

Testimony of  
Letitia James  
New York State Attorney General

Before the  
New York City Charter Revision Commission

Public Forum on Governance

March 18, 2019

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Good Evening. My name is Letitia James and I am the Attorney General for the State of New York. Prior to that, I proudly served as New York City Public Advocate for five years. I would like to thank Chair Benjamin and the rest of the Commission for inviting me here this evening to discuss reforming the governance of this great City.

Sponsoring the bill that set in motion this first ever legislatively created Charter Revision Commission was one of my proudest accomplishments as Public Advocate, and I am gratified that this body has been every bit as independent and thorough as I could have hoped. I would also like to recognize two of my predecessors in the Public Advocate's office: Mark Green and Betsy Gotbaum.

The office of Public Advocate is a special one and, as the only democratically elected watchdog, unique in all the annals of government. The heart of the role of Public Advocate is ensuring that the voices of all New Yorkers are heard, particularly when it comes to the government entities and agencies that exist to serve them. I have seen all my life how ours laws and the government that makes them are not neutral, monolithic, or unchangeable. In the wrong hands they can oppress and degrade and in the right ones they can protect and uplift. It is therefore a profound thing to have helped lead a new experiment in the eternal struggle for a government that is truly by and for the people.

I was proud of the things we accomplished during my time as the fourth ever Public Advocate, and I expect great things from our newly elected Public Advocate—my friend, Jumaane Williams.

Thirty years after the office was first created I believe two things are abundantly clear: The office has proven its worth many times over and it is time that its powers be strengthened after three decades of living with half measures. Although there is a great deal an aggressive and creative Public Advocate can do to tackle systemic problems, it is time to move past the watered down compromises of 1989.

The office is empowered to demand, and agencies are expected to provide, any information the Public Advocate needs to complete an investigation. But those demands are not backed up and given teeth by the power to issue subpoenas. The office is charged with resolving citizens' complaints with City agencies. But the office does not have explicit statutory capacity

to sue on their behalf. The office exists to serve as an independent check on the Mayor. But it is the Mayor who sets the budget for the office.

It is possible to get information and to resolve complaints without these legal mechanisms and I think it is clear that I and my three predecessors were able to act independently of the Mayor despite his control of the budget. But the time has come to put structural underpinnings beneath those good intentions.

I believe that, as we look at the governance of this great city with fresh eyes, we should take this opportunity to finally fulfill the promise of a fully empowered people's watchdog. To me that requires: subpoena power, the capacity to sue, and an independent budget beyond the reach of any Mayor.

Thank you for this opportunity. I look forward to continuing to work with you as you move towards a final proposal.



**CITIZENS UNION OF THE CITY OF NEW YORK**  
**Testimony to the New York City Charter Revision Commission 2019**  
**Meeting on the Office of Public Advocate**  
**March 18, 2019**

Good evening Chair Benjamin and distinguished members of the New York City Charter Revision Commission. I am Betsy Gotbaum, executive director of Citizens Union and the former New York City Public Advocate from 2002 to 2009. We are happy to see that you are holding a meeting on the Office of Public Advocate, and for giving Citizens Union and I the opportunity to share our recommendations with you.

In 2010, Citizens Union issued a report in which we advocated retaining the Office of Public Advocate and giving it more authority. The recommendations I make to you today expand on those made in the 2010 report and are informed by my own experience serving New Yorkers as Public Advocate.

Citizens Union believes that the Office of Public Advocate, when properly structured and adequately funded, can be a useful and necessary actor in city government, especially given the need for greater oversight of city agencies. With the City of New York having only three elected citywide officials, the Office of Public Advocate occupies a unique and useful position from which to assess the needs and failures of city services in a city as large and diverse as New York. We believe the following recommendations for Charter reform will strengthen the position of public advocate and should be taken up by this Charter Revision Commission.

1. **Establish independent budgeting for the Office of Public Advocate and increase its annual funding.** Independently elected officials should not have their office operating budgets decided by both the city council and the mayor when these officials, especially the public advocate, may challenge the mayor or the council on their positions and approaches to issues. It undermines the integrity of the office if the public advocate feels the need to couch their remarks and opinions for fear of having their budget cut. Independent budgeting would require the public advocate's budget to be tied to another line of the city budget. We also believe that, given its responsibilities, the public advocate's budget should be increased from the roughly \$3.6 billion it is now (we note that the mayor has slightly increased the public advocate's budget in his preliminary budget). In 2010, Citizens Union recommended the annual funding of the public advocate's office be set to between five and seven percent of the council's budget, however we have not revisited this formula.



2. **Give the public advocate the power to make one appointment each on the Franchise and Concessions Review Committee, the Board of Standards and Appeals, and the Conflicts of Interest Board.** Expand the Franchise and Concessions Review Committee (FCRC) from six to seven members, adding a designee of the public advocate to address concerns that the franchise and concessions process is too centralized and that the voices of consumers or other affected groups are not given enough weight during negotiations. The public advocate's representative would be a natural advocate for consumer issues and constituent groups citywide, given the office's ombudsperson role. This expansion will preserve a majority appointed by the mayor or representing mayoral agencies, and would provide three rather than the existing two votes for appointees of other elected officials (the comptroller, the borough presidents, and now the public advocate). It will also create an odd number of votes on the FCRC.

The appointment process for the Board of Standards and Appeals should include additional representatives from the borough presidents and the public advocate. Specifically, the BSA should be expanded to include one appointee from the public advocate and one appointee from each of the five borough presidents. For a given ruling, the voting BSA members would consist of seven members, five appointed by the mayor, one by the public advocate, and one representing the borough impacted by the ruling, as is the practice with the Franchise and Concessions Review Committee. Members of the BSA from the mayoral appointments also should now be required to possess professional expertise, with two of the five appointees being architects, and one of the five being an urban planner. Additional members to the BSA should be put in place immediately while professional expertise should be phased in as mayoral appointees are replaced.

The present appointment system of the Conflicts of Interest Board should be changed to create greater independence so that the mayor does not appoint all five members with council approval. It is recommended that the newly reconstituted Conflicts of Interest Board should have three appointees by the mayor, one by the comptroller, and one by the public advocate. The council would retain its role and power through its advice and consent authority for all appointees. Citizens Union believes that to go from all mayoral appointees to one in which a small plurality would be appointed by the mayor would inject too much change and politicize what has been a professional approach to ethics enforcement even though justifiable concerns exists over one elected official making all the appointments. Removal of Board members would be for cause only, at the discretion of the appointing office.

3. **Eliminate the Commission on Public Information and Communication (COPIC) and transfer its major duties and responsibilities into the Office of Public Advocate.** Such an amendment would give the public advocate a greater level of responsibility for expanding public access to government data, information, and reports. In addition, city agencies should be required to provide information, documents, and other data to the public advocate who, as the city's watchdog of public information, will be better able to



evaluate the ease of public access to city government information and the breadth of information available.

- a. Require the public advocate to review the city's procedures and timeliness of response related to Freedom of Information Law (FOIL) requests, and make recommendations in this area.
- b. Require the public advocate to make recommendations on improving access to data and information via new technologies, such as the internet and mobile devices, and on the reporting mechanisms developed.
- c. Require the public advocate to review current law requiring agency reports and make recommendations on sun-setting reports when they are no longer needed or useful.

**4. Empower the public advocate to request and receive documents from city agencies.**

This should be achieved in the Charter by mandating that agencies provide documents to the public advocate when requested, rather than requiring the public advocate go through the relevant council committee. Exceptions to this currently in the Charter, namely those documents for which a claim of privilege may properly be raised or are being used by the Department of Investigations for use in an investigation, should be maintained as provided in Chapter 2, Section 24(j) of the Charter. Citizens Union does not recommend granting the public advocate subpoena power, as there are already many investigative agencies in New York City.

**5. Give the public advocate access to data from the 311 call center.** The 311 call center is the nation's largest municipal call center and the most centralized site of communications between residents and city government. The system is intended to field complaints and inquiries, and act as a communication network among city agencies. As the citywide ombudsperson – the only elected official tasked with addressing individuals' complaints on a global scale – it is essential to have access to information gathered by 311. From nowhere else can the public advocate assess the scope and scale of city service problems so completely. 311 has an Agency Relations department, which works to exchange information about trends with city agencies, and there should be an explicit link between this work and the public advocate's.

We thank the Commission for its consideration of these important reforms to reinforce and expand upon the authority of the public advocate to serve as the city's ombudsperson. We look forward to continuing to work with you on this issue.

Opening Statement of Karen Griffin  
Professional Responsibility & Ethics Counsel  
Before the 2019 Charter Revision Commission

Good evening commissioners, commission staff, and members of the public. My name is Karen Griffin, and I am the Professional Responsibility and Ethics Counsel for the New York City Law Department. In this role, I counsel and train City attorneys in a wide array of legal ethics and professional responsibility matters and I chair the Law Department's Committee on Professional Responsibility and Ethics. I also served as a member of the New York City Bar Association's Committee on Professional Ethics from 2011-2016. Prior to my current role, I served in the Law Department's Appeals Division and its Tax & Bankruptcy Litigation Division. I am pleased to appear before the Commission to describe the role and duties of the Corporation Counsel.

Under the Charter, the Corporation Counsel is "attorney and counsel for the city and every agency thereof and shall have charge and conduct of all the law business of the city and its agencies and in which the city is interested." This means the Corporation Counsel represents all the agencies in the City, as well as the Mayor, the City Council, and all other City officials. Other than the Corporation Counsel and assistant corporation counsels, no other attorneys are authorized to represent the City of New York in litigation absent a special designation by the Corporation Counsel.

The Corporation Counsel is the head of the Law Department, which now has over 920 lawyers and 800 support professionals. Law Department attorneys give advice to our many clients, and they also represent the City in court. This means we defend the City in a variety of different lawsuits, as well as employees of the City, when appropriate. For example, our Labor & Employment Division represents the City in labor disputes and employment actions. Our Tax & Bankruptcy Division defends the City's real property tax assessments in Article 7 cases and also represents the interests of all City entities and agencies in bankruptcy matters in federal bankruptcy court. And our Environmental Law Division addresses some of the most pressing environmental problems facing municipalities today, including protecting the nation's largest unfiltered surface drinking water supply, solid waste management, clean air and water issues, and protection of New York City's harbors, rivers, park land and open spaces. Although our Environmental Law Division's work consists of both affirmative and defensive litigation on

behalf of the City, the Law Department also has an Affirmative Litigation division, which files lawsuits on behalf of the City's interests.

Giving advice and representing the City in court are our office's primary duties, but we additionally review procurement contracts, real estate leases, and financial instruments for the sale of municipal bonds. We also represent the City in juvenile delinquency proceedings brought in Family Court, and Administrative Code enforcement proceedings brought in Criminal Court. Our Legal Counsel Division frequently works with the Administration and the City Council on local legislation, and we also work on state legislation that affects the City.

The largest division in the Law Department is the Tort Division, and much of the Law Department's work is defending the City when private individuals and entities sue the City over an alleged harm. In defending the City in such matters, the Law Department, in consultation with affected agencies and entities and, when appropriate, with the Comptroller's Office, determines which approach best protects the City's interests as a whole.

When confronting legal issues, different officials of the City may disagree as to the best approach to take. In these situations, attorneys in our Office first try to develop a defensible approach that meets the primary goals of the different entities and officials. If such an approach is not feasible, then, after consultation with the various entities and officials, the Office will advance the legally defensible position it believes in good faith will best promote the interests of the City as a whole, taking into account the need to maintain consistent and defensible litigation positions on the City's behalf across many litigations. However, if the disagreement is a good faith legal dispute over the powers or duties of an independent official or body, the Law Department will authorize conflict counsel to be retained to represent that official or body.

We are counsel to the entire City, including this Commission, and we strive to faithfully serve all our clients. We take our statutory duty to represent the City of New York and our ethical duties to our various clients seriously. Thank you for inviting me to speak on behalf of the Law Department, and I look forward to your questions.



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## **Testimony for NYC Charter Commission**

My name is Victor A. Kovner and I had the honor to serve as Corporation Counsel of the City of New York during the administration of Mayor David N. Dinkins in 1990 and 1991. I will address my comments particularly to the portion of the Commission's recommendations dealing with the City Law Department.

The City Law Department is truly a treasure. For decades it has been led by people who, without exception, have run the office in a non-political manner serving the entire city. As my predecessors and successors have frequently noted, the Law Department represents the entire City, and not any particular public official including the Mayor.

There are numerous occasions when there will be different perceptions by various elected officials and various agencies of the city. Obviously, the Mayor, the City Council, the Borough Presidents, the Public Advocate, and the Comptroller will differ on some issues from time to time as will many of the city agencies. Outside of the law department, no official or agency has the responsibility for focusing on the interest of the city as a whole, as opposed to one or another of its many parts. Particular branches of the City are ill equipped to look beyond their particular jurisdictions in terms of the consequence of taking one

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legal position or another. Only the Law Department is equipped to evaluate the impact upon all of the city's agencies of taking one position or another.

Accordingly, it is a serious mistake to make the question of representation of the city in judicial proceedings dependent upon action by any other official or body. Of course, the Corporation Counsel has discretion and from time to time permits an agency or branch of the city to appear by separate counsel. But the courts of the state and of the federal government are entitled to have the legal views of those authorized to act for the City overall and I urge you not to undermine that overall that vital municipal interest.

Thus, it would be wrong to limit the Corporation Counsel to a three-year term and to make his or her appointment subject to City Council advice and consent. Such restrictions would undermine the independence of the office at great cost to the City.

Lastly, I would like to add that I have deep reservations regarding the overall recommendations of the Commission. They demonstrate an intent to implement a major restructuring of the City by diminishing the power of the Mayor substantially, and increasing the power of other agencies, which will, I fear, only lead to dissension and inefficiencies within the city. I urge you to proceed on these measures with the greatest of caution. Thank you.

## **NEW YORK CITY GOVERNANCE: GOVERNANCE AND OTHER MATTERS**

**Douglas Muzzio, Ph.D.**  
**Professor of Public Affairs**  
**Austin Marxe School of Public and International Affairs**  
**Baruch College, CUNY**

**Testimony before the 2019 Charter Revision Commission**  
**March 18, 2019**

Madam Chair and members of the Commission, thank you for the opportunity to testify before you. I'm Douglas Muzzio. I am a Professor of Public Affairs at the Austin Marxe School of Public and International Affairs at Baruch College, CUNY.

I am a confessed charter revision nerd. My affliction began in 1989 when I co-authored the City Council report for the 1989 Commission, followed in 1992 as the survey researcher for the New York State Charter Commission for Staten Island. It has persisted through the 2003 commission, as an expert witness and as a consultant to the 2010 Commission.

I want to congratulate you all for thoroughness of your efforts. I was a strong supporter of this commission that could/would comprehensively examine the 1989 Charter changes in light of challenges and opportunities that have arisen in thirty years.

Any meaningful review of today's charter take cognizance the 1989 charter changes. What has worked? What hasn't? Why? How have post-1989 commissions attempted to "fix" it? Have they been successful? How do we "fix" it now? Any unwanted consequences lurking?

A comprehensive charter, in my way of thinking, ought to be framed by three broad themes: centralized power vs. local power and advice and consent, governmental checks and balances (essentially, how to contain the power of the mayor/expand the power of other city officials/institutions), and expansion of an informed and efficacious electorate.

Specifically, I can discuss matters of governmental structure and process, among them

- the role of the City Council vis-à-vis the Mayor (e.g. advice and consent power, enhance its budgetary role),
- Public Advocate (i.e. retain, eliminate, enhance or reduce authority. If not eliminated dedicated questions funding stream; subpoena power),
- Borough Presidents (e.g. retain or eliminate, maintain, reduce or enhance authority such as in land use decision making and capital planning and budgeting)
- the role of the Corporation Council/law Department
- independent budgeting (Public Advocate, Borough Presidents, Comptroller)
- cautions

### **Articulate Clear and Compelling Goals**

The 2010 and earlier commissions never defined their goals. The 1986-88 Ravitch commission, believing that charters and, hence, charter changes should reflect clear and compelling goals, adopted a number of goals "to provide logic, rationale, and context for various decisions to more universal principles..." The chair of the successor 1989 commission, Frederick Schwarz, restated these goals in his "Initial Proposals" in April 1989:

- balancing power/checking power
- increasing participation/adding voices
- enhancing government efficiency and effectiveness



- fixing accountability
- ensuring fair representation

Without clearly articulated goals, a commission's deliberations are ultimately directionless. It can get you places where you don't/ought not want to be. Neither the preliminary staff report nor the final report to the 2010 commission provided a discussion of any principles that structured the choice of the alternatives and recommendations offered.

## Governance Issues

### City Council

The City Council in January 2019 released a report to the Charter Commission outlining its recommendations in six areas: the balance of power in city government, voting and elections, police oversight, the city budget, the procurement process, and land use. I support with various degrees of knowledge and enthusiasm most of these recommendations, focusing on those which seem paramount. I disagree on the matter of the Public Advocate and I am concerned with IRV. I also have concerns with the advice and consent powers over certain government officials and the accountability of these officials to the Council after their appointment.

The Council identified a number of areas designed to principally re-calibrate the executive/legislative balance in the city: advice and consent for what are seen as "key" actors in New York City government, the role of the Corporation Counsel and Law Department, among others. These concerned revenue estimating, units of appropriation, impoundment and budget modifications, independent budgeting for the Comptroller and Public Advocate and non-negotiable budgets for the Borough Presidents, as proposed by the City Council in its January 2019 report.

- **Advice and consent power of Council:** Corporation Counsel, Police Commissioner, Chair of City Planning, Chief Administrative Law Judge, Executive Directors of the Campaign Finance Board (current advice and consent), Conflict of Interest Board (current advice and consent)

Advice and consent of these officials by the Council is tied to core principles of altering the present balance of power, that is, sharing and checking the Mayor's power by the Council. It is an attempt to moderate in a small sense the dominant power of the Mayor in strong-mayor form of municipal government.

- **Separation/attenuation of powers:** same officials subject to establishment of three year terms. The Council proposes the removal of Commissioner of Investigation be subject to the approval of the Council.

The three year term provides two benefits

1. It enhances accountability to the City Council as the legislative branch in its policymaking role. The Council notes, in its Jan 2019 report, "The New York City Police Department, the City Planning Commission, The Office of Administrative Trials and hearings, the campaign Finance Board, and the Conflict of Interest Board played critical roles in city operations and the

carrying out of the policies established by the Council.” (An action which would bolster accountability would be to require periodic questioning – say twice a year – by the Council).

2. and at the same time gives some degree of independence of the designated officials.

There are several issues with this proposal:

1. The commission should prioritize one or two officials who meet specified criteria of importance/impact (Should it designate any?)
2. Do all designated officials “deserve” the requirements. Is, for example the control of the police department an exclusively executive prerogative or should policy-making be divorced from the technical/tactical?

Two examples of the latter are:

1. Los Angeles’ Board of Police Commissioners (Los Angeles Police Commission) is made up of five members who are appointed by the mayor and confirmed by the city Council. Each member serves a five year term with a maximum of two terms. The Police Commission is head of the Los Angeles Police Department. They set the overall policy while the Chief of Police manages the daily operations of the Department and implements the Board’s policies and goals.

2. The Detroit Board of police commissioners is vested by city charter with broad supervisory authority over the police department. The charter provides for the board to have 11 commissioners, four members appointed by the mayor and subject to the approval of the city Council and seven elected members, one from each of non at large police commission district. Each commissioner serves a five-year term. The Board has the authority to establish Police Department policy, rules and regulations, approves its budget, and serves as the final appellate authority for employee discipline

### **Corporation Council/Law Department**

The Corporation Counsel is the City’s “attorney and counsel” who has “charge and conduct of all the law of business of the city and its agencies and in which the city is interested.” As the city’s lawyer, the Council 2019 report asks who exactly does the Corporation Counsel represents. The City is composed of multiple branches and elected officials not under the control of the mayor. Why should the mayor’s wishes be prioritized?

The charter does not clearly state which branch of city government asked as the client in legal matters or provide direction for the city’s lawyer. It is doubtful that the mayor should be the sole arbiter of what is in the city’s best legal interest prioritizing only the mayor’s interests. Most notably when the mayor is in opposition to the Council or other elected officials.

**Bottom Line:** I agree that the charter should establish that in the event elected officials and the mayor disagree on a legal matter that the law department either represents both interest if possible or if not provide funding for outside legal representation for the Council, controller, Borough Presidents and the public advocate in certain matters

**Alternative:** In many jurisdictions, the duties of the Corporation Counsel are performed by independently elected officials mainly called the City Attorneys e.g. Los Angeles and San Francisco. The elected position is meant to disburse power in mayor-council systems away from the mayor as well as remove some of the quandaries surrounding New York’s Corporation Counsel mayor-dominated role. The Los Angeles Charter (Sections 270-275) characterizes the



City Attorney as both the city government's lawyer -- representing departments, elected officials, and city commissions -- and a criminal prosecutor. The City Attorney may be asked to interpret the city charter.

### Public Advocate

The commission has three options regarding the public advocate: 1. eliminate the office(s); 2. retain it as is; 3. enhance its powers, duties, resources. What are the arguments and the proposals regarding these choices? How do these proposals relate to/foster the goals of the charter and the commission?

**Eliminate:** Arguments for the elimination of the office in 2019 essentially reflect those made by opponents of retaining the then-City council President in 1989: 1. the ombudsman function would be better performed by an appointed, rather than an elected, official; 2. oversight of the mayor's service delivery function would be better performed by the Council and, moreover, an oversight role for the (then) council president would undercut the Council; 3. a (then) council president would not have enough to do governmentally (Schwarz and Lane 1998: 819).

The Goodman Commission in 1975 contemplated eliminating the position and later, in 1993, Mayor Dinkins and Council Speaker Vallone discussed placing a referendum on the ballot to eliminate the office, but they could not agree how to divide the office's limited power, particularly regarding mayoral succession. That year, legislation was proposed in the Council to eliminate the Council President but this was rejected in favor of simply changing the name to Public Advocate to reflect better the powers and purviews of the position.

Mark Green and Mayor Rudolph Giuliani (both elected in 1993) was contentious. The mayor attempted to blunt Green's activities through budget starving, cutting the Public Advocate's budget as a political weapon. Similarly, the Council and Mayor Bloomberg slashed Public Advocate Betsy Gotbaum's budget in retribution for her opposition to the overthrow of the two-term limit.

In 1999, Giuliani created a charter commission to change the city's succession procedure, largely to stop Green from becoming mayor if Giuliani left his job for the U.S. Senate. The measure, along with 14 others in the omnibus proposal, was overwhelmingly rejected by the voters 76-24%.

The 2002 charter commission appointed by Mayor Bloomberg proposed one ballot measure that changed mayoral succession from the Public Advocate being interim mayor until the end of the former mayor's term to being interim mayor only until a special election to be held within 60 days of a vacancy.

In 2009, then-councilmember and chair of the Governmental Operations Committee, Simcha Felder, introduced a bill and issued a report calling the office "redundant" and calling to get rid of it.

**Retain as is:** Supporters contend that the public advocate is important to the city's political opportunity structure. The cost of the Public Advocate is minimal relative to the overall size of the city budget. Moreover, proposing elimination could endanger all other commission recommendations, producing "collateral damage."

**Enhance:** The principal arguments in favor retaining or enhancing the powers, duties, and responsibilities of the public advocate are essentially the same as in 1989: that the office would be an additional check on powerful mayors and the mayor-controlled city bureaucracy and that it provides a stepping stone to the mayoralty (or at least as a candidate for the office).

**Ombudsman role:** The City Council President in 1975 became New York City's ombudsman (although Charter does not use the term), responsible for addressing complaints



about government waste and abuse. The office's ombudsman powers included a mandate to handle complaints and identify systemic problems in city agencies (Charter, Chap 2, section 24). (For a brief history of the ombudsman role of the City Council President/Public Advocate see Green and Eisner 1998)

An ombudsman, is "an independent, impartial public official with authority and responsibility to receive, investigate or informally address complaints about government actions, and when appropriate, make findings and recommendations, and publish reports" (United States Ombudsman Association 2003: 1)

A number of cities most notably Detroit, Portland, Oregon and Seattle, Washington have ombudsmen (For a discussion of municipal ombudsmen see Mills 1994):

Enhancements of ombudsman role include:

- **Ability to obtain agency information:** The Public Advocate should be empowered to receive documents directly from city agencies (now he or she must go through the relevant City Council committee should an agency be recalcitrant). Charter Chapter 2 section 24(j) should be changed to mandate city agencies to provide the Public Advocate documents and other materials upon receipt of written request of the Public Advocate.
- **Investigative/subpoena power:** The New York City Public Advocate, like its counterpart in Seattle/King County could be empowered to initiate investigations of any scope of any administrative act of any administrative agency, administer oaths and hold hearings in connection with any matter under inquiry, issue a subpoena to compel any person to appear, give sworn testimony or produce documentary or other evidence relevant to a matter under inquiry without the stricture that written complaints by a citizen of the city or county be required to initiate such an inquiry. Additionally, the charter could require access to independent counsel from the Law Department.
- **Appointive power:** Giving the Public Advocate an enlarged voice through augmented appointment powers, notably to the Board of Standards and Appeals, the Conflict of Interest Board, and the Landmarks Preservation Commission.

