chart illustrating NYPD’s implementation status of each recommendation is also provided below.

The full report is available [here](#).

## Recommendation Implementation Statuses as of December 31, 2025

#	Recommendation	OIG-NYPD Assessment
1	Memorialize in writing an internal review and approval process for posts on executive accounts.	The Department updated Administrative Guide Procedures 304-19 “Department Social Media Accounts and Policy” which became effective May 21, 2025, and requires that the Deputy Commissioner, Public Information, review and approve or disapprove all requests for social media accounts, as well as provide oversight for all content disseminated via Department social media. Therefore, this recommendation is considered implemented.
2	Update all relevant Patrol Guide Procedure and Administrative Guide Procedure sections to align with the requirements of the	The Department updated Administrative Guide Procedures 304-19 “Department Social Media Accounts and Policy,” which became effective May 21, 2025, which provides, among other things, that “All postings on social media sites should align with the Department’s mission and values (including A.G.

#	Recommendation	OIG-NYPD Assessment
	Citywide Social Media Policy.	304-06 Prohibited Conduct), use appropriate language, and demonstrate professionalism. Therefore, this recommendation is considered implemented.
3	Review the Citywide Social Media Policy and ensure NYPD complies with all of its requirements	After review of Citywide Social Media Policy, NYPD updated its policy and established clear roles, responsibilities, and training requirements for social media use; required official approval and registration of social media accounts through a centralized office; and set security standards and outline procedures for responding to cyberattacks and posts that violate the Citywide Social Media Policy. Therefore, this recommendation is considered implemented.
4	Update the Department’s social media use policy to include rules and guidance about appropriate content and language for posting on official Department social media accounts.	Administrative Guide Procedure No. 304-19, "Departmental Social Media Accounts and Policy," became effective May 21, 2025, and was updated to provide language on appropriate content and language, including that all postings on social media sites should align with the Department’s mission and values, use appropriate language, and demonstrate professionalism. The procedure also provides a list of prohibited conduct in regard to social media usage. Therefore, this recommendation is considered implemented.
5	Assign Digital Communications Officers to all social media accounts, including at the executive level, to ensure that social media posts are consistent with citywide and department policy, and memorialize this requirement in writing.	Each official Department social media account, including those at the executive level, now has an assigned Digital Communications Officer (“DCO”). All DCOs are required to adhere to the policies and procedures outlined in Administrative Guide Procedure No. 304-19, "Departmental Social Media Accounts and Policy", and Administrative Guide Procedure No. 303-17, “Digital Communications Officer” effective February 2, 2026. Therefore, this recommendation is considered implemented.

#	Recommendation	OIG-NYPD Assessment
6	Provide training to all staff using official agency social media regarding the Citywide Social Media Policy, the Department’s social media policy, and best practices.	The Office of the Deputy Commissioner, Public Information (DCPI), revised its training program for Digital Communications Officers (DCOs), including those managing executive accounts, and provided copies of the training and roll out schedule to OIG-NYPD. The Office considers this recommendation partially implemented until OIG-NYPD confirms all staff, including executives with access to social media accounts, have been trained.

## Update on NYPD’s Implementation of DOI’s 2023 Criminal Group Database Recommendations (October 2025)

In April 2023, the Office released its report, “An Investigation into NYPD’s Criminal Group Database,” which concluded that NYPD failed to provide adequate guidance to officers on the criteria for adding individuals to the database; maintained insufficient documentation to justify the inclusion and renewal of entries into the database; lacked any process for notifying parents that their minor children were entered into the database; and lacked documentation of key policies and practices related to the use of the database.

Based on these findings, OIG-NYPD issued 17 recommendations, of which NYPD accepted 11, rejected five, and placed one under consideration. In the October 2025 report, this Office assessed NYPD’s implementation of eight of the 11 accepted recommendations.

This Office found that NYPD needed to revise its Impact and Use Policy for the CGD; more clearly define the activation, renewal, and deactivation processes of CGD; explain the nature and extent of the evidence required to satisfy the entry criteria; and specify, by name, the law enforcement and two additional external entities with which NYPD could share information about the individuals included in the CGD.

Following its assessment, OIG-NYPD issued 13 new recommendations focused on training personnel on the requirements of the IUP, updating the IUP and Chief of Detective’s Memo, conducting quarterly internal reviews and audits of the database to ensure accuracy; and improving data collection and publication. According to NYPD’s 90-day response, issued on January 13, 2026, the Department accepted all 13 recommendations. Accordingly, these recommendations have been accepted in principle preliminarily until a full implementation status can be assessed during the 2027 annual report.

A full copy of the report is available [here](#).

## Outreach And Engagement

In 2025, OIG-NYPD's outreach included attendance at NYPD's CompStat, CCRB's public board meetings and public-safety panels including John Jay's *NYC at the Crossroads: Charting a Safe and Just Path Forward*. In addition, OIG-NYPD presented quarterly to newly assigned staff at NYPD's Internal Affairs as part of NYPD's Internal Investigation Course at the Police Academy.

To request a meeting with OIG-NYPD or to invite OIG-NYPD to an event, please contact the Office of the Inspector General for the NYPD at [outreachoignypd@doi.nyc.gov](mailto:outreachoignypd@doi.nyc.gov).

## Complaints and Investigations by the Numbers

In addition to conducting outreach, OIG-NYPD receives information from members of the public, elected officials, criminal justice stakeholders, as well as from members of the NYPD regarding concerns on the operations, policies, procedures, and practices of the NYPD.

Pursuant to § 803(d)(3) of the New York City Charter, as of December 31, 2025, OIG-NYPD reports the following:

1. Five (5) investigations have been opened for six months up to and including one year,
2. Zero (0) investigations have been opened for more than one year up to and including two years;
3. Zero (0) investigations have been opened for more than two years up to and including three years; and
4. Zero (0) investigations have been opened for more than three years.

These figures include both systemic reviews and individual complaints received from members of the public.<sup>5</sup>

## Featured OIG-NYPD Investigations, Recommendations, and Statuses

This next section features reports with recommendations that have changed status from partially implemented, accepted in principle, under consideration or rejected, to fully implemented during the 2025 annual review cycle.<sup>6</sup>

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<sup>5</sup> The Department has provided OIG-NYPD with access to all requested information regarding these investigations.

<sup>6</sup> Recommendation status updates for reports with recommendations that remain partially implemented, accepted in principle, under consideration, rejected, and no longer applicable appear in the appendix.

## **I. Using Data from Lawsuits and Legal Claims Involving NYPD to Improve Policing (2015)**

In 2015, OIG-NYPD released a report examining how NYPD could improve its collection and use of police litigation data to enhance officer performance, identify trends, and support meaningful process improvements. The report recommended that NYPD expand the scope of data it tracks to include details such as the nature of filed claims, core allegations, information about the subject police officer, the location of the alleged incident, and the plaintiff's home address. It also recommended that NYPD establish an interagency task force with the Law Department and the Comptroller's Office to coordinate the collection and sharing of litigation data and to provide the public with details regarding NYPD's Early Intervention System. OIG-NYPD issued three primary recommendations (Recommendations 1-3), along with three sub-recommendations (1.1-1.3), for a total of six aimed at guiding the New York City Police Department in improving its use of litigation data going forward. Of the six recommendations, three recommendations were implemented, one recommendation was partially implemented, one recommendation was under consideration and one recommendation was rejected.<sup>7</sup>

In 2025, recommendation 3 changed status from partially implemented to fully implemented following NYPD's creation of a publicly available website that provides details about their Early Intervention System. As such, OIG-NYPD now considers recommendation 3 fully implemented.

NYPD's Early Intervention System website can be access [here](#).

## **II. When Undocumented Immigrants are Crime Victims: An Assessment of NYPD's Handling of U Visa Certification Requests (2017)**

This Report examined NYPD's role in and procedures for the U nonimmigrant status visa ("U visa") certification process. A U visa is provided to undocumented victims of certain qualifying crimes who assist officials in the investigation and prosecution of those crimes. A certification of cooperation from a local law enforcement agency is required to obtain a U visa. The Report identified concerns regarding the Department's reliance on criminal background checks to deny certification requests, its practice of referring certification requests to other agencies, and the lack of standards for certification eligibility. OIG-NYPD issued ten recommendations to the Department designed to establish standardized practices for U visa certification, enhance transparency, improve public access to information, and expand training for officers who frequently interact with immigrant communities within the New York City Police Department. Of the ten recommendations, three recommendations

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<sup>7</sup> Recommendations 1 and 1.3 remain under consideration.

were fully implemented, two recommendations were partially implemented, and five recommendations were rejected.

In 2025, recommendation 3 was changed from partially implemented to implemented following the memorialization of NYPD's policy regarding uncooperative U Visa applicants in Patrol Guide Procedure 207-37. Additionally, recommendation 10 was reclassified from partially implemented to implemented after NYPD's updated Organizational Guide No. 160-01 to include an explanation of the Domestic Violence U-Visa review and intake process for certification requests. Accordingly, OIG-NYPD now considers recommendations 3 and 10 to be fully implemented.

A full copy of the report can be accessed [here](#).

### **III. Complaints of Biased Policing in New York City: An Assessment of NYPD's Investigations, Policies, and Training (2019)**

In New York City, "Bias-Based Profiling," otherwise known as biased policing, is defined in Section 14-151 of the New York City Administrative Code as any discriminatory action by law enforcement that is motivated by a person's actual or perceived status protected by law (for example, race, gender, or sexual orientation).<sup>8</sup> In 2013, a federal judge in *Floyd v. City of New York*<sup>9</sup> held that NYPD's "stop, question, and frisk" policies and practices violated the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments, finding that they resulted in the disproportionate and discriminatory stopping of hundreds of thousands of Black and Latino people. Among other remedies, the court required NYPD to track and investigate civilian complaints related to racial profiling and other allegations of bias.

In 2019, during our investigation into NYPD's handling of biased-based complaints, OIG-NYPD found that between 2014 and 2018 —when NYPD began tracking and investigating these complaints—there were significant deficiencies in how these cases were tracked and investigated. As a result, OIG-NYPD issued 23 recommendations to the Department aimed at improving NYPD's investigation into biased policing, improving public access to information on how to file a biased policing complaint, and creating clear protocols for information sharing between NYPD, Civilian Complaint Review Board ("CCRB"), and New York City Commission on Human Rights ("CCHR").<sup>10</sup> Of the 23 recommendations, 11 recommendations were accepted and implemented, two recommendations were partially

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<sup>8</sup> See <https://codelibrary.amlegal.com/codes/newyorkcity/latest/NYCAadmin/0-0-0-129754>

<sup>9</sup> See <https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca2/13-3088/13-3088-2014-10-31.html>

<sup>10</sup> CCHR advised OIG-NYPD that the recommendation for the NYPD to establish information sharing protocols or access to BWC footage with their agency is not applicable as they do not operate in the same manner as CCRB.

implemented, three recommendations were accepted in principle, one recommendation was under consideration and six recommendations were rejected.

