CITY COUNCIL
CITY OF NEW YORK

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TRANSCRIPT OF THE MINUTES

Of the

CHARTER REVISION COMMISSION 2019

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MARCH 7, 2019

Start: Recess:

HELD AT: COUNCIL CHAMBERS - CITY HALL

B E F O R E: GAIL BENJAMIN, CHAIRPERSON

COMMISSIONERS: DR. MERRYL TISCH

SATEESH NORI

REVEREND CLINTON MILLER

SAL ALBANESE, FORMER COUNCIL

MEMBER

STEPHEN FIALA, FORMER COUNCIL

MEMBER

JANETTA JOHN (SP?)

JIM CARAS

EDUARDO CORDER, SR., COMMISSIONER

LISETTE CAMILO, COMMISSIONER

CARL WEISBROD PAULA GAVIN

DR. LILLIAN BARRIOS-PAOLI

ALISON HIRSH

A P P E A R A N C E S (CONTINUED)

RACHEL BLOOM, Director of Public Policy and Programs at Citizens Union

ETHAN GERINGER-SAMETH, Citizens Union

JOO-HYUN KANG, Representing Communities
United for Police Reform

PAMELA MONROE, New York City Campaign for an Elected Civilian Review Board (ECRB)

MICHAEL SIZITSKY, Lead Police Council for New York Civil Liberties Union

LIZA CHOWDURY, Assistant Professor at Borough of Manhattan Community College, teaches Criminal Justice

CYNTHIA CONTI-COOK, attorney at Special Litigation Unit of the Legal Aid Society, member of Communities United for Police Reform

BRIAN CORR, Director of our Police review and Advisory Board, President of National Association for Civilian Oversight of Law (NACOL)

NICHOLAS MITCHELL, attorney at Office of Independent Monitor in Denver, Colorado

KEVIN RICHARSON, Deputy Commissioner, Department Advocate

A P P E A R A N C E S (CONTINUED)

OLEG CHERNYAVSKY, Executive Director of the Legislative Affairs for the NYPD

JONATHAN DARCHE, Executive Director of the Civilian Complaint Review Board (CCRB)

Dilite (SP?).

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2 SARGEANT AT ARMS: Test, test. This is
3 Charter Revision Commission. Today's date is March
4 7, 2019. This recording is being recorded by Hom

and welcome to tonight's public meeting of the 2019

New York City Charter Revision Commission. I'm Gail

Benjamin, the Chair of the Commission and I am joined

by the following members: To my left is Dr. Merryl

Tisch, Mr. Sateesh Nori, Reverend Clinton Miller, Sal

Albanese, former Council Member, Stephen Fiala,

former Council Member and to my right is my Council.

Uhm Janetta (SP?) James.

JANETTA JOHN: John.

CHAIRPERSON GAIL BENJAMIN: I don't know why I said James, John, they are all books.

JANETTA JOHN: You are alright.

CHAIRPERSON GAIL BENJAMIN: Jim Caras,
Lisette Camilo, Commissioner and below her is Carl
Weisbrod, Paula Gavin, Dr. Lillian Barrios-Paoli and
Alison Hirsh. Do you want to join them on that side?
Yeah, there is an extra seat there. Alison is on the
move. Okay. Before we begin, I will entertain a
motion to adopt the minutes of the Commissions

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meeting on February 25th at City Hall, a copy of
which has been provided to all of the Commissioners.

Do I hear a motion? Second? All of those in favor?

ALL: Aye.

CHAIRPERSON GAIL BENJAMIN: Opposed? motion carries. Today we will continue the Commissions series of expert forums on the focus areas we adopted in January. This evening we are privileged to be joined by a distinguished set of panelists put together in consultation with my fellow Commissioners who have generously agreed to speak to us about the extremely important topic of Police Accountability. New York like many cities has a long history of grappling with how best to ensure effective oversight over Law Enforcement Agencies and Officers who wheeled immense power in order to do the vital job of keeping the City and its citizens safe. The Commission has received many proposals for reforming and strengthening the Police Accountability and Disciplinary System. Many centered on the rules of the Civilian Complaint Review Board and of course the Police Commissioner himself. We very much look forward to delving into these important panelists with our topic. Uhm I would like to make a few

2	announcements just for the audience which I see is
3	very full. One is I know you are aware this is a
4	public meeting not a public hearing so you will not
5	be able to speak. Uhm our forum is that each one of
6	our panelists will have three minutes to make a
7	statement uhm and then the Commissioners will
8	question them for approximately half an hour. Uhm,
9	then we have several more panelists and panels. The
10	rules of the Chamber I noticed that many of you have
11	signs and I know that the Sargeant at Arms have told
12	you that the signs are fine as long as they are on
13	your lap but not above your head. Uhm, this one
14	would interfere with the live stream and the cameras
15	and two it is just kind of a little uhm, hard for
16	other people in back of you to see and I would like
17	to make sure as I have at all the meetings that the
18	hearing is a courteous one. Uhm in that regard, I
19	would ask that all of us refrain from clapping,
20	booing, or otherwise expressing satisfaction,
21	dissatisfaction with the speaker, the question uhm
22	and allow the panels to speak without interruption.
23	Uhm if you have comments, we are happy to take them
24	afterwards in writing or if you want to speak to a
25	staff member and give them comments or questions or

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other things, we are happy to take that. We also have your uhm our site online. You can tweet at us and there are various ways you can communicate with Uhm last but not least if you feel that you really want to indicate your support or something and you feel that you must let us know, we prefer jazz Uhm, with that being said, let's get started with our first panel. Each panelist will have three minutes to introduce themselves and provide brief opening remarks. Then we will have 30 minutes for Commissioner questions, if 30 minutes ends up not being enough time to get to your question, let me or staff know and we will arrange for a followup. brevity sake I'm going to call up the panelist and I will ask that each of them introduces themselves briefly in their statements. On this first panel we have Rachel Bloom, do you want to just raise your hand, Ethan Geringer-Sameth, Joo-Hyun Kang, have I pronounced that or mangled. Okay, Pamela Monroe and Michael Sizitsky. Uhm is now all yours, uhm Ms. Bloom would you like to start?

RACHEL BLOOM: Thank you very much. Good evening Chair Benjamin and distinguished members of the New York City Charter Revision Commission. My

2 name is Rachel Bloom and I am the Director of Public 3 Policy and Programs at Citizen's Union. Thank you for holding this forum and inviting us here to 4 publically share our recommendations with you. 5 as a Watch Dog Group for the public interest and a 6 historic advocate in open and honest government here in New York City we urge amendments to the City 8 Charter tonight that will strengthen the 9 accountability of the New York City Police 10 Department, the Public and consequently improve the 11 12 relationships between the NYPD and the public. 13 2008, we have been exploring the issue of police 14 accountability with particular emphasis on 15 establishing clarity and consistent across the police 16 oversight system and strengthening the Civilian 17 Complaint Review Board to bolster independent 18 oversight of the police. The following are our recommendations for Charter Reform which we believe 19 are urgent and should be taken up by this Revision 20 Commission. These changes, if adopted would amend 21 2.2 section 440 of Chapter 18A of the New York City Charter. (1) 23 Codify the CCRB's power to file and 24 handle the prosecution of complaints. substantiates with the recommendations of charges and 25

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specifications instead of NYPD Lawyers from the Department Advocates Office. The CCRB should be given full authority and responsibility in the law for developing its own team of qualified and experienced lawyers to litigate the substantiated cases. A 2012 Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) between the NYPD and the CCRB gave the CCRB this authority by establishing an administrative prosecution process but this does not have the force of law and the extent to which certain features of the MOU are being followed is questionable. Require the Police Commissioner to provide the CCRB and respondent the rationale when diverging from CCRB Disciplinary Recommendations. The 2012 MOU requires the Police Commissioner notify the CCRB in writing with a detailed explanation for the reasons for deviating from their recommendation, uhm Citizens Union was involved in the negotiation of the MOU and believes this requirement would provide inappropriate and meaningful expansion of the CCRBs independent oversight. (3) Amend the Charter to permit the CCRB to initiate an investigation into report or known incidents of police misconduct within its jurisdiction in the absence of a complaint. With

this authority the CCRB would no longer be forced to
remain on the sidelines when there was a notorious
and serious incident that has become the focus of
community and police concern. I am going to run
through them now. (4) Empower the CCRB to
investigate complaints by the public against members
of the Police Department's School Safety Division, a
unit of public safety officers under the supervision
of the police department as well as other divisions
overseen and controlled by the police department.
(5) Safeguard the independence and integrity of CCRB
investigations and standardize the effects of
participation in an investigation for complaints,
witnesses and officers and finally we would just
recommend that for greater transparency in the Budget
of City Agencies including the NYPD uhm the four
being voted on by the Council to that and the words
program, purpose, activity and institution need to be
defined in the Charter Chapter 6, Section 100 in
relations to units of appropriation so that units of
appropriation will be made more narrow and fine
rather than continue as a catch all category
reflecting numerous programs or an entire Agency's

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Budget. Thank you very much for having us here tonight to talk about this issue.

CHAIRPERSON GAIL BENJAMIN: Thank you very much, Ms. Kang. Sorry. Uhm dry. Can I say one thing? Hold on one second. Uhm we have just been joined by Commissioner Cordero.

JOO-HYUN KANG: Okay, uhm thank you Commissioners for inviting Communities United for Police Report to testify tonight. My name is Joo-Hyun Kang representing our campaign which is for those of you who don't know, a campaign that runs coalitions of up to 200 organizations that are national and local around police accountability. Our work on police accountability and transparency over the past few years has resulted in landmark legislation by the City Council including the Community Safety Act, the Right to Know Act. We were also able to coordinate a campaign to have Governor Cuomo do an Executive Order for a special prosector for all police killings in the State of New York. The Commission for tonight. We have seven recommendations and two areas that we would like to share, specifically around changes to the Charter that we think would advance Police Accountability and

2 Transparency. We will be submitting written 3 testimony separately uhm but I did want to start by saying that these seven recommendations are really 4 based on the experience of our Member Organizations 5 and CPR as a whole over the past number of years but 6 7 even preceding CPR over the past several decades working with families including families of Ramarley 8 Graham, Eric Garner, Delron Small, uhm Saheed 9 Vassell, Anthony Baez, Aminut Deallo (SP?), etc. but 10 also the experiences of our members whose names are 11 12 not known and who face daily humiliation in 13 Communities that are over policed or abuse that goes 14 hidden and not reported or reported and not acted 15 upon. The two areas that we have recommendations are 16 Around the absolute systemic crisis that there 17 is right now of lack of any kind of meaningful, 18 timely or transparent discipline when officers cause harm to members of the public and my harm we include 19 20 the entire scale including from the most egregious cases as revealed by BuzzFeed of hundreds of officers 21 2.2 who are still on the force today even though they 23 have been found guilty by the Department of Excessive Force, Sexual Misconduct and Lying. The second areas 24 25 around lack of transparency and lack of meaningful

2 oversight of major NYPD expenditures but on the first 3 category of lack of timely transparent and meaningful discipline there are four recommendations that we 4 have in terms of changes to the Charter (1) That the Police Commissioner should not have exclusive 6 7 authority for all disciplinary cases. We would recommend that the Ch, what one of the Charter 8 Revisions that the Commission takes up be that the 9 CCRB being able to determine discipline in cases that 10 the Administrative Prosecution Unit prosecutes 11 12 Secondly is to expand the CCRBs authority to be able 13 to prosecute related misconduct so that includes cases where someone has been, an officer was caught 14 15 lying or other kinds of misconduct that the CCRB 16 certainly, currently cannot prosecute on and so they 17 split cases and send those examples to the IAB which 18 almost never gets acted upon. (3) Third is to expand the CCRBs authority to include School Safety Agents 19 20 as well as Peace Officers as we saw most recently in the case of Jazmin Headley, uhm being brutalized by 21 2.2 officers it would have been incredibly important to 23 have some kind of oversight. (4) Fourth is when the Commissioner deviates from CCRB findings and 24 discipline the reason should be made public and then 25

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right now?

the other three recommendations around the oversight

NYPD expenditures I don't want to take too much

time so I am happy to go through them during

questions or do you just want me to run through them

CHAIRPERSON GAIL BENJAMIN: Just do them really quick.

JOO-HYUN KANG: I will do them really quick (1) Amend the Procurement Process. December the NYPD purchased its first set of drones. There was no public oversight process for that and unlike other municipalities around the country there is no ability for the public to require transparency or even to be able to veto those kind of expenditures around surveillance technologies (2) Second is to require NYPD reporting of private income and expenses where some surveillance and other types of purchases are made and there is no public oversight even from the Council that is enabled by that and third is similar to what Citizens Union said which is to make sure that there are detailed units of appropriation within the Budget so that the NYPDs full Budget is transparent to the public and to the City Council and to Legislators. Thanks so much.

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2 CHAIRPERSON GAIL BENJAMIN: Thank you,
3 thank you very much. The next speaker is uhm Pamela
4 Moore.

PAMELA MONROE: Monroe.

CHAIRPERSON GAIL BENJAMIN: Monroe, I'm sorry.

PAMELA MONROE: Good evening, my name is Pamela Monroe and I represent the Campaign for an Elected Civilian Review Board. We are a coalition of over 44 organizations and prominent individuals. Over the past three years we have talked to thousands of New Yorkers about replacing the current Appointed Review Board with an elected board. Our idea is met with nearly universal support wherever we go. As of this afternoon, we have thousands of signatures on our petition and we have collected more this evening. One day while canvassing in Brooklyn, we met a young black mother who told us she has arranged her work schedule morning and afternoon to walk her kids to and front school. This wasn't to protect them from gangs or criminals, she said this was to protect them from the NYPD. That is why we are here tonight, for New Yorkers who are afraid of the police and we have good reason to be afraid. Over the last four years,

over 17,900 Civilian Complaints were made to the 2 CCRB. As a result, 0 officers have been fired. But 3 in the past five years our City has paid out \$384 4 5 million taxpayer dollars in civil judgments. clearly, misconduct is occurring. 6 In fact, New 7 Yorkers are being harassed, injured and killed while our City's response is just to wait for the lawsuits. 8 At your faces, at their faces you will see the real 9 human cost is reflected in the portraits of our 10 neighbors killed by the NYPD. We propose a new 11 12 system of Police Accountability and Discipline. that is in the hands of the people. We propose a 13 board of 21 members elected by their neighbors, 14 15 responsible to their District and answerable to New 16 Yorkers. Police Discipline has been for too long tied up in an appointed board and by now we think it 17 18 is safe to say that the CCRB has failed. Our elected board would put the needs, experience and values of 19 20 the community to work holding the police accountable to the same standards that apply to every resident. 21 2.2 Our elected board would have bending disciplinary 23 power. Our elected board can change the fabric of New York. Public outcry around Rodney King gave rise 24 to the appointed review boards of the 90s. 25

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modern Black Lives Matter Movement demands elected civilian review boards now. Let's talk about being first to do the right thing. Let's bring in elected Civilian Review Board to voters.

Very much and if you could (applause). Excuse me.

Excuse me I had asked as a matter of courtesy if we would not applaud or boo or if we would just either use jazz hands to indicate that we are in favor of what a speaker is saying but I would really appreciate your assistance in this. (applause).

Please, please. Please. The next speaker is Ethan Geringer-Sameth.

RACHEL BLOOM: Ethan is just, he is just my colleague. We are just one testimony together.