### **Bottom Line**

The questions confronting the 2010 commission are essentially the same as those confronting the 1975, 1989, 1998, and 2002 commissions. Does the Office of Public Advocate make institutional sense? Does it (or can it be made to) serve an important and useful function in the city's governance? The answer to the first question is NO. It was an ad hoc creation, and its occupants have had different approaches, with different styles, with different effects of the which are hard to recall. It remains undefined and ad hoc with proposals for it hanging like Christmas ornaments from the tree.

### **Borough Presidents**

The Commission has basically three options regarding the borough presidents: 1. eliminate the office; 2. retain as is; 3. enhance the powers, duties, resources. How does each of these relate to or foster the overall goals and objectives of structural change for city government?

**Eliminate:** The *New York Post* has likened the borough presidents to dogs, with "nothing to do." The charter commission should "ax the beeps." The office "does offer the trappings of power — a lofty title, \$135,000 a year salary, a driver and sometimes a palatial

office — but without much real authority anymore" (Robinson 2005). Those supporting elimination argue that the boroughs were arbitrary constructs, created for political convenience at the time of the creation of the Greater City. As a result of the development of the structure of the city government over time, they say, the consequences on New York City politics and policy if the borough presidency were eliminated would be negligible. They argue further that the boroughs are massive, greater in population than most cities, so that it is not compelling to regard the borough presidents as bringing a "local voice" to public discourse.

**Retain as is:** Defenders of the office argue that borough presidents are accepted by the media and city residents as legitimate advocates, and have been effective in this role. Moreover, the offices have some resources through which they may define issues of concern to borough (and all city) residents, and advance policy solutions. Borough presidents also play an important role in the physical development of the city through their formal ULURP role.<sup>1</sup>

Additionally, the borough presidencies serve a political function. They are a sort of "junior varsity" for up-and-coming politicians, providing them a base from which to seek citywide or other higher office. Confirming this point, recent borough presidents who have run for mayor include Robert Wagner Jr., David Dinkins, Ruth Messinger, and Fernando Ferrer.

Moreover, those who advance this view say, there are more compelling structural matters that require the attention of the Charter Commission. Efforts to restructure the borough presidencies would likely be a distraction, diminishing public attention to these other issues and complicating the politics of charter change. The conclusion: "If it ain't broke, don't fix it."

**Enhance:** The structural changes being advanced for the borough presidencies strengthen their ability to act of behalf of the boroughs while not fundamentally reducing the power of the Mayor (or the Council).

They are:

1. providing an independent budget for the Borough Presidents
2. granting the power to require the appearance of borough agency heads and commissioners at monthly interagency meetings led by the borough presidents,
3. giving the borough presidents additional appointments to boards and commissions,
4. greater borough president input and influence in ULURP process.

**Bottom line:** Borough presidents are in the words of Gregory Perotta, "The Super City's Special Executives." The borough presidents ensure effective city service delivery and, more generally, give an important (and necessary) borough voice in the affairs of the city. The borough presidents are important to the city's political opportunity structure, and to incorporating its multi-dimensional diversity in governance.

## **Budget Powers**

**Revenue Estimates:** If final non-property revenue estimate of revenue still lies with the Mayor/OMB this should occur earlier than the current (June 5) date after spending proposals become known. These projections should be moved earlier to determine budget priorities. The Council in 2019 suggested May 25 for approval by the Council; the Citizens Union in 2010 suggested May 5 which is usually the beginning of Council hearings on the executive budget. By allowing the Mayor to modify the revenue estimate at the point of the final budget adoption, s/he could thwart spending proposals which s/he disagrees by reducing the revenue estimate by an amount equal to the spending with which s/he takes issue. Further, the Council recommends in 2019 that in the event the deadlines are not met, required the city

to adapt the revenue estimate produced by the Independent Budget Office. An assessment should be conducted comparing the accuracy of OMB and IBO revenue projections over the years

Another approach would be to designate another official (the Comptroller) or a body such as the Independent of Office or some sort of amalgam, including the Mayor.

**Units of Appropriation:** Units of appropriation discussed by 1989 commission staff as means to make the budget programmatic. The commission proposed a statement of programmatic objectives of each program/purpose/activity of each single unit of appropriation. In the intervening years, the units of appropriations were never re-structured to reflect the wishes of the 1989 charter.

The Council proposed to the structure and presentation of the expense budget to make it more programmatic, meaningful and transparent. Specifically, 1. narrower units of appropriation, providing definitions in Chap. 6, section 100 of the Charter of "program," "purpose," "activity," and "institution"; 2. prohibition on having a majority of an agency's spending in one unit of appropriation; 3. eliminating the distinction between personnel services and other than personal services. Units of appropriation should reflect spending on particular purposes, programs, or activities and include both personal and other than personal services. Large, unspecified units of appropriation make the budget opaque making it difficult for the Council to adjust priority.

**Impoundment Power:** limiting the Mayor's impoundment power to cases where there is a significant and sudden reduction in estimated revenues in current fiscal year. The impoundment power, like the revenue estimation power should not thwart the Council's budgetary roles.

### **Independent Budgeting**

The control of the Comptroller's, the Public Advocate's, and the Borough Presidents budget (and, hence, its activities) is held by the Mayor and the Council. And that control has been used as a political weapon. Mayor Giuliani attempted to reign in Public Advocate Green through "budget starving" (as well as removing the Public Advocate from the line of succession). Betsy Gotbaum was punished by the Mayor and Council for her opposition to the overthrow of the two-term limit through budget cuts. Mayor Bloomberg again slashed the Public Advocates budget for FY 2011 (which he had suggested eliminating), only to have the Council restore the funding.

The argument for independent budgeting is simply that officials selected by citywide or boroughwide electorates should not be at the mercy of the Mayor and the Council. A multiplicity of formulae (generally based on the Independent Budget Office model) are possible. Again, all are arbitrary, but hopefully wisely so.

### **Cautions**

Beware the unintended consequences.

Jimmy Flannery, the Chicago sewer inspector, machine ward heeler, sleuth and protagonist of Robert Campbell's crime series, has a warning in *The 600 Pound Gorilla* for those who would tinker with a city's government:



"A thing like a city government is like a tower built out of match sticks. It stands so rickety you think one breath'll knock it flat. Somebody decides to fix it. Take out this rotten beam and that rotten brick. Chop out a floor, pump out the basement, add a garden room. Then everybody acts surprised when it comes crashing down."

And Yogi: "If you're going to build a better mouse trap, you better make sure there are mice out there"

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# THE PUBLIC ADVOCATE FOR NEW YORK CITY: AN ANALYSIS OF THE COUNTRY'S ONLY ELECTED OMBUDSMAN

MARK GREEN & LAUREL W. EISNER\*

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I don't know if there's another city in America that has an elected public advocate. But think about what that means. What would it mean for you to be a public advocate? Someone who is standing up for people at large, right? For the public . . . I'm sort of the country's public advocate.

—President William Jefferson Clinton<sup>1</sup>

## INTRODUCTION

On January 2, 1994, Mark Green was sworn in as the first public advocate for New York City, a citywide elected position that is more than a century-and-a-half old. The holder of this office, formerly known as the “President of the City Council,”<sup>2</sup> historically presided over the New York City Legislature, represented citywide rather than borough or local interests in the City's governing bodies, and served as a counterweight to the powerful mayor. In response to the political upheavals of the 1960s, the council president in 1975 also became New York City's official “ombudsman”—responsible for addressing citizen complaints about government waste and abuse. When the new City Charter was adopted in 1989, the office's ombudsman powers were expanded significantly to include a mandate to identify and address systemic problems in City agencies.<sup>3</sup>

While there are many kinds of government and private ombudsman offices,<sup>4</sup> the Office of the Public Advocate is unique. A quirk in New York City's history has made it the only elected ombudsman in the world.<sup>5</sup> All

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1. President William Jefferson Clinton, *Remarks on Kick Butts Day in Brooklyn, New York*, 33 WKLY. COMP. PRES. DOC. 521 (Apr. 15, 1997), available in LEXIS, News Library, Presidential Documents File.

2. The name was changed to public advocate. See NEW YORK, N.Y., LOC. L. NO. 19 and LOC. L. NO. 68 (1993). For clarity, we refer to the position by the name it was given during each of the time periods discussed.

3. See N.Y. CITY CHARTER ch. 2 § 24 (1989).

4. See *infra* note 108 (list of general governmental ombudsmen).

5. This conclusion is based on a review of the known United States ombudsman offices, a survey of the members of the United States Ombudsman Association and the International Association of Ombudsmen, and correspondence with the leadership of ombudsman organizations and prominent scholars of ombudsmanship. See Letter from Stanley Anderson, Professor Emeritus, University of California, Santa Barbara, to Laurel W. Eisner, General Counsel for the Public Advocate (Jan. 7, 1997) (stating that he “know[s] of no other directly elected Ombuds [sic]”); Letter from Donald C. Rowat, Professor Emeritus of Political Science, Carleton University, Ottawa, Canada, to Laurel W. Eisner, General Counsel for the Public Advocate (Jan. 10, 1997) (“I have not heard of any ombudsman office in the world that is directly elected [ ] other than governors or lieutenant governors . . . I know of no literature that discusses the idea of an elected ombudsman.

the others are appointed by—and thus dependent on—the executive or the legislature. The public advocate is the only popularly elected government official whose primary role is to be an ombudsman.<sup>6</sup>

The elective nature of the office also makes the public advocate a player in the City's partisan political fray. That, along with the office's unusual structure, its mandate to function as a critic-at-large, and its lack of line responsibility,<sup>7</sup> has made the position the target of periodic proposals to eliminate or radically restructure it. The elective nature of the position has also protected it, however, by insulating it from critics and enabling the office holder to function independently of the sectors of government he or she is mandated to oversee. This independence permits the City's ombudsman to be responsive to the concerns and complaints of otherwise powerless communities and sub-groups in this multiracial, multiethnic, and economically heterogeneous city. The citywide election of the public advocate grants the office a popular mandate that City bureaucrats, other elected officials, and the media cannot easily ignore.

The public advocate's work, in fact, has been of significant interest to the press and the public and has led whistle blowers, advocacy groups, and concerned citizens to seek the office's intervention.<sup>8</sup> During Mark Green's

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The classical office is always assumed to be an agency of the legislature to monitor the administration."); Letter from Bernard Frank, American Friends of The International Ombudsman Institute, to Laurel W. Eisner, General Counsel for the Public Advocate (Jan. 16, 1997) ("I know of no other state or municipal Ombudsmen in the United States elected to office by popular vote. I doubt there are any such elsewhere in the world. Therefore, the New York City Public Advocate is unique in that respect.") [hereinafter Letter from Bernard Frank].

6. The handful of lieutenant governors who have taken on some ombudsman role are not elected as ombudsmen but rather as second-in-command to the chief executive. The ombudsman role is secondary—at best—and largely discretionary rather than statutory. In New York, in 1979, Governor Carey designated Lieutenant Governor Mario Cuomo to serve as the state's ombudsman. See Mario Cuomo, Editorial, *New York Needs an Elected Ombudsman*, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 5, 1981, at A22. The states of Colorado, Illinois, South Carolina, and New Mexico also established ombudsman functions in the lieutenant governors' offices in the 1970s. See Alan J. Wyner, *Lieutenant Governors as Political Ombudsmen*, in EXECUTIVE OMBUDSMEN IN THE UNITED STATES 135 (Alan J. Wyner ed., 1973) [hereinafter EXECUTIVE OMBUDSMEN IN THE UNITED STATES].

7. Like classic ombudsmen, the public advocate is mandated to handle complaints and identify systemic problems but has no authority to overrule executive decisions or implement proposed recommendations. See N.Y. CITY CHARTER ch. 2 § 24 *passim* (1989, as amended through 1997).

8. Unfortunately, the requests sometimes exceed the office's limited resources, which consisted, between 1994 and 1998, of only 45 staff members and a budget of \$2.3 million, which is nearly 40% lower than the budget of the office during the Dinkins administration. Compare CITY OF NEW YORK, OFFICE OF THE MAYOR, MESSAGE OF THE MAYOR: THE CITY OF NEW YORK EXECUTIVE BUDGET FISCAL YEAR 1997, at 234, with CITY OF NEW YORK,

first four and one-half years as public advocate, his office received nearly 80,000 complaints from the public and a steady stream of requests for the 115 investigative reports, budget analyses, and consumer guides issued by the office.<sup>9</sup> Two of Green's predecessors in the office—Andrew Stein and Carol Bellamy—also handled large numbers of individual complaints and issued reports about system-wide problems.<sup>10</sup>

Many of the investigative reports have provoked considerable controversy, as well as the enmity of the targeted entities, and the mayoral agencies have largely refused to cooperate with the office's investigations—particularly during Mayor Rudolph Giuliani's administration.

This article chronicles the historical evolution of the Office of City Council President/Public Advocate over the past 100 years—focusing on the events that led to the establishment of the office as a citywide elected ombudsman. It then summarizes the debates about the office during the 1989 New York City Charter revision proceedings and describes the office's powers under the resulting Charter and how they have been implemented during Mark Green's tenure. Finally, the article analyzes the position's strengths and weaknesses and proposes some changes to the Charter to clarify the position's powers and increase its effectiveness in future administrations.

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OFFICE OF THE MAYOR, MESSAGE OF THE MAYOR: THE CITY OF NEW YORK EXECUTIVE BUDGET FISCAL YEAR 1993, at 266.

9. Between January 1994 and June 1998, for example, the Public Advocate's Office (a) issued more than 100 investigative reports, (b) wrote dozens of analyses of the City's budget and letters to government officials identifying problems or recommending policy changes, (c) initiated and introduced, as prime sponsor, legislation in the City Council (including bills to overhaul New York City's commercial carting industry, to reform the City's campaign finance system, to make the Department of Investigation more independent of the mayor, to strengthen the City's laws for protecting whistle blowers, and to ban workplace discrimination against victims of domestic violence), (d) published several comprehensive consumer guides to health maintenance organizations and hospitals and a detailed research study of New York City's uninsured population, and (e) created a specialized ombudsman unit for individuals and families who deal with the City's child welfare system. The reports are on file at the Municipal Reference and Research Center Library located at 31 Chambers Street, New York, New York (hereinafter the "Municipal Reference Library"). A partial list and description of some of these publications is contained in *infra* notes 224-51, 255.

10. See *infra* notes 106-07 and accompanying text.



I. THE HISTORICAL EVOLUTION OF THE OFFICE  
FROM 1831 TO 1989

A. 1831 to 1975: *The City Council President,  
the Mayoralty, and Borough Politics*

The Office of Public Advocate dates back to 1831, long before the unification of the five boroughs into a single city. It began as the president of the Board of Aldermen, a legislative body of the borough of New York and a portion of the Bronx, who was first-in-line of succession to the mayor under the 1830 City Charter.<sup>11</sup> The survival of the office in various forms for over a century and a half is a testament to the deep-seated resistance by the City's political leadership and voters to placing excessive, or unchecked, power in either the mayor or the borough officials.

In 1898, the five boroughs were consolidated into one City, but power in the new unified entity was dispersed among numerous officials.<sup>12</sup> The president of the Board of Aldermen was designated to sit with the mayor and other citywide officials on the Board of Estimate and Apportionment, a separate entity which managed the City's budget.<sup>13</sup> In 1901, the City Charter was revised to weaken the new mayoralty's powers. The amended Charter strengthened the Board of Estimate and Apportionment and added the borough presidents as members, thus institutionalizing the pattern of governance that continues in modified form to this day. It provided some electoral representation to each of the boroughs but offset the centrifugal force of borough interests by vesting the balance of power in three citywide elected officials, who also checked each others' powers.<sup>14</sup>

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11. See REBECCA B. RANKIN, MONOGRAPH, HISTORY OF THE OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT OF THE BOARD OF ALDERMEN OF THE CITY OF NEW YORK (1920). The City Council replaced the Board of Aldermen in 1938. See Laurence Arnold Tanzer, Annotation, N.Y. CITY CHARTER, at 27 (1937).

12. See 1896 N.Y. Laws 488; see also 1897 N.Y. Laws 378; *The Reemergence of Municipal Reform*, in RESTRUCTURING THE NEW YORK CITY GOVERNMENT: THE REEMERGENCE OF MUNICIPAL REFORM I (Gerald Benjamin & Frank J. Mauro eds., 1989). See generally WALLACE S. SAYRE & HERBERT KAUFMAN, GOVERNING NEW YORK CITY: POLITICS IN THE METROPOLIS 13-17 (W.W. Norton & Co. 1965) (1960); R. Alta Charo, *Designing Mathematical Models to Describe One-Person, One-Vote Compliance by Unique Governmental Structures: The Case of the New York City Board of Estimate*, 53 FORDHAM L. REV. 735, 742 (1985); Joseph P. Viteritti, *The New Charter: Will it Make a Difference?* in URBAN POLITICS, NEW YORK STYLE 413-28 (Jewel Bellush & Dick Netzer eds., 1990).

13. The other members were the corporation counsel, the president of the Department of Taxes and Assessment, and the comptroller. See R. Alta Charo, *supra* note 12, at 742-43.

14. See *id.*; see also Viteritti, *supra* note 12, at 415-16.

Between 1901 and 1989, the City Charter was revised four more times,<sup>15</sup> and each time, the position that ultimately became the public advocate was retained as first in line of succession to the mayor and as an integral part of the governing structure. With each revision, various powers over budget, legislation, and land use were redesigned and reallocated, but the basic outlines of power remained constant. The increasingly important mayoralty was balanced by at least two other citywide elected officials, including the presiding officer of the legislature and five chief borough officers. Each Charter revision, including the latest in 1989, represented a compromise between competing visions of good government for the growing and unwieldy metropolis, that is, between centralizing City government and ensuring sufficient borough representation and other checks on mayoral power.<sup>16</sup>

In 1936, a new Charter replaced the Board of Aldermen with a City Council as the sole legislative body of the City of New York. The president of the Board of Aldermen became the city council president.<sup>17</sup> The council president remained first in line of succession to the mayor in the event of a vacancy, disability, or other absence from office.<sup>18</sup> The Charter modified the powers to be more akin to the role of the vice president in the United States Senate. The council president presided over the City Council and could participate in the discussions but only voted in the case of a tie.<sup>19</sup>

The 1936 Charter once again placed significant power in three citywide elected officials—the mayor, the comptroller, and the president of the Council, each of whom remained on the newly renamed Board of Estimate. Each citywide official cast three votes in that chamber: the Manhattan and Brooklyn borough presidents were entitled to two votes each, while the borough presidents of the Bronx, Queens, and Staten Island cast only one apiece.<sup>20</sup> Council members were elected for two years,<sup>21</sup> while the citywide officials, including the council president, served for four.<sup>22</sup>

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15. See Gerald Benjamin, *Charter*, in THE ENCYCLOPEDIA OF NEW YORK CITY 202-08 (Kenneth T. Jackson ed., Yale Univ. Press 1995) (stating that the City Charter was actually changed 14 times during this time period, however, in only 1936, 1961, 1975, and 1989 were the changes made by referendum or by proposals from a charter revision commission).

16. See generally R. Alta Charo, *supra* note 12, at 742-43 (describing changes to the structure of the Board of Estimate, including the five borough presidents).

17. See Tanzer, *supra* note 11, at 28. See generally List of Presidents of the Board of Aldermen (1831-1937) and Presidents of the City Council (1937-1975) (on file in the Municipal Reference Library archives).

18. See N.Y. CITY CHARTER ch. 1 §§ 10(a)(1), (2) (1936).

19. See *id.* ch. 2 § 29.

20. See *id.* ch. 3 § 62(a).

21. See *id.* ch. 2 § 24.

22. See *id.* ch. 1 § 3, ch. 2 § 23(a).

In the 1961 revised Charter, the council president continued to preside over the City Council and to be next-in-line to the mayor.<sup>23</sup> The three citywide elected officials, including the council president, continued on the Board of Estimate with equal voting power<sup>24</sup> and remained as trustees of the New York City Employees' Retirement System.<sup>25</sup>

*B. The 1975 Charter Revision—the Debate over the Council Presidency*

The City Charter was revised once again during the fiscal crisis of the mid-1970s which nearly brought the City to bankruptcy. In 1972, the New York State Legislature established a commission,<sup>26</sup> chaired by State Senator Roy M. Goodman,<sup>27</sup> to study the City Charter and propose reforms. In an effort to find an appropriate role for the Office of the City Council President, the Commission contracted with the Urban Analysis Center at the City University of New York ("the Center") to study that office. The Center issued a report<sup>28</sup> which noted the office's limitations—no administrative authority over City services, no access to the mayor's inner circle, and restricted influence in the Council—but concluded that it served an important function as a citywide "critic at large."<sup>29</sup>

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23. See N.Y. CITY CHARTER ch. 2 §§ 10(b), 23(d) (1961).

24. Their votes, respectively, were increased from three to four. Each of the five board presidents was given two votes. See *id.* ch. 3 § 62(a).

25. The City Retirement System created in 1920 designated the members of the Board of Estimate and Apportionment as the trustees of the system. See 1920 N.Y. Laws 427 § 1706. An independent Board of Trustees, including the council president, was established by state law in 1969. See 1969 N.Y. Laws 866.

26. See 1972 N.Y. Laws 634. This law created the Temporary State Commission on the Revision of the New York City Charter.

27. The Commission members in 1975 were Edward N. Costikyan (attorney and vice chairman), Richard Aurelio (former deputy mayor), Albert H. Blumenthal (Assembly majority leader), Charles Carreras (attorney), Albert V. Maniscalco (former Staten Island borough president), Maurice J. McCarthy, Jr. (former chair of the City Council Finance Committee), Robert J. Milano (industrialist), Basil A. Paterson (former state senator), Zelia P. Ruebhausen (former board member of the League of Women Voters), and Leonard P. Stavisky (chair of the Assembly Committee on Education). An additional member, General Lucius D. Clay, resigned in 1973 and was replaced by John F. Haggerty (counsel to the Senate majority leader). See URBAN ANALYSIS CTR., CITY UNIV. N.Y., THE CITY COUNCIL OF NEW YORK AND THE PRESIDENT OF THE CITY COUNCIL (1973) [hereinafter URBAN ANALYSIS CTR. REPORT]; STATE CHARTER REVISION COMM'N FOR N.Y. CITY, RECOMMENDATIONS: CITY COUNCIL BOARD OF ESTIMATE (Apr. 10, 1975) [hereinafter CITY COUNCIL RECOMMENDATIONS].

28. See URBAN ANALYSIS CTR. REPORT, *supra* note 27, at 13, 15.

29. *Id.* at 15.



[T]he ability of an incumbent Council President to influence city policy depends less on the formal powers deriving from the charter, and more from his personality, his ability to anticipate issues and to articulate them in the news media, and to use adroitly his Board of Estimate membership and available staff resources.<sup>30</sup>

[It is] important also to have within the top echelons of the government the potential, if not the reality, of a critic-at-large of executive bureaucracy and performance, whether at the central city, borough, or local level.<sup>31</sup>

Within the government, there are few city-wide foci of criticism to counterbalance the executive branch . . . . This supports the case for a critical "presence" with a city-wide perspective, removed from the daily chore of producing the goods and services of the government.<sup>32</sup>

Several of the commissioners were unpersuaded. In April 1975, the Commission issued a preliminary report which proposed eliminating the city council presidency, making the speaker the presiding officer of the Council, and creating a vice mayor who would be elected independently of the mayor and serve as chair of the Board of Estimate.<sup>33</sup> The vice chairman of the Council would be eliminated as well, to be replaced by the speaker.<sup>34</sup> Four commissioners, however, proposed a novel alternative:

Perhaps the President of the City Council should be given some additional responsibilities. Conceivably the President of the Council should be vested with the functions of an *ombudsman*, since he is elected City-wide and does not exercise line responsibility. Perhaps he should be Chairman of the City's citizen information and complaint service, where he could rely upon an existing network of district City Council members and

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30. *Id.* at 8.

31. *Id.* at 9.

32. *Id.* at 12-13. The Center also discussed the importance of the position as a vehicle for insuring representation of diverse populations—a hot button issue again in 1989. *See id.* at 15.

33. *See CITY COUNCIL RECOMMENDATIONS*, *supra* note 27, at 34-36.

34. *See id.* The Commission stressed the importance of a third citywide elected position to "provide[ ] balance between the Comptroller and the Mayor, traditional rivals, and also contribute[ ] a City-wide perspective unencumbered by the administrative constraints of the two other City-wide officials and the five Borough Presidents." *Id.* at 9.

Community Boards to be his officers in the field. Unfortunately, such options have not even been discussed in the reports.<sup>35</sup>

This latter view ultimately prevailed in modified form. The Commission's final report, issued four months later, retained the Office of City Council President but tied it to the mayor by requiring the mayor and council president to be "chosen jointly by the casting by each elector of a single vote applicable to both offices."<sup>36</sup> However, for the first time since the office was created in 1831, the Commission also proposed the addition of a new, quasi-ombudsman role for the city council president.<sup>37</sup>

In addition to his other duties and responsibilities, the president of the council shall (1) oversee the coordination of city-wide citizen information and service complaint programs, and (2) review complaints of a recurring and multi-borough or city-wide nature relating to services and programs, and make proposals to improve the city's response to and processing of such complaints.<sup>38</sup>

The Commission did not use the word "ombudsman," as the four dissenters had suggested,<sup>39</sup> and by linking the council presidency to the mayoralty, it apparently did not envision an independent overseer of executive agencies. Rather, the Commission intended "to make information about the City government readily available to the public and to secure prompt attention to all complaints" by creating an "information and complaint network in the City's service agencies with the aim of

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35. *Id.* at 40 (statements from Charles J. Carreras, Albert V. Maniscalco, Maurice J. McCarthy, Jr., and Leonard P. Stavisky, entitled *Concurring and Additional Views of Commissioners*) (emphasis added). The debates among the commissioners also reflected the historic disagreements over the extent to which power should be centralized. Commissioner Costikyan urged strengthening the Board of Estimate as a "balance wheel" between the central government and the locals districts. *See id.* at 33 (statements from Edward N. Costikyan, entitled *Additional Views of Vice-Chairman Edward N. Costikyan*) (emphasis added). Commissioner Ruebhausen argued that the Board was an anachronism and should be abolished. *See id.* at 43 (statements from Zelia P. Ruebhausen, entitled *Dissent of Commissioner Zelia P. Ruebhausen*).