During this past annual review cycle, recommendation 18 changed from partially implemented to fully implemented following NYPD's placement of information regarding how to file a biased-based policing complaint at: <https://www.nyc.gov/site/nypd/about/departments-policy/racial-bias-based-profiling.page>. Additionally, on December 5, 2023, the NYPD and CCRB entered a Memorandum of Understanding ("MOU") which put the necessary protocols in place for appropriate information sharing between the two agencies. On March 5, 2024, CCRB assessed NYPD's compliance with the MOU and indicated to OIG-NYPD that recommendation 23 was fully implemented. As such, OIG-NYPD considers recommendations 18 and 23 fully implemented. Recommendation 16 is no longer applicable.

A full copy of the Report can be accessed [here](#).

#### **IV. An Assessment of NYPD's Response to the POST Act (2022)**

On July 15, 2020, former-Mayor Bill de Blasio signed the Public Oversight of Surveillance Technology ("POST") Act into law, requiring NYPD to publicly disclose information concerning its use of surveillance technology and to develop policies surrounding the technology's use and impact on the public. The POST Act defines surveillance technology as "equipment, software, or systems capable of, used or designed for, collecting, retaining, processing, or sharing audio, video, location, thermal, biometric, or similar information, that is operated by or at the direction of [NYPD]."<sup>11</sup> For each qualifying technology, NYPD must publish an Impact and Use Policy ("IUP") that reports on ten areas.

In this Office's 2022 report, OIG-NYPD issued 15 recommendations to NYPD, including directing the Department to issue an IUP for each individual technology and assess any disparate impacts on protected groups, revise the sections of IUPS regarding health and Safety, and support the Office's annual audit by providing quarterly updates. Of the 15 recommendations, six recommendations were accepted and implemented, three recommendations were partially implemented, two recommendations were accepted in principle, one recommendation remained under consideration and three recommendations were rejected.

In February 2026, the Department updated all Impact and Use Policies related to surveillance technologies, which had a significant impact on the implementation status of recommendations within the POST Act. Recommendations 1, 5, and 12 moved from rejected to implemented with the issuance of new IUPs, updates to health and safety reporting and written guidelines surrounding modification of probe images. Recommendations 4 and 11 which had been accepted in principle became fully implemented following updates to the IUPs regarding disparate impacts and upon NYPD providing OIG-NYPD with listings of

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<sup>11</sup> N.Y.C. Local Law No. 65 (2020) codified at N.Y.C. ADMIN. CODE § 14-188 and N.Y.C. CHARTER § 803[c-1]

technologies acquired by the Department and their functionalities. Recommendations 2, 3 and 8 moved from rejected to partially implemented as updates to the IUPs addressed portions within each recommendation, and recommendations 7 and 13 moved from rejected to accepted in principle as NYPD has accepted these recommendations and continues to work towards the implementation of them. Recommendation 14 changed from under consideration to fully implemented following the receipt of semiannual updates provided by NYPD to this Office indicating that there had not been any newly acquired technology by the Department. Although these reports were not received on a quarterly basis, OIG-NYPD considers recommendation 14 fully implemented, as semiannual reporting is consistent with the requirements of the POST Act. Recommendation 6 remains rejected.

A full copy of the Report can be accessed [here](#).

## **V. An Investigation into NYPD’s Criminal Group Database (2023)**

In 2017, advocacy groups and media outlets revealed that the NYPD created and used a Criminal Group Database (“CGD”) to support the investigative and public safety efforts of officers. The CGD records provided details about alleged gang members and intelligence relating to criminal groups and their activity. Uniformed members of service were provided access to the database information through the Domain Awareness System’s (DAS) search function.

The use of the CGD generated significant public concern, with political leaders, advocates, and community members seeking information on several key issues: (1) the criteria for inclusion in and removal from the CGD; (2) the training and supervision of officers authorized to determine whether individuals should be included; (3) whether/how individuals can find out if they are in the database; (4) whether/how individuals can seek removal; (5) what due process, civil liberty, and/or privacy protections are in place to avoid the misclassification of individuals; and (6) how to prevent misuse of the data.

This Office’s 2023 report included, among other findings, that NYPD did not provide adequate guidance to officers on the criteria for adding an individual’s name to the database, the methods to add individuals were deficient, the process was insufficiently documented in policy or in supporting documentation, and parents of minors were not being notified when their children were added to the database. The original CGD report included 17 recommendations, of which NYPD had accepted 11. By 2025, one recommendation was implemented, seven were partially implemented, three remained accepted in principle, and six were rejected.

In OIG-NYPD’s follow-up investigation, “An Update on NYPD’s Implementation of DOI’s 2023 Criminal Group Database,” released in October 2025, OIG-NYPD assessed eight of the 11 accepted recommendations. A review of those recommendations found that the Department made significant changes to the activation, deactivation, renewal process and requirements, as well as provided members of service with updated written guidance in the updated IUP

and a Chief of Detectives Memorandum issued on October 13, 2023, and October 11, 2023, respectively.

As a result, OIG-NYPD now considers recommendations 2, 4-6, 14 and 15 of the 2023 report fully implemented. As noted earlier, OIG-NYPD issued 13 new recommendations to the Department as part of the 2025 report aimed at ensuring NYPD's compliance with internal policies.

A full copy of the Report can be accessed [here](#).

## **VI. An Assessment of NYPD's Compliance with the POST Act (2023)**

In OIG-NYPD's second annual POST Act report issued in 2023, the Office examined IUPs for five surveillance technologies introduced by NYPD during the 2023 calendar year. Those technologies were Digidog, a remotely operated robot; the Knightscope K5 Autonomous Security Robot ("K5"); StarChase GPS tracking technology ("StarChase"); IDEMIA Mobile Biometric Check application ("IDEMIA"); and an augmented reality smartphone application referred to as "the AR application".

OIG-NYPD found that NYPD did not issue new IUPs when deploying any of these five surveillance technologies and instead issued addenda to existing IUPs to address the use of K5, StarChase, IDEMIA, and the AR application. While K5, StarChase, IDEMIA, and the AR application were appropriately identified as enhancements to, or new uses of, existing surveillance technologies their addenda did not meet all the requirements of the POST Act. Additionally, NYPD addressed Digidog within an existing IUP rather than issuing a separate IUP as required.<sup>12</sup>

OIG-NYPD issued seven recommendations to the Department aimed at improving NYPD's transparency, compliance, and oversight of surveillance technologies under the POST Act. The recommendations called for issuing and updating IUPs to fully disclose how specific technologies operate, including their rules, data practices, and potential health and safety impacts. The recommendations also emphasized clearer policy organization by requiring that only closely related technologies be grouped together and that existing grouped policies be reviewed and corrected where necessary. Of the seven recommendations, one was partially implemented, four were accepted in principle, and two were rejected.

In May of 2025, the City Council passed Local Law 56 of 2025, amending the original language of the POST Act and mandating that NYPD publish IUPs for all new and distinct surveillance

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<sup>12</sup> In 2022, OIG-NYPD maintained that Digidog was a surveillance technology with distinct capabilities from situational awareness cameras and required a separate IUP. Based on OIG's analysis and the Department's reassessment of all IUPs following the 2025 amendments to the POST Act, Digidog is in the IUP titled, "Remote Controlled Robots: Tactical."

technologies. In complying with the amended POST Act, recommendations 1, 2, 4, 5 and 7 are now considered fully implemented.

A full copy of the Report can be accessed [here](#).

## **VII. An Assessment of NYPD’s Compliance with the POST Act (2024)**

The Public Oversight of Surveillance Technology (“POST”) Act, passed in June 2020, requires NYPD to publicly disclose information concerning its use of surveillance technologies, and its policies with respect to those technologies through Impact and Use Policies (“IUPs”). The law further requires OIG-NYPD to prepare annual audits of NYPD’s IUPs.

In OIG-NYPD’s third annual report related to the Department’s compliance with the POST Act, the Office reviewed NYPD’s use of unmanned aircraft systems (“UAS”), commonly referred to as drones, and the IUPs related to the surveillance technology.

OIG-NYPD’s review found that while the Thermographic Cameras IUP was sufficient with respect to drone technology, NYPD’s UAS IUP did not sufficiently disclose all the information required by the POST Act. Specifically, the UAS IUP did not describe the full capabilities of the Department’s drone fleet or provide a complete and accurate account of NYPD UAS operations in practice.

OIG-NYPD made ten recommendations that focused on increasing transparency regarding the capabilities of drone technology and the policies and procedures regulating its use by the Department. On March 20, 2025, NYPD provided its 90-day response letter. The Department accepted all ten recommendations. During this review cycle, OIG-NYPD reviewed the updates to the Impact and Use Policies related to UAS and as a result, recommendations 3-6, and 8-10 moved from accepted in principle to fully implemented.

A full copy of the Report can be accessed [here](#).

## Appendix: Recommendation Status of Reports Issued January 2015-December 2025

### 2015

#### Observations on Accountability and Transparency in Ten NYPD Chokehold Cases

#	Recommendation	Status
Rec. 1	NYPD and CCRB should increase coordination and collaboration to reconsider and refine the disciplinary system for improper use of force.	I
Rec. 2	NYPD should provide transparency with respect to the Police Commissioner's disciplinary decisions.	I
Rec. 3	NYPD should expand the Internal Affairs Bureau's access to newly filed complaints and substantive information on Use-of-Force cases filed with CCRB.	I
Rec. 4	NYPD should improve information sharing and case tracking for cases that are outsourced to borough and precinct investigators via the Office of the Chief of Department and Investigative Review Section.	I

#### Using Data from Lawsuits and Legal Claims Involving NYPD to Improve Policing

#	Recommendation	Status
Rec. 1.1	NYPD should perform a qualitative review of the most relevant data contained within legal claims and lawsuits against NYPD. Specifically: Nature of the claims/core allegations.	I
Rec. 1.2	NYPD should perform a qualitative review of the most relevant data contained within legal claims and lawsuits against NYPD. Specifically: Information about the subject police officer(s).	I

#	Recommendation	Status
Rec. 2	NYPD should create an interagency working group between NYPD, the Comptroller's Office, and the Law Department to improve their police-involved litigation data collection, coordination, and exchange.	I
Rec. 3	NYPD should provide the public with details about NYPD's Early Intervention System and its litigation data analysis team and solicit suggestions for further development. <sup>13</sup>	I
Rec. 1	NYPD Should Perform a Qualitative Review of the Most Relevant Data Contained Within Legal Claims and Lawsuits Against NYPD.	UC
Rec. 1.3	NYPD should perform a qualitative review of the most relevant data contained within legal claims and lawsuits against NYPD. Specifically: the location of the alleged incident and address of the plaintiff(s). <sup>14</sup>	UC

### Body-Worn Cameras in NYC: Assessment of NYPD's Pilot Program and Recommendations to Promote Accountability

#	Recommendation	Status
Rec. 1.1	NYPD should broaden and illustrate the standard for the mandatory activation of BWCs during street or investigative encounters.	I
Rec. 1.2	NYPD should redefine the safety exception for recording.	I
Rec. 1.3	NYPD should consider stricter limitations on recording vulnerable populations.	I

<sup>13</sup> The current Early Intervention program makes information available here: <https://www.nyc.gov/site/nypd/stats/reports-analysis/early-intervention-program-reports.page> changing the status of Rec. 3 from (PI) to (I).