CHAIRPERSON GAIL BENJAMIN: Okay, then we have Michael Sizitsky.

MICHAEL SIZITSKY: Thank you, good evening, my name is Michael Sizitsky. I am the Lead of the Policy Council with the New York Civil Liberties Union. I will also apply that we are also members of Communities United for Police Reform and we support all of the recommendations that Joo-Hyun mentioned in her testimony and I want to expand on

2 the pieces about what City Charter can be amended to better reflect greater accountability for Police 3 Discipline as well as greater oversight and 4 procurement of surveillance technology by the NYPD. Local and independent civilian oversight is a 6 7 necessary component for fair and accountable policing. The NYCLU has been instrumental in trying 8 to ensure that there were such systems in place in 9 New York City. We were instrumental in creation of 10 the CCRB and have worked to ensure that it has what 11 12 it needs to live up to its Charter mandate. But the 13 biggest problem has always been in the lack of the 14 CCRBs authority. While the CCRB has the authority to 15 investigate and in some cases to prosecute cases of 16 police misconduct, its recommendations on 17 disciplinary outcomes are not binding on the NYPD. 18 And the Police Commissioner has exclusive authority in the City Charter Section 434 to decide and impose 19 20 disciplinary outcomes in all cases. And in practice, the exercise of this authority has been really 21 2.2 causing for alarm. In 2017, the Police Commissioner 23 imposed penalties weaker than those recommended by the CCRB in the overwhelming majority of cases. 24 in the most serious cases of Officer misconduct that 25

2 were substantiated to the CCRB and that went to full departmental trials within the NYPD the Police 3 Commissioner imposed discipline consistent with CCRB 4 recommendations in just 27% of cases and this low 5 6 rate of concurrent is not unique to any one Police 7 Commissioner. It has been persistent throughout different Mayoral Administrations, throughout 8 different Police Commissioners. It has been a 9 consistent pattern of the NYPD flagrantly 10 disregarding CCRB recommendations. In the past the 11 12 NYCLU has called on the City to remove the Police 13 Commissioner's Exclusive Authority to decide disciplinary outcomes and we reiterate that call 14 15 tonight. The NYPD has proven time and time again its 16 willingness to ignore calls for outside oversight and 17 its unwillingness to hold itself to the high 18 standards that we expect of our police force. Civilian oversight of policing is an MT Exercise if 19 20 the Police Commissioner can just disregard the recommendations of =an oversight agency. So, we 21 2.2 would recommend that the Commission look at either 23 removing, transferring that authority, outright outside the NYPD or in some way cabining that 24 exercise of discretion to prevent the kind of abuses 25

2 that we have been seeing. And lastly the piece 3 regarding surveillance technologies. The problem that we see with police abuse of communities of color 4 5 is that it often happens in secret because the tools 6 that the NYPD uses to target and harass communities 7 of color are acquired in secret. Unlike places like Seattle, Oakland, Cambridge, Massachusetts. 8 places require anytime the Police Department seeks to 9 acquire new surveillance tools, it disclose that 10 planned acquisition to the City Council, proposed 11 12 their planned polities, how they intend to use the 13 technologies, whether they are going to share the information gathered by those technologies with other 14 15 agencies including potentially Federal Immigration 16 Enforcement Agencies and then give the public an opportunity to comment on, testify as to whether or 17 18 not they want that technology acquired in the first place and give those local Councils the ability to 19 20 veto technology acquisition if they find that the risk to privacy and civil liberties are not worth the 21 2.2 Uhm, so we would recommend that the Commission 23 look at amending the Charter to require that the NYPD seek Council approval anytime they seek to acquire 24 new surveillance tools and technologies. We have 25

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2 more information in our written testimony and would 3 be happy to answer any questions.

CHAIRPERSON GAIL BENJAMIN: Okay
Commissioners. Commissioner Hirsh?

ALISON HIRSH: I have two questions, uhm one is for either Rachel or Joo-Hyun, what is the current procedure for discipline of School Safety Officers?

RACHEL BLOOM: Sorry, there is not really a good procedure. Oftentimes those complaints actually end up going to IB, the Internal Affairs Bureau of the NYPD which as we all know actually doesn't act upon complaints with the seriousness that we need in New York and so an example of that is that there have been hundreds of racial profiling complaints of officers, not only in terms of School Safety Agents but NYPD officers and they NYPDs Internal Affairs Bureau has not substantiated one of them. This is after the stop in fr... the Federal Law Suit the Floyd Lawsuit. So, we don't really have any kind of faith that when serious allegations go to the IB that they will be acted upon and it is one of the reasons why it has important that the CCRB is now also investigating sexual misconduct complaints.

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ALISON HIRSH: Thanks.

JOO-HYUN KANG: And I would just add that it is extremely important when we are thinking about you know the youngest people, uhm that for a time very clear system for how they can file a complaint by a school, by a School Officer. There's a, you've got to think about access as well for those students in New York.

ALISON HIRSH: Uhm and my second question is for Ms. Monroe. I understand the goal of the elected CCRB is to reform the system and ensure its accountability but can you explain why elections are necessary to do that and are you at all concerned that you know organizations like the PBA could put a tremendous amount of resources and sort of shift in a way that the CCRB could be actually less transparent and worse than it is now through the election process?

PAMELA MONROE: Sure, uhm first and foremost we believe that an elected board is the way to go because it stands on the tenant of, of the Democratic tenant that citizens in this country deserve the right or have the right to have equal say in issues that affect them. So, we believe that

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current appointed systems are biased toward the politicians that appoint them so this would allow the people to have a say uhm which is a Democratic tenant and an elected board would represent not just one person elected or appointed from each borough but actually all of the neighborhoods in the City so there would be greater uhm representation of our diverse City so there would be 21 members versus the 13 and again they would not be one person from each borough, there would be 21 members from the different districts. There are so many reasons why we think an elected board would be the way to go. We, we don't currently have an elected board but that doesn't mean that there aren't strides being made in this country for elected or in part or in whole. Our sister ci... our sister city Rochester, New York has put through proposals to amend the current board to that of an elected board. Chicago is doing the same, uhm, New York City has the largest police force. The New Yorkers deserve to have the people represent them. don't, I don't, I don't un... well, I'll keep my personal opinion to myself, so. Uhm it, it allows basically the people who have been abused a says. It, the NYPD is the Police Department of the people,

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is it not, is, the tax payers they should report to the people. Yeah, yeah. Uhm.

CHAIRPERSON GAIL BENJAMIN: Uhm, Mr.

5 Caras?

Commissioner Hirsh's last question to the New York
Civil Liberties Union and the uhm Citizens Union.
Uhm what their views on an elected board would be?
Especially uhm my concern would be in times of
increasing crime you might get a very different
Civilian Complaint Review Board that in times of low
crime and also if you have any comments on any
changes that your organizations think might be
salutary for the composition of the board?

Union hasn't considered or taken a formal position on the position of an elected view board, uhm but we do believe that the amendments that we have outlined in our testimony are necessary steps to improving the accountability of the Police Department uhm and yes and uhm you know we would like to see those tested before. I don't know necessarily if we would like to see them tested before considering something as radical as uhm electing a review board, but you

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2 should be considered as part of that conversation as well.

PAMELA MONROE: Can I, I didn't answer Commissioner Hirsh's question about Special Interest. She asked me what did I think about the BPA maybe sending people. Uhm it is true that in a democratic society we have elections, and elections are a process whereby the people chose the most qualified candidate. So, anyone would have to run on a campaign and their campaign would, would expose their qualifications and expose their opinions and expose their interest. When you are looking at the whole City voting and you are looking at candidates from all of the neighborhoods, not just a borough but all of the neighborhoods yes, you may have people from Staten Island who may you want to see the police have a free pass but on a board with 21 members it is not about the one person it's about all of these people from all of these other neighborhoods who were affected by this crisis.

ALISON HIRSH: Thank you very much.

MICHAEL SIZITSKY: And uhm to answer your question the NYCLU has also taken no position on uhm an elected civilian review board. Our view has been

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- the Central Crisis facing police accountability has
 been the lack of authority for an outside,

 independent oversight agency but that said I do think
 that we are all in agreement with a shared goals of
 trying to find ways that the Charter can ensure that
 these decisions are not just left up to the NYPD

 Commissioner.
 - JIM CARAS: I'm sorry I didn't mean to leave Ms. Kang out as well.
 - JOO-HYUN KANG: Uhm we are a pretty big coalition and we are still in discussion so we don't have a position on this.

CHAIRPERSON GAIL BENJAMIN: Okay,
Commissioner Nori?

SATEESH NORI: I guess my question is not having a position on an issue such as having an elected CCRB at this time isn't that a position in itself and, and turning it over to Ms. Monroe, what are you views on the other recommendations made by your colleagues at the table? I mean do you support any of those recommendations? Do those recommendations satisfy some of the concerns that you are raising in support of an elected CCRB? So, maybe we would start with you guys first on your lack of a

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position on this issue as a position in itself. I mean seven recommendations but an elected CCRB is not one of them?

RACHEL BLOOM: Well, I will start for Citizens Union. Our work in police accountability uhm sort of really been focused in the last decade, we are 120 years old. It takes us a very long time to come to our policy positions. We have a very uhm slow collaborative process uhm, I think that when it's not that we didn't. I mean historically we largely usually believe that the Mayor has the right to appoint, make appointments. We've supported that, not necessarily specifically about the CCRB but in general about uhm different roles throughout the City Government. Uhm but I, I can also say that it hasn't been something as we started, as we focused on this work our work was about sort of making our, making the police and just more accountable and transparent and that is sort of our approach to police accountability reform. It could be something that we would look at in the future. Just, it is, we, we have not looked at it at all. Uhm that's not the say that we won't in the future we just haven't yet.

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2 PAMELA MONROE: Uhm to ans... oh, did you 3 want to go.

MICHAEL SIZITSKY: Uhm for the NYCLU we similarly have a long deliberative process internally and again this issue has been one where we viewed it as less of a problem of, where the appointments were, elections come from for these members as to what kind of power that we able to exercise in these matters. So that has been the main focus of our engagement with the CCRB with NYPD discipline more broadly is where those structural lines of authority to actually act upon disciplinary investigations and recommendations lie and similarly we work with a lot of community based partners, uhm, with uhm with communities for Police Reform and we are engaged in these conversations and we are trying to make sure that whatever positions that we take are reflective of where our community partners are.

PAMELA MONROE: Uhm and I don't know that my answers changes much beyond that we don't have a position. That we have a long, we are in discussion about it but what I would say is that the seven recommendations that we have come directly from our memberships experience with the failures in

2 relationship to cases. So, for example, with Eric Garner right now which I think everyone knows about 3 4 Eric Garner. It is one of the most high-profile 5 cases in the country as well as the world. We have a 6 situation right now where the only reason the officer 7 who put Eric in a chokehold and killed him in front of all of us in video is even being prosecuted for 8 disciplinary charges, because the CCRB brought 9 charges. And in fact, the NYPD blocked those charges 10 for close to a year. It wasn't until this past 11 12 summer when we were able to expose that the NYPD had been lying about why, uhm they couldn't move forward 13 that they finally let CCRB move forward with charges 14 15 against Pantaleo. However, Eric Gardner's mother has 16 been demanding that other officers who failed to 17 intervene who were found to lie on official reports, 18 who leaked sealed information should also be facing some type of discipline. And the NYPD has refused to 19 20 bring charges in any of those cases which is part of why one of our recommendations around expanding CCRBs 21 2.2 authority so that they can actually pursue those 23 types of cases when it is on a case that they are 24 already processing. So, they are prosecuting Pantaleo. They are prosecuting on this particular 25

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case of the killing of Eric Gardner and their hands are tied to be able to do anything about officers who lied, who've covered up and that's actually what the Blue Wall of Silence is? Right? It is not just about the brotherhood so called of the NYPD. actually systemic historical coverup that happens in all of the police brutality cases that we've worked on, uhm that we see routinely where there is illegal, activity including leaking sealed information or really brutal activity that is happening and I will just say that these recommendations are coming directly from the experience that members have had and what's been wrong in the cases to be able to see how we can actually increase accountability transparency of the NYPD and on the drones piece which is not really about the CCRB uhm recommendation for surveillance technologies, rather, we are in a moment right now where if we if New York City doesn't take action to try to reign in surveillance technologies we won't be able to turn back the clock. Uhm Pandora's box will be open.

JOO-HYUN KANG: To address the other question the Commissioner asked about how do we feel about the proposals that are being presented by other

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members of the panel. Uhm I will read from our proposed Legislation which has been submitted to you. Uhm in Section C, Powers and Duties of the Elected Civilian Review Board. I will just mention that we do, our proposal is asked for an elected and empowered board. So, under Section C under Powers and Duties of the Elected Civilian Review Board, the ECRB should have the power to receive, investigate here, make findings and this is the Amendment, take action upon complaints by members of the public. goes on to say in that section in expansion of their jurisdiction of things that we can and we outline all of the uhm, including sexual misconduct, all of the allegations that they can investigate so that's been hugely expanded. Uhm also within section C uhm number 5 the findings and determinations of the board and the bases therefore should be submitted to the Police Commissioner for implementation as opposed to for, a recommendation being submitted. elected board would be empowered with the things that they suggest.

CHAIRPERSON GAIL BENJAMIN: I'm sorry, are you referring to written to, some written testimony because I don't seem to have it?

3 | time ago when.

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CHAIRPERSON GAIL BENJAMIN: Okay.

5 JOO-HYUN KANG: When all of this but I am 6 happening to. The last time it was sent was in

7 December when we sent research.

CHAIRPERSON GAIL BENJAMIN: Okay then its on our website. I just thought that you had something that you were presenting today and that I just somehow lost it.

JOO-HYUN KANG: No.

CHAIRPERSON GAIL BENJAMIN: Council Mem... uhm Reverend Miller and then Council Member Albanese.

REVEREND CLINTON MILLER: Thank you. My question is actually about the elections of an elected Civilian Review Board. What would the elections look like? Would there be terms? How many terms? I'm assuming based on your testimony there would be absolutely no appointees. During such elections would candidates run under a political party affiliation? I would like to know more about that?

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the Election Civilian Review Board, point number four, the members shall be elected for a term of four years, coinciding with the terms of office and scheduled elections of the Mayor and City Council Members. Uhm, I don't think we specified that they have to run with a party. It might be kind of like how, how with the last election we just had it, it's, yeah.

CHAIRPERSON GAIL BENJAMIN: With a Public Advocate. Sal?

SAL ALBANESE: Uhm this is for anyone on the panel. Uhm, the CCRB has evolved from the time when it was basically a uhm a substratum of NYPD, most of the officials were appointed by the Police Commissioner and the Mayor and my limited law enforcement now, the CCRB doesn't have anyone that sits on that board that is an NYPD employee. And we also have another agency that was just created that has an additional 40 staff members uhm independent in the NYPD in the Inspector General's Office, whose focus is on police accountability. We also have a federal monitor who gets paid a lot money uhm to uhm, oversee the Police Department as part of a Federal

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2 Court decision. So, my question is to anyone on the panel, uhm are these things not working? (laughter).