36. STATE CHARTER REVISION COMM'N FOR N.Y. CITY, PROPOSED AMENDMENTS TO THE CHARTER FOR THE CITY OF N.Y. at 12 (Aug. 5, 1975) [hereinafter 1975 PROPOSED AMENDMENTS]; *see also* Maurice Carroll, *Symmetry Is One of the Goals of the Charter Revision*, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 6, 1975, at 40.

37. *See* 1975 PROPOSED AMENDMENTS, *supra* note 36, at 13.

38. N. Y. CITY CHARTER ch. 2 § 23(e) (1976, as amended through 1977).

39. The Urban Analysis Center study had discussed the city council president as "a sort of Ombudsman for the city as a whole," but made no such recommendation in its report. *See* URBAN ANALYSIS CTR. REPORT, *supra* note 27, at 13.

directing the attention of responsible authorities to the complaint and getting back word to the complainant within a reasonable time as to what is being done about it."<sup>40</sup>

The Commission's proposals for revision of the Charter were submitted to the electorate on November 4, 1975. The ballot contained ten separate propositions, each to be voted up or down on its own merits. The Commission unanimously recommended the first six, but, due to differences of opinion among the members, took no position on the final four, including the proposal to link the election of the mayor and the council president.<sup>41</sup>

The voters defeated the proposition linking the mayor and council president but approved the enhancement of the council president's position by adding an information and complaint oversight role.<sup>42</sup> Under the resulting Charter, in 1977, the city council president remained completely independent of the mayor, remained the presiding officer of the Council, retained the four votes on the Board of Estimate, and gained the new—albeit narrowly defined—role concerning citizen complaints. The addition of the new responsibilities, despite the very constrained Charter language, transformed the office and set the stage for its current incarnation as a full-fledged ombudsman.

### *C. The Council President, the Battles of the 1960s, and "Ombudsmania"*

In 1989, when the subsequent Charter Revision Commission was debating what to do with the city council president's position once the Board of Estimate was eliminated,<sup>43</sup> only the incumbent, Andrew Stein, cited the tens of thousands of citizen complaints received by his office as a primary—indeed sufficient—reason for retaining the office.<sup>44</sup> Everyone took this public service for granted. But during the 1960s and 1970s, the proposal to create an ombudsman for New York City with the authority to

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40. STATE CHARTER REVISION COMM'N FOR N.Y. CITY, A MORE EFFICIENT AND RESPONSIVE MUNICIPAL GOVERNMENT: FINAL REPORT TO THE LEGISLATURE 14 (Mar. 31, 1977).

41. See STATE CHARTER REVISION COMM'N, THIS NOVEMBER 4, THE MOST IMPORTANT CANDIDATE ISN'T A POLITICIAN: IT'S A PIECE OF PAPER (1975) (informational flier for voters highlighting proposed changes in the City Charter).

42. See Frank Lynn, *City Vote Apparently Bars 4 Amendments to Charter*, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 5, 1975 at, A1.

43. See discussion *infra* Part II.

44. See *Charter Revision Hearings Before the New York City Charter Revision Commission*, 202 (Apr. 6, 1989) (testimony of Andrew Stein) [hereinafter "Stein Testimony"].



hear and resolve citizen complaints was surprisingly controversial.<sup>45</sup> The idea was widely touted but only reluctantly implemented.

### 1. The Swedish Concept of Ombudsman in the United States

"Ombudsman," the Swedish word for intermediary or "go-between," is an idea that originated in Sweden in the early 1700s. Originally appointed by the king to oversee his ministers and other officials, by the 1800s the Swedish Ombudsman had evolved into an administrative body appointed by the Parliament to protect individuals against the excesses of the bureaucracy.<sup>46</sup>

The idea spread to other parts of Scandinavia and to Europe and Asia<sup>47</sup> but did not catch on in the United States until the 1960s, apparently in response to the social and political turmoil of that decade. The movements to empower ordinary citizens<sup>48</sup> (especially poor people and minorities), the political reform movements, and the profound racial conflicts around the country<sup>49</sup> provoked mainstream media and political leaders to propose citizen grievance offices—or ombudsmen—as a mechanism for defusing public anger at government.

The idea of an ombudsman as a solution to political discontent and bureaucratic abuses became, for a period of approximately twenty years,

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45. To this day some legislators continue to be hostile to the idea of their constituents turning to a citywide elected official for help with problems. The legislators are correct to note that constituent service is an important building block of political power. See David R. Eichenthal, *The Other Elected Officials*, in *URBAN POLITICS: NEW YORK STYLE*, *supra* note 12, at 86, 98-100.

46. UNITED STATES OMBUDSMAN ASSOCIATION, *PUBLIC SECTOR OMBUDSMAN* (1997) (information brochure); see also Douglas Ivor Brandon et. al., *Self-Help: Extrajudicial Rights, Privileges & Remedies in Contemporary American Society*, 37 VAND. L. REV. 1031 (1984). The Swedish ombudsman's office continues to this day.

47. See generally *THE OMBUDSMAN: CITIZEN'S DEFENDER* 7 (Donald C. Rowat ed., 2d ed. 1968) (citing numerous ombudsman offices throughout the world); see also Donald C. Rowat, *The Spread of the Ombudsman Idea*, in *OMBUDSMAN FOR AMERICAN GOVERNMENT? THE AMERICAN ASSEMBLY* (Stanley V. Anderson ed., 1968).

48. See, e.g., Richard A. Cloward & Richard M. Elman, *Poverty, Injustice and the Welfare State*, in EHRENSAFT & ETZIONI, *ANATOMIES OF AMERICA, SOCIOLOGICAL PERSPECTIVES* 133-35 (1969) (discussing the idea of an ombudsman for poor people); Rowat, *supra* note 47, at 7.

49. See WILLIAM GWYN, *BARRIERS TO ESTABLISHING URBAN OMBUDSMEN: THE CASE OF NEWARK I* (1974); see also Eugene Garaventa, *Urban Ombudsman Barriers Detailed*, NAT'L CIVIC REV., Dec. 1974, at 603-04.

the subject of much debate—part of the wave of “ombudsmania”<sup>50</sup> that swept the United States. This is reflected in hundreds of articles in academic and legal journals and dozens of federal, state, and local legislative initiatives during that period.<sup>51</sup> Most proponents of the idea envisioned a non-partisan, appointed officer of the executive branch or the legislature who would handle complaints of administrative injustice and be empowered to investigate, criticize, and publicize, but not to reverse or implement, an administrative action. That is the classic definition of ombudsman, based on the Swedish model,<sup>52</sup> but it differs considerably from the version ultimately established in New York City.

In theory, because the classic ombudsman has neither a partisan position nor elective ambitions, he or she is non-threatening to other government officials. In practice, however, at least in the United States, there was strong resistance to creating even such “non-political” ombudsmen. Many efforts to establish ombudsmen offices failed or were short-lived during that period.<sup>53</sup> Legislators and executives alike agreed in principle that grievances should be addressed, but they objected to the creation of a new and independent locus of power—even if its only function was to serve as a forum for citizen complaints. Executives predictably opposed creating an institution that could highlight bureaucratic abuses, and

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50. The term “ombudsmania” was coined by Donald Rowat, one of the key writers in the field during the 1960s. See Rowat, *supra* note 47; see also Paul Verkuil, *The Ombudsman and the Limits of the Adversary System*, 75 COLUM. L. REV. 845 (1975).

51. In addition to those cited so far, see, e.g., H.R. 6265, 89th Cong. (1965); STANLEY V. ANDERSON, OMBUDSMAN PAPERS: AMERICAN EXPERIENCE AND PROPOSALS (1969); WALTER GELLHORN, OMBUDSMEN AND OTHERS: CITIZENS’ PROTECTORS IN NINE COUNTRIES (1966); WALTER GELLHORN, WHEN AMERICANS COMPLAIN: GOVERNMENTAL GRIEVANCE PROCEDURES (1966); Stanley Anderson, *Ombudsman Research: A Bibliographic Essay*, 2 OMBUDSMAN J. 33 (1982); Alan J. Wyner, *Complaint Resolution in Nebraska: Citizens, Bureaucrats and the Ombudsman*, 54 NEB. L. REV. 1 (1975); SAM ZAGORIA, THE OMBUDSMAN: HOW GOOD GOVERNMENTS HANDLE CITIZENS’ GRIEVANCES (1988); Bernard Frank, *State Ombudsman Legislation in the United States*, 29 U. MIAMI L. REV. 397 (1975); William B. Gwyn, *Justice and the Ombudsman*, 15 TUL. STUD. IN POL. SCI. 95; Robert D. Miewald & John C. Comer, *Complaining as Participation: The Case of the Ombudsman*, 17 ADMIN. & SOC. 481 (1986); Terry L. Rosen, *Office of Citizen Response: The Denver Experience*, 37 PUB. ADMIN. REV. 528 (1977); *A State Statute to Create the Office of Ombudsman*, 2 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 213 (1965).

52. See Verkuil, *supra* note 50, at 847.

53. See, e.g., GWYN, *supra* note 49; Bernard Frank, *The Ombudsman Concept Is Expanding in the U.S.*, 61 NAT’L CIVIC REV. 235 (1972) (discussing a short-lived experimental project in Buffalo).

legislators were fearful of a competitor for the attention of their constituents.<sup>54</sup>

## 2. New York's Ombudsman Battles

In New York, bills were introduced in the state legislature in 1966 and 1967 to create a state ombudsman office,<sup>55</sup> and a similar resolution was introduced at the 1967 constitutional convention.<sup>56</sup> All of these proposals were dropped without any further action.<sup>57</sup> A proposal by Nassau County Executive Eugene Nickerson to create a county ombudsman was met with

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54. See Paul Dolan, *Pseudo-Ombudsmen: Political Conditions and Traditions Preventing Full Use of Concept by City Complaint Offices*, NAT'L CIVIC REV., July 1969, at 298 (writing at the height of ombudsmania, Dolan noted that even when ombudsmen offices were created, legislators tended to keep their budgets low); see also Paul Dolan, *Creating State Ombudsmen: A Growing Movement*, NAT'L CIVIC REV., May 1974, at 250. The legislative fear of a competitor for constituent service was expressed openly in 1993 and 1997 by some supporters of bills introduced in the New York City Council to eliminate the Public Advocate's Office. See *Introduction No. 643* to N.Y. CITY CHARTER (1993); *Introduction No. 927* to N.Y. CITY CHARTER (1997). In 1993, one of the bill's sponsors argued that handling thousands of complaints each year was no big deal because every elected official in the city is an ombudsman. See COUNCIL OF THE CITY OF NEW YORK, MINUTES OF THE COMMITTEE ON GOVERNMENTAL OPERATIONS, Jan. 29, 1993, at 11-12; see also Memorandum to *Introduction No. 927* to N.Y. CITY CHARTER (1997) (insisting, contrary to the evidence, that the Public Advocate's Office does not perform any constituent services).

55. See Bronston, *Introduction No. 428* and Roger Green, *Introduction No. 1134* to EXECUTIVE LAW (1966); see also Dunne, *Introduction No. 2684* and Jonas, *Introduction No. 4013* to LEGISLATIVE LAW (1967); S. Res. 675, Pr. 189, Leg., 1967 N.Y. Sess. Law Serv. S. Res. 675, Pr. 189 was introduced in the New York City Council on Jan. 31, 1967, calling upon the state legislature to pass a bill introduced by New York Senator Brennan amending the General City Law to create an "Office of Public Redress" in cities with populations over 1,000,000.

56. See N.Y. City Council, Proposition No. 271-A, May 22, 1967. This proposition called for the creation of an "Office of Legislative Ombudsman." Three similar proposals, Nos. 200, 261, and 827, were introduced, but none of these proposals were included in the proposed constitution.

57. The only initiative in New York that succeeded was in the City of Jamestown, which created an ombudsman office early on. Local Law of the City of Jamestown, No. 3-1970, was signed by then-Mayor Stanley Lundine, who was later elected lieutenant governor of the state. One-half of Jamestown's population at the time apparently was of Scandinavian descent. The Jamestown ombudsman was appointed by the mayor, subject to the approval of the majority of the Council, and exists to this day. See ZAGORIA, *supra* note 51, at 42.



a barrage of partisan invective, and Nickerson eventually created the office by executive order in 1966.<sup>58</sup>

New York City officials were equally resistant to the idea, although executive complaint units had been established in prior years. In 1934, the City Department of Investigation ("DOI"), which was responsible for investigating fiscal abuses and other problems in government,<sup>59</sup> established a complaint bureau to receive complaints from the public. The 1936 Charter codified the complaint function in a new section 804.<sup>60</sup>

In January 1961, Mayor Robert F. Wagner created a "Box 100" program. Residents were invited to write to this special mailing address with complaints and comments on the efficiency of City agencies, including any evidence of corruption.<sup>61</sup> The first several months produced thousands of letters, and in 1963, Mayor Wagner turned his "key" to Box 100 over to the Department of Investigation,<sup>62</sup> where it resides to this day.<sup>63</sup>

DOI's efforts, however, did not satisfy the desire for an ombudsman who would be insulated from the control of City Hall.<sup>64</sup> Then, as now, the

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58. See Philip J. Hannon, *The Nassau County Ombudsman*, in EXECUTIVE OMBUDSMEN IN THE UNITED STATES, *supra* note 6, at 111.

59. See NEW YORK, N.Y., LOC. L. NO. 1 (1924).

60. See RICHARD S. WINSLOW & DAVID W. BURKE, ROGUES, RASCALS & HEROES: A HISTORY OF THE DEPARTMENT OF INVESTIGATION, 1873-1993, at 48 (1993); see also N.Y. CITY CHARTER § 804 (1936).

61. See William H. Angus & Milton Kaplan, *The Ombudsman and Local Government*, in OMBUDSMEN FOR AMERICAN GOVERNMENT? THE AMERICAN ASSEMBLY, *supra* note 47, at 104-05.

62. See RICHARD S. WINSLOW & DAVID W. BURKE, ROGUES, RASCALS, & HEROES: A HISTORY OF THE NEW YORK CITY DEPARTMENT OF INVESTIGATION, 1873 to 1993, at 48 (1993). In November 1966, the Commissioner of the DOI reported that his department had handled 3,000 complaints that year from Box 100 mail; he subsequently predicted 9,000 would be received in 1967. See Angus & Kaplan, *supra* note 61, at 104.

63. Box 100 is still used as a City Hall mailing address—but only for complaints of suspected corruption. See Letter from Kevin R. Ryan, Public Information Office, The City of New York Department of Investigation, to Peter Wallis (Mar. 21, 1997). The DOI asserts that an average of 800 letters and 200 phone calls are received each month. The letter did not indicate whether the DOI compiles any statistical reports or summaries of its operations or procedures.

64. DOI's closeness to the mayor, particularly under the administration of Rudolph Giuliani, has undermined its reputation as an independent investigatory agency. During the 1996 scandal over the City's collusive contracting arrangement with the Hellenic American Neighborhood Association, the FBI decided to force the DOI out of the investigation. See David Firestone & Don Van Natta Jr., *Corruption Watchdog Has Become Mayor's Tool*, *Critics Say*, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 4, 1996, at 33. Further, DOI's refusal to grant public access to its final reports—overturned by the court in *Lewis v. Giuliani*, Index No. 116214/96 (Sup. Ct. N.Y. County, Apr. 21, 1997)—raises additional questions about its independence from the mayor. For this reason, Public Advocate Mark Green introduced a bill in the City Council in 1994 (co-sponsored by Council members Stanley Michels and

close relationship between the mayor and the commissioner of DOI constrained DOI's ability to be completely independent of the executive agencies subject to its investigatory jurisdiction.<sup>65</sup>

In 1965, City Council member at-large, Paul O'Dwyer, began a series of initiatives to create a truly independent, classic ombudsman office in New York City. He proposed an amendment to the Charter to create an "Office of Citizen Redress."<sup>66</sup> O'Dwyer envisioned a powerful non-partisan office that would be above the political fray.<sup>67</sup> The ombudsman would be appointed by the mayor for a term of six years from a choice of nominees submitted by a prestigious board composed of the heads of all the major universities in the city.

The idea apparently provoked as much apprehension as the idea of an elected ombudsman similar to the Public Advocate's Office. The bill languished.<sup>68</sup> The following year, in March of 1966, City Council President Frank O'Connor introduced a similar bill, this time granting the City Council, rather than the mayor, the power to appoint the Director of the Office of Citizen Redress.<sup>69</sup> This too failed to garner political support.

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Lucy Cruz) to change the method of appointing the DOI Commissioner to make the DOI more independent of the mayor. See Mark Green, *Introduction No. 401* to N.Y. CITY CHARTER (1994) (amending the New York City Charter, in relation to the appointment and removal of the Commissioner of Investigation).

65. See Angus & Kaplan, *supra* note 61, at 107; Dolan, *Pseudo-Ombudsmen*, *supra* note 54, at 279, 301.

66. See Paul O'Dwyer, *Introduction No. 766* to N.Y. CITY CHARTER (1965) (amending the Charter in relation to creating the Office of Director of Citizen Redress).

67. Under O'Dwyer's bill, the director of that office would have had the power "to receive complaints by any person in regard to the conduct of any agency or any officer or employee thereof" and "to investigate the conduct and affairs of any agency and the official conduct of any officer or employee thereof." *Id.* §§ 11(d)(1), (2). The Director also was authorized to "inspect and examine the papers, records and documents of any agency" and "to issue subpoenas compelling witnesses to appear and the production of records." *Id.* § 11(d). Finally, the Director was authorized, at his sole discretion, to issue reports of his investigations or surveys, to make them public, or submit them only to the mayor or the agency head. He was required, however, to issue an annual report about the activities of his office. See *id.* § 11(e).

68. It was re-introduced in the following year by Council member Diggs but fared no better. See *Introduction No. 5* to N.Y. CITY CHARTER (1966) (amending the Charter in relation to creating the Office of Director of Citizen Redress).

69. See Frank O'Connor, *Introduction No. 70* to N.Y. CITY CHARTER (1966) (amending the Charter in relation to creating the Office of Director of Citizen Redress). See also O'Connor's February 17, 1966, press release that summarizes the bill in the Municipal Reference Library ombudsman files.

### 3. The Police Oversight Referendum and the Ombudsman Idea

All of these proposals were introduced in the midst of an extremely heated and acrimonious battle over the extent to which civilians could challenge and control abusive police conduct—an issue that continues to roil the City to this day.<sup>70</sup> When John Lindsay became mayor in January 1966, he attempted to fulfill his campaign promise to create a Civilian Complaint Review Board to consider complaints against the New York City Police Department.<sup>71</sup> His initiative was met with powerful resistance. In November 1966, a proposal to ban the implementation of Lindsay's plan was submitted to the voters in a referendum.<sup>72</sup> After a fierce battle for public opinion, the referendum passed by a wide margin.<sup>73</sup>

Ironically, the defeat of the civilian oversight effort gave the notion of an ombudsman for New York City a big boost of support. A week after the referendum, the *New York Post* published an editorial titled *An Ombudsman for New York?*<sup>74</sup> The *Post* pointed to Paul O'Dwyer's 1965 bill:

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70. See, e.g., *Green v. Safir*, 664 N.Y.S.2d 232 (Sup. Ct. N.Y. County 1997) (detailing the public advocate's lawsuit against the police commissioner for resisting the office's right, under the Charter, to review records of the police department's handling of substantiated complaints of police abuse), *aff'd as modified*, 679 N.Y.S.2d 383 (App. Div. 1998); see also *Mayor of New York v. City Council of New York*, 640 N.Y.S.2d 951 (Sup. Ct. N.Y. County 1995), *aff'd*, 651 N.Y.S.2d 531 (App. Div. 1997) (concerning the City Council's abortive effort to create an independent police oversight board, successfully challenged by the mayor); Peter Vallone, *Introduction No. 961* to N.Y. CITY CHARTER (1997) (amending the City Charter in relation to the establishment of an independent police investigation and audit board).

71. See Angus & Kaplan, *supra* note 61, at 104-05.

72. The wording of the proposition was so broad as to arguably exclude any oversight of the police under any circumstances. Its expansive language was referred to later as "the sleeper clause":

Neither the Mayor, the Police Commissioner, nor any other office of the City of New York shall have the power to authorize any person, agency, board or group to receive, to investigate, to hear or to require or to recommend action upon civilian complaints against members of the Police Department.

Homer Bigart, *Liberties Union Invites Friends and 'Responsible' Foes of Review Board to Ombudsman Talks*, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 15, 1966, at 47.

73. The referendum, held on November 6, 1966, passed by a vote of 1,307,738 to 768,492. See Angus & Kaplan, *supra* note 61, at 105.

74. See *An Ombudsman for New York?*, N.Y. POST, Nov. 15, 1966, at 47.

A useful discussion has emerged with surprising speed in the aftermath of last week's citywide referendum vote rejecting the Police Dept.'s Civilian Complaint Review Board.

The question under discussion is: assuming there will be continuing citizen complaints about police and about city government generally, how should the city handle them?

Despite the bitter referendum battle, . . . there is growing support for a city "ombudsman."

. . . This poses the questions how to appoint an ombudsman, how to insure his absolute political independence, how to define his duties?

. . . .

There is a real opportunity at hand to develop a mature, modern mechanism for handling citizen complaints.<sup>75</sup>

The editorial noted that the Commissioner of Investigation considered himself "a kind of ombudsman" and was "resisting appointment of another."<sup>76</sup>

According to press reports, an unlikely coalition of former enemies favored the ombudsman idea as a substitute for the Civilian Complaint Review Board, including, on one side, groups that had fought to abolish the Review Board, the Patrolmen's Benevolent Association, and former Police Commissioner Vincent L. Broderick, and, on the other side, several organizations that had fought for the Review Board, including the National Association for the Advancement of Colored People ("NAACP"), the Civil Liberties Union, and several labor unions.<sup>77</sup> A New York Citizens Committee for an Independent Office of Public Complaints was subsequently formed, with Vincent Broderick as its chair, to press for Council legislation establishing an ombudsman. The following June, the unlikely duo of William F. Buckley, Jr., New York Conservative Party leader and editor of *The National Review*, and Michael Harrington, socialist

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75. *Id.*

76. *Id.*

77. See *Lindsay Favors Independent Ombudsman Idea*, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 14, 1966, at A1.



activist and author of *The Hidden Poor*, were named as associate chairmen of the committee.<sup>78</sup> Buckley commented:

It is strange and heartening that out of the bitterness in New York City over the Civilian Complaint Review Board for the Police Department, an idea has been given impetus which seems to have got the backing of liberals and conservatives alike.<sup>79</sup>

Mayor Lindsay, however, gave the idea only mixed and lukewarm support. He was unwilling to relinquish the complaint-handling role of his Commissioner of Investigation, and questioned whether a citywide ombudsman would be “overwhelmed” and inaccessible to people in outlying areas of the city.<sup>80</sup> Lindsay opted instead for a proposal to establish twenty-seven “Neighborhood City Halls,”<sup>81</sup> which City Council Democratic leader David Ross opposed as “an extension of the Mayor’s political club.”<sup>82</sup> Ultimately, no agreement was reached on either approach.<sup>83</sup>

The interest in a mechanism for citizen redress did not disappear from the public agenda, however. In May 1967, City Council President Frank O’Connor introduced a bill drafted as a model ombudsman statute by the Administrative Law Committee of the Association of the Bar of the City of New York.<sup>84</sup> It proposed the creation of an Office of Public Complaint, headed by an ombudsman to be appointed for five years by the mayor with

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78. See *Ombudsman Group Names 2 Members*, N.Y. TIMES, June 19, 1967, at 32.

79. *Id.*

80. See *Ombudsman Drive Picks Up Steam*, LONG ISLAND PRESS, Nov. 15, 1966; see also Bigart, *supra* note 72, at 47.

81. See Angus & Kaplan, *supra* note 61, at 105-06.

82. *Ombudsman Drive Picks up Steam*, *supra* note 80 (citing the lineup of lawmakers supporting or opposing the idea); see also Bigart, *supra* note 72, at 47.

83. Note that the two proposals—for an ombudsman and for little City Halls—reflected the continuing tension in New York City politics between solving problems through citywide versus neighborhood-based mechanisms. The various City Charters over the years reflect the uneasy compromises: Borough presidents are retained and community and district boards are established, but three citywide elected officials are also retained. Current City politics also keep the issue alive: while the City is struggling to reform the child welfare system by *decentralizing* it, see Nicholas Scoppetta, *Protecting the Children of New York: A Plan of Action for the Administration of Children’s Services*, Dec. 19, 1996, the school system is being reformed by *re-centralization*, see 1996 N.Y. Laws 720.