<sup>14</sup> NYPD has agreed to analyze the location of incidents and seeks to house a data analysis team for analyzing data changing the status of Rec. 1.3 from (R) to (UC).

#	Recommendation	Status
Rec. 1.4	NYPD should expand BWC training for officers using BWCs.	I
Rec. 2.1	NYPD should provide an example notification phrase to advise members of the public that they are being recorded.	I
Rec. 2.2	NYPD should redefine the safety exception for notifications.	I
Rec. 3.1	NYPD should require supervisors to review footage related to documented incidents.	I
Rec. 3.2	NYPD should address discipline when the BWC program is more established and formalized.	I
Rec. 3.3	NYPD should computerize the random selection of officers for review.	I
Rec. 3.4	NYPD should establish a system for high-level and periodic review.	I
Rec. 4.1	NYPD should grant supervisors general access to BWC footage with restrictions on arbitrary review.	I
Rec. 4.3	NYPD should solicit feedback and suggestions for improvement from supervisors performing quality assurance reviews and officers participating in the Volunteer BWC Pilot Program.	I
Rec. 5.1	NYPD should develop policies to guide supervisors when officer infractions are observed on BWC footage.	I
Rec. 5.2	NYPD should institute mandatory reporting procedures.	I
Rec. 5.3	NYPD should integrate BWC recordings into NYPD's existing force monitoring programs.	I

#	Recommendation	Status
Rec. 6.2	In all other instances, access to recordings prior to making statements should be noted in those statements.	I
Rec. 7.1	If and when disclosing BWC video, NYPD should provide privacy and safety protections for vulnerable populations.	I
Rec. 8.1	NYPD should establish a minimum retention period of at least 18 months.	I
Rec. 9	NYPD should incorporate government and public input in continuing to develop the BWC program.	I
Rec. 4.2	NYPD should integrate BWC footage review into NYPD's field training program. <sup>15</sup>	R
Rec. 6.1	Access to BWC recordings should be limited where officers are under investigation or are witnesses in misconduct investigations.	R
Rec. 7.2	NYPD should ensure fairness between citizens' and officers' right to view BWC footage.	R
Rec. 8.2	NYPD should ensure expeditious purging of archived BWC footage that no longer holds evidentiary value.	R

## Police Use of Force in New York City: Findings and Recommendations on NYPD's Policies and Practices

#	Recommendation	Status
Rec. 1	The NYPD Patrol Guide should include definitional language that provides officers and the public with greater clarity regarding what is meant by "force," "excessive force," and "deadly physical force."	I

<sup>15</sup> While the Department uses BWC footage to train officers at the command level, in-service training and at the police academy, the Department's FTO Program is published by NYS DCJS and has a DCJS curriculum; therefore, Rec. 4.2 moved from (AIP) to (R).

#	Recommendation	Status
Rec. 2	NYPD should update Patrol Guide §203-11 governing use of force and require officers to de-escalate all encounters where appropriate.	I
Rec. 3	NYPD should create a separate, uniform use-of-force reporting form.	I
Rec. 5	NYPD should create a database to track comprehensive Department-wide information on use of force, including data compiled from the use-of-force forms.	I
Rec. 6	NYPD should compile data and publish, on an annual basis, a report addressing Department-wide metrics on use of force, including but not limited to information from the new use-of-force reporting form. This report would track and collect various components related to the issue of use of force, including those addressed in this Report, such as officer tenure, assignments, age, type of force used, pertinent information regarding members of the public subjected to force, as well as officer injuries, disciplinary trends and outcomes, and other data deemed necessary for a comprehensive understanding of the issue.	I
Rec. 7	NYPD training should place a stronger and more thorough emphasis on de-escalation tactics, by adding specific Police Academy and in-service courses on de-escalation that incorporate both classroom and scenario-based training.	I
Rec. 8	NYPD should incorporate a formal evaluation system for all scenario-based trainings concerning the use of force.	I
Rec. 9	NYPD should increase funding and personnel at the Police Academy with respect to training for both recruits and in-service officers.	I
Rec. 10	NYPD should implement training to instruct officers to intervene in situations where other officers escalate encounters, use excessive force, and/or commit other misconduct.	I
Rec. 11	NYPD should review use-of-force trends to identify which categories of officers (e.g., by years of service and/or duty assignments) are most in need of de-escalation and use-of-force in-service training, and then implement such instruction.	I

#	Recommendation	Status
Rec. 12	In disciplinary cases where there are multiple disciplinary counts, each count should have an accompanying distinct penalty, as opposed to an aggregated penalty for all counts.	I
Rec. 13	NYPD should collect, review, and compare data regarding disciplinary penalties imposed in use-of-force cases and report on the effects of disciplinary penalties on the frequency of incidents of excessive force. NYPD should publish data in the previously mentioned annual report (Recommendation 6) on the number and percentage of cases in which the Police Commissioner reduces or declines discipline.	I
Rec. 14	NYPD should set forth, in writing, in its disciplinary paperwork, the extent to which an officer's placement on force monitoring has or has not impacted the penalty imposed.	I
Rec. 15	NYPD should share a subject officer's force monitoring history with CCRB's Administrative Prosecution Unit (APU) since this information is a critical element that must be taken into consideration when CCRB recommends penalties.	I
Rec. 4	NYPD should require all officers—whether the subject of a force investigation or a witness to a use of force—to document and report all force incidents. When completing this document, officers should use descriptive language to articulate the events leading up to the use of force in encounters with the public, the reason why the force was used, and the level and type of force used.	R

## 2016

### An Analysis of Quality-Of-Life Summonses, Quality-Of-Life Misdemeanor Arrests, and Felony Crimes in New York City, 2010-2015

#	Recommendation	Status
Rec. 4	NYPD should release incident-level and geographically-coded data on summonses and misdemeanor arrests.	I
Rec. 5	NYPD should release historical incident-level and geographic data.	I
Rec. 6	NYPD should ensure that data currently released in yearly formats also include more granular temporal data, including month-to-month formats and incident-level data.	I
Rec. 7	All incident-level crime data, from felony arrests and complaints to misdemeanor arrests and summonses, should be released in the same accessible spreadsheet file format (.csv or similar file format).	I
Rec. 1	NYPD should assess the relative effectiveness of quality-of-life summonses, quality-of-life misdemeanor arrests, and other disorder reduction strategies in reducing felony crime, demonstrating whether statistically significant relationships exist between these particular disorder reduction tactics and specific felony crimes.	R
Rec. 2	NYPD should conduct an analysis to determine whether quality-of-life enforcement disproportionately impacts black and Hispanic residents, males aged 15-20, and NYCHA residents.	R
Rec. 3	NYPD should expand consideration regarding quality-of-life enforcement beyond short-term real-time conditions.	R

## An Investigation of NYPD's Compliance with Rules Governing Investigations of Political Activity

#	Recommendation	Status
Rec. 1	For investigations of political activity, NYPD should use a formal mechanism for tracking investigative deadlines and should ensure that, where needed, extensions are approved prior to required deadlines.	I
Rec. 2	NYPD should use a formal case-tracking mechanism that identifies when investigations advance to the next investigative level.	I
Rec. 3	For the use of confidential informants and undercover officers in investigations of political activity, NYPD should use a formal mechanism for tracking expiration deadlines and ensure that extensions are approved prior to the expiration of an authorization.	I
Rec. 5	For authorizations and renewals of investigations, NYPD should create controls to ensure that authorizations to renew or extend investigations properly capture the date, signature, and approval of the authorizing officials.	I
Rec. 8	NYPD should create controls to ensure that authorizations to use or extend the use of human sources properly capture the date, signature, and approval of the appropriate supervisor.	I
Rec. 9	NYPD's Human Source Authorization Form should include the number of the extension request and the date of the last extension.	I
Rec. 4	For requests to extend a Preliminary Inquiry, NYPD should ensure that Investigative Statements capture fact-specific reasons why further investigative steps are warranted.	R
Rec. 6	NYPD's Human Source Authorization Form should require members of NYPD's Intelligence Bureau to specify the role of the undercover officer or confidential informant.	R
Rec. 7	NYPD should specify, when extending use of an undercover or confidential informant, the reason for the extension.	R

#	Recommendation	Status
Rec. 10	NYPD should consolidate its policies and procedures for investigations involving political activity into a unified handbook.	R
Rec. 11	NYPD should develop written guidelines concerning informational standards for Preliminary Inquiries, Full Investigations, and Terrorism Enterprise Investigations.	R

## 2017

### Putting Training into Practice: A Review of NYPD's Approach to Handling Interactions with People in Mental Crisis

#	Recommendation	Status
Rec. 1	NYPD should commit to creating timelines for any changes to its CIT initiative within 90 days of the publication of this Report.	I
Rec. 3	NYPD should create a dedicated mental health unit, or at the very least appoint a CIT coordinator who holds the rank of chief, in order to manage all aspects of a CIT program.	I
Rec. 4	NYPD should revise its Patrol Guide to explicitly authorize CIT-trained officers to use the skills learned in CIT training during crisis situations.	I
Rec. 5	NYPD should revise its Patrol Guide to require that CIT-trained officers respond to all crisis incidents whenever possible.	I
Rec. 6	NYPD should revise its Patrol Guide to allow all officers to use their discretion to refer individuals to officially approved and vetted outside community resources in appropriate incidents.	I
Rec. 7	NYPD should either substantially revise one of its current forms or develop a new permanent form to capture more useful data on incidents involving persons in crisis.	I
Rec. 8	NYPD should analyze data regarding mental crisis incidents.	I
Rec. 9	NYPD should consider training more officers in CIT.	I
Rec. 10	NYPD should begin training 911 call takers and dispatchers in at least some aspects of CIT.	I
Rec. 11	In every CIT training, NYPD should ensure that its officers interact with people living with mental illnesses.	I