JOO-HYUN KANG: Sorry, we are laughing along with the audience. I hope that is okay. but I think the bigger issue, or I think what we would say uhm with the Communities United for Police Reform is that all the agencies and individuals that you named actually have different functions. And the CCRB, the Police Commissioner still appoints three members to the CCRB board as you know so it is not as if the Police Commissioner has no influence right now. With the Federal Monitor they have a very narrow mandate. Which is only to assess compliance in relationship to the Floyd's Federal Stop and Frisk Lawsuit, the Langone Lawsuit and the uhm Davis Lawsuit in terms of Policing and Public Housing. it is kind of apples and oranges that you are talking With the Inspector General they are as an about. agency as you know within DOI that was created specifically to be able to review and look at systemic issues within the NYPD make recommendations but those are nonbinding recommendations. So, we are in a situation where we've got a, the biggest police agency in the world and in a country that actually

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2	has unfettered power. So, I don't think that saying
3	that there are all of these other agencies that have
4	particular pieces of jobs. He's, there shouldn't be
5	uhm that the Commission shouldn't take this
6	opportunity to put things on the ballot that will
7	increase accountability and transparency which we
8	desperately need.

SAL ALBANESE: Have you, have you uhm....

Assessed other cities with the municipalities in

terms of police accountability and, and what have you

come up. What is the ideal scenario that you see

across the country?

JOO-HYUN KANG: I mean I can keep talking.

MICHAEL SIZISKY: I mean I don't know that anywhere has actually gotten it right uhm in terms of police accountability uhm we've been working with some of our local partners. It was mentioned that there were some proposals in Rochester. That we are now looking at, kind of grappling with similar issues with a lack of accountability and their civilian review board and are looking to empower a new police accountability board with actual disciplinary authority. Because the current system

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just does not work there is no face in the institutions that exist to actually carry out their mandates and serve as independent checks on police abuse. So, I don't know that we can point to any place that has gotten it right because I don't know that such place exists.

JOO-HYUN KANG: And we would argue that it won't get right until you allow the people to hold the police, their police departments accountable. (applause).

CHAIRPERSON GAIL BENJAMIN: Please, please, Sal?

SAL ALBANESE: On a follow, up on the Federal Monitor, as I understand and we have a disagreement the Federal Monitor also monitors discipline, police discipline as well as the Stop of Frisk issue that was raised in a court decision.

JOO-HYUN KANG: Maybe we don't disagreement maybe it is a matter of clarification, the Federal Monitor has oversight to be able to oversee compliance of reforms that are discipline related that have to do with the Floyd, Davis, or Langone Lawsuits, not one discipline reform has been ordered so nothing is being monitor.

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CHAIRPERSON GAIL BENJAMIN: And please,
please, I would just add that uhm, what we are
asking, is we are asking to improve and better our
system. And I just because there are multiple forms
of oversight in different agencies doesn't mean you
know that does not necessarily not that they are
working well and so we are trying to just improve
upon the CCRB and just make sure it is more
accountable and transparent and more empowered to
actually act out on the things that they are putting
out and on their recommendations are actually
implemented.

SAL ALBANESE: You are raising some good issues regarding procurement, that's, that's something that should be looked at very carefully. For all agencies, especially the NYPD.

CHAIRPERSON GAIL BENJAMIN: Thank you, Commissioner Fiala.

STEPHEN FIALA: Thank you Madam Chair. For Citizen's Union, I took note during your testimony that you referenced the 2012 Memorandum of Understanding and so that I'm not speaking out of turn, the exact language was the extent to which certain features of the MOU are being followed is

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questionable. As we try to dig into the Bedrock in this subject matter. I think it would be helpful if we could put some meat to those bones. What specifically about the existing construct, that 2012 MOU that you refer to. What is questionable about it? What areas of reform would you suggest this body consider making, specially charter related to that MOU?

ETHAN GERINGER-SAMETH: What was questionable uhm in particular is the provision in the MOU that requires the Police Commissioner to explain when they've diverged from a CCRB recommendation of charges and specifications. from what Citizen's Union can tell, we understand that those explanations are still being delivered but it took us an appeal of a FOIL request to find that out. So obviously there is very little transparency in the way that these uhm explanations are being delivered and it is impossible for us to tell whether, for instance if the Police Commissioner is providing such a detailed explanation with reasons not limited to each factor that the Police Commission has considered in making that determination? Uhm so that, that alone we think is a problem.

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public can't tell the value of that explanation then
what value does that really have. Is it meaningful?

question that will have to be deferred for the CCRB but I will ask it of you anyway since you seem to have a fair amount of knowledge in this area. Are you aware of any current or ongoing discussions between the CCRB and the NYPD with respect to this particular provision that you seem to say is lacking? It is deficient? It seems to me that it is kind of a loop hole that wouldn't really require very much to close. Are you aware of any dialog that, that presently is being undertaken to close that loop hole or strengthen that provision so as to arrest the concern?

uhm I think part of, part of the wall that is being hid behind is the state law, the Civil Rights Law Section 50 A which prevents the Disclosure of Disciplinary Records of Police Officers and other officers. Uhm and that is being used as I believe as an excuse to also shield these explanations. Citizen's Union folds these written explanations and specifically asks that any identifying information of

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police officers or any other parties be redacted but we were told that that couldn't be provided because it was in violation of Civil Rights Law Section 50 A and only on appeal were, we given that information.

So, obviously Civil Rights Law Section 50 A does not actually constitute a barrier to that disclosure with the information redacted but there are obviously still serious barriers for the public accessing that information.

RACHEL BLOOM: Can I just add something slightly different in terms of this question is the, our main and I don't know that we differ but maybe it is just a different way of saying it. Our main concern with that provision is actually when the MOU was done in 2012 former speaker Quinn and others who executed it had the expectation that when the Commissioner deviated from findings or discipline recommendations of the CCRB that those, those deviations and the rationale for why it deviated would be made public. In fact, speaker Quinn was quoted saying that in the New York Times Article when the MOU first came out so the fact that that is now public now really actually shows how the NYPD is

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unfortunately been allowed to create their own rules even after making agreeance.

CHAIRPERSON GAIL BENJAMIN: I had the question or the members of the panel about the public safety officers and the peace officers that work for HRA, HHC, and a number of other city agencies. What is, what are they currently covered by, just union agreements? How are they disciplined now?

I'm not sure do you want RACHEL BLOOM: to.

ETHAN GERINGER-SAMETH: It varies so when the school safety agents, they report to IAB there are different union rules that govern the various agencies. Uhm but where you know the CCRB has interpreted its own charter given authority is just in relation to uhm uniformed, sworn members of the NYPD which is a problem because that's not how most people actually experience and encounter with a peace officer. In the case of Jasmin Headley, you know to her it really didn't matter whether the officer was an HRA officer or an NYPD officer the point was, there was someone who was empowered by the state with Law Enforcement Authority that was uhm engaged in horrific misconduct. Uhm so the uhm the sense and

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expectation of New Yorkers should be that when there is any officer, police officer or peace officer they should have some independent outside agency like the CCRB that is responsible for processing and investigating those cases. But it does, right now with the current system vary based on which agency. And I think what we would add is that it also, part of the problem is that there is a whole patchwork quilt right now, where actually nobody knows how is responsible.

RACHEL BLOOM: So, in a particular instance like with Jasmin Headley, HRA, the

Commissioner took action in relation to the HRA officers. But that doesn't mean that the public would known that they could actually make a complaint to HRA about peace officers who were stationed there and it is not clear that that would actually be how it happens. And what we hear often times from members who uhm are in homeless shelters in particular, that's another example where there is a lot of peace officers stationed is that they have no recourse. They feel like everytime they've complained ot the shelter or they try to complain anywhere else there is no mechanism for them to be

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able to actually have a complaint, follow the
complaint and see what happens.

CHAIRPERSON GAIL BENJAMIN: Uhm do you think you could provide us a list of all of the agencies that currently utilize peace officers?

RACHEL BLOOM: We could try.

CHAIRPERSON GAIL BENJAMIN: And would it be your recommendation that if they were covered by the CCRB that their agency heads function in the same way as the PC or would you have the PC make the determination?

JOO-HYUN KANG: I mean that we would say that the CCRB should make the determination that you are asking but I, I would have to ask our members.

CHAIRPERSON GAIL BENJAMIN: Okay thank you. I think Commissioner Gavin is next.

PAULA GAVIN: Yes, thank you very much.

I wanted to confirm that your recommendation is to expand the CCRB beyond the four current categories of complaints that they receive and then sort of a bit more about why you are recommending that?

PAMELA MONROE: Uhm I, it's probably my fault because uhm it went so quickly. We are not necessarily recommending and expansion beyond FUTO,

2 the Force of Use of Authority Etc. what we are recommending is that in cases where there is a fatal 3 complaint that is substantiated by the CCRB and that 4 5 the CCRB is prosecuting that case, that if there are other misconduct found that they should be able to 6 7 prosecute on those, that other misconduct and a great example I think is uhm you all probably heard of 8 James Blake, the retired tennis star who was slammed 9 ot the ground brutally in 2015. He was uhm the case 10 against Officer Frascatore was investigated by the 11 12 CCRB, they substantiated charges and they did the 13 trial on the excessive force. However, what happened 14 in addition is that Frascatore had also been guilty 15 of not notifying his supervisor and other related 16 misconduct and so the NYPD ended up doing a second 17 disciplinary trial, never told James Blake that this was happening so he finds out from the media that 18 there was another trial against Frascatore. 19 20 date, even though that trial happened last year or the year before I'm not quite sure, James still 21 2.2 doesn't know what the outcome, what the disciplinary 23 outcome against Officer Frascatore was. And so, it's a completely not only efficient but very abusive 24 25 system that means that you can have a complaint, you

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go to the agency where you think it is the oversight agency to be able to deal with it. They try to deal with what they can but then they have to form out the rest of the complaint to the IAB which doesn't really end up doing much.

CHAIRPERSON GAIL BENJAMIN: And did anybody else recommend expanding the CCRB?

MICHAEL SIZITSKY: So uhm also because we were pressed for time we had to, to rush through but uhm point number 5 of our testimony, safe guarding the independence and integrity of the CCRB investigations. Uhm and standardizing the effects of participation includes granting the CCRB the authority to prosecute officers who lie under oath during the course of their investigation, its investigation.

PAMELA MOORE: I would also like to add that we expand uhm areas of investigation that also include uhm conducting unauthorized investigation, surveillance infiltration, disruption of lawful, political, social, economic, religious organizations or their members for their politico-social economic views, religious views. Also discriminating on the basis of age, sex, race, ethnicity, religion, creed,

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national origin, immigration status, political views,
union membership, sexual orientation, gender identity
and expression, record of criminal conviction and
incarceration. There is a lot but uhm yeah, we try
to get it all in there.

CHAIRPERSON GAIL BENJAMIN: Thank you very much, are there any further questions from the Commissioners? Thank you very much for joining us and for your information and if you would like to send us any additional information that you may have or respond further to some of the questions that may have been asked, I would appreciate receiving that from you. Thanks so much. Thank you. (applause). (long pause). Okay, we are ready for our second panel now. First, I want to thank you all for being here and sharing your perspectives with us. We will proceed in the same manner as I described the first This is our second panel and we are joined by Liza Chowdhury, Cynthia Conti-Cook, Brian Corr and Nicholas Mitchell. Uhm can we start with Ms. Chowdhury which I have probably pronounced incorrectly.

LIZA CHOWDHURY: Hi how are you, I'm Dr. Chowdhury I'm and assistant professor down the street

2 at Borough of Manhattan Community College. I teach 3 criminal justice courses full-time but I am also a 4 long-time youth advocate and community organizer and the reason that I am here is to discuss uhm the CCRB 5 6 obviously but also the fact that uhm just this week 7 we've been covering policing. My students are here and they can attest to that and the question that I 8 opened up the chapter was with Do you think we need 9 the police? Simultaneous they all said yes. Then I 10 followed up with the question, do you trust the 11 12 police? More than half said no. So here we are with where I'm teaching criminal justice students that 13 want to one day become law enforcement officers that 14 15 don't trust an institution, they want to be a part 16 This is my concern. So, a lot of the work that 17 I do in the community is how can we improve this 18 Police-Community relationship? A lot of the youth that I work with they don't trust even trying to 19 report to the CCRB because they don't feel that it is 20 accessible to them or they feel that they are not 21 2.2 represented there. So uhm some of the conversations 23 that you know as we've heard to date you know how can we improve this. The CCRB needs to look like the 24 25 communities uhm so that they have the pulse of the

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City. They know what is going on in their community and they can actually reach out to the community so that they can bring them in and you know create some legitimacy as to the fact that you know they actually can be represented as a CCRB you know effectively.

So, that's all.

CHAIRPERSON GAIL BENJAMIN: Ms. Conti-Cook.

CYNTHIA CONTI-COOK: Good evening, my
name is Cynthia Conti-Cook. I'm an attorney at the
Special Litigation Unit of the Legal Aid Society
which is the largest public defender in New York
City, we serve all five boroughs. We are also a
member of Communities United for Police Reform. What
I want to talk about tonight are three things and I
apologize I don't have written testimony to submit to
you today but I will get it to you.

CHAIRPERSON GAIL BENJAMIN: That's fine.

CYNTHIIA CONTI-COOK: Uhm the three things that I want to talk about this evening are the conflicts between the law department and oversight agencies like the Civilian Complaint Review Board as well as the Board of Correction. Of course, this evening I will focus on the Civilian Complaint Review

2 Board and how that impacts our work in terms of what is publically disclosed regarding Police Misconduct 3 information and also what is disclosed throughout the 4 criminal court discovery process. 5 The second thing 6 that I want to talk about is the independence of the 7 CCRB and the third is the budget transparency. So, I want to start in talking about the conflict between 8 the law department and the Civilian Complaint Review 9 Board by discussing a little bit of history. So, 10 when before I worked at the Legal Aid Society, I was 11 12 a Civil Rights Attorney and fought for 7-1/2 years, 13 more than 100 cases of Civil Rights of 1983 Federal 14 Lawsuits and the opposing council in every single one 15 of those law suits was the City Law Department. 16 2014, I moved to the Legal Aid Society and I 17 initiated several FOIL requests. The CCRB in 2014 18 had answered several of those FOIL requests and had responded with information about a summary of those 19 20 officer civilian complaints and whether they were substantiated, unsubstantiated and what they 21 2.2 recommended to the NYPD. Several months later, that 23 process ended and we suddenly we found ourselves in a position where we had to litigate for the Freedom of 24 25 Information Request that we had sent in and we began

2 litigation and the responding, the opposing Council 3 in that case was also the City Law Department. 4 the City Law Department was responding not just for the Civilian Complaint Review Board, at the same time it was simultaneously representing all of the 6 7 officers who have been sued for Civil Rights It is also representing the NYPD and 8 Violations. that conflict I think needs to be addressed by this 9 Charter Revision Commission. Uhm one of the other 10 results of that if we, if we go back to about 2014, 11 12 2015, so when the CCRB stopped responding to our FOIL requests and we began litigating against the City of 13 14 New York for those FOIL requests, at the same time in 15 criminal court, we saw the CCRB, this is not 16 occurring now. This has past but for a period of 17 time and because the law is unclear enough and the 18 Charter is unclear enough for a period of time, the Civilian Complaint Review Board's General Counsel was 19 20 coming in to criminal court and fighting every subpoena that we were issuing for police officer 21 2.2 misconduct records. In cases where it was up to the 23 judge as the gatekeeper, to decide whether or not those records were relevant and material in each case 24 25 and it is because we even had a case where the judge

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had ordered that the subpoena be signed and that the CCRB information be turned over and the CCRB appealed the judge's order and they eventually withdraw that, that motion when we intervened but it was an example of how extreme this conflict can take an agency that is supposed to be an oversight agency and how far it can take it from its mission.

