

# Tackling crime, disorder and fear: A NEW POLICING MODEL

**“The basic mission for which police exist is to prevent crime and disorder as an alternative to the repression of crime and disorder by military force and severity of legal punishment.”**

**—Sir Robert Peel’s First Principle of Law Enforcement**

## The NYPD in the 1990s: Winning the Battle Against Crime

It is widely argued that the United States violent crime wave of the late 1980s and early 1990s was a culmination of the general upward trend in crime in the 1960s and 1970s coupled with a spike in drug-related crime in the 1980s. In New York City, another set of factors also contributed to the crime wave by steering police into a more reactive mode and undercutting their ability to prevent crime. The advent of the 911 system in the late 1960s had the perverse effect of reducing police presence on the street, as officers chased calls for service as a first priority. This condition was compounded by the 1975 Fiscal Crisis and the police layoffs of the late 1970s, which shrank the available patrol force. NYPD uniformed personnel fell from a peak of more than 31,000 in the early 1970s to about 22,600 in 1980, and did not reach 30,000 again until 1994, with the Dinkins Administration Safe City/Safe Streets hiring of the early 1990s.

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The Knapp Commission police corruption scandals in 1970 were also a factor in reducing police initiative and presence on the streets. Following the scandals, and for many years thereafter, patrol officers were actively discouraged from enforcing against such quality-of-life offenses as street-level drug dealing, gambling, and prostitution because it was feared that such enforcement might open opportunities for police corruption. The combination of all these factors caused what can be characterized as the de-policing of many neighborhoods and especially poor and minority

neighborhoods. Problems, including quality-of-life problems, were allowed to fester, and by slow degrees the police department lost control. Violent crime, and especially outdoor violence escalated.

In the late 1980s, the crack epidemic in inner city neighborhoods drove violent crime to record high levels as drug gangs battled over street turf and prime drug dealing locations. Homicide in New York City increased from 1,392 in 1985 to 2,262 in 1990, with 60 percent of the homicides taking place outdoors. Violent crime – the measure of murder, rape, robbery, and felony assault – also hit a peak in 1990 of nearly 150,000 incidents. By 1993 there were more than 5,200 incidents, approximately 100 per week, in which people were shot in New York City, frequently on the streets.

### THE NYPD RESPONDS

The public demand for the NYPD to tackle crime in New York City led to the election of Mayor Rudolph Giuliani in 1993 and the appointment of William Bratton as Police Commissioner in January 1994. Commissioner Bratton’s first order of business was to challenge the firmly established belief that police could only affect crime at the margins and would not be able to drive down any city’s crime rates significantly. The Commissioner publicly announced that the Department would seek to reduce crime by 10 percent in his first year. He was confident that key changes in operations and strategy could push down crime dramatically.

The first, and most important, of these changes was the development of a command account-



ability system that came to be known as CompStat. Commissioner Bratton appointed Jack Maple, a former Transit Police lieutenant and one the great innovators in the history of American policing, to be the Deputy Commissioner for Crime Control Strategies. Deputy Commissioner Maple, working with then-Chief of Patrol Louis Anemone, developed the CompStat system to refocus the police department on its central missions of controlling crime and disorder. The heart of the system was the semi-weekly CompStat meeting that convened precinct commanders, detective squad leaders, and specialty unit supervisors for intensive crime strategy sessions. Supported by the most recent crime data and by crime mapping that helped identify patterns, the CompStat meetings assessed crime control tactics, held precinct commanders accountable for their performance, and lent a pressing sense of urgency to the core business of policing.

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In a department that had traditionally run on three separate sets of tracks – patrol, detectives and narcotics – CompStat became the central forum for coordinating resources from the various operational bureaus. It also became the showcase of new and effective tactics that spread quickly throughout the Department. CompStat was particularly effective in countering the pattern crimes of robbery and burglary, usually committed by repeat criminals who operate in identifiable patterns, because the CompStat forum was identifying patterns more swiftly and prompting an equally swift police response. The use of timely information to identify problems, devise possible solutions, and evaluate the impact of those solutions – in so rigorous a forum – was a significant policing innovation that helped focus the enforcement assets of the NYPD as never before.