#	Recommendation	Status
Rec. 12	In every CIT training, NYPD should assess the retention of officers' skills.	I
Rec. 13	NYPD should provide a manual or reference guide to officers who undergo CIT training.	I
Rec. 2	NYPD should adjust its dispatch procedures to ensure that officers with CIT training are directed to crisis incidents.	PI

### Addressing Inefficiencies in NYPD's Handling of Complaints: An Investigation of the "Outside Guidelines" Complaint Process

#	Recommendation	Status
Rec. 1	NYPD should update and unify the computer systems it uses to track and manage OG cases by upgrading OCD IRS from BCATS to ICIS (or an ICIS - compatible system).	I
Rec. 2	NYPD should establish a uniform timeframe for completing OG investigations and a uniform system of tracking due dates.	I
Rec. 4	NYPD should revise the current OG Disposition and Penalty Form to include a box denoting the case's due date as well as a date section for each stage of the investigation.	I
Rec. 5	NYPD should implement a web-based procedure for communicating the status and results of externally generated OG investigations back to the community members who filed the complaints.	I
Rec. 3	If an OG investigation has not been completed within 90 days, the assigned supervising investigator should be required to request an extension from OCD IRS in writing, stating the reason for this request.	PI
Rec. 6	NYPD should publish quarterly reports on OG complaints.	R

## When Undocumented Immigrants are Crime Victims: An Assessment of NYPD's Handling of U Visa Certification Requests

#	Recommendation	Status
Rec. 2	When denying a U visa certification request based on the applicant's criminal history, NYPD should articulate, in its internal file, the reasons why the criminal history presents an ongoing public safety concern and warrants denial.	I
Rec. 3	If NYPD's investigative file states that the applicant was not cooperative but the applicant certification request or other information in the investigative file suggests the applicant had a reasonable basis for not helping law enforcement, NYPD should assess whether the non-cooperation was reasonable by contacting both the NYPD personnel who investigated the incident and the party requesting the U visa certification. <sup>16</sup>	I
Rec. 5	If an arrest has been made on the underlying crime, NYPD should evaluate U visa certification requests if the criminal case has closed.	I
Rec. 8	NYPD should publish contact information for its reviewers and certifying officials.	I
Rec. 10	NYPD should develop informational training on U visas for specialized NYPD units that frequently encounter immigrant communities. <sup>17</sup>	I
Rec. 4	NYPD should provide a written rationale in its internal file when concluding that the applicant was not a victim of a qualifying crime. <sup>18</sup>	PI

<sup>16</sup> Recommendation 3 was changed from partially implemented to implemented with the memorialization of Department policy regarding uncooperative U Visa applicants in Patrol Guide Procedure 207-37.

<sup>17</sup> NYPD provided OIG-NYPD with a copy of their training on U-visas for uniformed members of the Department who frequently encounter immigrant communities changing Rec. 10 from (PI) to (I).

<sup>18</sup> A form containing a list of qualifying crimes as well as the crime the applicant was subjected to is included in the internal file of each applicant; however, it is not codified that the narrative be completed with reasoning as to why an applicant did not meet the criteria for a U visa, changing Rec. 4 from (R) to (PI); pending further review during the next annual report cycle.

#	Recommendation	Status
Rec. 7	NYPD's denial letters should articulate specific reasons for each denial, using the facts of the case to explain the decision. <sup>19</sup>	PI
Rec. 9	NYPD should develop written materials regarding the U visa program for dissemination at precincts and other locations where victims may encounter police. <sup>20</sup>	PI
Rec. 1	NYPD should develop concrete, written standards on how to conduct an assessment of an applicant's criminal background and on the types of criteria that warrant denial of the certification request.	R
Rec. 6	NYPD should create and publish its complete standards for certification eligibility.	R

## Review of NYPD's Implementation of Patrol Guide Procedures Concerning Transgender and Gender Non-Conforming People

#	Recommendation	Status
Rec. 1	NYPD should provide mandatory in-service training and accompanying resource materials on the 2012 Patrol Guide revisions to all uniformed members through the NYPD-U webinar platform. Training attendance and completion should be tracked to ensure that all members of the police force have received this training. NYPD should conduct this training within the next six months.	I
Rec. 2	NYPD should create a memo book insert for officers with a summary of the revised LGBTQ protocols. Officers can use this for reference as needed.	I

<sup>19</sup> NYPD's denial letters indicate broad categories for denial and do not contain case specific details which changes Rec. 7 from (R) to (PI)

<sup>20</sup> NYPD's creation of a draft certification brochure for the Domestic Violence U-visa Unit containing the Family Justice Center's hours of operation and contact information changes Rec. 9 from (R) to (PI).

#	Recommendation	Status
Rec. 3	Community input should be carefully considered and incorporated as appropriate into the curriculum of officer training on LGBTQ issues.	I
Rec. 4	All handouts and additional resource materials provided during LGBTQ trainings should be consistent, as appropriate, ensuring that officers receive the same information.	I
Rec. 7	NYPD should consult with its LGBT Advisory Committee and re-examine whether and how to record gender identity information of TGNC people on NYPD forms and databases. The collection of this information is a sensitive matter for some members of the LGBTQ community. Any changes in how such information is recorded must not interfere with NYPD's ability to describe and circulate descriptions of suspects and persons of interest for purposes of apprehension.	I
Rec. 5	Within six months, NYPD should report to OIG-NYPD whether and how the Department will change remaining forms and databases to record an individual's preferred name in a separate field.	PI
Rec. 6	On a periodic basis, NYPD should make sure that police stations are using updated forms, particularly those documents that are intended to comply with the 2012 revisions.	AIP
Rec. 8	NYPD Internal Affairs Bureau's complaint system should be configured to categorize and track all LGBTQ-related allegations that implicate biased conduct, and not just "profiling." LGBTQ-related allegations involving bias would include violations of the 2012 Patrol Guide revisions and "offensive language."	R
Rec. 9	IAB should report patterns and trends associated with LGBTQ-related complaints to NYPD's LGBT Liaison to the Police Commissioner as well as to DOI pursuant to NYPD's reporting obligations under Local Law 70.	R

## 2018

### An Investigation of NYPD's New Force Reporting System

#	Recommendation	Status
Rec. 1	NYPD should add a field to the "Force Used" section of the arrest report for officers to note the associated T.R.I. incident number(s).	I
Rec. 3	NYPD should add a narrative section to the T.R.I. and require officers to provide a full account of the force incident, including specific details on the force used by the officer and/or members of the public, the chronology of the force encounter, as well as any injuries sustained by either.	I
Rec. 4	NYPD should add additional checkboxes to the T.R.I. worksheet to allow for more specificity in describing the force used by an officer, including a closed fist strike, an open-hand strike, and a knee strike.	I
Rec. 5	NYPD should add a section to the T.R.I. worksheet that prompts officers to indicate where exactly on the person's body force was used.	I
Rec. 7	NYPD should require desk officers to question the involved officers about any force used during arrest processing so that the command log accurately reflects the force incident.	I
Rec. 10	NYPD must enhance supervisory review of all arrest-related documentation at the local command level. In high-volume commands, NYPD should assign specially trained supervisors at the rank of sergeant or above to carefully review such documents during arrest processing to ensure that all uses of reportable force are properly documented.	I
Rec. 11	NYPD should dedicate well-trained and knowledgeable personnel to be available by phone during all shifts to answer questions from command supervisors regarding T.R.I. worksheets and approval. NYPD should consider removing this function from the Internal Affairs Bureau.	I
Rec. 12	NYPD should include in Patrol Guide series 221 a clear and unambiguous definition of "reportable force" by officers. The current policy provides a definition of force when used against officers and defines three levels of force by officers, but a lack of clarity still exists	I

#	Recommendation	Status
	for many officers regarding whether certain actions constitute reportable force.	
Rec. 13	NYPD should establish a clear policy that requires arresting officers to select “Yes” on the arrest report in response to the “Force Used” section if any officer used reportable force during the encounter.	I
Rec. 14	NYPD should impose appropriate discipline against arresting officers who fail to select “Force Used: Yes” on the arrest report when reportable force is found to have been used.	I
Rec. 15	NYPD should revise policies to ensure that the narrative or “Remarks” section of Medical Treatment of Prisoner forms include fact-specific details sufficient to explain the individual’s condition and, where known, what caused the condition. If an individual sustained an injury in the course of the police encounter, the form should specify the type of injury and its cause.	I
Rec. 16	NYPD should provide officers with more training and formal reminders on (a) when and how to complete a T.R.I. form and the importance of submitting the T.R.I. form, and (b) how to write a detailed account of a force encounter (should a narrative section is added to the T.R.I. form).	I
Rec. 17	NYPD should provide more training for desk officers, integrity control officers, precinct training sergeants, and other supervisors to (a) ensure T.R.I. compliance and proper supervisory review of completed T.R.I. worksheets, and (b) closely examine the arrest report narratives and the “Force Used” section on the arrest reports to ensure that officers are selecting “Yes” for “Force Used” when force was used.	I
Rec. 19	NYPD’s Force Review process should include quality-control procedures that seek to improve the accuracy of force reporting not only on T.R.I. forms, but also on arrest reports and other arrest-related documentation.	I
Rec. 21B	NYPD should use data from T.R.I. forms to publish annual Use-of-Force reports that identify and analyze trends in all force categories. The report should contain all information currently mandated by law and include the following trend analyses: B) Types of interactions leading to injuries;	I

#	Recommendation	Status
Rec. 21C	NYPD should use data from T.R.I. forms to publish annual Use-of-Force reports that identify and analyze trends in all force categories. The report should contain all information currently mandated by law and include the following trend analyses: C) Officer use of force based on job tenure and experience;	I
Rec. 21E	NYPD should use data from T.R.I. forms to publish annual Use-of-Force reports that identify and analyze trends in all force categories. The report should contain all information currently mandated by law and include the following trend analyses: E) Demographic characteristics of members of the public and officers involved in force incidents; <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Are there disparities in the types or amount of force used based on age, gender, race, national origin, precinct, or other factors?</li> <li>• What are the reasons for such disparities?</li> </ul>	I
Rec. 18	NYPD should conduct an annual audit of T.R.I. compliance and include the results in its annual and public Use-of-Force report.	PI
Rec. 21D	NYPD should use data from T.R.I. forms to publish annual Use-of-Force reports that identify and analyze trends in all force categories. The report should contain all information currently mandated by law and include the following trend analyses: D) Commands with the highest rates of force; <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Is the frequency of force consistent with crime and arrest rates in these commands?</li> <li>• Are certain units more or less likely to employ force?</li> </ul>	PI
Rec. 2	NYPD should continue to develop its software capabilities, which now initiate the creation of a T.R.I. number when an officer indicates on an arrest report that force was used, to also prompt officers that they may have to complete a T.R.I. when certain arrest charges are entered (such as Resisting Arrest or Assault on a Police Officer), when the arrest report indicates an arrestee or officer injury has occurred, and in other similar scenarios.	R
Rec. 6	NYPD should impose (a) an “end of tour” deadline by which officers must complete a required T.R.I. form, with appropriate exceptions, and (b) appropriate discipline against officers who fail to meet the deadline, except when certain exceptions apply.	R