84. See The Committee on Administrative Law, *Proposed Local Law for a New York City Ombudsman*, 22 REC. OF THE ASS’N OF THE BAR OF THE CITY OF N.Y. 484, 486 (1967).

the advice and consent of two-thirds of the City Council.<sup>85</sup> The policy section articulated a broad public mandate for the office:

It is hereby found to be in the public interest to establish an office of public complaints in New York City, headed by a person of distinguished accomplishments in the field of law or administration, whose main functions would be (a) to investigate and ameliorate grievances arising out of allegations of . . . maladministration, unfairness, unreasonableness, arbitrariness, arrogance, rudeness, oppressiveness, inefficiency, improper motivation, unwarranted delay, clear violations of laws or regulations, or other abuse of authority, and (b) on its own initiative, to investigate, study and make recommendations with regard to agency acts, practices and procedures.<sup>86</sup>

The Bar Association report explained why such an office is needed in a democratic society:

The fact that there are such "grievances" is not necessarily due to deliberate acts on the part of city agencies or employees . . . . Many of the cases stem from the size and proliferation of the bureaucracies, the skyrocketing of costs of governing well, insufficient personnel, the lack of means of informing people about available services and procedures, especially for the poor and even those of modest means, and the enormous pressures on urban life today resulting from inadequate housing, conflicts in community relations, dilapidated transportation and the like.<sup>87</sup>

Like the 1965 O'Dwyer bill, the Bar Association model gave the ombudsman broad investigatory authority, including subpoena power. It also granted the ombudsman the right to inspect all City agencies (except elected officials and the courts), immunized the ombudsman from judicial

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85. *See id.* at 487. The Bar Association had studied the O'Dwyer and Diggs bills as well as models drafted by Professor Walter Gellhorn of Columbia University, the most prominent ombudsman scholar of his time, and another published by the Harvard Journal on Legislation.

86. *Id.* This construct has all the elements of the classic notion of an ombudsman: wide discretionary authority, headed by a "distinguished" person who is appointed, and not elected, and authorized to address both the micro (individual complaints) and the macro (broad patterns); *see also* Proposed Local Law for a New York City Ombudsman, Sec. I, § 1170; The Committee on Administrative Law, *supra* note 84.

87. *Id.* at 484.

review of any findings and reports, and made it a misdemeanor to obstruct any such investigation.<sup>88</sup> The model bill also repealed DOI's authority to handle complaints under Charter section 804, but required the ombudsman to refer criminal investigations to that agency—a concept ultimately adopted by the 1989 Charter Revision Commission.<sup>89</sup>

Despite the scholarship and non-partisan spirit that produced the Bar report, the O'Connor bill, like the 1965 O'Dwyer bill, was largely ignored. However, these defeats in the Council between 1965 and 1967 did not end interest in an ombudsman for the City. Neither the so-called "ombudsmania" nor the social and political turmoil of that era had run its course. Upon assuming office in January 1969, City Council President Francis Smith announced that he was forming an ombudsman bureau and calling for public hearings on a bill to formally establish such an office. Smith commented on the great need citizens feel for such an office which "can help our citizens deal with a bureaucracy which often seems inaccessible and whose actions on occasion seem arbitrary and capricious."<sup>90</sup>

Smith named Abraham N. Goodman, his legislative assistant and former special assistant to the Commissioner of DOI, to head the volunteer-staffed unit.<sup>91</sup> Smith had been elected in January 1969 to serve out the term of Frank O'Connor, however, and he only held the office until the end of the year. Sanford Garelik, who previously had served as police commissioner, was elected that fall to succeed him, and there is no record of Garelik continuing Smith's ombudsman work.<sup>92</sup>

In 1973, Paul O'Dwyer was elected president of the City Council. When he took office in January 1974, he renewed his campaign to pass a bill like the one he had introduced as a Council member eight years earlier. This time he campaigned for months to enlist support from civic and labor groups, bar associations, and individuals. O'Dwyer held an all-day public

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88. *See id.* at 487-489 (Model Bill §§ 1172, 1175, 1180, and 1181).

89. *See* N.Y. CITY CHARTER ch. 2 § 24(k) (1989).

90. Alfred Miele, *Smith Names Ombudsman to Aid Public*, DAILY NEWS (N.Y.), Jan. 26, 1969, at 44.

91. *See id.* In November 1969, Mr. Goodman reported a complaint by a Bronx man who had dialed 911 after being held up but waited an hour and 20 minutes for the police to arrive. Goodman was quoted as saying, "We have asked the Police Department for the files on this case . . . and we are also planning to survey the entire emergency police communications system." *Ombudsman Puts in Heavy Day's Work*, LONG ISLAND PRESS, Jan. 28, 1969, at 4B. We have not found any record of whether Goodman received the files, or any results of the proposed survey. History is repeating itself in the current dispute between the public advocate and the police commissioner in *Green v. Safir*, 664 N.Y.S.2d 232 (Sup. Ct. N.Y. County 1997), *aff'd as modified*, 679 N.Y.S.2d 383 (App. Div. 1998).

92. There is a lack of information for 1969-1974 in the "Ombudsman" files of the Municipal Reference Library.

hearing at City Hall in September 1974,<sup>93</sup> and distributed a flier describing the concept and urging people to write in and to testify.<sup>94</sup> Despite support from a majority of the Council members, both the mayor, Abraham Beame, and the Council leadership opposed the idea.<sup>95</sup> Once again, the bill failed.

#### 4. Paul O'Dwyer—New York City's First Ombudsman

Paul O'Dwyer was still the city council president in November 1975, two years after the defeat of his last bill, when the new complaint oversight provision in the City Charter was adopted, creating a toe hold for him and other advocates of a full-fledged office of citizen redress. The narrow ombudsman-like obligations specified for the city council president in the 1976 Charter<sup>96</sup> were a far cry from the broad powers recommended by O'Dwyer, O'Connor, and the Bar Association. The new Charter did not authorize the council president to receive individual complaints and also failed to articulate any mechanisms, such as subpoena power, for fulfilling the responsibility to "oversee" and "review" other agencies' efforts.

But O'Dwyer was a great people's advocate.<sup>97</sup> To his everlasting credit, he saw the window of opportunity and moved swiftly through it. Pursuing the spirit, if not the letter, of the new Charter language, he established an ombudsman office under his jurisdiction to deal with "any and all" complaints and sought an annual budget appropriation of \$750,000

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93. See Steven Marcus, *Ombudsman: O'D Trying Again*, N.Y. POST, Sept. 19, 1974. Among those who testified in favor of the bill were the Swedish Ombudsman Bertil Wennergren. See *id.* Norman Adler, then a Hunter College professor and now a political consultant, opposed the bill just as he later opposed retaining the Office of the City Council President. See Edward Ranzal, *Parade Of Witnesses Backs City Ombudsman*, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 20, 1974, at 79.

94. See The "Ombudsman Project" flier; see also Memorandum from Joe Esposito, Assistant to the Council President, to all staff members (July 23, 1974) (regarding the "Ombudsman Bill"). The memo clearly articulates the arguments for creating an ombudsman and analyzes the reasons legislators and courts are insufficient resources for citizen grievances. Both documents are in the ombudsman file in the Municipal Reference Library.

95. See Marcus, *supra* note 93. O'Dwyer also speculated that some Council members were covertly uncomfortable with the bill that could, arguably, supplant their own efforts to gather political support with their constituents by assisting with complaints about the City bureaucracy.

96. The 1976 Charter reads as follows: "(1) [to] oversee the coordination of city-wide citizen information and service complaint programs, and (2) review complaints of a recurring and multi-borough or city-wide nature . . ." N.Y. CITY CHARTER ch. 2 § 23(e) (1976, as amended through 1977).

97. See Francis X. Clines, *Paul O'Dwyer, New York's Liberal Battler For Underdogs and Outsiders, Dies at 90*, N.Y. TIMES, June 25, 1998, at B9.



to support it.<sup>98</sup> He hired Bernard Frank, a widely published scholar of ombudsman systems and the Chair of the Ombudsman Committee of the International Bar Association, as a consultant to “develop[ ] an appropriate set of regulations for the establishment of a New York Ombudsman.”<sup>99</sup>

O’Dwyer’s aggressive approach did not sit well with Roy Goodman, chairman of the Charter Revision Commission, whose mandate had been extended until March 31, 1977, to oversee implementation of the new Charter.<sup>100</sup> Goodman harshly criticized O’Dwyer in an “acrimonious” exchange reported in the *New York Times*:

In more than an hour of testimony at a commission hearing in City Hall, [O’Dwyer] . . . clashed repeatedly with State Senator Roy M. Goodman, the commission chairman, who accused him of attempting to set up an ‘elaborate bureaucracy’ that was not mandated by the revised Charter adopted by the voters a year ago.

. . . .

Goodman said the commission had envisioned the Council President’s function as an ‘overseer and coordinator’ of city-wide services that provide information and receive complaints from citizens. Neighborhood service complaints are to be handled by the new district service managers serving under local community boards, while borough-wide service matters are to be dealt with by borough supervisors.

. . . .

Mr. O’Dwyer, visibly angered by [Goodman’s question about his budget request], retorted: ‘You created this office and now you’re trying to reduce it to a small function. You can’t set me up as an ombudsman, expect me to make government responsive to the people and then blame me when I fail to do so for lack of adequate staff.’<sup>101</sup>

Using his role on the Board of Estimate, which had extensive power over the budget under the 1976 Charter, O’Dwyer made a citywide ombudsman office a *fait accompli*. He obtained a \$400,000 appropriation

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98. See Glenn Fowler, *O’Dwyer’s Concept of His Position Under Charter Assailed at Hearing*, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 1, 1976, at B2.

99. Letter from Paul O’Dwyer to Bernard Frank (Oct. 18, 1976) (forwarded to the Public Advocate’s Office by Bernard Frank); see also Letter from Bernard Frank, *supra* note 5 (stating that he served as a consultant to Paul O’Dwyer in 1976 when the new City Charter was adopted).

100. See STATE CHARTER REVISION COMM’N FOR N.Y. CITY, *supra* note 40, at 1.

101. Fowler, *supra* note 98.

and by January 1977, recruited assistants who addressed citizen complaints.<sup>102</sup> Columnist Murray Kempton, the recently deceased great chronicler of the City, memorialized the historical moment as well as its irony:

[O'Dwyer] has been honored and cursed with an entire missing of his point, which had been that the ombudsman should first of all be someone who, unlike himself, was not a politician.<sup>103</sup>

O'Dwyer was the trail blazer, but he was not the City ombudsman for long. Like Winston Churchill, who won the war but was rejected by voters to lead the peace, O'Dwyer was defeated by State Senator Carol Bellamy in 1977 in a vigorously contested Democratic primary.<sup>104</sup> Bellamy won the election and became the new city council president. She took on the role of ombudsman and expanded it well beyond O'Dwyer's—not to mention Goodman's—concept. Bellamy retained the citizen grievance function and gave space to a group of volunteer senior citizens operating out of Hunter College to assist other seniors who phoned in their complaints. This became an effective "Senior Action Line," which continues to this day.<sup>105</sup> She began issuing investigative reports on aspects of City services, including the child welfare system, transportation, health care, highway construction, and park maintenance. She also published a research analysis of the complaint handling systems, aptly titled "Go Fight City Hall."<sup>106</sup>

Andrew Stein, who succeeded Bellamy in 1985 when she gave up her seat to run unsuccessfully in the Democratic primary for mayor, continued

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102. See Murray Kempton, *The Ombudsman Tries His Wings*, N.Y. POST, Feb. 5, 1977, at 4.

103. *Id.* Despite his historic role as the architect of the council president's ombudsman role, Paul O'Dwyer continued to believe that the job ideally should be held by a non-political appointee, not an elected official. He argued that position publicly during the Charter Revision debates in 1989. See Todd S. Purdam, *Stein Proposes A Stronger Oversight Role For His Office*, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 6, 1989, at B2.

104. O'Dwyer ran ahead of Bellamy (30% to 25%) in a five-way primary which included Assembly member Leonard Stavisky, businessman Abraham Hirschfeld, and City Council member Carter Burden, but Bellamy defeated him in the subsequent run-off. See Pranay Gupte, *Carol Bellamy Wins A Place In Runoff*, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 9, 1977, at A1.

105. It is now called the "Public Advocate's Senior Action Line." See THE GREEN BOOK: OFFICIAL DIRECTORY OF THE CITY OF NEW YORK 22 (1994-95).

106. Bellamy's reports are in the Municipal Reference Library, catalogued under "City Council President."

the tradition of handling individual complaints and doing investigative reports.<sup>107</sup>

By the time the 1989 Charter Revision Commission convened, the interest in ombudsmen had subsided and the idea had become less controversial. A handful of state and municipal government general ombudsman offices had been created, and several more have been established since that time.<sup>108</sup> Most are now entrenched institutions in their jurisdictions but have fairly low public profiles.<sup>109</sup> They focus largely on handling individual grievances and specific complaints rather than investigating systemic problems and policy concerns.<sup>110</sup> Many specialized, single-issue ombudsman offices have also sprung up, such as ombudsmen for long-term care, children, the mentally ill, etc.<sup>111</sup>

The individual complaint-handling function in the Council President's Office had similarly ceased to be controversial; however, it also ceased to be highly valued. The other ombudsman role of identifying systemic problems and issuing reports and exposés continued to create political

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107. See Stein Testimony, *supra* note 44, at 200-03. More than 30 of Bellamy's investigative studies are on file at the Municipal Reference Library. Unfortunately, only four of Stein's documents were deposited there, and the others can be gleaned only from press reports. Stein's record of complaints handled is contained in Annual Reports issued by his office between 1990 and 1993, but only the 1990 Annual Report is on file at the Municipal Reference Library.

108. The best list of current general governmental ombudsmen (as distinguished from speciality ombudsmen such as children's or long term care ombudsmen) can be found in the membership lists of the United States Ombudsman Association, located at 215 East 7th Street, Des Moines, Iowa 50319 <milosec@legis.State.ia.us>. The list includes the states of Nebraska (legislative); Iowa (legislative); Alaska (legislative); Arizona (legislative); Hawaii (legislative); Montana (executive); Ohio; Oregon (partial jurisdiction/executive—not statutory); Puerto Rico (legislative); Rhode Island (nonstatutory executive agency in governor's office); the cities/counties of Jamestown, N.Y. (the first city ombudsman in the United States); Atlanta, Ga.; Aurora, Ill. (executive, not defined in law); Detroit, Mich. (legislative); Flint, Mich. (legislative); Kansas City, Mo. (legislative); Cleveland (Cuyuga County), Ohio (County Executive agency not in statute); Portland, Or.; Dayton, Ohio (nonprofit corporation with general jurisdiction in city and county); Seattle (Kings County), Wash. (legislative); Anchorage, Ala. (legislative); and Lexington, Ky. (Fayette County) (legislative).

109. Several, however, have subpoena power which they use to bring in witnesses for investigation of individual complaints. See, e.g., NEB. REV. ST. § 81-8, 245(5) (1995); IOWA CODE ANN. § 601G.9(4) (West 1995); ANCHORAGE, ALA., MUNICIPAL CODE § 24.55.170 (West 1995).

110. See Conversation with Marie Ferguson, former president, U.S. Ombudsman Association (Sept. 12, 1997). Ms. Ferguson confirmed that, to the best of her knowledge, most ombudsman offices do not issue investigative and research reports. An excellent source of information about government ombudsman offices is now available via e-mail at <omb\_gov@staff.legis.state.ia.us>.

111. See, e.g., Brandon, et al., *supra* note 46, at 1032, n.1238.

sparks. In testimony before the 1989 Charter Revision Commission, Stein argued that his office provided a powerful check on the mayoral agencies.<sup>112</sup> He pointed to his exposé of the emergency medical services, his proposal to use the fire department as a first responder in cases of cardiac arrest, and his efforts in support of reforming the school custodian contract.<sup>113</sup>

Both Bellamy and Stein, in fact, faced uphill battles in their efforts to perform their investigative audits. Despite the power that flowed from the council president's votes on the Board of Estimate, the absence of express authority to obtain information from reluctant mayoral agencies posed serious problems and delays in their work.<sup>114</sup> The tension between the council president's mandate to identify and expose problems in City government and the mayoral agencies' resistance to oversight continues to be a constant theme in the public conflicts between council presidents and mayors. It was also an issue that the 1989 Charter Revision Commission was well aware of, and which it addressed in the new Charter.

## II. THE 1989 CHARTER REVISION COMMISSION DEBATES AND THE COUNCIL PRESIDENCY

The members of the 1989 New York City Charter Revision Commission,<sup>115</sup> set out to revise the Charter to comply with the Supreme Court's ruling in *Board of Estimate v. Morris*,<sup>116</sup> and, in so doing, overhauled the entire system of City governance.<sup>117</sup> Among the many challenges they faced was the question of what to do with the Council President's Office—this unique New York City institution that belongs in no one branch of government but has deep roots in the City's history.

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112. See Stein Testimony, *supra* note 44, at 199.

113. See *id.*

114. See *id.*; see also Legislative Hearing, Mar. 9, 1989, at 131-34 (testimony of Susan Wiviott).

115. The New York City Charter Revision Commission, appointed by Mayor Edward I. Koch on January 19, 1989, was chaired by Frederick A. O. Schwarz, Jr., former corporation counsel of the City of New York. The other members were Aida Alvarez, Amalia V. Betanzos, Fred Friendly, Simon Gourdine, Judah Gribetz, Nathaniel Leventhal, Harriet R. Michel, Theresa M. Molloy, Patrick J. Murphy, Archibald R. Murray, Mario Paredes, Bernard Richland, Joseph P. Sullivan, and David Trager.

116. 489 U.S. 688 (1989) (holding that the Board of Estimate—the upper house of the City's bicameral legislature—violated the constitutional principle of one-person, one-vote by giving equal voting power to boroughs with large differences in the size of their populations).

117. The new Charter was adopted by the voters in a referendum on November 4, 1989.

Under the 1976 Charter, as explained above, the council president, who presided over the City Council, was first to succeed the mayor,<sup>118</sup> and had a narrowly defined role in overseeing agency complaint-handling systems.<sup>119</sup> The council president's votes on the upper legislative body, the Board of Estimate, however, were the fulcrum of its power. The Commission was thus faced with the question of whether to eliminate the office and break with the century-and-one-half-old tradition of maintaining at least two citywide elected officials other than the mayor,<sup>120</sup> or to maintain and redesign the office. Three of the Commission's fifteen members—Judah Gribetz, David Trager, and Fred Friendly—argued strenuously and repeatedly during the deliberations that the office should not survive the demise of the Board of Estimate.<sup>121</sup>

This minority argued that because the office had no direct governmental authority, it would be a useless layer of bureaucracy and a mere launching pad for higher elected office.<sup>122</sup> Fred Friendly asserted that the council president would "have his own agenda" and would be running for mayor from the moment he or she took office. He thought this would be terribly divisive and "make the Mayor's life miserable from the beginning . . . [by being] a political gadfly."<sup>123</sup> Moreover, some

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118. This order of succession is mandated by N.Y. GEN. CITY LAW § 2-a(2) (McKinney 1980).

119. See N.Y. CITY CHARTER ch. 2 § 23(e) (1976, as amended through 1977). Both Stein and Bellamy used the ombudsman function in far broader fashion than the actual 1976 Charter language had specified. In this sense, they followed O'Dwyer's lead. See Fowler, *supra* note 98.

120. See R. Alta Charo, *supra* note 12, at 742 (discussing the role of the council president on the Board of Estimate).

121. Several editorial boards, political pundits, and even former city council presidents agreed, and some predicted, that the Board of Estimate would not survive as an institution of government. See, e.g., *About Politics; Chart a Course for Boroughs*, *NEWSDAY* (N.Y.), May 30, 1989, at 42, in which former City Council President Carol Bellamy, in an article co-authored with William Josephson, Chairman of a subcommittee of the Association of the Bar of the City of New York, gave the Charter Revision Commission an "F" for retaining the office; Robert F. Wagner, Jr., *Recommendations of the Citizens Union to the New York City Charter Revision Commission*, 33 N.Y.L. SCH. L. REV. 591, 591-95 (1988); Sam Roberts, *Campaign Matters; Call Him Provost or Chamberlain or Just Employed*, *N.Y. TIMES*, May 29, 1989, at 25 (quoting former holders of the office).

122. See Public Meeting, May 6, 1989, at 234 (statement of Commissioner Friendly); Public Meeting, June 20, 1989 at 188 (statement of Commissioner Trager); Public Meeting, July 31, 1989, at 249 (statement of Commissioner Gribetz).

123. Public Meeting, May 6, 1989, at 235. In fact, Friendly's concerns were not supported by the historical record. Since 1901, only seven of the 32 individuals who have held the office of the president of the board of aldermen/city council have run for mayor (including Andrew Stein, who dropped out before the primary). Of these seven, only Carol Bellamy ran against an incumbent mayor—and even that occurred when the incumbent sought a third term, something now impossible under term limits. See *ENCYCLOPEDIA OF*



commissioners, most notably Alvarez, wanted to replace the elected office with an appointed City ombudsman modeled after that used in other cities and states,<sup>124</sup> and create a vice mayor instead, which could facilitate the election of minority candidates to citywide office.<sup>125</sup>

Other voices in the Commission, however—whose views ultimately prevailed by a substantial margin—insisted that it was essential to retain a citywide elected official as an alternate voice to that of the powerful and centralized mayor. Commission Chairman Frederick A. O. Schwarz, Jr., former City corporation counsel under Mayor Edward I. Koch,<sup>126</sup> was a persistent and persuasive advocate of that view.<sup>127</sup>

Several organizations and individuals testified in favor of maintaining the office while others urged eliminating or restructuring it.<sup>128</sup> Andrew

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THE CITY OF NEW YORK, *supra* note 15, at 230, 737-44.

124. See Public Meeting, May 6, 1989, at 241.

125. This diversity issue generated a lot of controversy, including strenuous opposition by some Commission members and prominent black and Latino spokespersons who argued that a minority vice mayor would merely be "window dressing." Congressman Major R. Owens, for example, wrote that a vice mayor on the mayor's ticket "would lack the independence or the constituency to be truly heard and have any effect on government policy. Inevitably the position would be regarded as impotent by all New Yorkers—and thus as tokenism by the minority communities it is supposed to empower." Letter from Major R. Owens, Congressman, to Frederick A. O. Schwarz, Jr., Chairman, 1989 New York City Charter Revision Commission (May 8, 1989) (Charter Revision Commission Proceedings, Exh. 56-e); see also Letter from Hazel Dukes, President of the New York State NAACP, to Frederick A. O. Schwarz, Jr., Chairman, 1989 New York City Charter Revision Commission (May 9, 1989) (Charter Revision Commission Proceedings, Exh. 56-d) (expressing similar views).

126. Notably, three of the commissioners who had served in high positions in City government strongly supported retention of the office as a watchdog, including former Corporation Counsels Fritz Schwarz and Bernard Richland, and former Deputy Mayor Nat Leventhal. Judah Gribetz was the only former City official who disagreed.

127. See Public Meeting, May 6, 1989, at 205; Public Meeting, May 13, 1989, at 300; Public Meeting, June 20, 1989, at 227; Public Meeting, July 31, 1989, at 257.

128. See New York City Charter Revision Commission Appendices IX and X. One notable supporter of the office was Richard Emery, the civil rights attorney who successfully litigated *Board of Estimate v. Morris* before the Supreme Court. *Letter to the Editor*, N.Y. TIMES, May 19, 1989, at 34, col. 5; see also *Pols and Politics; A Word From Mom and Keeping It All in the Family*, NEWSDAY (N.Y.), May 26, 1989, at 18; Letter from Stanley Hill, District Council 37, American Federation of State, County, and Municipal Employees (AFSCME), to Frederick A. O. Schwarz, Jr., Chairman, 1989 New York City Charter Revision Commission (May 5, 1989) (Charter Revision Commission Proceedings, Exh. 56-a) (urging retention and strengthening of council presidency); Letter from Herman Badillo, of Fischbein Badillo, to Frederick A. O. Schwarz, Jr., Chairman, 1989 New York City Charter Revision Commission (May 9, 1989) (Charter Revision Commission Proceedings, Exh. 56-b) (opposing vice mayor idea and supporting retention of city council president as next-in-line to mayor); Letter from Calvin O. Butts III, Executive Minister of

Stein, the incumbent, lobbied heavily for keeping the office. He pointed to his investigative reports and exposés and the thousands of citizen complaints his office handled each year.<sup>129</sup> Stein and his staff also identified what they regarded as a key impediment to the effectiveness of the office—recalcitrant agencies and the Charter’s failure “to require that [they] comply with [his] requests for information.”<sup>130</sup> Citing several examples,<sup>131</sup> he urged the Commission to strengthen the council president’s power to obtain information and suggested extending the City Council’s power to issue subpoenas to the council president.<sup>132</sup>

Friendly’s concern about the office holder’s possible political ambitions was discussed extensively during these proceedings. Several members did not agree that political ambition would be detrimental to the effectiveness of the office. Schwarz’s response, for example, was that “the very political ambition that you worry about, ought to serve not as something that causes the person to misbehave, but that causes the person to want to demonstrate that they are capable of being positive and affirmative.”<sup>133</sup> Schwarz continued:

I think if the public heard four years of someone being just a gadfly, just saying, you stink, without coming forward with workable and affirmative ideas, I think they’d say well, you make a good gadfly, but you wouldn’t make a good Mayor.<sup>134</sup>

Commissioner Gourdine took the argument even further:

I think that there is a value in having that Citywide official be elected even though we recognize that person has political ambitions. I think it’s the political ambitions that are important, you know, to that mix, that the person is, in fact, questioning the Mayor, challenging policies and putting those policies under the spotlight.<sup>135</sup>

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The Abyssinian Baptist Church, to Frederick A. O. Schwarz, Jr., Chairman, 1989 New York City Charter Revision Commission (May 9, 1989) (Charter Revision Commission Proceedings, Exh. 56-c).