CHAIRPERSON GAIL BENJAMIN: Hold on, Dr. Chowdhury can I ask you to give the time that you didn't use to Ms. Conti-Cook?

LIZA CHOWHURY: Sure.

CHAIRPERSON GAIL BENJAMIN: Thank you.

LIZA CHOWHURY: Thank you. Uhm I will move to the other two points, uhm as was mentioned on the earlier panel, the independence of the CCRB is extremely important especially in their ability to serve officers. What partially caused the delay of the Initiation of the Disciplinary Proceeding against Daniel Pantaleo is the CCRBs inability itself to serve police officers with the charges it wants to bring. The, uhm issue about Budget Transparency in addition to what has already been mentioned, which of course we support, I want to add that the breakdown in the budget needs to happen also by command. We

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issued a website yesterday, capstat.nyc and in that
website you can really analyze officers but overtimes
and commands by overtime and the budget needs to also
allow a breakdown by command so that it is very clear
which commands are costing the City the most amount
of overtime. I will leave it there, thank you.

CHAIRPERSON GAIL BENJAMIN:

Commissioners. Oh, I'm sorry no not commissioners, uhm, Ms. Corr.

PAULA GAVIN: Can I, are you, did you give written testimony my dear?

CHAIRPERSON GAIL BENJAMIN: No, no she did not. She is going to provide written testimony ...

CYNTHIA CONTI-COOK: I will.

CHAIRPERSON GAIL BENJAMIN: In the ensuing days. Mr. Corr.

BRIAN CORR: Uhm good evening. Thank you for having me here. I just came down from Cambridge, Massachusetts where I work as the Director of our Police Review and Advisory Board, our City's oversight agency and I am also serving as the president of NACOL, the National Association for Civilian Oversight of Law Enforcement. I think it is probably more in that capacity that I was asked to

2	come down. NACOL represents approximately 70 Civilian
3	Oversight Agencies of all types across the United
4	States and about 1000 individuals who work in
5	Civilian Oversight as staff, board members, and other
6	capacities. And my own personal background, I am
7	originally from Detroit, Michigan, grew up in an era
8	in the 70s where we saw serious police misconduct
9	have worked for the ACLU of Massachusetts as an
10	organizer and have been working in Municipal
11	Government for about 11 years. The things that I
12	want to really focus on in my brief period here is to
13	say that my philosophy around Civilian Oversight is
14	that ultimately, we have the same goal, police
15	Departments, communities has a whole want peaceful
16	and just communities and where that falls short is
17	often where civilian oversight has been asked to come
18	in. But for Civilian Oversight to be successful
19	there are many elements that are important and I will
20	hopefully get a chance to touch on some of those
21	during the questioning from the Commissioners but I
22	will say that it is vital that procedural justice and
23	legitimacy exists in oversight. Just as we demand
24	that in our policing, we also demand that in
25	oversight and it means that Civilian Oversight has to

2 be impartial, it has to be fair, it has to look not just at back end accountability, looking at what went 3 wrong and what should we do about it but also at 4 5 front end accountability. How do we create systems within policing and within society that promote the 6 7 type of policing that our communities need and deserve and so in my comments I also want to mention 8 that the CCRB is very important but also the OIG, 9 NYPD, the Office of the Inspector General for the 10 NYPD is a very important element of oversight here in 11 12 New York City. Uhm in Civilian Oversight we have to be looking at not just as I said what went wrong but 13 14 what are the systemic issues and that's an important 15 part of creating the type of police departments that 16 we need. The other thing that I will mention that I 17 think is very important is the role of trauma, 18 individual trauma, community trauma, historical trauma and that trauma exists not just in the broader 19 community or in the most oppressed communities but 20 also within law enforcement and if we do not 21 2.2 understand the role the trauma plays in interactions 23 between individuals within the system issues, within law enforcement and in how law enforcement officers 24 25 themselves experience trauma we will not make

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progress in this work so those are some of the key
points and I look forward to the discussion.

CHAIRPERSON GAIL BENJAMIN: Great, thank you very much. Mr. uhm Mitchell.

NICHOLAS MITCHELL: Yes, uhm good evening my name is Nick Mitchell and I am the Independent Monitor of the Denver Police and Denver Sherrif Departments. I am also a New Yorker and in what feels like a lifetime ago I once worked for the CCRB. Uhm I'm an attorney and I suppose that I am here to talk with you about my experiences in, uhm in Denver. Uhm in these brief opening remarks I don't have sufficient time to comment on each of the proposed changes that are before you though I do have some thoughts that I am happy to discuss during the Q and A portion. Uhm so instead I wanted to propose a framework for you to think about each proposed As you contemplate each proposal, I suggest change. that you frame your inquiry around three principal questions. First, would the proposed change improve the independence and effectiveness of the oversight agency. Second, would the proposed change enhance the public's trust in the independence and effectiveness of the agency and third, what are the

2 likely unintended consequences associated with making 3 the proposed change. I believe if the answer to these three key questions will help you to determine 4 5 what changes should ultimately be recommended for the 6 City's Charter. Uhm I was asked to speak about 7 Denver to help provide some text for your current process. Uhm and during my six-year tenure as the 8 Independent Monitor in Denver on three occasions 9 Denver's Charter or ordinances have been amended to 10 address problems have arisen regarding the powers or 11 12 independence of my office. For example, oversight 13 agencies are sometimes rendered ineffective or less 14 effective than they could be by legal provisions that 15 are ambiguous about the authority of the oversight 16 agency to obtain documents or information from within 17 the Police Department. In Denver, we had a somewhat 18 ambiguous legal provision that governed my access to information and perhaps better stated it was 19 20 ambiguous about the Police and Sherrif Departments obligations to share documents and information with 21 2.2 me upon request. Several years ago, after 23 considerable friction regarding my access to internal documents, the law was changed to ensure that we now 24 have much broader authority to access all documents 25

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2 and information within the departments that we 3 oversee with some limited caveats. It is my 4 understanding that one of the recurring issues here in New York for the Inspector General and possibly for the CCRB relates to ambiguity about what 6 documents and information must be disclosed by the 7 If that is indeed an issue it would both 8 NYPD. undermine the effectiveness of the oversight agencies 9 and the public's perception of their effectiveness 10 and should be remedied by a change in the law. 11 12 Similarly, I note that several of the proposals 13 before you relate to enhancing the independence of 14 the CCRB and I haven't really yet seen proposals that 15 address the independence of the Inspector General. 16 Many agencies including some Inspector General 17 Agencies have created structures in which the 18 Inspector General is truly independent and free from any appearance of possible political influence over 19 20 his or her decision making. In New York the Inspector General is an official within the 21 2.2 Department of Investigation and is subordinate to 23 several layers of appointees within that agency. 24 That is, although the City has had hired an Inspector 25 General and told the public that they will receive

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that person's unvarnished opinions and analysis about some of the most pressing public safety issues facing the City. That person has been embedded underneath several political appointees within DOI, all of whom could theoretically influence the reports issued by the Inspector General and I want to be clear. I have no time left. I have no cause to believe that any official within DOI would operate with anything other than good faith in the handling of the OIG or attempt to interfere with the IGs reports but I am thinking about the second question that I proposed earlier the public's perception of independence and effectiveness, this structure in which the IG is subordinate to several layers of political appointees could create doubt for the public about whether or not the IG is truly as independent as has been advertised. And that is an issue that I suggest you should grapple with during this process. Thank you.

CHAIRPERSON GAIL BENJAMIN: Thank you very much. Any questions from Commissioners? Uhm let's start with Commissioner Nori and move in a leftward direction.

SATEESH NORI: Thank you all for taking the time to come out here. Uhm Ms. Conti-Cook I too

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work at the Legal Aid Society. You are one of my heros I am embarrassed to say that we've never met but it's a big organization. I'm wondering if you could talk a little bit more about uhm the new or new to me the database that you've been working on and the impact of transparency or the issue of transparency in police misconduct and what that means and other initiatives uhm that address the lack of transparency within the NYPD?

CYNTHIA CONTI-COOK: Yes, thank you and and likewise, I am, I do forget how large 3000 people large organization can feel like. Uhm the reason I didn't bring up transparency earlier is because I'm not sure what, what solution there is within this Commission's preview. Civil Rights Law 50A is a State Law and is really the crux of the problem. With that said, the position that Public Defenders are in, in relation to this information and then I will move to the public but the position that the public defenders were in when I joined the Legal Aid Society in 2014 and began the work of building a database in 2015 which was available to defenders in 2016, the purpose behind that was because our defenders when they were submitting their motions,

2 uhm under 50A they have to submit a motion in order 3 to have a Judge sign a subpoena and the things that the attorneys have to describe in the motion is why 4 they believe there is an existence of police 5 misconduct information in the custody of the NYPD or 6 7 in the custody of the CCRB that would be relevant and material in their client's cases. Now, without 8 having access to as much as a summary of that 9 information, it is impossible for our attorneys to be 10 able to describe the existence of records they can't 11 12 Let alone their relevance and materiality in access. their case. To address that problem, of really 13 arguing in the darkness for our client's ability to 14 15 confront the people that are accusing them of crimes, we created the database which allowed our defenders 16 17 to review the publically available information that 18 there is about officers misconduct histories to the extent that it is described in documents external to 19 20 a custody of the NYPD and external to the custody of the CCRB and that mostly was law suits, filed in 21 2.2 Federal Court through 1983 allegations. 23 extent that also included newspaper articles where officers are described as committing misconduct and 24 the way that our defenders have been able to use this 25

2 database in court is that they've been able to then point ot the existence of some information about 3 officer's misconduct and then use that information to 4 5 argue that there is likely existence of misconduct 6 records in the custody of the CCRB or the NYPD and 7 therefore the Judge should sign the subpoena. the impact that it has on the public is that people 8 who have been harmed by the police are not able to 9 uhm to sort of have any sense of whether that was a 10 bad day for an officer. Whether that was a mistake 11 12 or whether this is a systemic problem and whether 13 this is a problem that is not occurring because of an 14 off day or something that they misinterpreted but 15 because something that this officer has done. 16 really this work for me began when I was filing Civil 17 Rights Complaints and I saw the same people come in 18 to complain about the same squad of officers in the Brooklyn North Narcotics units over and over again 19 20 who are abusing people repeatedly the same way and yet new people would come in reporting the same type 21 2.2 of misconduct over and over. So, people are harmed 23 and unable to know. The public is not able to engage in an informed debate because they are, they are 24 prevented from knowing the context and the amount of 25

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information that the debate really requires. So, we can't sit here today for example and say you know what the Police Department isn't doing a very good job at disciplining Stop and Frisk as Mr. Albanese mentioned. We have no idea of what the average penalty is for an unlawful stop or frisk. And therefore, it is very difficult for the public to walk in and say we want more penalties for stop and frisk or different types of penalties. So those are some of the ways that the lack of ... (applause)... those are some of the ways that this lack of information harms, harms the people accused of crimes and harms of public.

CHAIRPERSON GAIL BENJAMIN: Reverend Miller. Uhm Council Member Albanese.

SAL ALBANESE: Mr. Corr you, you discussed the importance of Civilian Oversight which I agree with but in essence don't we have Civilian Oversight. We elect the Mayor, we elect the City Council, the Mayor appoints the Police Commissioner. The Mayor appoints members to the CCRB, the City Council appointments members to the CCRB, and if we don't like what they are doing, we can kick them out

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2 in the next election, isn't that in essence Civilian 3 Oversight (laughter).

BRIAN CORR: To answer your question Commissioner, I would say in the literal sense it is, in the practical sense for that oversight to be exercised effectively in the City as large as New York or many cities, even my own City you need to have an infrastructure that can actually do that work and also does need to be independent of the Police Department. Now I will say that it is very important that it be part of government to be able to exercise that oversight effectively you need entities that also report to the Mayor, to the City Council and can balance out that power but you have to have a structure with people who are trained in Civilian Oversight who understand investigations and who also can look at the systemic issues but ultimately I would say that Civilian Oversight is most effective when you have people who are able to focus on that as part of their work, are able to understand the broader picture of Civilian oversight can look at the history in a specific community and nationally and can really understand what are the standards? What is the type of training that both law enforcement

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officers get and Civilian Oversight Practitioners get? Civilian Oversight cannot be effectively exercised by an Executive individual or even a small cabinet but it has to be within an Agency that has independence, that has sufficient budget and that has the appropriate access. Uhm talking about Inspectors General in particular, one of the principals is unfettered access. If you look at the National Level, a Bedrock Principal and this is quoting the Council of Inspectors General from a May 2016 letter they sent to Senators McConnell and Reed federally, a Bedrock Principal Act of 1978 is that an Inspector General must have access to all agency records and information "which relate to programs and operations with respect to which that Inspector General has responsibilities under the Act." So, I bring that up because again to have effective Civilian Oversight, you have to have that level of access in an agency that is within the Government but is separate from and devoted to oversight.

SAL ALBANESE: But that's up to the political system or the Mayor or the City Council to create that infrastructure, correct?

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BRIAN CORR: I would, that would be my position in terms of something that can be effective in terms of having oversight of the police department.

SAL ALBANESE: And you pointed out something very important, that is that you need checks and balances. You need and entities that are independent of whatever agency like the City, have the City Council and the Mayor and they are checks and balances, right? We need the same thing with Agencies. The City Council if they did their job properly would also has oversight over the police department and the public safety committee so we have these things, these things in place. Now you mentioned the Inspector General uhm Ms. Cook referred to the Federal Monitor that I, that I mentioned, they both outside the police department, in your opinion is that a good vehicle for uhm for the checks and balances that we need. Just your opinion. You know. You are not a New Yorker I know but.

BRIAN CORR: I, but I try to be good anyway. So, you know I would say that in my opinion it's a vital part. It's not the only thing and in this particular model I think the Inspector General

2 within DOI is an interesting model as Mr. Mitchell mentioned. There are a few layers. I would say a 3 4 best practice would be for there to be either 5 independence or quasi independence from DOI. I do a lot of work with the City of Chicago as they were 6 7 creating a Deputy Inspector General for Public Safety about two years ago in the wake of everything that 8 they have gone through. And so, they did create a 9 10 DIG, a Deputy Inspector General within the Inspector General's Agency in order to be part of that umbrella 11 12 and to have access but it is a bit different from the 13 other Deputy Inspectors General in that Agency. Budget and the staffing for the Deputy in General, 14 15 the Deputy Inspector General for Public Safety was 16 about 4 of the entire budget of the IGs Office in 17 Chicago and also that particular position was 18 something that you could not just dismiss the person at will but there had to be cause and the Council was 19 involved in that so I think that to have an effective 20 Inspector General that really has the independence 21 2.2 because of the size of the police department. 23 Because you are dealing with a multi-billion dollar budget, tens of thousands of sworn Law Enforcement 24 25 Officers and more Civilians, you need to actually

make sure that the Inspector General in this City
which has oversight of the police department is able
to have the independence and the resources to do that
effectively and then with CCRB I will just add that
I've reviewed some of the recommendations that they
have made and I know that the Director will be
testifying so I won't say a lot but I, I think the
recommendations you are making are important about
unfettered access, about the Budget being pegged to
the police department budget, that really is being
seen as a best practice in communities where you can
do that so that whatever happens as the police
department grows or shrinks as you bring in body worn
cameras and video or other things that the oversight
agency has the ability in the Budget and the staffing
to manage that, to do it's oversight effectively.
Uhm I will stop with that because I could go on and
on.