#	Recommendation	Status
Rec. 21A	NYPD should use data from T.R.I. forms to publish annual Use-of-Force reports that identify and analyze trends in all force categories. The report should contain all information currently mandated by law and include the following trend analyses: A) All force encounters disaggregated by the reason force was used.	R
Rec. 8	NYPD should reinstate the “Force Used” checkbox on the arrest-processing stamp used in precinct command logs and add an entry on the stamp for force details and the T.R.I. incident number. <sup>21</sup>	NLA
Rec. 9	NYPD should prompt desk officers to record the details of a force incident and the T.R.I. incident number in the command log, including details from the “Force Used” checkbox on the arrest-processing stamp, as required by Patrol Guide Series 221. <sup>22</sup>	NLA
Rec. 20	NYPD should standardize the quarterly reporting mechanism for bureau and patrol borough commanders and ensure that their quarterly T.R.I. reports are submitted to the First Deputy Commissioner in a timely fashion.	NLA

## An Investigation of NYPD’s Special Victims Division – Adult Sex Crimes

#	Recommendation	Status
Rec. 5	NYPD should increase in-house training opportunities for SVD staff in order to better prepare them for the rigors and unique nature of SVD work. The depth and rigor of this training should be equivalent to the training provided to other specialized units in NYPD.	I

<sup>21</sup> Arrest Reports are digitized and effectively indicate when force is used. Requesting the Department to record when force is used in the command log is duplicative and less practical for review and oversight given the update to electronic record-keeping. As such, rec. 8 is moved from (R) to (NLA).

<sup>22</sup> Arrest Reports are digitized and effectively indicate when force is used. Requesting the Department to record when force is used in the command log is duplicative and less practical for review and oversight given the update to electronic record-keeping. As such, rec. 9 is moved from (R) to (NLA).

#	Recommendation	Status
Rec. 6	To the extent that it is inevitable that patrol officers may be the first to respond to sexual assaults in exigent circumstances, NYPD should expand existing training, both in-service and at the academy, to include trauma-informed care and best practices regarding sexual assault.	I
Rec. 7	NYPD should formally end the “triaging” process for sex crimes— instead, all sex crimes should be investigated and enhanced by SVD detectives, including patrol arrests for “domestic rape” and “acquaintance rape.” The implementation of this recommendation will have staffing implications that are not accounted for in Recommendation 1 above, and NYPD should, therefore, include appropriate staffing increases in implementing this recommendation.	I
Rec. 10	NYPD should take steps to safeguard the identifying information of sex crimes victims, including conducting a review of the various reports, forms, and memoranda generated during the course of a sex crimes investigation that unnecessarily require the victim’s name, address, or other contact information.	I
Rec. 11	NYPD should review the use of CompStat as the oversight mechanism for SVD.	I
Rec. 12	NYPD should increase and publicize existing efforts to encourage victims of sex crimes to come forward and report these crimes to law enforcement. At the same time, NYPD should take new steps to advise policy makers and the public that success in this area will result in an apparent rise in the “index crime numbers” for sexual assault cases, even if the “true” rate of sex crimes remains unchanged.	I
Rec. 1	NYPD should immediately increase the staffing level in SVD’s adult sex crime units to meet the minimum investigative capacity required by an evidence backed and nationally-accepted staffing analysis model. To appropriately handle a caseload as seen in 2017, that model would require an additional 21 detectives in Manhattan SVS, 11 detectives in Bronx SVS, 16 detectives in Queens SVS, 21 detectives in Brooklyn SVS, and four detectives to in Staten Island SVS.	PI
Rec. 4	NYPD should immediately take steps to improve SVD’s ability to recruit and retain experienced detectives by making SVD a “graded” division. Once completed, NYPD should end the practice of transferring officers to SVD without extensive investigative experience.	PI

#	Recommendation	Status
Rec. 8	NYPD should find new physical locations and/or completely renovate all five SVD adult sex crime unit locations. These new physical locations should be easily accessible from public transportation and built out in the model of the Children's Advocacy Centers now operational in New York City.	PI
Rec. 2	NYPD should adopt an evidence-based investigative staffing model that relies on actual investigative hours available and projected caseload and continuously monitor SVD caseloads and staffing levels to ensure the appropriate number of staff are available for the assigned caseloads. <sup>23</sup>	AIP
Rec. 3	NYPD should use the staffing model adopted in Recommendation 2 to appropriately staff the other SVD sub-units. <sup>24</sup>	AIP
Rec. 9	NYPD should invest in a new case management system for SVD that would replace ECMS. The new system should have the highest security protocols and limit access to the case detective and their immediate supervisors within SVD. In addition, any new system should have advanced caseload, staff management, and data analysis capabilities.	AIP

### Ongoing Examination of Litigation Data Involving NYPD

#	Recommendation	Status
Rec. 3	NYPD should regularly enter data about claims naming individual officers into its new Risk Assessment Information Liability System (RAILS), or comparable early intervention system, so that NYPD is aware of at-risk officers who may require assistance.	I

<sup>23</sup> The NYPD reviews caseloads monthly to ensure that the projected numbers remain consistent with the targeted case load identified by the Commanding Officer; therefore, until the practice is codified Rec. 2 and Rec. 3 are (AIP) as opposed to (R).

<sup>24</sup> Rec. 3 recommends that the NYPD use the method used for staffing adopted in rec. 2 to apply to sub-units and based on the two recommendations connection, rec. 3 is also (AIP) as opposed to (R).

#	Recommendation	Status
Rec. 4	NYPD should create public reports that do not violate rules of confidentiality, taking care to disclose only the number and the general nature of claims filed against the Department as well as the current state of any interventions or policy changes. <sup>25</sup>	PI
Rec. 1	NYPD should analyze Department-wide litigation patterns and trends as well as observable patterns and trends within individual precincts and units in order to identify areas for improvement in Department policies, training, supervision, and tactics. In paying greater attention to data within individual precincts, NYPD should review and analyze patterns and trends such as those shown in DOI's analysis of the 77th Precinct. <sup>26</sup>	UC
Rec. 2	NYPD should create internal reports that describe specific Department-wide and precinct or unit level patterns and trends in legal claims and should share these reports with command leadership. <sup>27</sup>	UC
Rec. 5	NYPD should increase the number of employees focusing primarily on tracking litigation trends in order for NYPD to conduct proactive litigation analysis so that patterns and trends can be identified, tracked, and, where necessary, addressed.	R

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<sup>25</sup> Local Law 166 requires the NYC Law Department to publish claims against the Department and as such, OIG-NYPD reassessed this recommendation moving it from (R) to (PI) as the information requested is in part publicly available.

<sup>26</sup> The current Early Intervention Program is distinct from the one assessed in 2018, and the Department is willing to consider more actively utilizing the litigation data provided to it by the Law Department and published by the Law Department pursuant to Local Law 166 moving Rec. 1 from (R) to (UC).

<sup>27</sup> As noted in response to the 2015 Litigation Data report, the Department is willing to consider more actively utilizing the litigation provided and published by the Law Department bringing Rec. 2 (UC) from (R).

## 2019

### 2019 Assessment of Litigation Data Involving NYPD

#	Recommendation	Status
Rec. 1	NYPD should consider incorporating peer officer averages and performance indicator ratios in its thresholds for RAILS, or other approaches that would account for officers with greater activity who may not necessarily exhibit problematic behavior.	NLA <sup>28</sup>
Rec. 2	NYPD should seek input from supervisors in further developments of RAILS and create a mechanism for supervisors to direct their feedback. Supervisors should be involved in each stage of the development and implementation process for RAILS. NYPD should have a formal, standing mechanism for supervisors to direct their feedback, including any problems or concerns with the system.	NLA
Rec. 3	NYPD should ensure that sufficient and ongoing training is available to all supervisors once RAILS is fully developed. Such training should specifically take into account supervisors' new roles and responsibilities with the system.	NLA
Rec. 4	NYPD should ensure there are procedures in place before RAILS is fully implemented to hold supervisors accountable for upholding their responsibilities concerning the system. These procedures should include a policy outlining how often supervisors should log on to RAILS and review their alerts. NYPD should also take steps to confirm that supervisors are following this policy as directed, such as by conducting regular audits of the system.	NLA

<sup>28</sup> Each of the four recommendations drafted in the 2019 Assessment of Litigation Data Involving NYPD Report are no longer applicable due to the dissolution of NYPD's Risk Assessment Information Liability System ("RAILS").

## Complaints of Biased Policing in New York City: An Assessment of NYPD's Investigations, Policies, and Training<sup>29</sup>

#	Recommendation	Status
Rec. 4	Consistent with NYPD's investigative training, NYPD should amend its written investigative procedures to document the number of attempts that investigators must make to contact complainants for interviews when investigating biased policing complaints before the case is closed.	I
Rec. 5	NYPD should amend its written investigative procedures to require investigators to attempt to interview incarcerated complainants when such complainants are being held at a jail located within the five boroughs of New York City (regardless of whether the jail is managed by NYC Department of Correction, NYS Department of Corrections and Community Supervision, or the federal Bureau of Prisons).	I
Rec. 6	Consistent with NYPD's investigative training, NYPD should amend its written investigative procedures to state that a guilty status, plea, or conviction does not resolve the issue of whether an officer or a non-uniformed employee engaged in discriminatory conduct, even if the criminal matter and the complaint of biased policing arise from the same set of underlying facts.	I
Rec. 7	NYPD should amend its written investigative procedures to state that a complainant's previous criminal history should not be dispositive of whether a biased policing allegation is substantiated. Where NYPD does regard the complainant's previous criminal history as a factor in a non-substantiation decision, the investigator should articulate how the criminal history impacted the decision and the investigator must still complete a full investigation of the allegation.	I
Rec. 8	Consistent with NYPD's investigative training, the Department should amend its written investigative procedures to state that a subject officer's race/ethnicity or other protected status should not be determinative in deciding whether to substantiate a biased policing allegation, even when the officer (or non-uniformed employee) and complainant identify as members of the same race/ethnicity or other protected group.	I

<sup>29</sup> Recommendation 20-21 are related to CCRB and have been implemented by the CCRB.