129. See Stein Testimony, *supra* note 44, at 198-202.

130. *Id.* at 200.

131. See *id.*

132. See *id.* at 201.

133. Public Meeting, May 6, 1989, at 236.

134. *Id.*

135. *Id.* at 221.

The commissioners also addressed the related question of whether it was appropriate for an ombudsman to be elected. David Trager argued against it:

The theory being advanced is the notion we need a Citywide office to act as a counter-poise to the Mayor, and I can accept that premise. But I cannot accept the premise that the function of that office, at least the way it's being touted now, is consistent with the role of an ombudsman, because that role has traditionally, as it developed in Scandinavian countries, the notion was, essentially, of a person who would rise above politics . . . otherwise it just becomes a nice job to advance one's career, because it's easy to recommend proposed changes . . . that's a recipe with [sic] a job with power and no responsibility.<sup>136</sup>

Trager was right about the Scandinavian model, but several members of the Commission thought it absolutely essential that New York City's ombudsman be elected, not appointed.<sup>137</sup> Chairman Schwarz noted:

[W]e want someone else out there . . . who has been elected by the people as a whole, who has the credibility of having been elected by the people as a whole, to stand in criticism of the Mayor . . . . *Having been elected Citywide, itself, creates clout.*<sup>138</sup>

Commissioner Bernard Richland agreed:

The ombudsman position works only if you have power, independent power, and that is what [O'Dwyer] discovered. He discovered that because he was a member of the Board of Estimate, and, by God, they had to pay attention to him. An ordinary ombudsman, appointed by somebody, even with a term of office, would have nothing like that kind of power or standing.<sup>139</sup>

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136. Public Meeting, May 13, 1989, at 325-26.

137. Commissioner Gribetz—agreeing with Commissioner Trager that an ombudsman should not be elected—suggested at one point that the Commission look at other ombudsman models. See Public Meeting, May 6, 1989, at 212. Apparently this did not occur—at least in any systematic fashion. See *supra* note 46.

138. See Public Meeting, May 6, 1989, at 205-06 (emphasis added).

139. *Id.* at 200.

I think that his activity as an ombudsman is enormously improved by the circumstance that he is a separately elected person with some muscle . . . . Without muscle in this city you can't get anywhere . . . .<sup>140</sup>

Commissioner Theresa Molloy concurred as well:

We talked about an elected ombudsman who would do two things: It would, first of all, somehow, be, in my words, a court of appeals; someplace where citizens or groups had no place else to go there would be a court of appeals or a place they could go to. But more importantly, as a watchdog over all of the delivery of services and what came out.<sup>141</sup>

The discussions about the office were complicated by the proposal to create a vice mayor to supplement or replace the council president. As a result, the Commission debated the future of the office on at least five occasions,<sup>142</sup> took three separate votes, and finally decided 9 to 4 (with one abstention) to retain the office substantially in its historic form with some added responsibilities, described *infra* in section III.<sup>143</sup> Just prior to the final vote, Commission Chairman Schwarz articulated his vision of the *raison d'être* for the office:

This is an issue which we properly spent a lot of time on because it's important, and I will try and summarize for myself why I believe the job is one of continuing value to the city.

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140. Public Meeting, May 13, 1989, at 321.

141. *Id.* at 312.

142. The major discussions can be found in the transcripts of Public Meetings that took place on May 6, 1989; May 10, 1989; May 13, 1989; June 20, 1989; June 26, 1989; and July 31, 1989 (when the final vote was taken). An article in the *New York Times* stated that it was one of the few subjects that provoked significant rancor among the Commission members. See Alan Finder, *What Gets Charter Panel All Riled Up?*, N.Y. TIMES, July 5, 1989, at B1.

143. The first vote, on May 6, 1989, was nine to four; Chairman Schwarz and commissioners Michel, Betanzos, Gourdine, Murphy, Molloy, Richland, Murray, and Leventhal voted "yea"; Commissioners Trager, Gribetz, Alvarez and Friendly voted "nay." See N.Y. CITY CHARTER, Exhibit 58 (1989). The second vote, on June 20, 1989, was ten to four. See Public Meeting, June 20, 1989, at 279. The final vote, on July 31, 1989, was nine to four with the same voting patterns as those on May 6, except that Commissioner Molloy abstained. See Public Meeting, July 31, 1989, at 273.

The first two reasons have to do with, in the good sense, the political structure of the government, and this is a complex, huge city with many different aspirations and views among its people, and with great variety among its people.

It seems to me, after weighing all the arguments for that there be not just one citywide official who stands as an alternate to the Mayor, but two alternates in the sense of serving in government as a citywide official and being able to present from a citywide perspective disagreement or concurrence.

. . . . .  
In the broadest sense, I think there is a balance . . . conceptually between the comptroller and the council president in the sense of oversight of city programs from the executive branch.

The one concentrating on the fiscal cost efficiency elements of the programs, the other concentrating on the service implications of the programs, . . . I think that balance has attractiveness when you think about the twin aspects of government, that you deliver things effectively fiscally and deliver things effectively . . . humanly.<sup>144</sup>

Schwarz's comments echoed those in the Center report to the 1975 Commission fifteen years earlier: balance, counterweight, and citywide presence—all the historic roles for the council president.<sup>145</sup>

The lengthy debates in 1989, however, did not put to rest the controversy over the council presidency. In late 1992, Mayor David Dinkins and Speaker Peter Vallone discussed placing a referendum on the November ballot to eliminate the office, but they could not agree on how to divide up the office's limited powers—in particular, the succession to the mayor and the appointment of a Planning Commission member.<sup>146</sup> In January 1993, one bill to eliminate the office through a referendum,<sup>147</sup> and

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144. Public Meeting, July 31, 1989, at 257, 259-60.

145. See *supra* Part IB. There is no evidence that any of the commissioners realized they were breaking new ground by creating the only elected ombudsman in the United States, and possibly the world.

146. See James Bennet, *Aides to Dinkins and Vallone in Talks to Abolish Stein's Job*, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 16, 1992, at B39; Bob Liff, *Ax Spares Stein's Job*, NEWSDAY (N.Y.), Aug. 22, 1992, at 10.

147. See Council Members Fusco, Pagan, Harrison, and Sabini, *Introduction No. 643* to N.Y. CITY ADMIN. CODE (1993) (amending the New York City Charter in relation to repealing section 24 of the Charter and abolishing the office of the president of the City



one to change the name to public advocate,<sup>148</sup> were introduced in the Council. Both bills were considered at a public hearing on January 29, 1993,<sup>149</sup> and several public officials testified for and against the proposal.<sup>150</sup> Speaker of the City Council Peter Vallone urged keeping the office but changing its name.<sup>151</sup> The good government groups that weighed in were divided: Citizen's Union urged the abolition of the office,<sup>152</sup> but the New York Public Interest Research Group ("NYPIRG")<sup>153</sup> argued against altering the 1989 Charter without more studies and a clear mandate from the electorate.<sup>154</sup>

In the end, the City Council resolved simply to change the name of the office to "Public Advocate"<sup>155</sup> to more accurately reflect its Charter roles and to dispel the impression that the holder exercised a predominant role

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Council).

148. See Council Member Vallone, *Introduction No. 624-A* to N.Y. CITY ADMIN. CODE (1993) (changing the title of the president of the council to the public advocate).

149. See generally Council of the City of New York, *The Transcript of the Minutes of the Committee on Governmental Operations*, Jan. 29, 1993; see also Douglas Feiden, *Many Vying to Fill Stein's Council Shoes*, CRAIN'S N.Y. BUS., Feb. 15, 1993, at 9; Editorial, *Let the Ax Fall*, NEWSDAY (N.Y.), Feb. 3, 1993, at 48; Sheryl McCarthy, *Does Anyone Really Care If We Scrap Stein's Job*, NEWSDAY (N.Y.), Feb. 1, 1993, at 8.; Selwyn Raab, *"President" Is Confusing; Council May Alter Title*, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 30, 1993, at 25.

150. Council members Israel Ruiz and Stephen DiBrienza, State Senator Donald Halpern, and Police Benevolent Association President Ron Reale—all of whom had expressed interest in running for the position—urged its retention. See generally *Transcript of the Minutes of the Committee on Governmental Operations*, Jan. 29, 1993.

151. See *id.* at 3-7.

152. Henry Stern, speaking as president of the organization, said the city council presidency was "the vermiform appendix of city government [which] should be excised from the body politic." *Id.* at 68. He argued that the office was obsolete, used primarily as a bully pulpit for those seeking other elective office, and the advocacy role could be done better by the comptroller. See *id.* at 67-72.

153. See *id.* at 42-51.

154. During these debates, City Council President Andrew Stein cited the steady flow of demands for help from his ombudsman unit. His 1991 Annual Report cited responses to 19,416 requests for help, and he again provided the figure of 19,000 in an interview in 1993. See McCarthy, *supra* note 149. The 1991 report, required by the New York City Charter chapter 2, section 24(n), was 10 weeks late, see Bob Liff, *Did the Dog Eat Andy Stein's Report?*, NEWSDAY (N.Y.), Jan. 11, 1992, at 11, thus adding fuel to the argument that the office was a waste of taxpayer money. During the past four years, the Public Advocate's Office has taken the October 31 deadline very seriously, and Green has delivered a completed Annual Report to the speaker each year on or before that date.

155. See NEW YORK, N.Y., LOC. L. NO. 19 (1993). The bill to eliminate the office was re-introduced in 1997 by Republican Council Member John A. Fusco but was ignored by most Council members and the press.

in the City Council.<sup>156</sup> The Charter Revision Commission had discussed the same idea, and even created a subcommittee to suggest a new name, but it never reached a decision.<sup>157</sup> Some thought the 1993 name change diminished the office's status and prestige, but others, including Mark Green—who by then was considering running for the office—thought it was a great improvement since it clearly identified the officeholder as the public's voice in government.

### III. THE PUBLIC ADVOCATE FOR NEW YORK CITY: THE OFFICE CREATED BY THE 1989 CHARTER

#### A. *The Charter Revision Commission's Handiwork*

The office ultimately created by the 1989 Charter is a political and historical anomaly, with one foot in the legislative branch (presiding officer of the City Council), one in the executive (next-in-line to the mayor)<sup>158</sup> and an eye on the City bureaucracy (ombudsman). Elected for a term of four years at the same time as the mayor<sup>159</sup> and on a separate ballot line, the public advocate has five major areas of responsibility and several subsidiary ones.

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156. There was considerable speculation in the press that the bill to eliminate the office was defeated in part because the incumbent, Andrew Stein, was planning to run for mayor in the Democratic primary, and abolishing his job during the campaign would have been viewed as a political attack by the mayor. See James C. McKinley, Jr., *A New Job For Stein, Without a Race?*, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 23, 1993, at B3.

157. It appears that the name "Public Advocate" was discussed informally during the 1989 Commission Meetings. At one point Commissioner Schwarz refers to the office by that name. See Public Meeting, July 31, 1989, at 260.

158. The New York City Charter notes:

In case of the suspension of the mayor from office, the mayor's temporary inability to discharge the powers and duties of the office of mayor by reason of sickness or otherwise, or the mayor's absence from the city, the powers and duties of the office of mayor shall devolve upon the public advocate or the comptroller in that order of succession . . . .

N.Y. CITY CHARTER ch. 1 § 10(a) (1989, as amended through 1997).

159. See *id.* ch. 2 § 24(a).

## 1. Legislative Roles in the City Council

The public advocate is the presiding officer of the City Council but may vote only in case of a tie,<sup>160</sup> which apparently has rarely, if ever, occurred in the modern history of the Council.<sup>161</sup> A tie is not likely to occur in an odd-numbered Chamber dominated by one party and its speaker.<sup>162</sup> The public advocate may also sit *ex officio* on committees<sup>163</sup> and introduce and sponsor legislation.<sup>164</sup>

## 2. The Bureaucracy Beat

The public advocate serves as the City's ombudsman on both the macro and micro levels. The 1989 Charter added a considerable amount of new language to the limited ombudsman provision in the 1976 Charter.<sup>165</sup> The public advocate is responsible for processing individual grievances,<sup>166</sup> investigating and reporting on recurring and citywide problems,<sup>167</sup>

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160. See *id.* § 24(e).

161. Interviews with Richard Weinberg, General Counsel, New York City Council, and Herbert Berman and Stanley Michels, New York City Council members, in New York, N.Y., Dec. 16, 1998.

162. During Mark Green's first term as public advocate, the Council consisted of 45 Democrats and six Republicans, and was led by a very powerful speaker, Peter F. Vallone. Vallone usually did not bring matters to a vote on the Chamber floor unless he had the votes to prevail. However, since a two-term limit went into effect as of January 1994, there will be significant turnover in membership by 2001. Ten new Council members took office in January 1998, and by January 2002, 40 of the members in office as of mid-1998 will have been "termed out." The current power relationships, as well as the imbalance between Democrats and Republicans, could change significantly as a result.

163. See N.Y. CITY ADMIN. CODE ch. 2 § 3-203 (1985).

164. See N.Y. CITY CHARTER ch. 2 § 22(a) (1989, as amended through 1997) (identifying the public advocate as a member of the Council).

165. See N.Y. CITY CHARTER ch. 2 § 23(e) (1976, as amended through 1977).

166. As to these grievances, "[t]he public advocate shall establish procedures for receiving and processing complaints, responding to complainants, conducting investigations, and reporting findings, and shall inform the public about such procedures." N.Y. CITY CHARTER ch. 2 § 24(g) (1989, as amended through 1997).

167. As to these problems:

[t]he public advocate . . . shall (1) monitor the operation of the public information and service complaint programs of city agencies and make proposals to improve such programs; [and](2) review complaints of a recurring and multiborough or city-wide nature relating to services and programs, and make proposals to improve the city's response to such complaints . . . .

performing discretionary reviews of City agencies,<sup>168</sup> and monitoring the public information and service complaint programs of City agencies.<sup>169</sup>

The commissioners' intent, articulated in their deliberations, was to ensure multiple sources of oversight of the executive agencies, with the comptroller doing fiscal oversight and the public advocate doing the parallel "service" oversight.<sup>170</sup>

After some debate and research by staff, the Commission also decided to give the office wide berth in the scope of its jurisdiction.<sup>171</sup> The final language restricted the scope of the officeholder's powers in only a small number of circumstances, for example, when an individual grievance is one that a City agency "is mandated by law to adjudicate" or is covered by a collective bargaining agreement.<sup>172</sup> In addition, if the public advocate obtains evidence of violations of criminal law, the matter must be referred immediately to an appropriate law enforcement agency and the public advocate may "take no further action."<sup>173</sup> The same rule applies to evidence of conflicts of interest, which must be referred to the Conflicts of Interest Board established by Charter chapter 68.<sup>174</sup>

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*Id.* § 24(f).

168. *Id.* § 24(h).

169. The Charter reads:

Except for those matters which involve conduct which may constitute a violation of criminal law or a conflict of interest, the public advocate may, on the request of a resident, taxpayer, community board, council member or borough president, or on his or her own motion, inquire into any alleged failure of a city officer or agency to comply with any provision of the charter.

*Id.* § 24(i); *see also id.* § 24(h).

170. *See* Public Meeting, July 31, 1989, at 257, 259-60.

171. *See id.*

172. *See* N.Y. CITY CHARTER ch. 2 § 24(f)(4)(i) (1989, as amended through 1997). An opinion by corporation counsel, given to the Charter Revision Commission, stated that the four agencies covered by the "mandated adjudication" provision are the Civil Service Commission, the Human Rights Commission, the Taxi Commission, and the Board of Standards and Appeals. *See* Memorandum from Paul Refren, Chief of the Division of Legal Counsel, Corporation Counsel, to Eric Lane, Counsel and Executive Director, 1989 New York City Charter Revision Commission (June 21, 1989) (on file with the *New York Law School Law Review*); *see also* Public Meeting, June 26, 1989, at 361-68.

173. *See* N.Y. CITY CHARTER ch. 2 § 24(k) (1989, as amended through 1997).

174. *See id.* ch. 68 § 2602(a) (1989).

If the public advocate receives a complaint alleging conduct which may constitute a violation of criminal law or a conflict of interest, he or she shall promptly refer the complaint regarding criminal conduct to the department of investigation or,

The commissioners discussed, and rejected, proposals to further narrow the agencies and circumstances subject to the public advocate's review.<sup>175</sup> The Commission also decided to make only a handful of the public advocate's oversight responsibilities mandatory or required on an annual basis.<sup>176</sup> The selection and timing of the others<sup>177</sup> is left to the officeholder's discretion.<sup>178</sup> A significant portion of the public advocate's job is to identify patterns of problems and address them systemically. The Charter language reflects the understanding that handling grievances one-by-one is often inadequate and, for that reason, it authorizes, and in some cases mandates, a variety of investigations as well as the power to hold hearings.<sup>179</sup>

Troubled by the difficulty encountered by Stein's staff in obtaining documents, but reluctant to place a power as weighty as the issuance of a

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as applicable, to the appropriate prosecuting attorney or other law enforcement agency and shall refer the complaint regarding conflict of interest to the conflicts of interest board . . . . Unless otherwise provided by law, all complaints received and any investigative file prepared or maintained by the public advocate regarding matters covered by this subdivision, shall be confidential.

See N.Y. CITY CHARTER ch. 2 § 24(k) (1989, as amended through 1997).

175. See Public Meeting, June 20, 1989, at 240-52.

176. See, e.g., N.Y. CITY CHARTER ch. 2 § 24(f) (1989, as amended through 1997) ("[T]he public advocate shall . . . review complaints of a recurring and multiborough or city-wide nature . . . ."); *Id.* § 24(n) ("Not later than the thirty-first day of October of each year, the public advocate shall present to the council a report on the activities of the office during the preceding fiscal year.").

177. See, e.g., *id.* § 24(f)(1) ("monitor the operation of the public information and service complaint programs of city agencies"); *id.* § 24(f)(2) ("review complaints of a recurring and multiborough or city-wide nature"); *id.* § 24(f)(4) ("resolve . . . individual complaints"); *id.* § 24(h)(1) ("the public advocate may review . . . the implementation of the requirements for coterminality of local services"); *id.* § 24(h)(3) ("the public advocate may review . . . the responsiveness of city agencies to individual and group requests for data or information regarding the agencies' structure, activities and operations").

178. The reasoning behind this language is explained in colloquies among commissioners. Some Commission members were concerned that the Charter language not be phrased to require the council president to do an annual audit of every City agency. See Public Meeting, June 20, 1989, at 256-61; N.Y. CITY CHARTER ch. 2 §§ 24(g)-(h) (1989, as amended through 1997) (using the discretionary "may" language).

179. See N.Y. CITY CHARTER ch. 2 § 24(f)(2) ("[T]he public advocate shall . . . review complaints of a recurring and multiborough or city-wide nature . . . ."); *id.* § 24(g) (stating that the public advocate may conduct investigations of unsatisfactory agency response to complaints and issue reports and recommendations for administrative, legislative or budgetary actions); *id.* § 24(h) (stating that the public advocate may review the programs of City agencies); *id.* § 24(m) (stating that the public advocate has the power to hold hearings).

subpoena in the hands of a single individual,<sup>180</sup> the Commission created a compromise. It added a provision to the Charter that requires City agencies to respond to the public advocate's requests for documents "in [a] timely fashion."<sup>181</sup> It also authorizes the public advocate to go to a committee of the City Council if he or she wishes to obtain a subpoena. The text reads as follows:

The public advocate shall have timely access to those records and documents of city agencies which the public advocate deems necessary to complete the investigations, inquiries and reviews required by this section. If a city agency does not comply with the public advocate's request for such records and documents, the public advocate may request an appropriate committee of the council to require the production of such records and documents pursuant to section twenty-nine of the Charter.<sup>182</sup>

The Charter Revision Commission added this section to the Charter to give the public advocate some leverage in dealing with mayoral or other agencies and to ensure that the problems encountered by city council presidents before 1989 were not repeated.<sup>183</sup> It also added the provision about the City Council to make clear that the public advocate, although not a voting member of the Council, could obtain a subpoena from that body.<sup>184</sup> The Commission also left intact Charter section 1109, an anti-corruption provision that has been in every Charter since 1873. This unusual

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180. See Public Meeting, May 6, 1989, at 192-95.

181. N.Y. CITY CHARTER ch. 2 § 24(j) (1989, as amended through 1997). The Commission *did not*, however, make the public advocate's authority to go to the Council the sole and "exclusive" remedy for the mayoral agencies' violation of § 24(j). See *Green v. Safir*, 664 N.Y.S.2d 232 (Sup. Ct. N.Y. County 1997), *aff'd as modified*, 679 N.Y.S.2d 383 (App. Div. 1998); *infra* note 272 and accompanying text. The Charter transcripts contain no hint that the Commission, by extending the Council's subpoena power to the council president, intended to bar the latter from turning to the courts for relief. Indeed, the Commission left intact another provision of the Charter, chapter 49, section 1109, discussed *infra* at notes 185-86 and accompanying text, which has long permitted the council president to go directly to court on certain matters.

182. N.Y. CITY CHARTER ch. 2 § 24(j) (1989, as amended through 1997).

183. See, e.g., Public Meeting, May 6, 1989, at 199-201; Legislative Hearing, Mar. 9, 1989, at 25-27, 115-20, 122, 131-34.

184. See Stein Testimony, *supra* note 44, at 201. There is no definitive Charter history on the reason for the "subpoena" clause in § 24(j), but Commission staff, including Eric Lane, who was executive director/counsel, and Frank Mauro, who was director of research, remember that as its likely purpose.



provision, which has never been used by an elected official,<sup>185</sup> authorizes the public advocate (and certain other elected officials, or any five taxpayers) to go to court and seek a summary judicial inquiry “into any alleged violation or neglect of duty in relation to the property, government or affairs of the city . . .”<sup>186</sup>

### 3. The Public Advocate as “Charter Cop”

The Charter designates the public advocate as the official responsible for ensuring enforcement of the provisions enacted in 1989, for investigating violations of the Charter,<sup>187</sup> and for reporting annually on the progress of its implementation.<sup>188</sup> Consistent with this Charter oversight role, the public advocate chairs a new information oversight body, the Commission on Public Information and Communication (“COPIC”).<sup>189</sup>

COPIC’s purpose is to oversee, encourage, and improve public access to government information. It is authorized to hold hearings and required to “render advisory opinions” in response to elected officials or members of the public on aspects of the Charter or “other laws which require public access” to information<sup>190</sup> on the model of the State Committee on Open Government.<sup>191</sup> Finally, the public advocate holds several other *ex officio*

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185. A number of reported cases have been brought since the provision was first enacted, but all of these cases have been efforts by taxpayers to challenge alleged misconduct by government officials. *See, e.g.,* Jones v. Beame, 382 N.Y.S.2d 1004 (Sup. Ct. N.Y. County 1976); *In re Larkin*, 295 N.Y.S.2d 113 (Sup. Ct. N.Y. County 1968); *In re City of New York*, N.Y. L.J., Feb. 5, 1964, at 14 (Sup. Ct. N.Y. County).

186. N.Y. CITY CHARTER ch. 49 § 1109 (1989, as amended through 1997).

187. *See id.* ch. 2 § 24(i).

188. *See id.* § 24(n).

189. *See id.* ch. 47 § 1061.

190. *Id.* § 1061(d)(5).

191. *See* N.Y. PUB. OFF. LAW § 100 (McKinney 1988). Unfortunately, since the mayor and the City Council have never provided any funding for COPIC, it has not been possible to appoint an executive director or other staff to fulfill the plan envisioned by the Commission. Public Advocate Green’s office has provided modest staffing to fill the gap, but far more could—and should—be done with even a modestly funded COPIC. In July 1998, the Public Advocate staff prepared for COPIC a comprehensive consumer guide to the New York State Freedom of Information Law and how to use it in New York City, including a list of the Records Access Officers of both City and State agencies. *See* COMMISSION ON PUBLIC INFORMATION AND COMMUNICATION, LET THE SUNSHINE IN: HOW TO USE THE FREEDOM OF INFORMATION LAW AND THE OPEN MEETINGS LAW IN NEW YORK CITY (1998).

positions, including membership on the Audit Committee,<sup>192</sup> and the Voter Assistance Commission.<sup>193</sup>

#### 4. Pension Trustee

The public advocate is one of eleven trustees of the New York City Employees' Retirement System ("NYCERS"),<sup>194</sup> a pension fund valued at \$37.7 billion as of June 30, 1998.<sup>195</sup> He casts one of the seven votes on the governing board, which makes investment decisions, hears employee appeals of disability pension denials, comments on and proposes legislative changes to state pension laws, and generally oversees the proper budgeting and administration of the NYCERS system.

#### 5. Appointment Powers

The public advocate appoints one member of the City Planning Commission,<sup>196</sup> and, with other elected officials, the director of the Independent Budget Office ("IBO")<sup>197</sup> and the ten-person Advisory Board that screens and recommends candidates for the IBO directorship.<sup>198</sup> Under state law, the public advocate also recommends to the governor five appointees to the New York City Transit Authority Advisory Council.<sup>199</sup>

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192. See N.Y. CITY CHARTER ch. 5 § 97(a) (1989, as amended through 1997).

193. See *id.* ch. 46 § 1054(a). Under the by-laws of the Queens Borough Public Library, the public advocate also designates one of that institution's trustees. See BY-LAWS OF THE QUEENS BOROUGH PUBLIC LIBRARY art. I, § 1 (1996).