SAL ALBANESE: I, one more question of Professor Chowdhury?

LIZA CHOWDHURY: Yes.

SAL ALBANESE: I'm always puzzled by this. We have, you mentioned and you did an

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2 assessment of your students and they had a very
3 negative view of the police. Uhm, correct?

LIZA CHOWDHURY: Well, they distrusted.

SAL ALBANESE: They distrusted the police. Now every poll that I have seen over the last nine or ten years, the findings were that 70% of the minority's communities, people of color had a favorable view of the police? How did we?

LIZA CHOWDHURY: Had a favorable?

SAL ALBANESE: A favorable view, yes.

(background noise).

LIZA CHOWDHURY: Which po... I'm sorry, I'm not aware of the poll that you are dis...

SAL ALBANESE: No there's a, there are a number of polls and I can send them to you but...

LIZA CHOWDHURY: I mean uhm if we look at studies and understand systemic trauma and the relationship between black and brown communities and the police, we know there is a historical kind of layer right of what has gone and the distrust and where it comes from right? We are not far from that, I mean I don't have to bring out the cases like Michael Brown, Eric Garner. Right here in New York City we have a lot, right. I've seen videos of young

2 people walking home from school. I, i work with kids that walk home from school and are sometimes you 3 4 know, you know kind of ostracized by the police not 5 for doing anything just maybe not saying Hi, or not 6 looking approachable, whatever it is, right? 7 in the community. Like I'm with the kids, right and for me it's problematic when uhm I teach criminal 8 justice and I used to be a law enforcement officer 9 for 10 years, I used to be a probation officer for 10 the State of New Jersey. I know how important it is 11 12 to have a good, a good relationship with the community, so that the young people that we work with 13 14 trust us, right. So, we need transparency. We need 15 oversight, we need the Civilian Review Board to 16 actually look like the community, because right now 17 the way it looks it's not accessible to them. 18 don't feel comfortable reporting complaints and things like that. (applause). So, so uhm I'm not 19 20 sure of the, of the poll that you are referring to but I know there are several studies. You can look 21 2.2 at everything, policing, black and brown lives. 23 has a huge talk about Oakland. We can look at New 24 York City's history we just have right now. You 25 already know we are under. All of this is coming out

2 because people are dissatisfied and my concern is as a professor who teaches criminal justice, I'm 3 teaching future officers. I worry about their 4 5 safety, right, because when they are being 6 legitimized, when they are working out in the 7 community because there is no trust in them right How can they do a good job, even for the ones 8 now. out there trying to do a good job, right and then for 9 the community because I'm worried about these kids 10 that don't feel comfortable reporting to the police 11 12 and so they are walking around carrying guns because they don't feel safe. Let's get real so you know I 13 14 just think that. So, growing up in a black and brown 15 community. Growing up in a predominantly working-16 class community, I have a different world view and you know as far as my research is concerned, uh for 17 18 the population that usually work with. Our young people that are in gangs and you know young people 19 20 that live in these types of communities. right now in Harlem with the Live and Redemption 21 2.2 Youth Opportunity Hub and you know I do a lot of work 23 in Patterson, New Jersey. You know so, I know what these kids fear, right? And I would love for the to 24 feel safe in their community and one of the ways to 25

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do it is legitimizing it by having transparency with the CCRB that is representative of them and they feel that it is accessible to them. So that is just my take on it. (applause).

CHAIRPERSON GAIL BENJAMIN: Council, jazz hands. Council Member Fiala.

STEPHEN FIALA: Thank you Madam Chair and thank you to each of the panelists for those who traveled from outside of New York. We thank you for visiting us and we thank all of you for attending You know Professor I would say you tonight. Uhm. are very eloquent and uhm the issue of trust I don't think is lost on anybody today because it seems to me that your colleagues in the university or college setting, regardless of what area they teach. Let's take Law Enforcement out of the mix, right. You go into any other profession and I imaging the students would say the same thing about that area of vocation because it seems that over the last half century, uhm our trust as a people in institutions, government, religious and otherwise has been on a downward trend. So, trust is very important, I agree with you there. Uhm but that is a tough concept, right. In the abstract it is easy when you then try to get into the

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specifics okay what does that mean. So, my questions if I could uhm start with Mr. Mitchell, you used the word independence a few times. Independence is a great word. We all like to think that we are more independent. We all kind of support the notion of independence. It's a bold word. For most people I think they perceive it as a good thing. But what does it truly look like? Alright how do you go from that abstraction notion of an independent, external review board for placing? Uhm how do you go from the abstract to the specific, what in your view constitutes true independence and if you could to the extent that you can, specifically with regard to New York City, what's lacking right now that if these things were addressed would suddenly equate to okay now we have true independence of this external review board.

NICHOLAS MITCHELL: So, thank you for that question. Uhm I guess my first point would be I, I don't know that there is one thing lacking, you know in light of the testimony that has already been provided tonight. I think there are probably several areas that are lacking uhm you know that may be necessary to to create the kind of independence that

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I do believe that is needed to be taken to enhance

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the public's perception of the independence of that
body.

STEPHEN FIALA: So, could I ask each of you, your thoughts on an elected you, you have some concerns with unintended consequences. Mr. Corr, I don't know if I caught you agreeing but I would love to hear your thoughts on that as well, right? We know what, we know what is intended, right? We don't ever spend enough time on what are the unintended consequences. What other types of things could result? So, if any of you feel comfortable enough that you want to approach this question, I'd be grateful.

BRIAN CORR: Well I'd be happy to start off and I think that yes, unintended consequences are very important. I will say I am not an attorney so I don't necessarily have that worst-case scenario thinking that is very valuable in an attorney perhaps. But I do think specifically when we are thinking about civilian oversight and unintended consequences. I would put those in two broad categories, considering the proposals that I am aware of that have been made and with no disrespect to people who are here in New York City who are doing

2 this work and who are living the struggle. I would= say that the main challenge I see around an elected 3 Civilian Review Board is that once you have a group 4 5 of people that are elected that have oversight of the 6 police department there will be many, many forces 7 locally and nationally. You've got I believe four very powerful police unions; you've got a National 8 Federation of Police. There will be lots and lots of 9 effort to make those elections turn out the way that 10 those forces want and as someone who personally comes 11 12 out you know a lefty political organizing background 13 and that is really where my heart is. I also have learned that the believe often in the communities 14 15 were better organizers and we will out organize the 16 opposition and I think that the biggest unintended 17 consequence of having an elected Civilian Review 18 Board would be that it would become political, again not to disparage anyone or pick on anyone but I know 19 20 a comment earlier about it shouldn't be politicians who are doing this. Well if you have an elected 21 2.2 review board it is by its very nature, political and 23 they are politicians. And I'm not opposed to 24 politicians. The other big unintended consequence that I see from some of the proposals that have been 25

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made is actually around binding recommendations and I wouldn't say that I or NACOL has an absolute position on this but one of the challenges when you have something where you have binding recommendations that are outside of the command structure is you've got people who are managed within that paramilitary policing structure but the discipline is separate and again in the abstract that could sound really great but the reality is there are many unintended consequences and this sort of when you know when you squeeze the balloon it pops out some place else so I think people have to be very careful as they are contemplating what would be the actual results of say giving the OIG, NYPD or the CCRB absolutely binding power on specific recommendations about misconduct or on broader recommendations about systemic changes. Uhm I will stop with that.

CHAIRPERSON GAIL BENJAMIN: Reverend Clinton Miller.

REVEREND CLINTON MILLER: Thank you.

Thank you very much Madam Chair. I think

Commissioner Fiala brings up a very interesting

dynamic that might give us traction on how to resolve

some of these issues regarding trust, how do you

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transform the abstract to the specific? How do you make this look like something that we can all understand and practice? In my conversations with police officers and high ranking brass there is an unspoken pedigree requirement so that, that ends up looking like a police officers father was a police officer and grandfather was a police officer and there is a very inherent distrust for people of color, not to become police officers, have there been any studies done and Mr. Corr you mentioned not only working on the back end of police misconduct but working on the front end of being proactive. Have there been any studies that could try to translate how hiring could become easier with the, the result of the police force being reflected of the population in the five boroughs more so than it is right now.

proportunity to first say I'm not an academic and I don't have studies that I can cite so I will, I will try to respond to the heart of your question. Uhm in terms of reflecting communities, I'm going to say something that I want everyone to really think about. We often hear rightfully so that we want our police departments to look like our communities. We think

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about where people live. We think about what their ethnicity is. We think about their family background which is very important. I rarely hear anyone say and we want police departments that are 50% female. I think the biggest thing that we can do to change policing in this country is to have a balance between overall you know understanding gender is changing in our society. Men and women have much more of a balance. Not because women are inherently different from men but the socialization that men and women undergo is different. The standards that we hold women and men to are different and if we want to change policing, if we want to reduce the use of force, whether it is lawful or not we should change that aspect of policing. The other thing that I will say, related to this is what when you talk about multi-generational police families and a lack of trust that police may have of people who don't have that background experience. This is here I go back to trauma. There is a different but shared experience of trauma. And I think that people in law enforcement are becoming increasingly aware of this. They are looking at the role that trauma plays around bad decision making, around shortened life

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2	expectancies and increasingly understanding why
3	police officers and police systems make bad terrible
4	decisions. Decisions that take people's lives
5	needlessly. Not just law enforcement officer's lives
6	of course but the lives of people all over this
7	country, especially black and brown people and young
8	people and at the same time we have to look at how
9	trauma has affected our communities and officers have
LO	to understand that. They have to understand the
L1	history so I would say those are my big two buckets.
L2	So not really directly answering your question but we
L3	have to look at the gender composition of our police
L4	department and change that radically and we also have
L5	to look at the role of individual and multi-
L6	generational trauma and how that sets up, sets up
L7	this terrible cycle of violence and mistrust from
L8	the, I hate to say both sides because that is a toxic
L 9	term these days in our society but from these
20	different parts of our community, the police
21	department, law enforcement, the community activist,
22	the every day residence, the government officials.
23	All of us have to be taken out of that cycle of

trauma and violence.

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JOHN CARAS: I, just if you could all perhaps. First of all, I want to thank everyone. think this is great. Uhm the Police Commissioner. We haven't said anything about the Police Commissioner. In New York City, appointed solely by the Mayor, only can be removed by the Mayor. Or the governor under some circumstances. Should that (background noise). change?

BRIAN CORR: Should it change in, in what respect? The elec...

know should the Police Commissioner be accountable to more than just the Mayor? Should there be advice and consent? Should there be a term? Well there is a term a five-year term but I think the Council has proposed a three-year term where they have to come back to the Council in three years and therefore you know if their rate of disc... ignoring the CCRB Discipline is 95% they would have to answer that after three years. You know? I'm just asking for your thoughts on that. You know it is sort of the other end of the equation?

BRIAN CORR: Sure, well you know I think your question sort of relates back to the question

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2 about political accountability uhm earlier from the 3 Commission and yes, clearly, the sort of political 4 oversight of the police department is an important 5 component. It is not the same thing as I think Mr. 6 Corr mentioned. It is not the same thing has 7 Civilian Oversight. It is political oversight by the political branches and uhm it is sort of policing is 8 a critical municipal function that I think sort of 9 belongs with the Mayor's office but the Council has a 10 very important role to play in overseeing the way in 11 12 which the policing function is executed in the City 13 of New York and that would and should include tough 14 questions about things like some of the statistics 15 that we've heard on the first panel about the rate at 16 which the police commissioner is or is not accepting 17 the CCRBs findings for discipline. It could and 18 should include you know very tough political oversight form the City Council associated with a 19 20 whole variety of functions of the Police Department and how they are being carried out. Uhm whether that 21 2.2 equates to changes you know in the, in the advice and 23 consent process. I mean that seems like it would 24 make sense to me. I'm not sort of taking a position

on behalf of my agency but my personal perspective I

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think it would make sense to involve the City Council at both sort of the front end in the appointment process and on you know the back in over... in overseeing the performance of the Commissioner and so I would support those kinds of proposals.

CHAIRPERSON GAIL BENJAMIN: That's not mine. Ms. Conti-Cook I had a couple of questions.

Okay I had a couple of questions for you. You spoke about the law department and their role in representing perhaps you would say too many clients at the same time and wearing too many hats. Uhm within the process of police accountability and discipline. Could you elaborate on how you think that could be handled in a better way and whether you think there is a need for some other type of legal representation within that system?

CYNTHIA CONTI-COOK: Yes and thank you I did not get to sort of close that loop and offer what I think could be the recommendation and the recommendation would be to allow the Civilian Complaint Review Board and other types of oversight agencies to elect a Conflict Counselor or have Conflict Counsel where they could ask for legal advice or legal representation from law firms outside

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2	the law department of the City of New York and so
3	both of the things that were, that are happening were
4	the CCRB, it interpreting 50A along the lines of the
5	City Law Department and is interpreting its
6	disclosure duties under subpoenas. I think both of
7	those legal interpretations were made directly
8	because the law department was sort of dictating how
9	they interpreted Civil Rights Law 50A.
10	CHAIRPERSON GAIL BENJAMIN: And my second

question has to do with something the prior panel brought up which is that and this is for you and the other members that there are other officers who are not represented in under CCRB such as Peace Officers, School Safety officers. Do you know of any example where officers other than police officers are disciplining for those officers are handled through a CCRB type process?

CYNTHIA CONTI-COOK: In another jurisdiction?

CHAIRPERSON GAIL BENJAMIN: Yes.

CYNTHIA CONTI-COOK: I'm not aware, no.

NICHOLAS MITCHELL: So, in Denver,

Colorado as I mentioned at the beginning, I'm the

Independent Monitor of the Denver Police Department

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and the Denver Sherrifs Department. The Sherrifs
Department in Denver does not have a patrol function
so it does not patrol its officers do not patrol the
streets. They run the jails, they run courthouse
security, the run the vehicle impounds lots and other
kind of associated processes and so through my office
we, oversee the investigation of both police officers
and in effect Sherrifs Deputies who are really quasi
kind of correction officers.

CHAIRPERSON GAIL BENJAMIN: And do they also hand the discipline of other police personnel such as 9-1-1 operators or?

NICHOLAS MITCHELL: We do not, our jurisdiction is limited to sworn employees of the police department and the sherrifs department for civilian employees. There are there is a separate process handled by the Department for investigating and disciplining Civilian Employees.

BRIAN CORR: And if I may uhm there are so many different models. Every place is different but I know for example, Milwaukee, they have a police and fire commission and so in Milwaukee you have one agency that has oversight both of the police and of the fire department and it may not occur to a lot of

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people but they actually gets lots of complains about people on the fire department and again thinking about what fire fighters go through and the trauma they experience and how they may inappropriately. You can imagine there are a number of issues that come up, so, uhm and that's something that we can certainly at NACOL I could go back and talk to my colleagues around the country and find out which agencies have that kind of multi-jurisdictional oversight.

CHAIRPERSON GAIL BENJAMIN: I'd be really interested in anything you could supply us with.

That came up from a prior panel and I was, it had never occurred to me and was not aware uhm of the discrepancies. But thank you very much, are there other questions for this panel?

PAULA GAVIN: Can I just say something?
CHAIRPERSON GAIL BENJAMIN: Yes.