A second important change was a concerted reassertion of police presence on the streets, largely accomplished through the focus on more

minor crimes. In 1994, the NYPD embraced quality-of-life policing, enforcing a variety of laws against street drug dealing, public drinking, public marijuana smoking, open-air prostitution, and other minor offenses, reversing the de-policing trends of the 1970s and 1980s. From 1993 to 1996, drug arrests and misdemeanor arrests increased by 98 percent and 51 percent respectively.

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The Department reclaimed many of the city’s street corners from drug dealers and other violent criminals who had turned some neighborhoods into shooting galleries. Quality-of-life enforcement stemmed incipient criminal activity and defused criminogenic environments. Instead of street corners growing more violent as the night wore on, police intervention checked the situation early by breaking up the groups who were drinking and smoking marijuana. In the first several years, the police were also finding a significant number of illegal firearms on people searched after being arrested for lesser crimes.

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## THE GREAT CRIME DECLINE

The shooting numbers plummeted from 5,269 in 1993 to 3,265 by 1995 to 1,759 by 1998. With the decline in shootings came a spectacular decline in homicide, with the city recording the four largest drops in homicide in its history in four successive years, including a 345 incident drop in 1994 and 401 incident drop in 1995. Robberies dropped by more 13,000 incidents in 1994, by another 12,000 in 1995, and by more than 10,000 in 1996. Burglaries were down more 10,000 incidents in 1994, 14,000 in 1995, and 13,000 in 1996. Auto theft, which the NYPD attacked by closing “chop shops”



and apprehending stolen auto exporters, fell by 17,000, in 1994, 22,000 in 1995 and 12,000 in 1996.

Needless to say, the NYPD met the Police Commissioner's crime reduction goals with overall declines in index crime of 12.8 percent in 1994, 17.3 percent in 1995, and 15.5 percent in 1996, the only consecutive double-digit declines in crime in the city's modern history. Commissioner Bratton's major strategic shifts in NYPD policy and practice dramatically reduced crime in New York and set the standard for suppressing crime across the United States. Between 1993 and 1998, index crime in New York City dropped from 432,643 incidents to 212,913. The next year, index crime slipped under 200,000 for the first time since the mid-1960s.

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The downward trends in New York City crime continued after 1998, although at a more moderate rate. There were rare exceptions, like the 9.8 percent increase in homicides in 2006, but remarkably, steady declines were recorded in most crime categories every year. In 2010 the city recorded 105,111 index crimes, the lowest since reliable crime statistics became available in 1970. The years since have seen some significant upticks, amounting to an approximate five percent increase by 2013. These general increases were accompanied, however, by major declines in homicide of 18.9 percent in 2012 and another 20 percent in 2013. In 2013 New York, by far the largest and densest city in the country, recorded a lower murder rate at 4.0 per 100,000 of population than the nation as whole at 4.5.

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In 2014, there were declines in every crime category except auto theft, which recorded a 3.9 percent increase, but is down by 93 percent since 1993. Overall index crime was down by 4.5 percent, and robberies were down a remarkable 13.7 percent, following a 21-year decline of nearly 80 percent. The index crime total for 2014 was the third lowest since 1970, and the murder total of 333 was the lowest since 1957.

Throughout the long crime decline, police management of public spaces to reduce disorderly behavior also reduced the daily opportunities for crime. Order bred more order because the communities themselves began to exercise control of the public space. As shooters and other criminals were driven off the street corners and the risks of being killed or seriously injured diminished, law-abiding community members emerged and started to exert the kind of informal social control that is the standard in less crime-troubled neighborhoods. In these enhanced environments, people, and especially young people, were subject to far more restraint and were far less likely to end up in jail, partly explaining the steep drop in jail and prison population that New York City and New York State have experienced during the years since 1993. The stronger the community control the easier and more productive police work became, and some significant portion of the New York City crime decline is very likely attributable to the community efforts and community influence that emerged as violent crime began to decline.



## Quality vs. Quantity: Reforming a Numbers-Driven Organization

The victory against crime came at a price. Focused as it was on achieving further declines in crime in each successive year, the NYPD slipped by degrees into a numbers-driven mode, pressing its officers for more activity, as measured by arrests, summonses and stops. CompStat had been designed, in part, to prompt activity, to ensure that police officers were working in an active, focused way to respond to emerging crime patterns, but in its early days, it concentrated on developing plans and tactics, not on pushing activity for its own sake. As sometimes happens in large organizations, the message became muddled, as field supervisors and officers began to see arrests and summonses as the measure of effective performance.