#	Recommendation	Status
Rec. 9	NYPD should make records of complaints and investigations of biased policing allegations available to CCHR for analysis and review.	I
Rec. 10	NYPD investigators should not be assigned investigations of biased policing allegations until they complete the formal “Profiling and Bias-Based Policing” training for investigating such complaints.	I
Rec. 13	Deputy Chiefs should receive training and reminders emphasizing that biased policing investigations can only be closed when proper investigative protocols have been followed, unless such protocols were impossible to implement or inapplicable to the particular case.	I
Rec. 20	CCRB should add all the protected statuses, such as “National Origin,” “Color,” “Age,” “Alienage,” “Citizenship Status,” and “Housing Status” as outlined in § 14-151 of the NYC Administrative Code and § 203-25 of NYPD’s Patrol Guide, to the sub-classifications of its Offensive Language category.	I
Rec. 21	CCRB should adopt a policy to classify and investigate allegations of biased policing by uniformed members of NYPD under its Abuse of Authority jurisdiction instead of referring such allegations to IAB for investigation. Consistent with this new authority, CCRB should request additional resources from the City to take on this new responsibility if the agency can demonstrate that more resources are necessary.	I
Rec. 22	City agencies that handle biased policing complaints (NYPD, CCRB, CCHR) should convene within the next four months to address the findings and recommendations in OIGNYPD’s investigation. This would, for example, include developing standard categories and definitions for how these complaints are grouped and sub-classified.	I
Rec. 23	NYPD, CCRB, and CCHR should develop protocols and procedures to share data and information on biased policing complaints on a regular basis. To the extent that implementing this Report’s recommendations would require CCRB or CCHR to have prompt access to NYPD records (e.g., case files, data, body-worn camera video, etc.), protocols should	I

#	Recommendation	Status
	be established so that NYPD will commit itself to providing such access to these agencies. <sup>30</sup>	
Rec. 18	NYPD should develop written materials to educate the public about what biased policing is and how members of the public can file biased policing complaints. This information should be conspicuously visible on NYPD's website and in other locations where such information would be readily available to the public.	I
Rec. 1	NYPD should amend its Patrol Guide policies to explicitly require NYPD officers and non-uniformed employees to report instances of biased policing upon observing or becoming aware of such conduct.	AIP
Rec. 2	NYPD should amend its Patrol Guide policies so that complaints alleging the use of offensive or derogatory language associated with an individual's actual or perceived protected status, such as racial slurs, are classified as biased policing if there is a discriminatory intent.	AIP
Rec. 17	NYPD's Performance Monitoring Program should develop monitoring criteria to include officers and non-uniformed employees who are the subject of biased policing complaints, regardless of substantiation, modeled on the metrics currently in use for excessive force complaints.	UC
Rec. 3	NYPD should amend its written investigative procedures related to biased policing so that offensive or derogatory language associated with an individual's actual or perceived protected status, such as an officer's use of racial slurs, is classified, investigated, and adjudicated as a biased policing matter.	R
Rec. 11	NYPD should develop a checklist of all the required protocols for investigating allegations of biased policing, such as interviewing complainants and sub-classifying all applicable protected statuses.	R
Rec. 12	Investigators should be required to complete and submit to their supervisors the checklist with their case closing reports.	R

<sup>30</sup> All necessary protocols have been implemented both internally and with CCRB and have been proven effective to ensure timely compliance with the Department's obligations under the profiling MOU entered between the agencies. Thus, Recommendation 23 moved from (PI) to (I).

#	Recommendation	Status
Rec. 14	With respect to complaints of biased policing, NYPD should ensure that IAB's case management system contains the same controls found in the ICMT system used by NYPD's Bureau/Borough investigators, including controls regarding the requisite number of attempts to contact complainants. This will ensure that the necessary requirements of an investigation are completed prior to the closure of all biased policing cases.	R
Rec. 15	NYPD should develop and implement a pilot mediation program for some biased policing complaints. As part of that program, NYPD should develop criteria for referring to mediation cases involving both uniformed and non-uniformed members.	R
Rec. 19	NYPD should publish statistics for the public as part of an annual report covering biased policing. These statistics should, at a minimum, include a breakdown of the following: (i) the subject officer's uniformed versus non-uniformed status, bureau or unit assignment, gender, race/ethnicity, age, and length of service to the Department; (ii) the self-reported demographics (race/ethnicity, sex, age, etc.) of complainants; (iii) the types of police encounters that resulted in complaints of biased policing; (iv) the number of biased policing complaints initiated by borough and precinct; (v) the discriminatory policing conduct alleged; (vi) the sub-classifications and outcomes of such complaints; and (vii) the status of the Department's efforts to prevent biased policing. This information should be conspicuously visible on NYPD's website and in other locations where such information would be readily available to the public.	R
Rec. 16	NYPD's RAILS should be expanded to capture unsubstantiated biased policing allegations involving both uniformed and non-uniformed members. <sup>31</sup>	NLA

<sup>31</sup> Due to the dissolution of NYPD's Risk Assessment Information Liability System ("RAILS") use within the Department, rec. 16 moved from (AIP) to (NLA).

## An Investigation of NYPD's Officer Wellness and Safety Services

#	Recommendation	Status
Rec. 1	To guide the Department's efforts and memorialize the Department's commitments, NYPD should develop an overarching Mental Health and Wellness policy that articulates goals, establishes standards, and outlines relevant programs and resources. This policy would encompass the recommendations in this Report, the work of the Mental Health and Wellness Coordinator, and the efforts of the Mental Health and Wellness Task Force and the Health and Wellness Section.	I
Rec. 2	NYPD should use the results of its own recent 2019 officer survey on health and wellness (and, if necessary, conduct additional officer surveys with the assistance of outside experts) to inform the Department's overall Mental Health and Wellness policy referenced in Recommendation 1.	I
Rec. 3	Consistent with the size of the Department, NYPD should increase the staffing levels in the Health and Wellness Section to include full-time licensed mental health professionals and support staff with appropriate levels of competency in the areas of mental health and wellness.	I
Rec. 4	NYPD's Health and Wellness Section should have access to specific internal data that would assist the Section with identifying behavioral themes or trends in the conduct of NYPD personnel so as to inform the work of the Section.	I
Rec. 5	NYPD should retain outside mental health experts to review and audit the current range of Department-wide health and wellness trainings provided by NYPD to personnel, many of which are new, and ask these experts to recommend to NYPD what additional training, if any, should be developed and delivered.	I
Rec. 6	NYPD should study the feasibility of establishing mandatory periodic mental health checks for all police officers or certain categories of at-risk officers.	I
Rec. 7	NYPD should modify its early intervention system—Risk Assessment Information Liability System (RAILS)—to include an “officer wellness” category, based on various relevant indicators, so that NYPD personnel requiring officer wellness intervention can be identified.	I

#	Recommendation	Status
Rec. 8	NYPD should establish clear written procedures on debriefing NYPD personnel in the wake of critical incidents and follow up with these officers after the debriefing sessions.	I
Rec. 9	NYPD should collaborate with the National Officer Safety and Wellness Group to help amplify new and existing efforts to reduce suicide among NYPD personnel.	I
Rec. 10	NYPD should establish a mandatory program that provides NYPD personnel approaching retirement with helpful information on the availability of support services following separation, adjusting to life as a member of the public, financial advisement, and medical and retirement benefits.	I
Rec. 11	NYPD should explore the needs of its retired personnel and endeavor to make wellness support services available to them for a reasonable period of time following retirement or separation.	I
Rec. 12	In implementing the recommendations in this Report, NYPD should put in place mechanisms to ensure that the privacy rights of NYPD personnel are respected and strictly protected, both internally and externally, so that information relating to officer health and wellness is not misused and is accessible only by those who need to know. Such efforts should be informed by discussions with officers and representative organizations like police unions and fraternal organizations. <sup>32</sup>	PI

## 2021

### Sharing Police Body Worn Camera Footage in New York City

#	Recommendation	Status
Rec. 3	Within six months of the release of this Report, NYPD should consult with each of the covered Charter § 808 agencies, as well as OIG-NYPD, to determine whether additional access to BWC footage would benefit them in fulfilling their mandates, and engage in good faith discussions to expand or streamline access if necessary.	AIP
Rec. 1	NYPD should conduct an internal review to ensure that sealed BWC footage is not being commingled with unsealed BWC footage, and, if necessary, enact software-level safeguards to prevent sealed BWC footage from being viewed (either within or without NYPD) without a court order or waiver.	R
Rec. 2	In an effort to more efficiently produce BWC footage and assist CCRB in fulfilling its mandate, NYPD should provide CCRB with independent and direct remote access credentials to all BWC storage databases so that BWC videos can be searched and viewed as necessary for CCRB investigations. Such access should be subject to appropriate credentials and audit trails to address security and privacy concerns.	R

## 2022

### An Assessment of NYPD's Response to the POST Act<sup>33</sup>

#	Recommendation	Status
Rec. 1	NYPD should issue an IUP for each individual surveillance technology, as opposed to continuing its practice of grouping similar technologies under a single IUP.	I
Rec. 4	NYPD should include in each IUP the potential disparate impacts on protected groups of the use and deployment of the surveillance technology itself.	I
Rec. 5	NYPD should revise the Health & Safety Reporting sections of all published IUPs, to include any safety hazards that are identifiable on the basis of existing research, manufacturer warnings, or evaluations by experts in the field, or to state that no such hazards have been identified after a search for relevant information.	I
Rec. 11	Within 30 days, NYPD should provide OIG-NYPD an itemized list of the surveillance technologies that it uses. This list should include information concerning the functionalities of each technology, so that OIG-NYPD can assess whether NYPD has, in fact, issued an IUP that covers each surveillance technology that has a distinct functionality or capability.	I
Rec. 12	NYPD should create written policies establishing guidelines to specify the modifications that can be made to probe images used for Facial Recognition Technology.	I
Rec. 14	To facilitate the OIG-NYPD's mandated annual audits, beginning January 15, 2023, NYPD should provide OIG-NYPD with quarterly updates, reflecting newly acquired or discontinued technologies in an itemized list of the surveillance technologies that it uses.	I
Rec. 2	NYPD should identify in each IUP each external agency, by name, with which the Department can share surveillance data.	PI

<sup>33</sup> On or before February 4, 2026, the Department updated all of the Impact and Use Policies ("IUPs") moving Recommendations 1, 5, and 12 from (R) to (I), Rec. 4 and Rec. 11 from (AIP) to (I), Rec. 2, 3 and 8 from (R) to (PI), Rec. 7 and 13 from (R) to (AIP), and Rec. 14 from (UC) to (I).