194. See N.Y. CITY ADMIN. CODE § 13-103(b)(2) (1994). The three citywide officials and three union representatives cast one vote each. The five borough presidents each cast one-fifth of a vote.

195. See CALLAN ASSOCS. INC., INVESTMENT MEASUREMENT SERVICE QUARTERLY REVIEW, NYC EMPLOYEES' RETIREMENT SYSTEM 7 (1998).

196. See N.Y. CITY CHARTER ch. 8 § 192(a) (1989, as amended through 1997). Andrew Stein appointed Amanda Burden in 1990, and Mark Green re-appointed her for a second five-year term effective July 1, 1995.

197. See *id.* ch. 11 §§ 259-60.

198. See *id.* The public advocate and the comptroller jointly appoint the 10 Advisory Board members, who must meet specified categories of expertise and experience, for staggered five-year terms. The selection of a director is made from the Board's recommendations by the public advocate, the comptroller, a Council member selected by the Council, and a borough president selected by the five borough presidents.

199. See N.Y. PUB. AUTH. LAW § 1204-a (McKinney 1982).

### B. *The Public Advocate's Office Under Mark Green*

Thus, the Office of Public Advocate is an odd amalgam of roles and responsibilities, powers, and limitations. The following is a description of how the first public advocate used the authority granted by the Charter. It not only chronicles the co-author's work but also sets the stage for addressing the question posed at the beginning of this article—what changes, if any, would increase the office's effectiveness and its value to the residents of New York?

#### 1. The Council Role

Although the public advocate wields the gavel, the speaker, who is the chosen Democratic majority leader, is the *de facto* official who controls the agenda of Council meetings. The public advocate has never been called on to break a tie in this fifty-one member body, and it is highly unlikely, although not inconceivable, that such a situation would ever arise.

The public advocate's most important role in the Council, arguably, is the power to introduce legislation—which is unusual if not unique for an ombudsman. Green has actively exercised this authority to implement the results of his investigations and his ideas for reform. Most significant of these during Green's first term was the "Giuliani-Green" bill to clean up the \$1.5 billion commercial carting industry, enacted as Local Law 42 of 1996.<sup>200</sup> During the first months of his second term, the public advocate introduced a series of reforms of the City's campaign finance law<sup>201</sup> designed to reduce the power of large contributors and corporations and to enable a broader spectrum of candidates without access to large donors to

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200. See NEW YORK, N.Y., LOC. L. NO. 42 (1996). In January 1994, shortly after taking office, Green introduced legislation aimed at creating "managed competition" within the waste-hauling industry as a way to break the mob-influenced carting cartel and save city businesses the equivalent of a half a billion dollars per year in overcharges. See Mark Green, *Introduction No. 127* to N.Y. CITY ADMIN. CODE (1994). The bill established "competition zones" in which the City would use a competitive bidding process to select one or two carters that would be authorized to pick up the commercial waste in each of the designated zones. Each carter in the zones would be required to hire an Independent Private Sector Inspector General ("IPSIG") to identify problems and prevent corruption. Both the demonstration districts and the IPSIG idea were incorporated, in modified form, into Mayor Giuliani's 1995 bill to establish rigorous screening and enforcement procedures for carting licenses. The resulting joint effort led to Local Law 42 being signed into law on June 3, 1996.

201. See N.Y. CITY ADMIN. CODE tit. 3 ch. 7 (1996).

compete for public office.<sup>202</sup> The package of three bills, co-sponsored by Speaker Vallone, became law in the fall of 1998.

Green has also introduced legislation to ban workplace discrimination against victims of domestic violence,<sup>203</sup> to increase whistle blower protection for City workers,<sup>204</sup> to create a New York City False Claims Act modeled on the federal law,<sup>205</sup> to create a Department of Investigation that is more independent of the mayor,<sup>206</sup> to create a Licensing Review Commission to overhaul and rationalize the City's regulations (and create "one stop-shopping" for businesses),<sup>207</sup> and to prohibit businesses such as

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202. See NEW YORK, N.Y., LOC. L. NO. 48 (1998) (amending "the administrative code of the City of New York in relation to raising matchable contributions for participating candidates in the [c]ampaign [f]inance program who do not accept corporate contributions and lowering the contribution limits for such programs"); NEW YORK, N.Y., LOC. L. NO. 39 (1998) (amending "the charter of the City of New York and the Administrative Code of the City of New York, in relation to donations accepted and expenditures made on behalf of candidates elected to certain local offices for purposes of such candidates' transition or inauguration into office"); NEW YORK, N.Y., LOC. L. NO. 40 (1998) (amending "the New York City Charter in relation to prohibiting an officer or employee of the city or of any city agency who is a candidate for an elective city office or the spouse of such officer or employee to appear or otherwise participate in any television, radio or printed advertisement or commercial or by electronic means on the Internet which is funded, in whole or in part, by governmental funds or resources on or after January first in the year an election for such office shall be held"). New York City Local Law No. 48, passed by the Council over the mayor's veto by a vote of 44 to 4 on Oct. 22, 1998, makes major reforms in New York City's campaign finance law by providing four-to-one public matching funds for contributions up to \$250 for those candidates who join the campaign finance system, lowering the maximum individual contribution from \$8,500 to \$4,500 (for candidates for citywide office) and banning contributions from political action committees that fail to register with the campaign finance board.

203. See Mark Green, *Introduction No. 400* to N.Y. CITY ADMIN. CODE (1998) (amending "the administrative code of the city of New York, in relation to employment discrimination against domestic violence victims").

204. See Stanley Michels & Mark Green, *Introduction No. 726* to N.Y. CITY ADMIN. CODE (1996) (amending "the administrative code of the city of New York, in relation to the enhancement of protections for whistle blowers").

205. See Mark Green & Stanley Michels, *Introduction No. 666* to N.Y. CITY ADMIN. CODE (1995) (amending "the administrative code of the city of new [sic] York in relation to authorizing the imposition of a civil penalty against anyone who files a false claim for payment with the City and to permit private persons to bring actions for such penalties on behalf of the City and to share in the awarded damages"). Both the whistle blower and false claims bills were developed cooperatively with co-sponsor Council member Stanley Michels.

206. See Mark Green, *Introduction No. 401* to N.Y. CITY CHARTER (1994).

207. See Mark Green, *Introduction No. 652* to N.Y. CITY CHARTER (1995) (amending "the New York City charter, in relation to the creation of a License Review Commission," as well as "the powers and membership" of the License Review Commission).

dry cleaners and hair salons from charging women more than men for equivalent services.<sup>208</sup>

## 2. Individual Grievances/Ombudsman

This is, paradoxically, one of the most important and the least publicized of the public advocate's responsibilities. Under Public Advocate Green, a ten-person ombudsman unit has continued the tradition established by his predecessors in office, beginning with Francis X. Smith and Paul O'Dwyer, of providing assistance to thousands of individuals who contact the office each year in person, by letter, and by phone.<sup>209</sup> They bring a wide array of complaints and frustrations about the City bureaucracy. Between January 1994, and July 1998, the office responded to some 80,000 complaints, which are documented in a computer system and analyzed by agency and type of complaint in the office's annual reports.<sup>210</sup>

In the majority of cases, the ombudsman staff refer people to the appropriate government agency for assistance, as required by Charter sections 24(f) and (g);<sup>211</sup> in other cases they advocate on their behalf to correct a bureaucratic error; in yet another percentage of cases—such as private financial or personal disputes or legal battles—staff must help the complainants understand that, for a variety of reasons, they may try to

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208. See Mark Green, *Introduction No. 804* to N.Y. ADMIN. CODE (1996) (amending "the administrative code of the city of New York, in relation to the prohibition of discriminatory pricing"). This introduction, co-sponsored with Council member Eristoff, was signed by the mayor after its language was moderated at the mayor's insistence. It was enacted as Local Law 2 of 1998.

209. The requests for assistance from the ombudsman unit continue to grow—and it is a challenge to keep up with the workload.

210. The extent of interest in the office's services and the success of the ombudsman unit belie the prediction of one well-known political advisor, Norman Adler, who was quoted in 1993 as saying the office could not have much impact. "People focus on the politicians who have helped them . . . And when you're City Council President, it's hard to make that impression." James Bennet, *Question No. 1 in the City Council President Race; Why Would Anyone Want the Job of Mostly Sitting Around Waiting to Break a Tie?*, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 28, 1993, at 29 (internal quotation marks omitted). Adler was proven wrong by the outpouring of support for the office during the 1998 Charter Revision Commission Hearings by constituents who had received assistance and organizations who were pleased with the office's investigative reports. See discussion *infra* at notes 297-98 and accompanying text.

211. Such referral is mandatory in three types of cases: where another City agency is required by law to adjudicate the grievance, see N.Y. CITY CHARTER ch.2 § 24(f)(4)(i) (1989, as amended through 1997); where a collectively bargained grievance procedure governs the matter, see *id.* § 24(f)(4)(ii); and where the complaint alleges "conduct which may constitute a violation of criminal law or a conflict of interest," *Id.* § 24(f)(4)(iii).

mediate the disagreements but may not be able to resolve them. As a matter of policy, the office does not intervene where a case is already in litigation. Some of the individual grievance work is repetitious and unremarkable. The daily challenge to the ombudsman staff is to make their best efforts to help distressed grievants suffering from bureaucratic errors or injustice who are desperate for a place to get a polite hearing (sometimes, even if there's no way to help). The great reward for the ombudsperson occurs when he or she successfully untangles the proverbial red tape and helps a citizen obtain his or her due from the government or a business. The office's files are replete with letters of gratitude from such clients. Some typical examples of the ombudsman unit's efforts over the past four-and-a-half years follow:

- assisted a 28-year victim of mistaken identity—who had lost his job and was subject to a warrant for his arrest—by persuading the child welfare authorities that he was *not* the deadbeat dad of a 14-year-old they had been pursuing;
- obtained restored phone service for a 91-year-old whose home care aide had secretly run up hundreds of dollars worth of overseas calls;
- responded to a “Dear Santa” letter from a child by arranging for a homeless family to be reinstated in the section 8 housing subsidy program to which it was entitled;
- obtained an emergency inspection and repair of an elevator that had been boarded shut, in response to a complaint from a terminally ill, wheelchair-bound client who lived in a 6th-floor apartment;
- persuaded the Buildings Department to rescind an elevator inspection bill wrongly sent to the owner of a one-story building;
- arranged for a Bronx mother to get \$1,420 in back child support that had been “stuck” in the Human Resources Administration bureaucracy;
- obtained a refund of garnished wages of a constituent who had already paid off his debt to the City Marshal;
- worked with the Bureau of Pupil Transportation Services to get a new bus for a public school in Manhattan that was using a dangerously overcrowded school bus;



- worked with the Police Department to expedite issuance of accident reports for insurance purposes to victims, scores of whom complained of waiting more than six months for such reports;
- assisted a constituent who had been trying unsuccessfully for five weeks to obtain copies of his parents' death certificates so he could claim his inheritance of securities.<sup>212</sup>

In some instances a single complaint reveals a pattern of serious government mismanagement rather than mere bureaucratic bungling or private consumer fraud or abuse. The ombudsman unit's work in those cases has a broader impact. To cite a few examples:

- In 1994, in response to nearly 150 complaints of erroneous water bills, the ombudsman staff met with City officials and private utilities and won refunds ranging from \$250 to \$2,500 for 40 complainants. The Department of Environmental Protection promised to reduce errors and improve customer services through a centralized billing system (which apparently is not yet in place as of this writing).
- In response to a single complaint, the ombudsman unit learned that thousands of single family homeowners were being fined for failing to file a low-pressure boiler inspection report, even though one-family homes are exempt from the local law requiring such reports. The office succeeded in getting many of the violations removed.
- In 1996, in response to the complaint of an 85-year-old Queens resident who was conned out of \$240, the ombudsman unit identified a pattern of complaints of fraudulent sales of purported water-saving devices to senior citizens and referred the matter to the District Attorney.
- In 1996, a young couple with a newborn baby turned in desperation to the office because a defective dry cleaning machine on the ground floor of their residential building was emitting large and illegal amounts of toxic perchloroethylene ("perc") fumes into their apartment. The office's intervention and publication of the

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212. These are only a sampling of the thousands of cases contained in the ombudsman unit's computerized data base that records all complaints received, the dates and types of follow-up, and the resolution. The monthly reports by each staff member also record victims assisted successfully and amounts of money returned or saved.

dry cleaner's violations led to a speedy shut down of the machine.<sup>213</sup>

- In 1997, a complainant brought in a home video of police cars secretly rolling over a sensor to switch a traffic light in front of the Bronx Zoo from flashing yellow to red, and then, when motorists failed to make an abrupt stop, slapping them with \$125 traffic tickets. The office assisted the complainant to obtain media coverage; the trap was confirmed by many other community members when aired on TV and published in the *Daily News*.<sup>214</sup>

The office's success with complaints like these is partly a function of the expertise and persistence of the ombudsman staff members. It is also a reflection of the potential power of the public advocate as an elected official to embarrass a sluggish bureaucracy by reporting the problem to City Hall or exposing it through a report to the media.<sup>215</sup>

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213. The office issued two in-depth studies of the health dangers of perc fumes. See *infra* note 247 and accompanying text. The public advocate also introduced a resolution in the City Council calling for restrictions on dry cleaning equipment in residential buildings. See Mark Green, *Resolution No. 974*, PROCEEDINGS OF THE COUNCIL OF THE CITY OF NEW YORK (1995) ("calling upon the Pataki Administration to expeditiously promulgate rules restricting hazardous perchloroethylene emissions generated by dry cleaning equipment . . . to protect the health of people who live and work in buildings containing dry cleaning establishments and workers in dry cleaning establishments" as well as protecting the environment).

214. See James Rutenberg, *Cops' Tricky Light Show: Signal Switcheroo Turns Off Drivers*, DAILY NEWS (N.Y.), Aug. 26, 1997, at 3. Unfortunately, the New York City Police Department's response was to arrest the whistle blower that afternoon for a thirteen-year-old outstanding traffic violation. The Public Advocate's Office won his release within hours, and a judge ruled the violation too stale to pursue. See Dan Barry, *Giuliani Is Said to Consider Stronger Police Review Board*, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 27, 1997, at B2. The mayor and the police commissioner continued their attack on the hapless whistle blower, however, by publicly releasing and distorting his rap sheet, in apparent violation of New York Criminal Procedure Law section 160.55. The man's past history was irrelevant, of course, to his right to complain about the traffic trap; the administration's *ad hominem* attack on him sent a clear message to potential whistle blowers: "[T]hink twice before challenging City Hall." In August 1998, the whistle blower filed a federal lawsuit against the administration alleging retaliation for exercise of his First Amendment rights. See *Schillaci v. Giuliani*, 98 Civ. 5583 (S.D.N.Y. 1998) (complaint filed Aug. 6, 1998; Answer filed Nov. 16, 1998).

215. This political reality is articulated in one of the dozens of thank-you letters the office receives from grateful complainants: "Your avocation [sic] on my behalf worked wonders when you interceded . . . . The mear [sic] mention of your name jolted these people into imediate [sic] action . . . ." Letter to Mark Green, Public Advocate (May 14, 1995) (name withheld to protect complainant's identity) (on file with author).

Some cases that reflect a broad pattern or practice are referred by the ombudsman unit to the research and investigations unit, discussed later, which may undertake a broader investigation and publish a report, as it did in the case of the water meter billing errors.<sup>216</sup>

Finally, in response to the large number of complaints the Public Advocate's Office receives about the child welfare system—and the frequent heartbreaking and horrifying reports of fatalities among children known to the system—the office under Green created a model specialized child welfare ombudsman project. Child Planning and Advocacy Now ("C-PLAN"), a public-private partnership,<sup>217</sup> was established in May 1995, to assist families and children who are dealing with the child welfare system and to investigate and document recurring problems in that system.<sup>218</sup> C-PLAN has a forty-member advisory board of advocates, government officials, and service providers. In its three-and-a-half years of existence, it has provided individual assistance and advocacy to more than 1,400 clients, including foster parents, birth parents, foster children, foster care agencies, and relatives of children in the system. All told, close to 4,000 children have been affected by its work.

In addition, C-PLAN is now operating a *pro bono* legal assistance network, which recruits and trains private attorneys—some from large law firms—to handle Family Court cases referred by C-PLAN social work advocates, and a "Family Court Initiative" that addresses systemic problems in that venue.<sup>219</sup>

### 3. The Bigger Picture—Research and Investigation of Systemic Problems

The public advocate's individual grievance-handling work can usually be done effectively with limited cooperation from the higher-ups in City

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216. See PUBLIC ADVOCATE FOR THE CITY OF NEW YORK, *EXPENSIVE WATER: WRONG WATER METER BILLS FLOOD CITY RESIDENCES* (1995); see also PUBLIC ADVOCATE FOR THE CITY OF NEW YORK, *NEW YORKERS KEEP GETTING "SLAMMED"* (1996) (responding to complaints of fraudulent switching of long-distance telephone carriers without the customers' permission).

217. C-PLAN is funded by grants from private foundations to a not-for-profit corporation, the Accountability Project, which supports municipal reform efforts generated by the Public Advocate's Office.

218. In January 1996, C-PLAN issued a report recommending the establishment of a separate agency to deal with child-welfare programs. Later that month, in response to the death of Elisa Izquierdo—a child long known to the system—Mayor Giuliani announced that he would remove the Child Welfare Agency from the Human Resources Administration and establish a new and independent agency, the Administration for Children's Services.

219. The *pro bono* legal assistance project is operated in conjunction with a training component provided by Professor Martin Guggenheim at the New York University Law School.

Hall, so long as agency line staff respond professionally to individual problems, which is usually the case. The investigative studies of systemic problems are, however, far more difficult to accomplish in the face of a resistant or hostile mayor.<sup>220</sup> The public advocate has aggressively pursued the role envisioned for the office by the Charter Revision Commission and has sought to exercise his right under Charter section 24(j) to obtain documents and information in furtherance of his investigations of City services. However, section 24(j), at least as drafted, has proven an inadequate mechanism for dealing with an administration that is intent on resisting oversight.<sup>221</sup> The scope of the public advocate's authority to

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220. Mayor Rudolph Giuliani has been openly hostile to the existence of the Public Advocate's Office, and to Green's work, since they both took office in January 1994. The mayor began his first term by proposing a 23% budget cut for the Office of the Public Advocate—far beyond that sought for any other elected official. *See Allison Mitchell, For Giuliani and Green It Might As Well Be 1997*, N.Y. TIMES, June 11, 1994, at A1. This proposed cut was in addition to a 30% cut already enacted in outgoing Mayor David Dinkins' final budget modification in the fall of 1993. *See Jonathan P. Hicks, 6 Candidates Contend for a Chance to Define the Retitled Position of Public Advocate*, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 12, 1993, § 1, at 48. Under the leadership of Speaker Peter F. Vallone, the City Council restored nearly half of the mayor's proposed cut. This left the new office with a \$2.3 million budget for FY 1995, down from Andrew Stein's budget of \$3.7 million for FY 1994. The mayor's effort came perilously close to interfering with the public advocate's ability to perform the Charter responsibilities, which would have been an illegal attempt to amend the Charter without a referendum. Charter section 38 and State Municipal Home Rule Law section 23(2)(f) both require a referendum for any law that "abolishes, transfers or curtails any power of an elective officer." *See New York Pub. Interest Research Group v. Giuliani*, 644 N.Y.S.2d 38, 39 (App. Div. 1996) (invalidating a local law that delayed, by two years, the establishment of the Independent Budget Office because it curtailed the powers of the elected officials, including the public advocate, who appoint the director and receive information from the agency). The mayor's campaign to undermine or eliminate the office was taken up once again in July 1998, when he appointed a Charter Revision Commission consisting of his close colleagues and supporters. The Commission members briefly considered eliminating the office. *See infra* notes 294-95 for further discussion.

221. The vast majority of the requests the Public Advocate's Office has made over the past four years have been denied, ignored, delayed, or challenged outright as beyond the office's purview. As a general policy, mayoral agencies have refused to acknowledge the public advocate's authority under Charter section 24(j), and often have responded by treating requests for information from the public advocate as Freedom of Information Law ("FOIL") requests—the state law designed for the general public—and then denying the requests anyhow. In addition, mayoral agencies frequently refuse to respond unless the public advocate identifies, in advance, the nature, scope, and purpose of the request—in other words, permits the agencies to pre-screen each inquiry. Under Mayor Giuliani, City Hall is widely known to retain centralized control over the release of information to other public officials as well as the general public. *See Editorial, A Stonewall at City Hall*, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 14, 1998, at A18; *see also* Public Meeting, N.Y. CITY COMM'N ON PUB. INFO. AND COMMUNICATION, July 10, 1997, at 17-73 (where advocacy groups testified about their difficulty in obtaining information from mayoral agencies). The courts invalidated this

obtain documents has been a source of constant conflict between the public advocate and the Mayor's Office and will most likely be resolved in the end by the courts.<sup>222</sup>

Notwithstanding these obstacles, the office has continued to investigate problems in City government. The public advocate has a skilled research staff which identifies problems—many flagged by complaints to the ombudsman unit or in meetings with community groups. During Mark Green's first term four-and-a-half years in office, he issued 115 reports, including in-depth studies of major City policy and budget matters and investigations of bureaucratic bungling, corruption,<sup>223</sup> inefficiency, and

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mayoral policy toward the public advocate in *Green v. Safir*, 664 N.Y.S.2d 232 (Sup. Ct. N.Y. County 1997), *aff'd as modified*, 679 N.Y.S.2d 383 (App. Div. 1998). A unanimous appellate division agreed with the lower court's ruling that the public advocate is entitled to review the requested documents to fulfill the public advocate's official functions. The Giuliani policy of challenging the right of other officials and news media to obtain information through FOIL has been rejected by the courts in several cases, including *Lewis v. Giuliani*, Index No. 116214/96 (Sup. Ct. N.Y. County, Apr. 21, 1997); *Messinger v. Giuliani*, Index No. 402236/97 (Sup. Ct. N.Y. County, Aug. 11, 1997); *New York Times Co. v. City of New York*, 673 N.Y.S.2d 569 (Sup. Ct. N.Y. County 1998); and *Criscitello v. Giuliani*, Index No. 105621 (Sup. Ct. N.Y. County 1998).

222. The dispute between the public advocate and the mayor over the intent and meaning of the public advocate's Charter powers was decided in Green's favor. In *Green v. Safir*, 664 N.Y.S.2d 232 (Sup. Ct. N.Y. County 1997), Justice Edward Lehner granted the public advocate's Article 78 petition challenging the police commissioner's refusal to permit the Public Advocate's Office to review (with names redacted) records of the police department's handling of substantiated complaints of police abuse referred by the Civilian Complaint Review Board ("CCRB"). The public advocate requested the review because of the many complaints about police misconduct and the CCRB's own data, which showed between 30% and 50% of substantiated complaints resulted in no disciplinary action by the New York police department. See NEW YORK CITY CIVILIAN COMPLAINT REVIEW BOARD, SEMIANNUAL STATUS REPORT, Jan.-Dec. 1995, VOL. III, No. 2, at 29; NEW YORK CITY CIVILIAN COMPLAINT REVIEW BOARD, SEMIANNUAL STATUS REPORT, January-June 1996, VOL. IV, No. 1, at 51; NEW YORK CITY CIVILIAN COMPLAINT REVIEW BOARD, SEMIANNUAL STATUS REPORT, January-December 1996, VOL. IV, No. 2, at 47; see also NEW YORK CIVIL LIBERTIES UNION, A FOURTH ANNIVERSARY OVERVIEW OF THE CIVILIAN COMPLAINT REVIEW BOARD, JULY 5, 1993-JULY 5, 1997, at 9. The appellate division unanimously affirmed the lower court decision and modified the ruling to grant the public advocate's counsel attorneys' fees. On Dec. 22, 1998, the appellate division denied Commissioner Safir's motion to appeal to the New York Court of Appeals.

223. Green's office has referred numerous matters to the Department of Investigation, and a few to the United States Attorney or an appropriate district attorney. Unfortunately, the DOI is unnecessarily and inappropriately secretive about the conclusions of its investigations, and has never notified the public advocate of the results of any of the matters referred. In *Lewis v. Giuliani*, brought by the *Daily News*, the court ruled against the DOI's refusal to report on its work, but the practice has not improved, at least with respect to the Public Advocate's Office. See *Lewis v. Giuliani*, Index No. 116214/96 (Sup. Ct. N.Y. County, Apr. 21, 1997).

squandering of public funds. These included, among others, extensive reports on:

- the City's denial of assistance to (a) desperate homeless families,<sup>224</sup> (b) low-income elderly people seeking rent increase exemptions,<sup>225</sup> and (c) disabled or mentally ill adults needing protective services;<sup>226</sup>
- the City's arcane and poorly enforced procedures for licensing plumbers and the resulting high costs and shoddy work;<sup>227</sup>
- poor training, testing, and supervision in the City's lifeguard program;<sup>228</sup>
- favoritism and lack of standards in granting government contracts for everything ranging from food for foster care programs<sup>229</sup> to contracts for services to immigrants;<sup>230</sup>
- interfering with democracy: the Human Resource Administration's failure to comply with the federal "Motor Voter

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224. See PUBLIC ADVOCATE FOR THE CITY OF NEW YORK, EMERGENCY HOMELESS HOTLINE: ACCOUNTS OF RESPONSES TO "EMERGENCY" CALLS BY A CALLER IN THE OFFICE OF THE PUBLIC ADVOCATE TO THE DIVISION OF HOMELESS SERVICES EMERGENCY ASSISTANCE HOTLINE (1995); see also PUBLIC ADVOCATE FOR THE CITY OF NEW YORK, THE HOMELESS SERVICES HOTLINE: WHEN A HOTLINE BECOMES A BRICK WALL (1996) (following up on a study that was done one year earlier).