PAULA GAVIN: I want to say that I learned so much listening to all of you tonight. The first panel and the second panel. I learned a lot and it made me think about things in a very different way and I want to thank all of you for taking the time.

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1 86 2 CHAIRPERSON GAIL BENJAMIN: Are there any 3 other questions for this panel? If not, I thank you 4 very much and I hope that we will be in touch with 5 you in the days to come. Thank you very much. 6 (applause). (long silence, background noise). 7 (gavel pounding). 8 UNIDENTIFIED: I say give it a couple of raps and tell people to start finding your seats 9 10 we've got the next panel here. 11 CHAIRPERSON GAIL BENJAMIN: 12 pounding). Excuse me we have one more panel to go 13 folks and so if you could start finding your seats. 14 (silence). And for our final panel. We will be 15 joined by Deputy Commissioner Kevin Richardson and 16 Oleg Chernyavsky, how badly did I mangle it as well 17 as Jonathan Darche or Darche. 18 JONATHAN DARCHE: Darche. CHAIRPERSON GAIL BENJAMIN: From CCRB. 19 20 Please go ahead and introduce yourself and share any comments that you may have. Uhm let us start with 21 2.2 Mr. Darche. 23 JONATHAN DARCHE: Thank you Madam Chair.

CHAIRPERSON GAIL BENJAMIN: Uhm you need to turn your mic on. When the red dot is on.

2 JONATHAN DARCHE: Thank you Madam Chair. 3 My name is Jonathan Darche and I am the Executive 4 Director of the Civilian Complaint Review Board or 5 CCRB, an independent City agency that investigates, 6 prosecutes and mediates complaints of misconduct 7 filed by Civilians against the New York City Police Department, against members of the New York City 8 Police Department. Thank you to the 2019 Charter 9 10 Revision Commission for inviting me to speak about some of the proposed City Charter changes related to 11 12 police accountability. The CCRB is committed to a 13 fair, transparent and robust system of police 14 accountability in New York. However, there are a 15 number of challenges to achieving that goal that 16 would be greatly diminished by making four changes to 17 the City Charter. First to codify the CCRBs 18 Administrative Prosecution Unit. Second to enable the board to designate subpoena, the power to sign 19 20 subpoenas to the agency's highest-ranking staff. Third to better define the department's duty to 21 2.2 cooperate with the agency with our request for 23 information and documented related to policy, 24 outreach and operational support. And finally, to 25 amend the CCRB Budget to be 1% of the NYPDs Budget.

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2 I can provide more detail on any of our 3 recommendations, achievable Charter Revisions that we think would help strength the CCRB but for tonight I 4 will limit my focus to two important areas 5 6 codification of the APU and the NYPDs Duty to 7 Cooperate. The work of the APU is governed by a 2012 Memorandum of Understanding between the NYPD and 8 The first unit of its kind in the United 9 States and heralded is a significant step for police 10 oversight by local elected officials and advocates. 11 12 The APU prosecutes nearly all of the cases in which 13 the board recommends charges and specifications, the 14 most serious disciplinary recommendation. Since the 15 creation of the APU, the CCRB has administratively 16 prosecuted officers for misconduct at 374 trials, as 17 evidenced by the APUs current prosecution in the 18 Pantaleo case, the APU was a vital part of a disciplinary process for officers who commit 19 20 misconduct. Amending the City Charter to codify the APU will ensure that this independent and effective 2.1 2.2 tool for Civilian Oversight will continue. 23 Similarly, better defining the NYPDs Duty to Cooperate would enable the established cooperation 24

between agencies to continue regardless of leadership

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changes at either agency. The charter currently
requires that the NYPD cooperate with CCRB
investigation, relax any specific language requiring
the Department to Cooperate with prosecutions or the
agencies operational capabilities. Further, while
there is no current charter requirement for the
Police Commissioner to defer to the CCRBs Findings of
Fact Recommendations for Discipline there is also no
requirement for the Commissioner to explain his or
her reasons when downwardly department, Madam Chair
do you mind if I?

CHAIRPERSON GAIL BENJAMIN: No, please continue.

JONATHAN DARCHE: Thank you ma'am, when downwardly departing from the CCRBs findings and recommendations including a provision in the Charter to require the Police Commissioner to document the CCRB, the case specific, factual and legal reasoning for downward departures would help hold the Police Commissioner accountable for disciplinary decisions regardless of the person in the role. That's its ma'am.

CHAIRPERSON GAIL BENJAMIN: That's all?

JONATHAN DARCHE: Yes ma'am.

I've submitted a lengthier statement in the interest

of time, I would like to highlight recent action the

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2	Police Commissioner has taken to improve the
3	Department's Discipline Process and our push for
4	greater transparency into the process before speaking
5	to some of the Charter Revision Proposals. As part
6	of his continuing effort to better the department,
7	Commissioner O'Neill last year, took the
8	unprecedented step of commissioning an external panel
9	of criminal justice experts to examine the
10	department's internal discipline process. Thought
11	the panel noted that there was no evidence of a lack
12	of fairness it made a number of important
13	recommendations which the Commissioner immediately
14	accepted. He quickly formed an implementation group
15	chaired by the First Deputy Commissioner and a number
16	of the Department Executives to guide the effective
17	implementation of these recommendations. Some of
18	which the department was already in the process of
19	addressing. For example, taking steps to expedite
20	the disciplinary timeline and assessing the
21	feasibility of adopting a disciplinary matrix to
22	assist in the consistent application of discipline.
23	Equally important with regard to transparency, the
24	department strongly supports legislative efforts to

amend rather than repeat Civil Rights Law 50A. Our

2 goal for an amended 50A would permit us to release information of significant public interest including 3 officer names, trial transcripts, trial decisions and 4 final disciplinary outcomes concerning all serious 5 misconduct that leads to the formal service of 6 7 charges as well as cases involving improper use of force or improper searches, even if charges are ot 8 served in those cases at the conclusion of a 9 disciplinary process. This is information advocates, 10 elected leaders and the public have long sought. 11 12 Importantly, such an amendment would leave in place 13 safeguards that protect police officers by allowing 14 the Department to Assess and Address threats to 15 officer safety prior to disclosing such records. 16 Safeguards against disclosure of non-disciplinary personnel records, such as records dealing with 17 18 changes to social status, absence from or tardiness at work and transfer requests and safeguards aims at 19 20 protecting officers against harassment on the stand, reprisals, hostility and outright threats to their 21 2.2 physical safety which has always been the intent of 23 the law. We pledge to continue those efforts as their fruits will enable us to publicly demonstrate 24 the effectiveness of our discipline process and build 25

2 greater trust and confidence in the department. Ι now would like to brief comment on some of the 3 Charter Revision Proposals. First granting the CCRB 4 Prosecutorial Powers and making their decisions 6 binding. As you are aware the department and the 7 CCRB are participates in the agreement whereby the police commissioner had delegated CCRBs, 8 administrative prosecution unit, the authority to 9 process civilian complaints against NYPD officers 10 that have been substantiated and for which the board 11 12 has recommended charges and specifications. agreement has been in effect since 2012 and stands as 13 an excellent example of the effective collaboration, 14 15 cooperation and respect, amongst, amongst our agencies. Although the commissioner can delegate 16 17 portions of the discipline process as the legally 18 vested administrator of the Department and its discipline. This delegation should not be codified 19 20 or circumscribed as it effectively dilutes the police commissioner's authority by extinguishing his 21 2.2 judgment in this final area of Department Governance. 23 Judgment that has been exercise prudently by this commissioner and his predecessors who have reflected 24 on their decades of police service to arrive at 25

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2 meaningful and fair discipline that creates a deterrent to future misconduct while at the same time 3 preserving morale. Second, granting subpoena signing 5 power to the CCRBs highest ranking staff. Currently 6 the CCRBs Board may compel attendance of witnesses or 7 doc... or production of documents by a majority vote via their existing subpoena power. It is important 8 to note that the department routinely cooperates with 9 the CCRB by providing witnesses and documents without 10 the need for a subpoena. The Department does not 11 12 have an objection the subpoena signatory authority 13 being expanded to include the Executive Director of 14 the CCRB in connection with cases where there is an 15 active CCRB investigation based on a Civilian 16 complaint; however, we would object to such an 17 expansion which effectively eliminates the majority 18 board vote safeguard against overly broad demands and demands for information that may not be relevant if 19 20 the scope of CCRBs authority is expanded beyond its current charge. Third, the expansion of the 21 2.2 Department's duty to cooperate with CCRB in relation 23 to subjects that go beyond the scope of the investigations. Currently the Charter mandate that 24 25 the Department cooperate with the CCRB in connection

2	with investigations that the CCRB is conducting
3	pursuant to its legal authority. While the
4	Department will continue to encourage a healthy
5	working relationship that goes beyond the strict
6	bounds of the Charter, we, as we did with the
7	creation of the APU we do not support such an
8	expansion of the CCRBs authority. As the members of
9	the Commission are aware the Department is the
10	subject of multiple oversight entities to include the
11	Office of the Inspector General, Department of
12	Investigation, District Attorneys, US Attorneys, a
13	Federal Monitor, the Commission to Combat Police
14	Corruption, the City Council, and of course the
15	public, allowing an expansion of the CCRBs Legal
16	Jurisdiction to include prosecution and policy review
17	would be duplicative of existing oversight frameworks
18	and create a significant unfunded burden to the
19	Department.

CHAIRPERSON GAIL BENJAMIN: Could you just summarize, your last points?

OLEG CHERNYAVSKY: Sure, I have two more, right, mandate that the CC, the CCRBs Budget be fixed, a fixed percentage of the NYPDs Budget. It is our position that every City Agency has a duty to put

forward the justifications for their expenditures and their future needs and those and those are the needs uhm that should be evaluated. Tying an Agency's Budget to the NYPDs Budget we do not believe is, has a rationale correlation to the needs of any particular agency. With respect to establishing set timelines for various aspects of the discipline process. As the department has done prior to the Blue Ribbon Panel being commissioned as well as based on the Blue Ribbon Panel's recommendations we are already in the process of streamlining our current discipline process as well as implementing the recommendations of the Blue Ribbon Panel and will continue to do so; however, there are many variables that are unique to each discipline case that guide the timing of that particular case which could include adjournments requested by the subject of the discipline and it could include requests for stays in the prosecution of discipline cases by whether, by either state prosecutors or US attorneys. So, we would ask that the codification of timelines not, that they not be codified in law but rather left to policy. With that, thank you for listening to our

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New York City or any bureaucracy to get its full sea

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1 2 legs. So I think it is fair to say that we are 3 probably still in the early stages of getting this 4 entity to a place where everyone believes, oh it is 5 really maximizing it's potential, am I right that 6 there is ongoing dialog and that there are some big 7 ticket areas where you seem to be willing to meet on that bridge and I would assume and correct me if I am 8 wrong, I would assume that would simply mean amending 9 the existing Memorandum of Understanding as opposed 10 to looking toward Legislative fixes other than and 11 12 this is the second area of inquiry, it seems to me 13 based on your testimonies as well as the two subse... 14 the two previous panels, Lord please, no subsequent 15 panels. Uhm that 50A, Civil Rights Law 50A is a 16 significant impediment. That is a state law if I am 17 correct. There is, there are some real serious 18 issues around that so you couldn't just snap your fingers and do all the things that folks want today 19 because there is that wall that quite frankly needs 20 to be addressed. So, if I could I realize this has 21

23 you guys uhm working in tandem to try and effectuate 24 some reforms on your own through amending the

been a very convoluted set of questions here.

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existing memorandum and uhm are you all on the same

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page with respect of the fixes that we are alluded to with 50A in, in your testimony. For anyone who want to jump in first.

KEVIN RICHARDSON: So uhm with respect to the ongoing relationship, I think you are correct, although it has been since 2012, six years, uhm important to note that it spanned two Administrations and three Police Commissioners so there is a commitment that uhm crosses Administrations and crosses the heads of our Department to uhm to the Memorandum of Understanding and the framework around it. Uhm I think we have and I'll let Executive Director Darche comment after me. I think the relationship is productive, it's constantly uhm being reviewed. I think we speak with one another on a regular basis and uh meaning our agencies work together and we resolve any issues or try to resolve any issues that may come up. With respect to 50A, I think you're correct that it is a state law. respect to Commissioner O'Neill he has attempted uhm to be more transparent within the bounds of the existing law by uhm by attempting to release body worn camera footage that was the subject of litigation. Recently we have a favorable court

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decision that permitted the release of body worn camera footage in the sense that it didn't classify it as 50A personnel records. We also uhm the Commissioner also tried to release data that would provide greater transparency into our discipline process that would include having some cases so the reader, the public would be able to not only see numbers and statistics of how many cases are coming in and what kind of bucket it falls into but they could also get a feeling of what are the cases about and could compare and contrast cases. That, that attempt is the subject of current litigation and the subject of the stay. So, what we are left with is to be able to be as transparent as possible within the bounds of the law. We are committed to lobbying in furtherance of an amendment to 50A that would offer the protections that I mention because 50A should not be repealed and I, I need to say that as clearly as possible because I think what often times gets conflated is the need for greater transparency into our discipline process with, with the safeguards that are created by 50A. We can have both, we don't need to throw away the safeguards that are afforded to our officers at the cost of transparency. We could

2	actually amend the law that could give greater
3	insight into discipline records while at the same
4	time maintaining the purpose of that law which was to
5	protect officers against harassment because at the
6	end officers testify. There are many, there are many
7	folks that are protected by 50A, many correction
8	officers, fire department but police officers are
9	unique in the sense that police officers routinely
10	testify in court as a function of their duty and what
11	we're, and what 50A was built around was not to
12	conflate the charges being brought against an
13	individual that is being tried in a criminal case
14	with the harassment of an officer and digging up
15	irrelevant accusations against an officer and
16	diverting the attention of the juries away from the
17	subject of the trial and on to a police officer. So
18	that's what rule 50A was actually built for and that
19	part of 50A should remain as well as the protections
20	against personnel records, you know that are, not
21	connected to discipline at all. The things that are
22	just generally aren't of any kind of public interest.
23	CHAIRPERSON GAIL BENJAMIN: Okay.

JONATHAN DARCHE: And Chair can I respond

as well?

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2 CHAIRPERSON GAIL BENJAMIN: Certainly.