#	Recommendation	Status
Rec. 3	NYPD should include in each IUP the specific safeguards/restrictions on use or dissemination of the surveillance data, for each external agency with which the Department can share such data.	PI
Rec. 8	Within 90 days, in order to facilitate OIG-NYPD's statutorily obligated audit under the POST Act, NYPD should provide OIG-NYPD with information indicating, for each surveillance technology, the various types of data collected and which NYPD units maintain that information. NYPD should include information about the retention procedures and practices for each type of data collected so that OIG-NYPD can assess NYPD's compliance with the IUP.	PI
Rec. 7	Within 180 days, NYPD should create an internal tracking system for every instance in which NYPD provides an external agency with data collected via surveillance technologies that NYPD controls, including the name of the agency and the date of that the data was provided. <sup>34</sup>	AIP
Rec. 13	NYPD should conduct periodic audits of its Facial Identification Section's use of facial recognition technology to ensure compliance with its policies related to the use of the technology and its data. This auditing process should be memorialized in writing. <sup>35</sup>	AIP
Rec. 15	NYPD should issue a press release announcing the publication, related public comment period of any new IUPs, and subsequently publish the press release on its website.	UC
Rec. 6	Within 180 days, NYPD should convene a working group of NYPD personnel, relevant City Council members or their appointees, and representatives from select advocacy groups and community organizations who have expertise in surveillance technologies. The purpose of the working group is to make recommendations to NYPD on necessary updates to the existing IUPs and on any information that	R

<sup>34</sup> The POST Act was amended in 2025 to, among other things, require the NYPD to develop an (1) internal tracking system to document each instance in which an external entity is provided with data collected by a surveillance technology, including the name of the entity and the data provided. The Department is working internally to develop such systems in compliance with the amended law and as such, Rec. 7 moves from (R) to (AIP).

<sup>35</sup> The POST Act was amended in 2025 to, among other things, require perform audits of the use of FIS's facial recognition technology, the Department has accepted to comply with the amended law. As such, Rec. 13 moves from (R) to (AIP).

#	Recommendation	Status
	<p>should be included in any future IUPs for new technologies, based on the group's expertise. NYPD's procedures applicable to the working group should ensure the protection of sensitive information as appropriate.</p>	
Rec. 9	<p>NYPD should provide OIG-NYPD with any data access and retention policies that are included in the existing contracts with vendors who supply the surveillance technologies used by NYPD.</p>	R
Rec. 10	<p>NYPD should provide OIG-NYPD with the data access and retention policies contained in any newly executed contracts with surveillance technology vendors by the 15th of each quarter (i.e., January, April, July, and October).</p>	R

## 2023

### An Investigation into NYPD’s Criminal Group Database (2023)

#	Recommendation	Status
Rec. 2	Within 180 days, NYPD should revise the IUP for the CGD to describe the activation, renewal, and deactivation processes, explain the nature and extent of the evidence required to satisfy the entry criteria, and identify by name the law enforcement and other external entities with whom NYPD may share information about the individuals included in the CGD, for investigative or other purposes. The document should also describe the security protections that prevent unauthorized parties, within or outside of NYPD, from accessing the CGD. <sup>36</sup>	I
Rec. 4	NYPD should provide written guidance to officers explaining how to apply the Option A and B entry criteria, including examples of the type and extent of evidence that is sufficient for activation. <sup>37</sup>	I
Rec. 5	NYPD should provide written guidance about how to complete the Person Maintenance, Activation, and Renewal DD5s for the maintenance and entry of individuals into the CGD and should include a requirement that available documentation be attached to the DD5s to substantiate that entry criteria are satisfied.	I
Rec. 6	NYPD should create a list of police encounters and arrest types that constitute “qualifying police contact,” for purposes of renewal determinations, to be used by officers responsible for deciding whether to renew or deactivate individuals from the CGD.	I
Rec. 14	NYPD should not consider sealed arrests when making CGD activation and renewal determinations <sup>38</sup>	I

<sup>36</sup> See updates to CGD IUP issued Feb. 4, 2026, which reflect the recommendations of OIG-NYPD and meet the new requirements of the POST Act, as amended. As such, Rec. 2 moved from (PI) to (I).

<sup>37</sup> OIG-NYPD’s review of the NYPD’s Chief of Detectives Memo led to an update in status for Recommendations 4, 5, and 6 from (PI) to (I).

<sup>38</sup> OIG-NYPD confirmed sealed arrests are not considered for renewal determinations. Additionally, NYPD accepts OIG-NYPD’s 2025 recommendation to conduct semi-annual audits to ensure individuals are not renewed on arrests that are subsequently sealed moving Rec. 14 from (PI) to (I).

#	Recommendation	Status
Rec. 15	NYPD should increase the number of staffers assigned to support the administration of the CGD. <sup>39</sup>	I
Rec. 17	Annually, as requested, NYPD should provide a random sample (including minors) of all Activation, Renewal, and Deactivation DD5s and any support documentation to OIG-NYPD for review.	I
Rec. 3	NYPD should require a multilevel review process for the activation, renewal, and deactivation of all entries in the CGD, to be supported by the signature of each reviewer where required. That process should be memorialized in writing.	PI
Rec. 13	NYPD should ensure that officers completing Person Maintenance, Activation, and Renewal forms do not have access to sealed arrest information for those purposes, including, but not limited to, ensuring that DD5 forms used for those purposes do not autofill with sealed arrest information unless explicitly authorized by law.	PI
Rec. 7	Within 180 days, NYPD should begin a review of each entry in the CGD to determine whether inclusion is still warranted. That analysis should be completed by the Department within one year after the publication of this Report. <sup>40</sup>	PI
Rec. 11	NYPD should notify parents or guardians of minors that their children have been activated into the CGD within 60 days of activation unless notification would interfere with active criminal investigations.	AIP
Rec. 1	Within 180 days, NYPD should publish a statement on its website describing how the CGD contributes to the Department's public safety and violent crime reduction strategies. The statement should provide more detail than what is contained in the publicly available IUP and it should describe how the information in the database supports the	AIP

<sup>39</sup> NYPD has increased the number of staff assigned to support the administration of the CGD, and as such Rec. 15 is moved from (PI) to (I).

<sup>40</sup> Rec. 7 was updated from (R) moved to (PI) with the Department's acceptance of Rec. 9 of the 2025 CGD Update report, during which time, confirmation of minors' renewal or deactivation had already begun to occur. Once OIG-NYPD can confirm that this review continues to occur on a periodic basis, the recommendation will be moved to (I).

#	Recommendation	Status
	Department's efforts to combat violent crime as well as its effectiveness as a tool of crime prevention.	
Rec. 8	NYPD should require, by written policy, the review of all CGD entries every twelve months for minors and every eighteen months for adults.	R
Rec. 9	NYPD should make inaccessible via DAS and other search methods all CGD entries that are not evaluated within 60 days of review deadlines, until those entries are reviewed.	R
Rec. 10	NYPD should require and convene a special review panel of Department personnel to approve the activation of minors into the CGD, documented by the signature of the chair of the group.	R
Rec. 12	NYPD should create a process for minors and their parents to appeal their inclusions in the database if the minors have no contact with law enforcement over a twelve-month period.	R
Rec. 16	NYPD should create a written policy formalizing its intention, after an individualized assessment, to generally grant FOIL requests by individuals with respect to whether they are in the CGD, by providing them with redacted versions of any relevant supporting documents if they are in the database, and by informing them that there are no relevant documents, if they are not.	R

### Overtime Under Review: NYPD Overtime and the Increased Risk of Negative Policing Outcomes

#	Recommendation	Status
Rec. 1	NYPD should develop and incorporate policies related to fatigue in its written overtime procedures.	PI
Rec. 3	NYPD should develop and implement training for officers concerning how to recognize and to mitigate the effects of fatigue due to long work hours, as NYPD currently provides to supervisors.	PI

#	Recommendation	Status
Rec. 2	NYPD should develop a system to track off-duty employment hours worked by its officers.	R
Rec. 4	To further inform its development of overtime and fatigue-related policies, NYPD should utilize a consulting firm that specializes in, among other things, risk assessments, to calculate the risks and benefits of overtime and to identify solutions to mitigate those risks while meeting the Department's overtime needs. This assessment should include an analysis of fatigue-associated risks and overtime shift justifications, and the assessment should identify solutions to control overtime shift length and distribution. Depending on the results of this assessment, NYPD should develop appropriate risk mitigation strategies.	R
Rec. 5	NYPD should make the results of the risk assessment recommended in number 4, above, and any recommendations, available on its public website in an area that is readily accessible.	R
Rec. 6	NYPD should codify in its Patrol Guide and/or Administrative Guide any changes made as a result of the risk assessment and recommendations. If no changes are made, NYPD should issue a statement explaining its decision-making on its public website in an area that is readily accessible.	R

### Statement of Findings Regarding NYPD's Technical Assistance and Response Unit and the Revised Handschu Guidelines

#	Recommendation	Status
Rec. 1	NYPD should require in a written policy that TARU notify the Legal Bureau of any requests from the Intelligence Bureau for access to TARU footage.	I
Rec. 3	NYPD should revise Patrol Guide Procedure 212-71 to more accurately reflect NYPD's approach to TARU record retention. If the Department intends to continue its indefinite retention of all video/photographic materials the policy should clearly state that position, and explain the purpose of indefinite retention, as well as any other purposes for which	PI

#	Recommendation	Status
	materials can be retained, and the appropriate length of any such retention. <sup>41</sup>	
Rec. 6	NYPD should revise NYPD Patrol Guide Procedure 212-71 to address the circumstances in which TARU can be deployed without the requisite preauthorization from NYPD's Legal Bureau, and in which retroactive authorization can be granted. <sup>42</sup>	PI
Rec. 2	NYPD should require in a written policy that the Legal Bureau process any requests from the Intelligence Bureau for access to TARU footage in accordance with the Revised Handschu Guidelines.	AIP
Rec. 5	NYPD should replace the current hard copy logbook and content lists which catalogue the video/photographic material collected by TARU (its practice since May 2020) with an electronic tracking system that would enable more efficient searches for particular footage in TARU's library.	AIP
Rec. 4	NYPD should create an index/log for the over two decades of video/photographic footage that was captured prior to May 2020, when the Department began consistently cataloging and indexing such footage.	R
Rec. 7	NYPD should revise NYPD Patrol Guide Procedure 212-71 to require that TARU request logs identify the specific basis and rationale for TARU's request to be present and record at a public gathering, instead of using boilerplate language.	R
Rec. 8	NYPD should require that TARU request logs specify what types of video/photographic technology is sought	R

<sup>41</sup> The revised P.G. 212-71 clarifies that all video recordings/photographs taken by TARU will be indefinitely retained and the purpose for the use of the video recordings are provided. However, the policy does not provide a purpose for indefinite retention. The "Scope" section indicates purposes for which video and/or photographic equipment may be used but not the purpose of indefinitely retaining the resulting materials. As such, Rec. 3 is updated from (AIP) to (PI).

<sup>42</sup> The revised P.G. 212-71 clarifies that there are "exigent circumstances" in which TARU can deploy without Legal Bureau pre-authorization. There is no clarity about what circumstances qualify as "exigent." Rec. 6 is moved from (AIP) to (PI).