225. See PUBLIC ADVOCATE FOR THE CITY OF NEW YORK, SENIORS ON HOLD-WAITING FOR SCRIE: PROBLEMS WITH THE SENIOR CITIZEN'S RENT INCREASE EXEMPTION PROGRAM (SCRIE) AND WAYS TO FIX THEM (1995).

226. See PUBLIC ADVOCATE FOR THE CITY OF NEW YORK, INVESTIGATION OF HRA'S OFFICE OF PROTECTIVE SERVICES FOR ADULTS (PSA) (1996).

227. See PUBLIC ADVOCATE FOR THE CITY OF NEW YORK, ENFORCEMENT DOWN THE DRAIN: HOW THE CITY TOLERATES FLAGRANT VIOLATIONS OF LICENSING LAWS SUPPOSED TO PROTECT THE PUBLIC FROM ILLEGAL PLUMBING WORK (1996). Green introduced comprehensive legislation to improve regulation of the industry. See *Introduction 302 to N.Y. CITY ADMIN. CODE* (1998).

228. See PUBLIC ADVOCATE FOR THE CITY OF NEW YORK, PRELIMINARY INVESTIGATION INTO THE PARKS DEPARTMENT LIFEGUARD PROGRAM (1994).

229. See PUBLIC ADVOCATE FOR THE CITY OF NEW YORK, FOOD FIGHT: A PRELIMINARY INVESTIGATION ON HOW THE CITY MIS-SPENDS MILLIONS TO FEED "GREEN MEAT BALLS" AND "GOLDEN APPLES" TO THE HOMELESS AND FOSTER CARE CHILDREN (1994).

230. See Letter from Mark Green, Public Advocate for the City of New York, to Diane McGrath-McKechnie, Commissioner, Community Development Agency (Mar. 25, 1996) (on file with author) (requesting information regarding alleged tampering with scores in rating of proposals for utilizing federal immigration funds).

Law”<sup>231</sup> and the Board of Elections’ mishandling of the September 1996 primary, which resulted in the disenfranchisement of hundreds of Brooklyn voters;<sup>232</sup>

- the City’s failure to assist mothers on welfare to locate safe, affordable child care,<sup>233</sup> or to establish an efficient welfare bureaucracy equipped to meet its administrative responsibilities under the federal welfare laws;<sup>234</sup>
- the unresponsiveness of City agencies to calls from the public;<sup>235</sup>
- the City’s failure to study the environmental impact of the Fresh Kills Landfill;<sup>236</sup> and
- the deadly impact of lead paint in City housing, schools, and day care centers.<sup>237</sup>

Because of his broad view of the Charter mandate, the public advocate has focused not only on investigations of mayoral agencies but also on the various public benefit corporations that receive taxpayer dollars,<sup>238</sup> such as the Port Authority of New York and New Jersey,<sup>239</sup> the Health and

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231. See PUBLIC ADVOCATE FOR THE CITY OF NEW YORK, A VOTE OF NO CONFIDENCE: HOW NYC IS VIOLATING THE “MOTOR VOTER LAW” (1995). The public advocate is a prime sponsor with Council member Gifford Miller of Introduction 450 of 1998, which extends the motor-voter law to more City agencies and strengthens the enforcement mechanisms.

232. See PUBLIC ADVOCATE FOR THE CITY OF NEW YORK, A PRELIMINARY REPORT ON THE INVESTIGATION OF THE SEPTEMBER 10, 1996 PRIMARY ELECTION IN KINGS COUNTY (1996).

233. See PUBLIC ADVOCATE FOR THE CITY OF NEW YORK, WELFARE AND CHILD CARE: WHAT ABOUT THE CHILDREN? (1997).

234. See PUBLIC ADVOCATE FOR THE CITY OF NEW YORK, FROM WELFARE TO WORK: GETTING LOST ALONG THE WAY (1997).

235. See PUBLIC ADVOCATE FOR THE CITY OF NEW YORK, HURRY UP AND WAIT: AN EVALUATION OF HOW NYC AGENCIES RESPOND TO CALLS FOR INFORMATION OR ASSISTANCE (1997).

236. See PUBLIC ADVOCATE FOR THE CITY OF NEW YORK, UNHEALTHY CLOSURE: THE NEED FOR A FULL ENVIRONMENTAL IMPACT STATEMENT ON DOS’S LONG-TERM PLAN TO CONTROL POLLUTION FROM FRESH KILLS (1997).

237. See PUBLIC ADVOCATE FOR THE CITY OF NEW YORK, LEAD & KIDS: WHY ARE 30,000 NYC CHILDREN CONTAMINATED? (1998).

238. See N.Y. CITY CHARTER ch. 52 § 1150(2) (1989) (defining “agency” as an entity funded in whole or in part from the City treasury).

239. See PUBLIC ADVOCATE FOR THE CITY OF NEW YORK, FOLLOW THE MONEY: HOW THE PORT AUTHORITY OF NY AND NJ HAS FAVORED NEW JERSEY OVER NEW YORK (1996) (documenting how the Port Authority is biased against New York, which generates 60% of the revenue but receives only 48% of the capital spending).



Hospitals Corporation,<sup>240</sup> the Transit Authority,<sup>241</sup> and the Board of Education,<sup>242</sup> as well as government-regulated industries and programs that have a major impact on city residents' lives.<sup>243</sup>

The office focused particular attention between 1994 and 1998 on two of the thorniest and most costly service delivery systems: health care and child welfare. In the area of health care, the office issued sixteen major investigations, including a 160-page, year-long study of and guide to

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240. See PUBLIC ADVOCATE FOR THE CITY OF NEW YORK, *AFTERSHOCK: RAPE SURVIVORS IN HHC EMERGENCY ROOMS* (1994) (reporting on how Health and Hospital Corporation hospitals treat rape survivors, with recommendations for change. A Summer 1996 follow-up study found significant improvements); see also PUBLIC ADVOCATE FOR THE CITY OF NEW YORK, *FOR WHOM THE "BELL" TOLLS* (1994) (investigating the failure of public and private hospitals to comply with the 1989 state regulations—the "Bell regulations"—limiting resident hours and working conditions). In 1998, the State finally took note and began issuing hefty fines against violators.

241. See PUBLIC ADVOCATE FOR THE CITY OF NEW YORK, *UNEASY RIDER: HOW THE TRANSIT AUTHORITY VIOLATES FEDERAL BUS ACCESSIBILITY RULES* (1995) (documenting how City buses failed to comply with federal laws requiring access for people with disabilities); see also PUBLIC ADVOCATE FOR THE CITY OF NEW YORK, *THE T.A. IS DRAGGING ITS FEET ON SUBWAY DRAGGINGS* (1995) (documenting the T.A.'s failure to implement its own task force's 1988 safety recommendations to reduce subway draggings). In April 1998, the public advocate also filed an administrative complaint with the Federal Transit Authority, alleging that the Metropolitan Transportation Authority ("MTA") and the Transit Authority are violating the Americans With Disabilities Act by denying disabled paratransit riders services comparable to public transportation. See Richard Weir, *No Easy Ride for Disabled*, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 20, 1998, § 14, at 7. In December 1998, the MTA announced that it would spend significant funds to correct the primary problem identified in the public advocate's federal complaint. See James Rutenberg, *TA Maps Upgrades*, DAILY NEWS (N.Y.), Dec. 3, 1998, at 4.

242. See PUBLIC ADVOCATE FOR THE CITY OF NEW YORK, *CONSTRUCTION VS. CHILDREN: THE NEED TO IMPROVE ENVIRONMENTAL SAFETY DURING RENOVATION OF SCHOOLS AND PUBLIC HOUSING* (1996) (reporting on safety problems in Housing Authority and Board of Education construction projects).

243. See PUBLIC ADVOCATE FOR THE CITY OF NEW YORK, *COMPETITION IN SANITATION: HOW TO REDUCE COSTS AND IMPROVE SERVICE FOR BUSINESSES AND RESIDENCES* (1994) (proposing to end the "mob tax" in the private carting industry); PUBLIC ADVOCATE FOR THE CITY OF NEW YORK, *THE POOR PAY MORE . . . FOR LESS* (1994) (reporting on how banks have abandoned poor neighborhoods and have been replaced by expensive check-cashing services); PUBLIC ADVOCATE FOR THE CITY OF NEW YORK, *DON'T BANK ON US: TELLER MACHINE AVAILABILITY AND BANK BRANCH HOURS IN URBAN NEW YORK* (1994) (documenting the absence of automated teller machines, weekend hours, and bank branches in low-income neighborhoods and proposing the installation of automated teller machines at police stations to improve security). City Hall agreed with the proposal but, as of the date of this writing, has not taken steps to implement it.

HMOs,<sup>244</sup> two detailed exposes of how HMO's override doctors' prescription choices;<sup>245</sup> a comprehensive demographic and statistical study of New Yorkers without health insurance;<sup>246</sup> two detailed investigations of the serious health hazards of dry cleaning emissions in residential buildings in the City;<sup>247</sup> a comprehensive consumer guide to New York City's public and private hospitals;<sup>248</sup> an exposé of nursing homes' poor compliance with public disclosure requirements regarding their health and safety records;<sup>249</sup> an analysis of the State's poor enforcement of nursing home standards of care;<sup>250</sup> and a study of the legal barriers to holding HMOs responsible for medical decisions.<sup>251</sup> In June 1997, the office won an important legal victory when a judge ruled that the State Department of Health is required to turn over statistical data on adverse incidents in public and private hospitals.<sup>252</sup>

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244. See PUBLIC ADVOCATE FOR THE CITY OF NEW YORK, WHAT AILS HMOs—A CONSUMER DIAGNOSIS AND RX (1996). The office has done several related studies of problems in HMOs. See, e.g., PUBLIC ADVOCATE FOR THE CITY OF NEW YORK, TWO LISTS: COMMERCIAL AND MEDICAID MANAGED CARE PROVIDERS (1995) (reporting on how six leading HMOs discriminate against Medicaid patients by limiting their choice of doctors to a smaller, separate list); PUBLIC ADVOCATE FOR THE CITY OF NEW YORK, MANAGED CONFUSION: HOW HMO MARKETING MATERIALS ARE TRICKING THE ELDERLY AND THE POOR (1995).

245. See PUBLIC ADVOCATE FOR THE CITY OF NEW YORK, COMPROMISING YOUR DRUG OF CHOICE: HOW HMOs ARE DICTATING YOUR NEXT PRESCRIPTION (1996).

246. See PUBLIC ADVOCATE FOR THE CITY OF NEW YORK, WHO ARE THE UNINSURED? (1997); see also PUBLIC ADVOCATE FOR THE CITY OF NEW YORK, WHO WILL TAKE CARE OF MOM? WHO WILL TAKE CARE OF ME?: THE NEW YORK STATE PARTNERSHIP FOR LONG-TERM CARE DOES NOT DELIVER ON ITS PROMISES (1995) (reporting on the private long-term care program endorsed by the State).

247. See PUBLIC ADVOCATE FOR THE CITY OF NEW YORK, CLOTHED IN CONTROVERSY: THE RISK TO NEW YORKERS FROM DRY CLEANING EMISSIONS AND WHAT CAN BE DONE ABOUT IT (1994); PUBLIC ADVOCATE FOR THE CITY OF NEW YORK, CLOTHED IN CONTROVERSY II: THE URGENT NEED TO PROTECT NEW YORKERS FROM TOXIC DRY CLEANING FUMES (1997).

248. See PUBLIC ADVOCATE FOR THE CITY OF NEW YORK, THE CONSUMER GUIDE TO NEW YORK CITY HOSPITALS (1997). The publication took more than a year to produce. It includes a handbook with detailed explanations of the indicators listed in the report, a separate guide for the hospitals in each major area of the City, and a comparative analysis of the factors to consider in locating the best hospital. *Id.*

249. See PUBLIC ADVOCATE FOR THE CITY OF NEW YORK, NURSING HOME SAFETY: THE HIDDEN REPORT CARD (1998).

250. See PUBLIC ADVOCATE FOR THE CITY OF NEW YORK, RESIDENTS AT RISK: THE COLLAPSE OF NURSING HOME ENFORCEMENT IN NEW YORK CITY (1998).

251. See PUBLIC ADVOCATE FOR THE CITY OF NEW YORK, NO DAY IN COURT: HOW HMOs IN NEW YORK ESCAPE LEGAL RESPONSIBILITY FOR THEIR CONDUCT (1998).

252. See *Green v. DeBuono*, No. 1746-97, mem. op. (Sup. Ct. Albany County, June 4, 1997).

The office has also focused on child welfare.<sup>253</sup> In cooperation with C-PLAN,<sup>254</sup> which analyzes problems in the child welfare system based on the pattern of complaints of those who seek its assistance, the public advocate issued several studies of problems in the City and State child welfare bureaucracies.<sup>255</sup>

All of the public advocate's studies<sup>256</sup> contain extensive recommendations for change, and, in many instances, the advice has been followed.<sup>257</sup>

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253. In April 1997, C-PLAN held a conference in cooperation with Fordham University Stein Center for Ethics and Public Interest Law, *Starting from Scratch*, in which leading researchers and practitioners in the child welfare field explored ways to improve the system.

254. See *supra* notes 217-18 and accompanying text (describing C-PLAN).

255. See BEYOND ELISA'S LAW: THE NEXT STEPS (1996) (proposing a twelve-step "Agenda for Safer Children"; issued with Comptroller Alan Hevesi, Assembly member Roger Green, and Council member Stephen DiBrienza); C-PLAN ANALYSIS: INDIVIDUAL AND SYSTEMATIC ADVOCACY (1995) (analyzing complaints received and troublesome trends in service delivery); CREATING A CHILD WELFARE SYSTEM FOR THE 21ST CENTURY (1996) (listing recommendations for the new Administration for Children's Services); CUTS THAT CO\$T II: CHILD WELFARE PROGRAMS (1995) (discussing early predictions of the likely fiscal and social impact of the governor's and mayor's proposed \$237 million in cuts to child-welfare programs); see also ANNUAL REVIEW OF NEW YORK STATE DEPARTMENT OF SOCIAL SERVICES CHILD FATALITY REPORTS (1996); SECOND ANNUAL REVIEW (1996); THIRD ANNUAL REVIEW (1997) (analyzing reports on child fatalities by the New York State Department of Social Services); CHILD WELFARE SCORECARD (1998) (providing a comprehensive look at how the system has fared since 1995).

256. All of the reports have been deposited in the Municipal Reference Library, indexed under "Public Advocate."

257. For example: (1) C-PLAN's January 1996 recommendation that a separate agency be created to deal with child-welfare issues was adopted by the mayor shortly thereafter with the announcement of the creation of the Administration for Children's Services; (2) the public advocate's August 1996 recommendation to the mayor and the state attorney general that they sue the tobacco companies for tobacco-induced Medicaid costs was adopted by the mayor in October 1996 and former Attorney General Vacco a few months later; (3) in January 1997, the public advocate successfully urged the Federal Reserve Board to withdraw a proposal to give banks an extra day to credit customers' accounts for deposits of local checks; (4) citing safety and fiscal problems in other jurisdictions, the public advocate joined state legislators in a successful effort to persuade the mayor not to privatize City jails and prisons; (5) an inspection of the Frederick Douglass Houses in March 1994 by the public advocate uncovered asbestos in gaping holes; following a meeting with 500 tenants, the New York City Housing Authority accepted responsibility and agreed to take corrective measures; (6) the public advocate's exposé on hospital violations of the "Bell Regulations" led to stepped up enforcement by the Department of Health. See *supra* note 240.

#### 4. Citizen Access

The public advocate has focused on ideas and suggestions from communities as well as individual complainants. Calling the office “a socket for citizens to plug into,” Green has tried to link his own bureaucracy to his constituents. He designed the staffing and scheduling of the office not only to receive complaints at the central location, by phone and in person, but also to make the office’s information and services available to people in their homes and neighborhoods. This was accomplished through several mechanisms:

##### a. Public Information

In 1995 the Office published *The People’s Green Book, 1995-1996: Your Guide to New York City Government Services*, a user-friendly guide organized by type of service rather than agency name (as found in the standard City-issued *Green Book*), and *A People’s Guide to New York City Agency Publications*, a survey of the materials available from City agencies. The Public Advocate’s Office was the first City agency to go online when it established an e-mail address<sup>258</sup> and a Web page<sup>259</sup> in April 1995. The Web site was credited by *New York Magazine* as “The Best of New York”<sup>260</sup> and in May 1997, in conjunction with the Baruch College School of Public Affairs, the Public Advocate’s Office announced the establishment of a public policy discussion area attached to its Web site. “Vox New York: A Public Policy Forum for the City” is designed to

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258. The office’s e-mail address is <mgreen@pubadvocate.gov>.

259. The web site homepage can be accessed at <<http://www.pubadvocate.nyc.gov/~advocate/index.html>>.

260. See Sarah Bernard et al., *The Best of New York*, N. Y. MAG., Apr. 14, 1997, at 109.

Mark Green’s New York City Public Advocate’s Home Page . . . , a virtual advertisement for the man’s Good Government virtuousness, *does* deliver. While this well-organized site never lets you forget that the PA’s office is a bastion of civic benevolence, we can think of no better place to find out everything you need to navigate the thicket of the city bureaucracy. Noisy neighbors? Suckered by a fly-by-night electronics store? Streetlight out on your block? This searchable cyber version of the *Green Book* (an occasionally updated compendium that’s hard to get your hands on) delivers, with just a few mouse clicks, the goods—the names of the appropriate city agencies and commissioners, their phone numbers, plus sundry advice on the best ways to seek redress for your ills.

*Id.* at 109-10 (first emphasis omitted).

encourage New Yorkers to become more informed about important legislative and public policy issues and to join in online discussions of them.<sup>261</sup>

In 1996, 1997, and 1998, the Public Advocate's Office co-sponsored, along with the national "Campaign for Tobacco-Free Kids," special school events designed to discourage young teenagers from smoking. Green's April 15, 1997, national "Kick Butts Day"<sup>262</sup> was broadcast by closed circuit from Hudde Junior High School in Brooklyn to an estimated 2 million youth in conjunction with events in 75 cities and towns. President Clinton, who has made teens and tobacco one of the priorities of his administration, joined the public advocate in addressing the students.<sup>263</sup>

#### b. Community Outreach

Providing information services is one way to communicate what is going on in the City and to learn what concerns people. Going to neighborhoods is another. During his first term, Green held a Town Hall meeting in each of the City's 59 community board districts. These Town Halls were cable-cast citywide by Crosswalks, New York City's government-operated cable TV station. Co-sponsored by local elected officials, the meetings drew between 75 and 125 participants. Public Advocate staff with particular areas of expertise attended the meetings to field questions and follow up on specific complaints. In the great American

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261. Vox New York can be accessed at <<http://www.baruch.cuny.edu/voxnewyork>>.

262. Kick Butts Day is sponsored by the Public Advocate's Office in collaboration with the Accountability Project. See *supra* note 217.

263. The President, in his speech to the teens, stressed the essential features of the office:

I want you to think about Mark Green's title a minute . . . Mark Green's title is the public advocate. I don't know if there's another city in America that has an elected public advocate. But think about what that means. What would it mean for you to be a public advocate? Someone who is standing up for people at large, right? For the public. Now, it was in that connection that Mark Green created this day, Kick Butts Day, all across the United States.

President William Jefferson Clinton, *Remarks on Kick Butts Day in Brooklyn, New York*, *supra* note 1.

In conclusion, the President explained to the students that, in his job, he was "sort of the country's public advocate." *Id.*

tradition of "town halls," the meetings often became open-ended (and unpredictable) forums where people spoke their minds about government.<sup>264</sup>

The Public Advocate's Office also organizes special events focused on particular issues or constituencies, including Federal-City Budget and Legislative Briefings,<sup>265</sup> a forum in December 1994 on the impact of budget cuts on the Latino Community, an annual Gay and Lesbian Pride Award Event, and "Shop & Vote" campaigns to register voters at shopping locations.<sup>266</sup> In addition, the office established five special units to work with local community activists and concerned residents to address and correct local problems. These so-called Citizen Action Teams ("CAT"), located in the Rockaways, the Northeast Bronx, Bay Ridge, the South Bronx, and Harlem, grapple with a whole host of neighborhood issues including health care delivery, police brutality, job training, and public safety.

## 5. The "Charter Cop" Role

In this capacity, the public advocate joined with the petitioners in the landmark case that forced the mayor and the City Council to establish and fund the Independent Budget Office—an agency designated in the 1989 Charter to provide independent fiscal analyses of the City budgets and expenditure and revenue projections.<sup>267</sup> Green is also a plaintiff in a

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264. Each year, the office schedules a few town hall meetings during the daytime at senior centers, since many seniors do not attend evening meetings. In August 1995, Mayor Giuliani—working with the commissioners of the Department for the Aging ("DFTA") and the New York City Housing Authority—attempted to bar the public advocate from holding these meetings. The mayor charged falsely that the events were "partisan" and thus barred by federal, state, and city laws governing public housing and programs for seniors. After ten prominent civil liberties attorneys wrote a letter of protest to the mayor, and the public advocate threatened to sue, the DFTA quietly reversed itself. The senior center town hall meetings, and other such meetings, proceeded without incident thereafter.

265. The forums were held in October 1994 at City Hall and September 1996 at the U.S. Customs House. Speakers included staff from federal agencies and the City Congressional delegation.

266. The campaigns were held in June of 1996 and 1997 in 700 New York City supermarkets, record stores, and bookstores in collaboration with the New York City Board of Education, the Food Industry Alliance of New York State, and the United Food and Commercial Workers Union.

267. Both the Dinkins and Giuliani administrations declined to fund the Independent Budget Office ("IBO"), which provoked a five-year legal battle led by the New York Public Interest Research Group. *See* New York Pub. Interest Research Group v. Dinkins, 83 N.Y.2d 377 (1994). As one of the officials responsible under the Charter for appointing the IBO Advisory Board and the director, City Council President Andrew Stein initially was named as a respondent in the suit brought in 1991. After Mark Green took office, he petitioned the court for permission to switch sides in the lawsuit. He joined the petitioners

lawsuit filed in April 1998 by the IBO against Mayor Giuliani for interfering with the IBO's work by systematically withholding information.<sup>268</sup>

Green also weighed in with amicus curiae briefs on several important "constitutional" disputes over the powers of the mayor under the 1989 Charter. In 1994, the public advocate supported the City Council's interpretation of its power to amend the mayor's proposed mid-year budget modifications.<sup>269</sup> The following year, Green supported the Council's effort to establish an Independent Police Investigation and Audit Board.<sup>270</sup> In 1997, the public advocate joined Borough Presidents Ruth Messinger and Fernando Ferrer on amicus briefs in the U.S. District Court and the Second Circuit Court of Appeals opposing the mayor's decision to permit commercial programming by Fox News Network and Bloomberg News on New York City's government-access cable channels.<sup>271</sup> In a similar vein, the public advocate's most recent significant effort to uphold the drafters' intent is his own lawsuit,<sup>272</sup> *Green v. Safir*, in which Green challenged the Police Department's refusal to permit him to review redacted records of the department's handling of substantiated complaints of police misconduct referred by the Civilian Complaint Review Board.

Green also submitted an amicus letter brief urging the court to deny the administration's request for the sealing of three independent reviews of the performance of the Administration for Children's Services. The court

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(as did Borough Presidents Ruth Messinger and Fernando Ferrer) and played a leading role in the final legal strategy that resulted in a victory for petitioners. In November 1995, the court ordered an expedited schedule for choosing an Advisory Board and a director, and the public advocate's staff spearheaded the process. In February 1996, Douglas A. Criscitello was appointed the first director of this office, which has issued several highly regarded fiscal analyses.

268. See *Criscitello v. Giuliani*, Index No. 105621/98 (Sup. Ct. N.Y. County 1998). The court granted plaintiffs summary judgment at oral argument on Dec. 17, 1998.

269. See *Council of New York v. Giuliani*, 621 N.Y.S.2d 832 (Sup. Ct. N.Y. County 1994).

270. See *Mayor of New York v. Council of New York*, No. 402354, 95-001, 95-003, 1995 WL 478872 (Sup. Ct. N.Y. County 1995), *aff'd mem.*, 651 N.Y.S.2d 531 (App. Div. 1997), *lv. to app'l denied*, Slip. Op. Mo. No. 232 (May 6, 1997). The Council lost this case and the one over the budget modification process, but the legal disputes raised important questions about the balance of power in the 1989 Charter.

271. The District Court's decision in *Time Warner Cable v. City of New York*, 943 F. Supp. 1357 (S.D.N.Y. 1996), enjoining the mayor's action, was affirmed by the Second Circuit Court of Appeals on July 3, 1997. See *Time Warner Cable v. Bloomberg*, 118 F.3d 917 (2d Cir. 1997).