JONATHAN DARCHE: So, with regard to 50A the CCRB has not made a decision to back any particularly bill but it is clear that the current version of Civil Rights Law 50A as it exists is a real impediment to communicating to the community and explaining exactly what is happening in the police disciplinary system. The CCRB is committed to doing everything it can within the law as it stands now to inform people of what is going on in the disciplinary system and if, if you look at our quarterly APE reports you will see that we include summaries of cases in a way that stays within Civil Rights Law 50A but does explain not only what the CCRB believes happened but if the Police Commissioner has a difference of opinion what that uhm opinion was and the reasoning behind it and with regard to the, the first part of your question about, Mr. Commissioner with regard to, do we have conversations? Yes we do because as, we are very different agencies with very different points of view but we have to work together in order for the CCRB to do its job of, of overseeing the actions of the NYPDs members of service and so while we often communicate in order to explain each

other's points of view there are sometimes just going
to be differences that can't, that can't be bridged
but we work as hard as we can to explain our point of
view and hear from the Department their point of

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OLEG CHERNYAVSKY: And if I might add, uhm to Mr. Darche's comments, we have conversations that aren't just conversations but they are constructive conversations for both sides. Department learns from our conversations with the CCRB. We listen to how the CCRB accepts cases, how they analyze cases. How they evaluate and review cases and where we agree with the CCRB on those components we act upon that agreement but where there is a disagreement rather than just attempt to be heavy handed and not communicate, we speak back to the CCRB and we explain to them the department's view of the evidence that the CCRB has uncovered or presented. We explain to them the department's interpretation of a legal standard or of a patrol guide provision that might different from what the CCRBs evaluation was and, in those conversations, we have learned that we can find a middle ground. can find a concurrence if you will on disciplinary

issues and it relates to all four of the CCRB 2 categories, force cases, abuse of authority, 3 discourtesy and offensive language and it's through 4 those constructive conversations that the current MOU 5 has proved to be an invaluable template for us 6 7 working together for the CCRB working in the trial room on their charges cases, for the department 8 having an obligation pursuant to the Memorandum of 9 10 Understanding to cooperate and assist the CCRB in those prosecutions. So many of the things that the 11 12 Charter Revision Committee is discussing are things 13 that exist within the MOU but they are also things that we are working with the current MOU and actually 14 15 achieving through great communication and great 16 understanding so those points I think that the current MOU as it exists is a very valuable tool, is 17 18 a very dynamic resource for both sides to look at, to evaluate and process disciplinary cases. 19 And to that 20 end, I personally communicate with Jon Darche several times a week, probably more times than I would like 21 2.2 to but the conversation while we may disagree in 23 points they are professional, they are respectful, they are informative, they are insightful, Jon Darche 24 will offer assistance from the CCRB to the department 25

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to understand what the CCRBs vision is and we have
also offered assistance to the CCRB in the form of
material, in the form of training, in the form of
resources that we have to demonstrate our commitment
ot what the policies of the department are and to
make sure that the CCRB is fully informed and aware
of them. And it is through those constructive
conversations that I think that we've built a
relationship that is also unprecedented in the
history of CCRB with the level of cooperation, the
level of collaboration and a level of discipline that
the department imposes in CCRB cases.

CHAIRPERSON GAIL BENJAMIN: Thank you.

OLEG CHERNYAVSKY: Uhm Chair can...

CHAIRPERSON GAIL BENJAMIN: Actually, the next, the next speaker is Mr. Weisbrod and then Ms. Hirsh and then Ms. Camillo and then Mr. Albanese.

CARL WEISBROD: I have, first just a, just a quick clarification, Mr. Darche because your statement is sort of awkwardly worded but the four changes that you mention I just want to clarify are changes to the Charter that would in the opinion of the CCRB or your view, enhance and strengthen your role rather than diminish your role?

JONATHAN DARCHE: Correct.

CARL WEISBROD: Okay. Second, I'm a little I'm just a little confused. I don't quite understand, I disagree with my colleague, Commissioner Fiala. This is an MOU that has now existed for six years, almost seven years, it hasn't been amended, uhm it has as Mr. Chernyavsky indicated uhm span two Mayoral Administrations, three Police Commissioners uhm a) which shouldn't it be codified given the fact that it is, has stood the test of I have spent a lot of time in City Government and six years is uhm more than enough time to get it right and it appears that you have gotten it right so my first question is why it shouldn't it be codified? And my second question is, uhm what do you think of the various citizen's union recommendation regarding the operation of the MOU uhm and its effectiveness in addressing the issues that the MOU was intended to address? And I will first start with Mr. Darche and then Mr. Chernyavsky.

JONATHAN DARCHE: So, I agree with

Commissioner Richardson in that the MOU is a great

template I just think that it is a template for a

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2 Charter Revision and I think it belongs in the 3 Charter.

CARL WEISBROD: You are agreeing that it should be codified?

JONATHAN DARCHE: Correct.

CARL WEISBROD: Thank you.

JONATHAN DARCHE: The, when I, when I first joined the agency around in 2013 we were, I was the Deputy Chief Prosecutor of the APU and we were trying to hire staff and it was a real difficulty to get experienced prosecutors to give up their positions to take a risk on something that they saw as not established. So, on that level alone I think it would make sense to put the APU in the Charter. But I also think it sent a message to the people of this City that the CCRBs prosecutorial power on discipline cases is an important part of its function and, and should be permanent.

CARL WEISBROD: Mr. Chernyavsky.

OLEG CHERNYAVSKY: Sure, so the, the
Police Commissioner is giving you, is given unique
authority in the Charter. He is in charge of the
governance of the Police Department, the
Administration of the Department, the Discipline of

2	the Department and that was done for a reason and it
3	is an important reason which is the individual that
4	holds that spot. And if we look back at uhm I guess
5	recent history and not so recent history, the
6	individuals that have held that spot have long
7	records of police service. They rose through the
8	ranks of police officer all the way to the highest
9	rank of the, the civilian rank of Police
10	Commissioner. These individuals are citizens of New
11	York City. They take a look at discipline through a,
12	through a variety of lenses. Not only, not only that
13	of a citizen but that as a police officer in every
14	rank all the way up to their existing rank. At a
15	time where I think the important part, the important
16	balance to strike is that yes there needs to be
17	confidence with the public in our discipline process
18	and I think that confidence can be achieved by
19	amendments to 50A and greater transparency. Because
20	even the independent Commission of respected legal
21	experts have found that there is, the system is a
22	fair system, the only problem is that not too many
23	people know too much about it and can see that it is
24	a fair system. But I think the other point is that
25	police officers have to be comfortable with the

2 Have to have confidence in the system and especially at a time when, where, we are implementing 3 4 neighborhood policing which is fully implemented 5 across all precincts. Police surface areas, being expanded into schools, being expanded into the 6 7 transit system where police officers are told don't only respond to radio runs. Don't sit in your car and 8 wait until the radio rings and just go respond to a 9 They are being told spend 1/3 of your time off 10 of the radio, go and affirmatively engage with the 11 12 public, put yourself out there. I think when 13 officers are given this expanded mission, this unique 14 mission that we can do because I'm sorry, oh I think 15 we can do it because we have seen crime drop to 16 record lows while at the same time enforcement 17 significant decreased, summons are down, arrests are 18 down and crime continues to go down. So, I think we are leveraging those achievements in furtherance of 19 better ties to the community, building trust with the 20 community and telling our officers put yourself out 21 2.2 there but at the same time we need the officers to 23 also have trust in the system. They need to trust that the individual who has this great level of 24 experience that has been appointed to the title of 25

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Police Commissioner will exercise those duties,
unique to the Police Commissioner which in addition
to the governance of the whole entire department also
includes the governance in the administration of its
discipline system.

CHAIRPERSON GAIL BENJAMIN: Thank you.

Uhm Alison?

ALISON HIRSH: Yes, uhm just as a followup to that for Mr. Darche's testimony uhm earlier today suggested that the Commissioner should not be the final arbiter of discipline and I'm wondering if you or the agency have an opinion on that?

JONATHAN DARCHE: That's uhm, it's a very complicated question. Its, a there is an intersection of state law and the Charter and the, the uhm Administrative Code and it gets to the heart of as I think Mr. Corr was describing in the las panel, the difference between oversight and employment but the changes that the CCRB has proposed to the duty to cooperative, I think uhm would give people knowledge of what's going on in the disciplinary process. It would give them more confidence in the, in the system.

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ALISON HIRSH: And that includes uhm sort of an explanation when the Commissioner decreases the disciplinary recommendation?

JONATHAN DARCHE: Correct.

ALISON HIRSH: And can I ask, uhm Mr. Uhm Chernyavsky, uhm can you I guess, like understanding the limitations that 50A grants you know you spoke to us a minute ago the prior panel spoke to the same importance of public trust in the system, assuming you know Albany is a crazy place. You may or may not be able to accomplish anything ever and uhm (laughing) and you know the, it seems like especially in occurrences when the Commissioner either decreases the, the uhm recommendation, the recommended discipline or in cases where there is no knowledge of what is going on and families of Victims of police brutality have no idea where in the system, where in the process you know the disciplinary procedures may be. What do you see as the obligations of the Department in terms of, or what kind of proposals would you share for how to better under, understanding limitations of current law how to better, uhm explain the policies, procedures, recommendations and processes of the Department when

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2 it comes to issues of discipline and police
3 brutality?

OLEG CHERNYAVSKY: Sure, so I think that uhm what the ... with the restrictions of the law create is our inability to give more pointed or specific data. I mean I think that there have been interpretations of, of 50A that have dated back the five decades and more recently there have been cases that found even the redaction of certain information uhm is does not eviscerate the protections of 50A. I think what we can do is give some level of aggregate data that looks into the process. I think what we can do is explain the process of putting aside numbers, putting aside how many complaints or how many disciplines and what the complaints are for. What is the process? How does it work? I mean I've; I've talked about it during the discipline hearing before the Council. I've, it's part of my longer prepared statement that I cut out of my, my condensed statement. I think those are steps that we can take. Now the commissioner has tried, Commissioner O'Neill has tried to give greater insight as I mentioned by giving case summaries and more data than we current given that that has been stayed and so that is the

subject of litigation. We can't do that so we are
really playing within the margins. We are trying to
push, we are trying to go further but when a, when a
case if filed and we are stayed we know that that is
a line that we can't cross. Now there are certain,
certain information obvious CCRB puts out certain
information on their website. Uhm we put out certain
information on ours. I think the Blue-Ribbon Panel
certainly made a recommendation that we, that we be
more transparent and look at these things. The, the
Commissioner and paneled and implementation paneled
and so we are looking at that now to see how far we
can go. I think in the last week or two we started
posting trial room calendars on our website something
that was a recommendation of the panel that gives
greater transparency. I think one of the issues was
that attorneys from some of the stakeholders would be
seated, seated in the trial room waiting to see if
the case that they were interested in was coming up
so I think this should resolve that issue, uhm I
think uhm so I guess that's, that's not so short
answer to your question.

JONATHAN DARCHE: Madam Chair?

CHAIRPERSON GAIL BENJAMIN: Yeah.

JONATHAN DARCHE: Could I respond to that
as well? Because I just wanted to, to explain some
of the things that CCRB does to make sure people are
informed when they have a compliant and that is in
our jurisdiction that they have made to us. So, every
person knows who their investigator is once they make
the complaint and they can reach out and contact them
for information on what's going on. We have a
website so if they know their case number they can
look and find out what status their case is in and if
it, it will tell them to call if they have questions.
At the end of the CCRB investigation, the, the
Complainant and the member of service are both given
written explanation as to what the board's decision
was and then in cases where an allegation of
misconduct is substantiated, we give Civilian an
explanation of what the final discipline decision
was.

CHAIRPERSON GAIL BENJAMIN: Thank you.

OLEG CHERNYAVSKY: And I just add one point, my colleagues pointed out that one of the recommendations of the, of the Blue Ribbon panel was to appoint a liaison in these situations where the liaison could contact the complainant and give them

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2 status updates on the case and that's certainly
3 something the implementation group is working on.

CHAIRPERSON GAIL BENJAMIN: I have two questions, one short and one possibly longer but I will try not to take too much time. This is just for information because I don't actually know, can the CCRB take complaints of witnesses of uhm policemen misconduct or just from Victims of police misconduct?

JONATHAN DARCHE: So that is currently the subject of litigation but currently the CCRB takes complaints from witnesses of misconduct.

CHAIRPERSON GAIL BENJAMIN: Okay. And then uhm from my limited reading it looks like the concurrency rate, I guess is the technical term between the CCRB recommendations and the Police Commissioner's Final Discipline Ruling has dropped like considerable and I wonder if either of you have any explanation of, or if there is anything that the Agency of CCRB is doing to deal with that issue or why that is?

OLEG CHERNYAVSKY: Well actually I think that, thank you, actually I think the disciplinary rate for the full year of 2018 has actually gone up.

CHAIRPERSON GAIL BENJAMIN: Oh.

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OLEG CHERNYAVSKY: We saw a decline in the concurrency rate between the two agencies in 2017, uhm there had been some adjustments made to the reconsideration process that I think caused that reduction in the concurrence rate. Those changes have been, have been revised so for 2018 I think that you will see that the Department imposed discipline in over 90% of the CCRB cases including 85% of the CCRBs most serious cases, the charges cases. it's through that, again that communication that collaborative effort that we have spoken about to make sure that the Department is disciplining its officers properly which is what the department's interest is, which is what the CCRBs interest is and I'm not speaking for Mr. Darche he is here but we do that through, through our joint communication. yes there was a dip downward in the concurrency rate but we've seen that go up before year 2018 and I expect that to improve for this year as well.

JONATHAN DARCHE: I think uhm a lot of the discrepancy comes between using our discipline rates and the concurrence rate. So, the discipline rate measures if the CCRB recommends discipline and the Department imposes discipline. The concurrence

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Uhm Ms. Camila?

cooperate.

rate is lower which is when the CCRB makes a recommendation, the Department imposes exactly that recommendation so in a, APU case where a member of service has uhm, uhm had five allegations of misconduct on their charges and the CCRB makes a recommendation based on the guilt of the member of service to all five specifications and then not all five specifications are guilty in either the, the hearing officer recommends less than what the CCRBs original recommendation is and then the, the police commissioner imposes less than what the CCRB recommended that shows up as less than concurrent.

ALISON HIRSH: Thank you.

CHAIRPERSON GAIL BENJAMIN: Thank you.

LISETTE CAMILA: Thank you uhm very much

for the testimony I, my question is directed to Mr. Darche, so you focused your testimony on two recommendations but I was hoping you could expand on the other two that you didn't talk about. So, the subpoena signatory power as well as the duty to

JONATHAN DARSHE: With regard to the subpoena power, uhm it seems silly but days matter.

In New York City many of the locations that record
video, copy over it after several days so if the CCRB
needs to uhm investigate or gets a case, drafts a
subpoena we have to take it uptown to where the,
current chair is working. The board is part-time and
then he signs it and then we have to get someone to
bring it back and the we can serve the subpoena and
if you lose two or three days you might have lost the
evidence. So, it is actually very important to be
able to designate a staff member to sign those
subpoenas so that we don't lose valuable evidence
that is helpful in having the CCRB make a
determination. The CCRB is committed to uhm fair and
impartial investigations and we need evidence of that
and it is important for us to get that evidence and
the video is a very important part of that function
and the the presence of body worn camera footage is,
is helpful in that part but also just video that is
just being used by different locations to
surveillance video, for us to get that video is very
important.

23 LISETTE CAMILA: Thank you.

CHAIRPERSON GAIL BENJAMIN: Commissioner

25 Albanese.

SAL ALBANESE: Uhm as one of the
panelists pointed out, I think all of you agree that
a disciplinary system has to be, has to be fair and
transparent. The public has to be comfortable with
it as well as police officers. Otherwise it is just
not going to work. We have work to do in order to
make sure that it does work. Uhm I just want to
clarify something, 80% of the complaints are either
unsubstantiated for false? Correct? At CCRB? About
80% I don't, I don't believe that's, that's. What's
the number do you know?

JONATHAN DARCHE: So approximately half of the complaints in our jurisdiction are not fully investigated. Uhm of the cases that are, and that's for a variety of reasons, sometimes someone has pending litigation whether it is a civil suit or a criminal case against them that they don't want to give a statement so the case is, it is closed without having a fully investigation, sometimes someone, we are unable to find them to get a full statement from them. The uhm Chair to mind if I...

CHAIRPERSON GAIL BENJAMIN: Oh no, it's okay. Continue.