## 2024

### An Assessment of NYPD's Compliance with the POST Act<sup>43</sup>

#	Recommendation	Status
Rec. 1	NYPD should issue a new individual IUP for Digidog. <sup>44</sup>	I
Rec. 2	NYPD should amend the addenda to the IUPs applicable to StarChase, IDEMIA, and the AR application to meet all of the requirements of the POST Act. The GPS Tracking Devices' IUP should be updated to adequately disclose the specialized rules, processes, and guidelines, health and safety impacts, and the type of data that may be shared with external entities in relation to StarChase; the Digital Fingerprint Scanning Devices' IUP should be updated to adequately address policies and procedures related to data retention. <sup>45</sup>	I
Rec. 4	For future IUPs, NYPD should group surveillance technologies into single IUPs only when the surveillance technologies at issue are substantially similar in capability and manner of use, and the IUP identifies and specifically names the individual technologies to which specific information within the IUP applies. <sup>46</sup>	I
Rec. 5	NYPD should review its existing IUPs, that "group" multiple surveillance technologies to determine if grouping is permissible under	I

<sup>43</sup> These recommendations are related to the May 2024 release of the POST Act Report. OIG-NYPD agreed to consider implementation of recommendations up until February 15, 2026. Therefore, the February 4, 2026, updates to all IUPs are noted and considered.

<sup>44</sup> A new IUP was drafted to comply with the 2025 amendments to the POST Act. The Remote-Controlled Robots: "Tactical Impact and Use Policy" thereby creates a separate IUP for Digidog and similar technologies. As a result, Rec. 1 is moved from (AIP) to (I).

<sup>45</sup> The addendum in the IUP applicable to StarChase, IDEMIA, and the AR application meet the requirements of the POST Act as amended moving Rec. 2 from (PI) to (I).

<sup>46</sup> In compliance with the amended POST Act, the updated IUPs consist of surveillance technologies that are similar in capabilities and manner of use and as such, Rec. 4 is moved from (AIP) to (I).

#	Recommendation	Status
	the standard set out in Recommendation 4, and issue new IUPs or addenda as appropriate. <sup>47</sup>	
Rec. 7	OIG-NYPD continues to maintain, as it did in its 2022 Report, that while not a requirement of the POST Act, NYPD should include in each IUP the potential disparate impacts of the surveillance technology on protected groups (instead of the potential disparate impacts of the IUP on protected groups, as is currently required under the law). <sup>48</sup>	I
Rec. 6	While not a requirement of the POST Act, NYPD should update the Internal Audit and Oversight sections of its IUPs to include mechanisms for tracking and monitoring use of its surveillance technologies to ensure that the technologies are being used as described in the IUPs, and that the IUPs do not result in a disparate impact on any protected groups.	R
Rec. 3	In the event that NYPD uses K5 in the future, the Department should disclose health and safety information related to the technology within the SAC IUP. <sup>49</sup>	NLA

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<sup>47</sup> In compliance with the amended POST Act, the updated IUPs consist of surveillance technologies that are similar in capabilities and manner of use and as such, Rec. 5 is moved from (AIP) to (I).

<sup>48</sup> In compliance with the amended POST Act, which now requires that each IUP list the disparate impact of the surveillance technology, and as such, Rec. 7 is moved from (R) to (I).

<sup>49</sup> The Department no longer possesses K5 and has not utilized it since the publication of the 2023 POST Act report and while the recommendation was (AIP) the status of Rec. 3 has moved to (NLA) unless the Department returns to using the technology.

## A Review of NYPD's Community Response Team

#	Recommendation	Status
Rec. 1	Update the NYPD website to include information on CRT under the Patrol Services Bureau.	I
Rec. 2	Memorialize a mission statement in writing that includes the aims and goals of CRT, including its crime/offense focus, and publish it on NYPD's website.	I
Rec. 3	Memorialize in the Patrol Guide and/or Administrative Guide policies and procedures specific to CRT for the following areas: uniform requirements; statistics concerning CRT's work that will be maintained by the Department and the individuals responsible for recording/maintaining them; recruitment guidelines; the requirements for CRT officers in supervisory roles; the training required to perform CRT officer duties; and where officers can be deployed and how deployment will be determined.	I
Rec. 5	Conduct a minimum of two inclusive and accessible meetings a year, per Patrol Borough Command to gather community sentiments with respect to CRT and maintain a detailed agenda and minutes from each meeting.	I
Rec. 6	Track and maintain a database for all CRT deployment on a weekly basis.	I
Rec. 4	Collect, analyze, and publish 311-related data, specifically pertaining to QoL categories, that fall under the Department's official QoL definition and CRT's mandate. Analysis should consider changes in 311-related data over time and be used to inform deployment and enforcement decisions.	UC
Rec. 7	Publish the CRT-specific data that NYPD is already collecting for CRT (i.e. arrests, summonses, mopeds, etc.) on the NYPD website.	R

## An Assessment of NYPD's Compliance with the POST Act<sup>50</sup>

#	Recommendation	Status
Rec. 3	Update the UAS IUP to make clear that the requirement of an FAA remote pilot certificate is applicable to all UAS operators, rather than only TARU personnel.	I
Rec. 4	Update the UAS IUP to include all the capabilities of its UAS fleet.	I
Rec. 5	Update the UAS IUP to include a reference to the Thermographic Cameras IUP, which contains additional information relevant to this technological capability of UAS.	I
Rec. 6	Update the UAS IUP to note that operations involving First-Person View drones require a designated visual observer, as per FAA guidelines, except if there is an active COA waiving this requirement.	I
Rec. 8	Update the UAS IUP to reflect that flight log information is automated and should be entered directly into FORMS rather than maintained by TARU.	I
Rec. 9	Update the UAS IUP to disclose health and safety impacts related to UAS.	I
Rec. 10	While not a requirement of the POST Act, update the UAS IUP to include the potential disparate impacts of the use and deployment of UAS technology itself on protected groups, as NYPD has done for certain, but not all, surveillance technologies.	I

<sup>50</sup> These recommendations are related to the December 2024 release of the POST Act Report in which the Department accepted all ten recommendations. OIG-NYPD agreed to consider implementation of recommendations up until February 15, 2026. Therefore, the February 4, 2026, updates to all IUPs are noted and considered. Recommendations 3-6, and 8-10 move from (AIP) to (I), and Recommendations 1, 2 and 7 moved from (AIP) to (PI).

#	Recommendation	Status
Rec. 1	Update the UAS IUP to reflect that TARU personnel are not the only ones operating and supervising UAS operations and currently all operations are performed independently from TARU. <sup>51</sup>	PI
Rec. 2	Update the UAS IUP to accurately describe the approval, supervision, and reporting structure for UAS operations. <sup>52</sup>	PI
Rec. 7	Update the UAS IUP to specify whether TARU is the only unit responsible for retaining UAS data, and if not, specify requirements applied to those other units. <sup>53</sup>	PI

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<sup>51</sup> The updated IUP included that TARU personnel are not the only ones operating and supervising UAS; however, did not include that all operations are performed independently from TARU. Therefore, Rec. 1 is moved from (AIP) to (PI).

<sup>52</sup> The updated IUP describes the approval process; however, a reporting structure for UAS operations is not detailed. Therefore, Rec. 2 is moved from (AIP) to (PI).

<sup>53</sup> The updated IUP describes the data safeguards and retention policies; however, there is no reference to TARU's role or other unit's involvement with UAS data retention, and as such, Rec. 7 moved from (AIP) to (PI).

## 2025

### An Assessment of NYPD's Use of Social Media

#	Recommendation	Status
Rec. 1	Memorialize in writing an internal review and approval process for posts on executive accounts.	I
Rec. 2	Update all relevant Patrol Guide Procedure and Administrative Guide Procedure sections to align with the requirements of the Citywide Social Media Policy.	I
Rec. 3	Review the Citywide Social Media Policy and ensure NYPD complies with all of its requirements.	I
Rec. 4	Update the Department's social media use policy to include rules and guidance about appropriate content and language for posting on official Department social media accounts.	I
Rec. 5	Assign Digital Communications Officers to all social media accounts, including at the executive level, to ensure that social media posts are consistent with citywide and department policy, and memorialize this requirement in writing.	I
Rec. 6	Provide training to all staff using official agency social media regarding the Citywide Social Media Policy, the Department's social media policy, and best practices.	PI

### Update on NYPD's Implementation of DOI's 2023 Criminal Group Database Recommendations

#	Recommendation	Status
Rec. 1	Ensure that all uniformed personnel authorized to nominate individuals into the CGD receive training about the requirements of the IUP and the Chief of Detectives Memorandum.	AIP

#	Recommendation	Status
Rec. 2	Update the IUP and Chief of Detectives Memorandum to require the two independent reliable sources to provide substantive explanations for their reasonable belief of an individual's criminal group membership and to document those explanations on activation DD5s.	AIP
Rec. 3	Update the IUP and Chief of Detectives Memorandum to clarify that the two independent sources should be different from the reporting officer.	AIP
Rec. 4	Update the IUP to mirror the detailed guidelines included within the Chief of Detectives Memorandum	AIP
Rec. 5	Update the IUP and Chief of Detectives Memorandum to reflect a multilevel review process for renewals and ensure that a supervisor reviews and signs off on all renewal DD5s, as previously recommended and accepted by the Department, and list the required supporting documentation.	AIP
Rec. 6	Update the IUP to require the nominating detective to notify the juvenile's parent or guardian within 60-days of activation into the CGD.	AIP
Rec. 7	Update the IUP and Chief of Detectives Memorandum to ensure that renewal and activation DD5s include a required field containing the individual's next review date.	AIP
Rec. 8	Create, and memorialize in writing, an internal audit requirement to ensure that notifications to parents of minors added to the database are made, that the associated Notification DD5s are completed, and that the notification appears within a new column in the database as required by the Chief of Detectives Memorandum.	AIP
Rec. 9	Confirm whether any individual activated at age 16 or 17 has been in the database for over two years without a review, due to the coding error identified above and review any such individual to determine whether they should be renewed into the database or deactivated.	AIP
Rec. 10	Ensure that supporting documentation is included for all renewals.	AIP

#	Recommendation	Status
Rec. 11	Conduct quarterly audits to ensure that there are no past due entries for review, and if there are, renew or deactivate them immediately.	AIP
Rec. 12	Review individuals renewed based on an arrest every six months to ensure that renewals are not based on arrests that are subsequently sealed. NYPD should at minimum explore whether it is feasible to audit renewals for this purpose.	AIP
Rec. 13	Collect, analyze, and publish data concerning the number of entries added, renewed, and deactivated from the database annually.	AIP



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