272. The trial court ruled in Green's favor on October 14, 1997. See *Green v. Safir*, 664 N.Y.S.2d 232 (Sup. Ct. N.Y. County 1997), *aff'd as modified*, 679 N.Y.S.2d 383 (App. Div. 1998).



ruled that the City could not keep the studies secret.<sup>273</sup> And in September 1998 the public advocate submitted an amicus brief supporting the City's Council's legal challenge to the validity of proceedings of the Charter Revision Commission appointed by Mayor Giuliani to bump the Council's proposed referendum on Yankee Stadium.<sup>274</sup>

## 6. Pension Trustee

This is an important part of the public advocate's historic role as one of the three citywide elected officials and is codified in City law.<sup>275</sup> Green has used his vote on the NYCERS board to press for improved management of the NYCERS system and responsible use of the pension funds for economically targeted investments. In view of the extreme volatility of tobacco stock and its vulnerability to new and restrictive regulations and tort liability, beginning in May 1997, Green began urging his fellow trustees to move toward divestment of NYCERS' \$360 million holdings in that industry.<sup>276</sup> The public advocate also cast the deciding vote in 1996 in favor of "corpus funding," *i.e.*, to fund NYCERS' administrative operations from the corpus of the pensions funds—which the trustees control—rather than from the mayor's executive budget. Severe mayoral budget cuts in the past had led to insufficient staffing and serious backlogs in processing member and retiree applications. The proposal was adopted that year by the state legislature.

In sum, the Public Advocate's Office has a limited Charter mandate, a very small budget, a powerful adversary who keeps a tight rein on the executive agencies, and no line authority to compel change. Despite these obstacles, an aggressive and creative "people's advocate" can do a great deal with these limited powers to reform public policy and to fulfill the 1989 Charter Revision Commission's expectation that it serve as a *vox populi*.

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273. See *Marisol A. v. Giuliani*, No. 95 Civ. 10533, 1997 WL 630183 (S.D.N.Y. 1997) (mem. decision).

274. See *Council of New York v. Giuliani*, No. 2496, 1998 N.Y. App. Div. LEXIS 11001 (Oct. 16, 1998).

275. See N.Y. CITY ADMIN. CODE § 13-103(b)(2) (1994).

276. In June 1998, the trustees voted to freeze tobacco holdings in NYCERS' passive portfolios.

#### IV. THE HONOR AND THE CURSE OF BEING AN ELECTED OMBUDSMAN: LESSONS FOR THE FUTURE OF THE OFFICE

As columnist Murray Kempton wisely predicted in 1975 when Paul O'Dwyer became the City's first ombudsman, being an elected ombudsman is both an honor and a curse.<sup>277</sup> It is an honor because it is a citywide elected position to which tens of thousands of New Yorkers turn each year for help and to which numerous politicians aspire. It is a curse, however, because of the fierce resistance of the executive agencies to the ombudsman's mandate and the limited powers provided by the Charter to change government policy.

The theme running through the battles in New York City and elsewhere over the past several decades was how to create a truly effective, independent ombudsman that other appointed and elected officials will accept as a legitimate oversight body and complaint-handling agency. The dominant view, propounded by the Bar Association and all the ombudsman scholars was that the ombudsman should not be elected or aspire to elective office because the taint of electoral politics necessarily would undermine the ombudsman's usefulness and credibility.

We respectfully disagree. In the real world, the mandate to oversee and investigate mayoral agencies has inescapable political overtones, no matter how "above the fray" the ombudsman may wish to be. Serving as a check on the official exercise of power is fundamentally a political process (even if not a partisan one), and the ombudsman cannot be both insular and effective. If the ombudsman is doing a good job, toes will be stepped on.

No little-known appointee, especially if ultimately accountable to politicians—be it a mayor or a City Council—can have the impact or effectiveness of one who is elected citywide and hence accountable to the public. The battles in New York City during the 1960s and 1970s prove the case. The fear of establishing an office that would favor one faction, party, or political institution over another paralyzed the legislators and rendered them unable to create *any* effective system for redressing citizen complaints. In the end, none of the carefully crafted proposals to create an "independent" appointed ombudsman of "high stature" allayed the fears of the elected officials about the potential for political competition and reduction in their own power.

New York City was not alone in this respect. Most ombudsman offices created during that period were either executive ombudsmen, and thus

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277. See Kempton, *supra* note 102.

insufficiently independent,<sup>278</sup> or legislatively appointed ombudsmen who maintained a relatively low public profile. The reports issued by these offices indicate that most of the work focuses on resolving individual complaints. Some ombudsman offices also initiate reviews of agencies with repeated patterns of complaints and attempt to correct them through quiet advocacy.<sup>279</sup> The Iowa ombudsman, for example, reports that it initiates a separate investigation when it discovers that a complaint evidences a systemic problem or general practice or policy warranting more extensive review.<sup>280</sup> On occasion, that office makes recommendations for change, proposes legislation or monitors the agency's response to the criticisms.

It appears, however, that none of the governmental ombudsmen are in a position to issue extensive and hard-hitting investigative research and whistle-blowing reports like those prepared by the Public Advocate's Office. In part, this is because none of those other ombudsman offices evolved in the unique way that New York's ombudsman did—as a player on the political scene for over a century—and in part it is because they must avoid excessively antagonizing the officials who appointed them, even when they have set terms of office.<sup>281</sup> One of the most powerful ombudsman offices created over the past two decades—the New Jersey Department of the Public Advocate—was highly effective and pro-active, but ultimately fell victim to the political wars. Established by state law in 1974 as a cabinet-level department, the office was eliminated entirely in January 1994, when the Republicans won control of both the statehouse and the legislature.<sup>282</sup>

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278. See EXECUTIVE OMBUDSMEN IN THE UNITED STATES, *supra* note 6, at 2. Alan J. Wyner notes that the "clear disadvantage" of the executive ombudsman is that his "allegiance to the person who appointed him may prevent him from assuming an impartial attitude when investigating complaints that may prove damaging to the chief executive." *Id.*

279. Some good examples are contained in the annual reports issued by the ombudsmen of Puerto Rico and Hawaii. The ombudsman of Puerto Rico, Dr. R. Adolfo de Castro, has made an interesting proposal to extend his jurisdiction to cover "any business, enterprise or person . . . contracted by the State to provide services to the citizenry or that has acquired from the State a majority interest over the public entity which formerly provided those services." R. ADOLFO DE CASTRO, *THE OMBUDSMAN AND THE PRIVATIZATION OF GOVERNMENTAL SERVICES* 2 (Aug. 6, 1997) (emphasis omitted) (on file with the *New York Law School Law Review*).

280. See Letter from Duncan C. Fowler, Deputy Citizens' Aide/Ombudsman of Iowa, to Laurel W. Eisner, General Counsel for the Public Advocate of the City of New York (Apr. 28, 1995) (on file with author).

281. See ZAGORIA, *supra* note 51, ch. 4.

282. N.J. STAT. ANN. § 52:27E-31 (West 1982-1983) (repealed 1994). For a history of the department and its powers, see Martin A. Bierbaum, *On the Frontiers of Public Interest Law: The New Jersey State Department of the Public Advocate—the Public Interest*

That is why the New York City public advocate's position as an elected ombudsman, established by popular referendum in the City Charter, is the better model.<sup>283</sup> Without the popular mandate provided by an election, it would be far harder, if not impossible, to stand up to a mayor predictably annoyed by someone overseeing his performance.

The fact that the public advocate is elected rather than appointed strengthens the public advocate's position in disputes with the mayor. The elective nature of the position also sparks the interest of both the public and the media in the office's work. As an elected official, the public advocate can use the office as a bully pulpit, which is the office's most important tool for making an impact—far more important than the power found in the technical language of the Charter. This was true of Paul O'Dwyer, Carol Bellamy, and Andrew Stein, and it has been true of Mark Green.

When the voters elect a public advocate by a strong majority, the public advocate's pulpit power carries greater strength.<sup>284</sup> Public support is critical to the office's ability to make positive changes in City government.<sup>285</sup> It means that bureaucrats take notice when the office calls and consider possible press exposure when they resist the office's efforts. They realize that the public advocate may use access to the electorate and the media to expose their errors. As H.L. Mencken aptly said: "Conscience is the sense that someone may be watching."<sup>286</sup> That, after all, is the *raison d'être* of the office.

Bernard Richland, who had served as City corporation counsel, often provided the historical view during the 1989 Charter Revision Commission deliberations. On the subject of the elected ombudsman, he noted that he wrote the bill O'Dwyer introduced into the Council for an appointive ombudsman.

It was received by the Council with hollow silence, and nothing happened to it.

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*Advocacy Division*, 13 SETON HALL L. REV. 475 (1983). Bierbaum foresaw the dangers to the office in his 1983 article, noting the legislature could abolish it at any time, and, in addition, that the public advocate himself served at the pleasure of the governor and was thus vulnerable to political pressure. See *id.* at 489.

283. Unlike the New Jersey office, the Public Advocate's Office cannot be eliminated except by referendum of the voters.

284. Mark Green received 60% of the vote in 1993 and 73% in 1997.

285. 1989 Charter Revision Commission Members Schwarz, Richland, Betanzos, Gourdine, and Leventhal expressly noted that the power of the office comes from having been independently elected to stand in criticism of the mayor. See Public Meeting, May 6, 1989, at 198; Public Meeting, May 13, 1989, at 303.

286. Michael Moncur, *Michael Moncur's Collection of Quotations* (visited Dec. 4, 1998) <<http://www.starlingtech.com/quotes/qsearch.cgi>>.

It wasn't until O'Dwyer became Council President and a member of the Board of Estimate, with real power that he was able to do something . . . . He did a splendid job of keeping tabs on what the Mayoral bureaucracy was up to, what kind of mischief was going on.<sup>287</sup>

Richland was right.<sup>288</sup> Without the threat of public exposure,<sup>289</sup> agency bureaucracies would be less concerned about the public advocate's findings.<sup>290</sup> The glare of publicity has benefitted the public and proven Justice Brandeis' axiom that "[s]unlight is said to be the best of disinfectants."<sup>291</sup>

Despite the original skepticism about the value of the office, by the end of Green's first term as public advocate, the office had fulfilled the mandate created by the 1989 Commission. Green used the hybrid nature of the office and its lack of line administrative authority not as a limitation but as a license to investigate and innovate in pursuit of more democratic and user-friendly government.

During the 1993 electoral campaign, when six candidates sought the party nominations for the office, several commentators predicted that "once the first Public Advocate proves the value of the job, . . . the City Council leadership and the Mayor will stop trying to eliminate it."<sup>292</sup> Unfortunately, this prediction has not yet come true. Although the office's services have been in heavy demand by the public, and its reports have received wide public notice, the office is not safe from attack by those annoyed by its independence and its critiques.

In June 1998, Mayor Giuliani appointed a Charter Revision Commission to block the City Council from placing a referendum on the

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287. Public Meeting, May 6, 1989, at 199.

288. He spoke strongly in favor of retaining the office in the new Charter, but he believed that "the ombudsman position works only if you have power, independent power . . . ." *Id.* at 200.

289. Commissioner Gourdine articulated the point well when he said that the political ambition of the officeholder keeps a constant spotlight on his or her policies. *See supra* note 135 and accompanying text.

290. The accident of politics that brought Green into office as a Democrat during the administration of a Republican mayor may have intensified the conflict, but Green's role would be hardly different in a Democratic administration. He promised during the 1993 campaign for the job to "blow the whistle when a mayoral agency is falling short." Sam Roberts, *It's More Than Words: Race In Election Year*, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 13, 1993, at B2. Many of the problems the office has exposed have been longstanding and have cut across both Republican and Democratic administrations.

291. LOUIS D. BRANDEIS, *OTHER PEOPLE'S MONEY AND HOW THE BANKERS USE IT* 89 (Melvin I. Urofsky ed., 1995).

292. *See* Bennett, *supra* note 210.

November 1998 ballot on whether to move Yankee Stadium from the Bronx to Manhattan.<sup>293</sup> Before holding a single public meeting, the twelve-member Commission, comprised largely of the mayor's close colleagues and political supporters,<sup>294</sup> announced its interest in eliminating the Public Advocate's Office, as well as the other mayoral oversight agency which has criticized the mayor, the Independent Budget Office.<sup>295</sup>

The Commission met with a barrage of criticism and within two weeks dropped both of these ideas. The Commission was responding to harsh press reports and opposition from many community organizations, good government groups, and ordinary New Yorkers. The *New York Times* ran an editorial supporting the office's retention: "Some City Hall officials want the commission to shut down the advocate's office and the Independent Budget Office entirely. Both provide independent assessments that are burrs under the Mayor's powerful mantle, institutional reason enough to keep them both alive."<sup>296</sup> Fritz Schwarz reiterated his belief in the office designed by the 1989 Commission that he had chaired.<sup>297</sup> Additionally, many private citizens and advocacy groups sent in powerful testimonials to the value of the Public Advocate's Office.<sup>298</sup>

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293. Under New York Municipal Home Rule Law section 36(5)(e), a Charter amendment placed on the ballot by a mayoral charter revision commission automatically preempts any referendum initiated by the City Council or by citizen petition.

294. The *New York Times* opined that the commission appointed by the mayor was "stacked . . . with his cronies . . ." Editorial, *A Rush to Charter Revision*, N.Y. TIMES, June 26, 1998, at A22.

295. See generally Letter from Peter Powers, Chairman, 1998 New York City Charter Revision Commission (June 19, 1998) (on file with the *New York Law School Law Review*) (This Powers Commission letter went to hundreds of people, usually addressed as "Dear Friend." It stated that the functions of City offices including the public advocate would be reviewed by the Charter Revision Commission).

296. Editorial, *A Rush to Charter Revision*, N.Y. TIMES, June 26, 1998, at A22.

297. Mr. Schwarz wrote: "Nor should you recommend the elimination of independent offices such as the Public Advocate and the Independent Budget Office that, among other things, serve as a check on and balance to the enormous powers of the mayoralty and its huge bureaucracy." Letter from Frederick A. O. Schwarz, Jr., Cravath, Swaine & Moore, to Peter Powers, Chairman, 1998 New York City Charter Revision Commission 6 (June 29, 1998) (on file with the *New York Law School Law Review*). Schwarz's comment was contained in a seven-page critique of the 1998 Charter Revision Commission's lack of representativeness, lack of independence, and poor processes. See *id.*

298. A Queens resident wrote: "Please do not abandon the people. Please do not take away our only course of action when we have problems with bureaucracies—and can't afford legal fees or larger contributions to people in office. It gives us a great sense of security and peace of mind to know that there is a Public Advocate in government looking out for, and defending, the 'little people' of New York City." A letter from a Manhattan resident praised the public advocate's annual *Ranking Banking* surveys. The Urban Justice Center opined: "The office of the Public Advocate offers one of the most effective voices for the forgotten and disenfranchised in the City." Letter from Douglas Lasdon, Executive

On August 20, the Commission issued its final report, which contained a much scaled-down series of modest campaign-finance reform proposals for the ballot, some of which did not require a referendum or Charter revision. The report describes the Commission's change of opinion about the Public Advocate's Office:

The Commission considered amending Charter § 24 to eliminate the Office of Public Advocate. The Public Advocate, formerly known as the Council president, had been retained by the 1989 Charter Revision Commission by a split vote . . . . Nonetheless, a number of people testified at the public hearing in favor of retaining the Public Advocate. The office seems to be functioning well for some New Yorkers who could not otherwise find help in resolving bureaucratic problems. The Public Advocate's election by a citywide electorate apparently strengthens the office's ability to help individual citizens resolve problems that are perhaps unsolvable by a City Council member representing a smaller district. The Commission, therefore, unanimously resolved at the July 16, 1998, meeting to continue studying whether the City Council or another City official or agency could be as effective a trouble shooter for New Yorkers.<sup>299</sup>

It is evident from the events of 1998 that despite the office's long history, its successes in recent years, and its meager budget, as long as the public advocate continues to function as a thorn in the bureaucracy's side, challenges to its existence are likely to re-emerge from time to time.<sup>300</sup> There is also reason to believe that it will survive the attacks as it has for 167 years.

It would be worthwhile some time in the future, however, to correct three serious structural limitations that impede the ability of any occupant of the office to accomplish his or her goals in the most efficient manner:

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Director of Urban Justice Center, to the 1998 New York City Charter Revision Commission (June 30, 1998). According to the National Committee to Prevent Child Abuse, the public advocate's child welfare ombudsman project, C-Plan, "provides an essential and tremendously valuable service." Letter from Christine S. Deyss, Associate Director of the National Committee to Prevent Child Abuse, to Jane Golden, of C-PLAN (June 24, 1998). In a poignant version of the letters the office receives on a regular basis, even without a Charter crisis, one Brooklyn resident wrote to the Commission: "I'd like to tell you about how the Public Advocate's office saved my life." (June 30, 1998).

299. N.Y. CITY CHARTER REVISION COMM'N, FINAL REPORT, Aug. 20, 1998, at 35.

300. The *Daily News*, which covers many of the office's studies, has repeatedly printed editorials attacking the office. See, e.g., Editorial, *Advocate This*, Mark Green, DAILY NEWS (N.Y.), Feb. 18, 1997, at 30.



(1) *The absence of subpoena power*: At the very least, the public advocate needs a clearly defined mechanism to compel compliance with requests for information under Charter section 24(j). No administration, however right-minded, will happily open its books to an institutional auditor unless there are sanctions for refusing to do so. The Giuliani Administration, in fact, has elevated the practice of withholding information from actual or potential critics to the level of a policy and does not hide the fact that it does so intentionally.<sup>301</sup>

(2) *The absence of a fixed bottom line in the budget*: Without a fixed budget, the public advocate is at the mercy of the very official whose agencies he must, by law, investigate, as well as the City Council, which may regard him as a rival for attention.<sup>302</sup>

(3) *The lack of access to independent legal advice*: The public advocate (and the City Council, the comptroller and the borough presidents) do not have access to independent counsel from the City Law Department, because the corporation counsel is appointed by the mayor and serves at the mayor's pleasure.<sup>303</sup> None of these other elected officials, has the benefit of the hundreds of lawyers on the corporation counsel's staff unless the mayor decides, in his discretion, to champion the other official's cause.<sup>304</sup>

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301. See *supra* note 221 and accompanying text; see also Clyde Haberman, *Once Again the Mayor Hogs the Ball*, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 7, 1998, at B1.

302. Speaker Peter Vallone has protected the Public Advocate's Office from the worst blows of the mayor's budget ax, but the office's dependence on the outcome of negotiations between the mayor and the Council creates inappropriate limits on its ability to function independently. See *supra* note 220 and accompanying text (discussing the conflicts between Mayor Giuliani and Public Advocate Green over the size of the office's budget). There also may come a time when a hostile mayor and City Council will agree to sharply reduce the public advocate's budget. One legal safeguard against any excessive cut in the budget is the requirement in the City Charter text that only a popular referendum can "abolish[ ], transfer [ ] or curtail[ ]" the power of the office. See N.Y. CITY CHARTER ch. 2 § 38(5) (1989).

303. N.Y. CITY CHARTER ch. 17 § 391 (1989), establishes the law department to be headed by a corporation counsel, but does not, in fact, expressly state that the corporation counsel shall be appointed by the mayor. The mayor's power here apparently is inferred from his power under New York City Charter, to appoint "all commissioners and all other officers not elected by the people, except as otherwise provided by law." *Id.* ch. 1 § 6.

304. Where these officials disagree with a mayoral agency, they have no source of independent public legal advice. In April 1997, for example, the Public Advocate's Office was barred from observing a license-revocation hearing convened by the Taxi and Limousine Commission. See Letter from Diane McGrath-McKechnie, Commission Chairperson of the New York City Taxi & Limousine Commission, to Mark Green, Public Advocate (Apr. 25, 1997). This decision to exclude the public advocate's representative was contrary to the Charter mandates of the office and clear legal precedent requiring such proceedings to be open to the public. See *Matter of Herald Co. v. Weisenberg*, 59 N.Y.2d

Nor can the public advocate or any of the other non-mayoral officials go to court without the mayor's approval,<sup>305</sup> because the Charter places the corporation counsel in charge of "all the law business of the City."<sup>306</sup> The courts have long interpreted that provision, and others like it in localities around the state, as restricting an official's power to appear in court without corporation counsel, unless the latter has a conflict of interest, e.g., where the mayor is on the other side of the versus, as in the case of *Green v. Safir*,<sup>307</sup> or the power the official seeks to enforce is one that is "necessarily implied" from the powers of the office.<sup>308</sup> Even in those circumstances, the other officials must search for counsel willing to take the case *pro bono*, until such time as the court ultimately orders the City to pay attorneys' fees;<sup>309</sup> any firm that takes on the mayor takes a big risk by lining up with a government office like the public advocate's against the enormous power of the mayor.<sup>310</sup>

None of these three structural problems is difficult to remedy. The Charter Revision Commission's concern about placing subpoena power in one individual can easily be addressed by authorizing the public advocate to seek prior judicial approval for a subpoena. This could be done through a Charter amendment that either adds the necessary requirements to section 1109, which grants the public advocate the power to seek a judicial

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378 (1983). The public advocate was not able to rely on the assistance of the corporation counsel to notify the Taxi and Limousine Commission ("TLC") of its error. After a very long delay, the TLC impliedly conceded that it could not keep the proceeding secret and produced the tape of the hearing to the public advocate.

305. N.Y. CITY CHARTER ch. 17 § 394(a) (1989), states: "Except as otherwise provided in this chapter or other law, the corporation counsel shall be attorney and counsel for the city and every agency thereof and *shall have charge and conduct of all the law business of the city and its agencies and in which the city is interested.*" (emphasis added).

306. *Id.*

307. 664 N.Y.S.2d 232 (Sup. Ct. N.Y. County 1997); *see also supra* note 70 and accompanying text.

308. *See Hevesi v. Pataki*, 643 N.Y.S.2d 895, 899 (Sup. Ct. N.Y. County 1996) (holding that the comptroller's right to go to court to enforce a settlement between the City and the State was "'necessarily implied' by his power to agree to the settlement in the first place").

309. *See, e.g., Lamberti v. Metropolitan Transp. Auth.*, 565 N.Y.S.2d 111 (App. Div. 1991). The appellate court ordered fees to the public advocate's lawyers in *Green v. Safir*, 664 N.Y.S.2d 232 (Sup. Ct. N.Y. County 1997), *aff'd as modified*, 679 N.Y.S.2d 383 (App. Div. 1998), relying on *Lamberti*.

310. A number of potential *pro bono* counsel have stated off-the-record that they or various partners in their firms were not willing to take a case where the mayor is on the other side for fear of loss of favor or business in other matters. *Cf. David Firestone, Giuliani Backs Aide Who Asked Firms to Shun Watchdog*, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 20 1997, at B1.

"summary inquiry,"<sup>311</sup> or by a provision that authorizes the public advocate to seek a judicial subpoena under New York Civil Practice Law and Rules section 2302.<sup>312</sup>

With regard to the public advocate's funding, a solution is also obvious. Charter section 259 pegs the budget of the Independent Budget Office at ten percent of the executive branch's Office of Management and Budget, thus permitting the IBO to issue independent analyses without fear of fiscal reprisal. The Public Advocate's Office should similarly have a budget that is a specified percentage of another agency, perhaps the Mayor's Office.

Finally, the right to independent legal advice is as essential to good government as it is to citizenship. In our view, the Charter should be amended to require the City Council's advice and consent for a position as essential and powerful as Corporation Counsel and to expressly mandate that this official serve all City elected officials with equal independence and objectivity.<sup>313</sup>

### CONCLUSION

At some point in the next year, or the next decade, a new charter revision commission may consider, once again, the allocation of powers in New York City's government. No doubt, the questions addressed by the 1975, 1989, and 1998 Charter Revision Commissions will be revisited: Does the Office of Public Advocate make institutional sense? Does it serve an important and useful function in the City's governance?

We submit that the answer to both questions is "yes." The office continues to meet its historic function of being a counterweight to—and a watchdog over—the mayor. Through the groundbreaking efforts of O'Dwyer, and the expansion by Bellamy, Stein, and Green of the

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311. See *supra* note 185 and accompanying text.

312. During the 1989 Charter Revision Commission proceedings, Commissioner Bernard Richland argued that the public advocate was already authorized to issue a subpoena under the Civil Practice Law and Rules, since section 2302(a) permits issuance of a subpoena without court order by "any member of a board, commission or committee authorized by law to hear, try or determine a matter *or to do any other act, in an official capacity, in relation to which proof may be taken or the attendance of a person as a witness may be required.*" N.Y. C.P.L.R. § 2302(a) (McKinney 1995) (emphasis added). Richland argued that the public advocate's authority to hold hearings necessarily implied his right to issue subpoenas. The Commission never addressed the issue further. Without going that far, the Charter arguably could be amended to expressly state that the public advocate is authorized to get prior approval of a court before invoking that authority.

313. See also William Josephson & Russell Pearce, *To Whom Does the Government Lawyer Owe the Duty of Loyalty When Clients Are in Conflict?*, 29 How. L.J. 539 (1986).

individual grievance-handling to include broad research, investigation, and oversight of the City bureaucracy, the office has truly evolved into a “people’s advocate.” The cost of sustaining the public advocate— a minuscule \$2.4 million of the \$34 billion New York City budget (or thirty cents per person per year)—is a very small price to pay for the office’s role in maintaining a more open, accountable, and efficient government in New York City.

As a city already sixty percent “minority” becomes more racially and ethnically diverse, there will likely be a backlash against any attempt to eliminate a citywide office that, as the Charter drafters intended, could be a rung on the ladder of government power for a minority candidate.

Thus, because of its long history, its cost-benefit ratio, its obvious record of accomplishments, and its appeal to citywide minority aspirants, the only elected ombudsman in the United States will and should endure as an institutional and political presence in New York City for generations to come.