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2	JONATHAN DARCHE: Of the cases that we
3	do fully investigate approximately 20% are
4	substantiated, uhm, there is, I should know the exac
5	number of exonerations, unfounded and but there is
6	also I would say approximately half of the cases are
7	unsubstantiated.
8	SAL ALBANESE: Let me get the essence of
9	my question, the unsubstantiated complaints or false
LO	complaints uhm.
L1	CHAIRPERSON GAIL BENJAMIN: Uhm, I'm not
L2	sure that unsubstantiated means false.
L3	SAL ALBANESE: Unsubstantiated or false,
L 4	or false. No, I didn't say that. Do you is it your
L5	proposal to publish the names of the officers when
L6	complaints of substantiated?
L7	JONATHAN DARCHE: I don't, I don't think
L8	that was proposed but if.
L9	SAL ALBANESE: That's not something that
20	you are considering?
21	JONATHAN DARCHE: So, not not in these
22	four proposals, no and it is something that if Civil
23	Rights Law 50A were to change it is something that w
24	could consider but certainly members of service who

have either had their allegations exonerated which

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means that the conduct that was complained about
occurred so the department was able to the CCRB was
able to determine that. The civilian made a
complaint and what they complained about happened but
the officer did not commit misconduct when it
happened. That's not a false complaint. If the CCRE
did an investigation and was unable to determine by a
preponderance of the evidence what happened, that's
an unsubstantiated complaint that doesn't mean that
it didn't happen. So, it's a very small number of
cases that are false complaints.

SAL ALBANESES: My, my point is that uhm you know police officers' career could be, if that information was public, uhm an officer's career could be derailed or sidetracked if that officer (yelling). If that officer.

CHAIRPERSON GAIL BENJAMIN: Please, we agreed that that was not going to happen.

SAL ALBANESE: If that, if that officer says three or four unsubstantiated complaints.

That's why I am asking the question is that one of the things that you are considering publishing the names of the officers who have had unsubstantiated complaints?

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2	JONATHAN DARCHE: So, I, I don't think
3	that would actually derail someone's career and we
4	inform the department when what happens in those
5	cases. So, I don't.
6	SAL ALBANESE: So, are you planning to

SAL ALBANESE: So, are you planning to publish the names of the officers?

JONATHAN DARCHE: No sir. No Mr. Commissioner.

SAL ALBANESE: Okay thank you.

CHAIRPERSON GAIL BENJAMIN: Okay I've got a question now. Uhm a series of questions and the first uhm Ms. Conti-Cook who spoke earlier spoke about the problem of the Law Department representing both you and the police department and basically everybody else who is involved in the process except for the lawyer for the complainant. Do you see that as a problem also?

JONATHAN DARCHE: So, I'm aware that some people see that as a problem. We monitor the situations that come up to look for active conflict between, that would prevent the law department from representing the CCRB and in those cases uhm I would go to the board and request permission to retain outside Counsel.

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CHAIRPERSON GAIL BENJAMIN: And in your experience how many times has that happened?

JONATHAN DARCHE: We have not don't that.

CHAIRPERSON GAIL BENJAMIN: Excuse me?

JONATHAN DARCHE: We have not done that.

CHAIRPERSON GAIL BENJAMIN: So, is that because you don't consider any of the cases that have come before you to have had that issue, because the board did not approve outside counsel or this just isn't an issue?

JONATHAN DARCHE: So, my understanding of the case law surrounding this issue is that there needs to be an active conflict and an active litigation and so far, I as Executive Director haven't been confronted with an issue like that where I've gone to the board.

CHAIRPERSON GAIL BENJAMIN: Do you think there is a smaller issue that may not be active but that the law department is speaking on behalf of more than one client whose interest may not be perfectly aligned?

JONATHAN DARCHE: It's possible.

CHAIRPERSON GAIL BENJAMIN: Anyone else?

Oh no I was just asking and my second question,

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several of the first panel raised the issue of other kinds of officers who may be subject to disciplinary actions peace officers, uhm school safety officers, uhm and that they are not under the umbrella of CCRB. Do you think that it would be a desirable thing to have them under CCRB?

JONATHAN DARCHE: So, if the, if the City were to change the Charter to add peace officers and school safety agents to our jurisdiction it would be an extremely difficult expansion. Uhm number one I think just school safety agents are another 5,000 school safety agents so how would we have the capacity to take on that added uhm responsibility. It not something that I would just take on. But its more than just the numbers, it's also, my investigators are trained and experienced in dealing with a patrol guy that, members of the NYPD are responsible for abiding by. I, I don't know what school safety agents or HRA peace officers, how they are trained, how they are, what their standard they are held to. It would be, I'm not saying that we couldn't do it but it's not something that if uhm in November when the voters vote on Charter Revision if it was enacted its not something that we can do

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quickl	У•	Ιt	would	be	an	intensi	Lve	process	for	us	to
get up	and	rı	unning	and	l re	esource	int	tensive.			

CHAIRPERSON GAIL BENJAMIN: I don't think its good for the schools either to, to have that.

You know I was involved in school safety officers for over a decade and I just don't see. I understand the need for monitoring them but I just don't think that is right basket to put them. When PD was in the schools though did complaints against school safety officers who were members of PD fall within the CCRB jurisdiction?

JONATHAN DARCHE: So, school safety agents were never in the CCRBs jurisdiction but police officers, sworn members of service even when they go into a school are in our jurisdiction.

JIM CARAS: I just was curious as to what effect the APU prosecuting cases since the 2012 MOU has had on the discipline and the concurrence rate?

JONATHAN DARCHE: I'm sorry, I'm sorry can you repeat your question please?

 $\,$ JIM CARAS: What affect did the APU that was required by the 2012 MOU has had on the

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discipline and the concurrent rate? I mean has there
been a correlation, has it been negative? Positive?

OLEG CHERNYAVSKY: Do you mind if I answer it? So, in the year and a half before the MOU went into effect which is before Deputy Commissioner Richardson was at the Department there were no trials in cases that had been referred by the CCRB. Just having the APU has resulted in 374 public trials that people can attend and see. So, just from that alone, the amount of visibility into the discipline process, because of the APUs presence is dramatic.

JIM CARAS: So, let me ask about uhm police department. So, you don't want the APU codified so you would be okay going back to a situation where I don't mean you, this, this Police Commissioner but where a future Police Commissioner sort of threw out the MOU and we went back to no trials?

OLEG CHERNYAVSKY: No, I, I don't think that at all, I think that we have shown. First the APU and the MOU was voluntarily entered in to so this was something that the police department saw value in. We, we, as we do with many of the programs initiatives that we do we always reevaluate, reassess

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and see and find, try to find ways to improve, that

improvement as it related to discipline in 2012 was

giving CCRB prosecutorial jurisdiction over the cases

pursuant to the MOU. Now that MOU has survived and

been built on and improved. So, I, I would not say

that we want to go back to to.

JIM CARAS: No, no I don't mean you. I mean.

OLEG CHERNYAVSKY: No, no I understand but I am speaking on behalf of the department sir.

JIM CARAS: The Mayor or another Police Commissioner could want to go back to a situation where there are no trials and not codifying the MOU would give them that opportunity.

JONATHAN DARCHE: Well I think that is a bit of a mesomeric the term no trials. There were trials prior to the creation of the MOU and the MOU and the creation of the Administrator Prosecution Unit it is just that those cases were tried by department trial lawyers. But the cases were tried in the same courtrooms that the CCRB appears in and tries cases. So, the cases were tried, they just weren't tried by the CCRB.

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JIM CARAS: But were they CCRB cases that
were getting tried? I don't believe so.

JONATHAN DARCHE: CCRB cases were tried as well. If a CCRB case was substantiated was brought to a position where it was going to be tria... where it was trial ready and it needed to go to trial those cases would go to trial. So it wasn't that no cases were tried. It's just before the, before the APU the CCRBs prosecutors weren't the prosecuting attorneys.

JIM CARAS: How ha.. I guess I am not.

JONATHAN DARCHE: I think we agree to disagree on that.

JIM CARAS: I think I'd like.

OLEG CHERNYAVSKY: I think to your larger point about future Administrations I guess coming before the Council and testifying on a regular basis I think at last count four or five times a month I can tell you that if a program, an initiative such as this were to go away there would be a lot of answering to be done to the 51 members of the Council. Where routinely subjected to oversight whether it be by the City Council, we have an Inspector General that, that does oversight, a

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Federal Monitor and on and on. The Commission to

Combat Police Corruption so we, we are very

accountable and we are held to account and we are

called to hearings where we need to explain our

decisions and in the scenario that you raised, that

having a situation where some future Police

Commissioner is going to say okay no more APU and we

are not going to prosecute CCRB cases either, I think

there would be a lot of explaining that needs to be

done and I can't envision that such a scenario would

ever happen.

 $\label{eq:chairperson gail benjamin: Paula you are next and then Alison. \\$

PAULA GAVIN: Uhm this is for uhm Deputy
Commissioner Richardson. I have noticed that you two
don't agree and that is the four proposals that you
don't agree with and CCRB does agree with. But one
of them I want to poke at a little bit which has to
do with the uhm Police Commissioner documenting the
reasons for his decision. In the Independent Review
Panel, the recommendation was to go to a decision
matrix and to use that to explain decisions. Is that
going to be implemented?

2	KEVIN RICHARDSON: First of all, thank you
3	for your question. Uhm the Blue-Ribbon Panel
4	suggested that, one the Police Commissioner detail
5	more specifically why he deviated from a disciplinary
6	penalty. The Police Commissioner has committed to
7	that recommendation from the Blue-Ribbon Panel and
8	has already begun the process of formalizing
9	informational memoranda of why the Police
10	Commissioner made the decision that he made in a
11	particular case but with respect to the disciplinary
12	matrix the department had been considering that for
13	some time. The recommendation of the Blue Ribbon
14	Panel just strengths to resolve to review the
15	Disciplinary Matrix so that is currently under review
16	by the implementation committee and we have actually
17	had conversations with the CCRB where we have
18	committed to including them in the conversations
19	about creating and building a disciplinary matrix
20	that we would both share and utilize and I do agree
21	that if we had such matrix in place it could assist
22	in a disciplinary concurrent rate but a matrix is not
23	an absolute because there are always going to be
24	variables in each and every case involving each and
25	every officer that have to be considered both in the

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Department cases and in CCRB cases. So, we are making sure that we create a, a matrix system that takes into account the need for standardization yet maintains the ability to have flexibility.

PAULA GAVIN: So, to some degree you do agree with the proposal to strengthen the documentation?

KEVIN RICHARDSON: Yes, I do.

PAULA GAVIN: Exactly okay and then the other one is a totally different question and that is the you've talked to the proposals that you support or don't support. Is there anything that NYPD would like in the charter for example, neighborhood policing is there any issues that are important that you think should be in the Charter?

KEVIN RICHARDSON: That's a good, that's a good question, I think uhm I mean I think generally speaking I'm not going to be able to give you exact proposals but I think anything that strengthens our ability generally speaking to, to provide better police services, to uhm...

PAULA GAVIN: To build trust.

KEVIN RICHARDSON: To build trust. To offer greater transparency and I think just to the

transparency point, yes, we are working towards an
amendment to 50A but we, I would argue that I think
and I think most would agree that we are probably the
most transparent, uhm we've ever been, I think. I
think we have (background noise). We've collaborated
with Council I would say over 30 or so transparency
bills where we put data up. We've put or patrol
guide online. We self-initiate reporting to point if
you simply just go to our website and you will see a
tremendous amount of data, a treasure trove of data
that could enable individuals, the public, academics,
to crunch numbers, determine patterns, we put, we put
most of our data on machine readable format so making
it easier for folks to digest. So, yeah, I, the
nonspecific answer.

PAULA GAVIN: Well I think police accountability does have an underlying point on trust so maybe you do want to think about if there is anything. Thank you.

CHAIRPERSON GAIL BENJAMIN: Commissioner Hirsh.

ALISON HIRSH: Uhm this question is for Mr. Darche, uhm on the first panel in particular we heard a lot about the make up of the CCRB. I think

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in the limited research that I have done many other cities their Independent Review Board does not have any appointees for instance made by the Police Department of the Commissioner. There was also one panelist spoke about the fact that the youth that she works with doesn't look at the, either members of the. I couldn't, I wasn't clear if it was members of the board or the staff and see them as folks that they feel comfortable and trusting in in submitting their complaints and so I was wondering if you have any thoughts on whether the current make up of the CCRB works or what the ideal make up of the CCRB would be?

DONATHAN DARCHE: So I think in and I believe that the board is committed to making sure that the board and the staff of the CCRB reflect the diversity of the City and the CCRB has hired a recruiter to make sure that we are bringing on investigators, investigative staff that we are trying to get not just the best people but the best people who also reflect this City and I'm I'm confident that we are making strides to doing that. It is something that we are committed to that the board has charged me with doing and I take very seriously. Uhm.

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ALISON HIRSH: In terms of the make up of the who gets to appoint and the makeup of the appointees on the board do you have a position or is that too fraught for your position?

JONATHAN DARCHE: So, I've seen some of the proposals and I think they are, they go towards how the board functions at its core. So, most cases are heard by panels of three people. Uhm one City Council designee, one Mayoral designee and one Police Commissioner Designee. If there is a different type of designee added to the mix it would make for a four person panel which could result in ties which is something that we try and avoid and it also will make it much more harder to schedule and uhm it is a real priority for the agency to do things as fast as possible and it is a real struggling and making that process more complicated, would if that happens will will work with it but I just urge you all to take into account how we actually hear cases when you are working on the who designates things.

ALISON HIRSH: Thank you.

CHAIRPERSON GAIL BENJAMIN: Thank you

24 very much.

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2	JONATHAN DARCHE: Uhm Madam Chair
3	Commissioner Camila had asked a question earlier and
4	I only answered one part of it and I want to
5	apologize and see if there is a chance for me to
6	answer it fully.

CHAIRPERSON GAIL BENJAMIN: Okay.

JONATHAN DARCHE: With regard to the 1%, there is sometimes things that happen in the NYPD in their budget over the course of a year. Decisions that they make that have a real impact on the CCRB. They require us to have to change how we train. They require us to change our technology and, and while I, I understand what uhm Mr. Chernyavsky, Executive Director Chernyavsky said about how every agency should have to justify its own needs on its own terms. It is very tough to do oversight over such a, the largest police force in the country when you are playing catchup.

CHAIRPERSON GAIL BENJAMIN: Thank you very much. Uhm seeing no further questions, uhm I want to thank all of you and I want to thank all of the people in the audience, all of the participants who have been here and been a part of this hearing.

I appreciate your time and your interest. I 25

CHARTER REVISION COMMISSION 2019 appreciate the courtesy that you have shown us and I hope that you feel we have shown you. Uhm and our next forum will be on Monday March 11th at 6 p.m. at the Borough of Manhattan Community College and that will be on Finance and Budget. So I thank you very much and (gavel pounding). Uhm do I have a motion to hit the gavel again (laughing)? Is there a second? Any discussion? All in favor? ALL: Aye. CHAIRPERSON GAIL BENJAMIN: Opposed, the meeting is adjourned (applause).

World Wide Dictation certifies that the foregoing transcript is a true and accurate record of the proceedings. We further certify that there is no relation to any of the parties to this action by blood or marriage, and that there is interest in the outcome of this matter.



Date April 22, 2019