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As felony crime declined in late 1990s and early 2000s so did felony arrests, which stood in 2014 at 94,782, or 53,000 fewer than in 1994. Misdemeanor arrest increased, however, driven by the categories of marijuana arrests, transit system arrests, traffic arrests and arrests for misdemeanor assault and theft. There were more than 50,000 marijuana arrests in 2010 and again in 2011. Misdemeanor arrests increased from about 190,000 in 1993 to a peak of nearly 290,000, also in 2011. Given the way the district attorneys and the courts manage misdemeanor cases in New York City, more than 90 percent of these arrestees were not being sentenced to jail. Indeed, during the post-1993 era, and in stark contrast to the trend around much of the nation, the prison population in New York State declined by 25 percent and the New York City jail population declined by 45 percent from their previous highs. Yet, the level of police intervention represented by arrests was leaving an impression of heavy-handed police tactics in some minority neighborhoods. The question began to arise as to whether all of these arrests were necessary. Were they contributing to controlling crime and disorder, or could the department scale back on these interventions without risking a rising crime rate?

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### STOP, QUESTION AND FRISK

Nowhere was the numbers-driven focus more pronounced than in the steep increase in reasonable suspicion stops or “stop, question and frisk” encounters. The reported numbers climbed steadily in the first decade of the 21st Century from fewer than 100,000 in 2000 to approximately 685,000 in 2011. A forcible stop is based on the reasonable suspicion that a crime has been committed, is being committed, or is about to be committed. Officers might stop a person who appears to casing a potential victim, car, or premises, or they might stop people leaving the scene of a robbery who fit the description of the perpetrators. The stop is not an arrest, but rather a temporary hold while the officer determines if there is probable cause to make an arrest or issue a summons. If the officer’s suspicions prove unfounded the officer must immediately release the stopped person.

The NYPD began to count and memorialize these stops more thoroughly in the late 1990s and the early 2000s, and by slow degrees the stops became a kind of de facto productivity measure within the Department, another way to encourage police activity on the streets. Reported stops surged, and the police department and the city were sued in three separate court actions for violating the civil rights of stopped persons. The consequences are well known, including a court-imposed federal monitor to oversee reasonable suspicion stop activity and the City Council’s vote to establish an Inspector General to review and comment on Department policy and practice. Annual stops have since fallen by more than 90 percent.



## A MORE DISCRETIONARY APPROACH

Mayor Bill de Blasio appointed William Bratton as New York City Police Commissioner in January 2014, and the commissioner took office exactly 20 years after the start of his first term as commissioner in 1994. Noting that crime conditions had dramatically improved over the past two decades, he called for a less numbers-driven approach to street enforcement. In his early messages to the rank and file, and ever since, he has been emphasizing the quality of arrests and other enforcement actions over the quantity. To maintain the gains against crime and to preserve order on the streets, NYPD officers must continue to be active and ready to intervene when circumstances warrant police action. But, as Commissioner Bratton has told veteran police officers and police cadets alike, he is not pushing for arrests and summonses for their own sake. In the Commissioner's view, countering current crime and social conditions will require a far more targeted and subtle approach than large-scale stops and arrests. More than in the past, police will have to work closely with neighborhoods to make progress against the entrenched crime that remains, with sharply focused investigations that rely on information provided by local residents. To achieve this working relationship, the commissioner sees the need to significantly revise both NYPD's patrol model and its investigations model in the most crime-troubled of New York City's communities.

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The commissioner's priorities are on full display in the CompStat meetings. In the past year, CompStat has sharpened its focus on comprehensive anti-crime and quality-of-life enforcement strategies. The NYPD is shifting away from quantity-driven enforcement towards targeted, quality

arrests. It is promoting and encouraging officer discretion in all citizen encounters. A refreshed and renewed CompStat process is complementing this shift by evaluating commanding officers on how they are deploying and directing their resources, rather than on how much activity they are generating.

**"There is still a drive for police activity, but for activity that is productively focused on people known to be involved in violence and serious crime and on locations where that crime takes place."**

While crime will always be the primary performance indicator for the NYPD and will almost always drive the CompStat sessions, it is no longer to be the sole indicator of success, and the metrics by which commanding officers are evaluated are no longer restricted to a small set of enforcement statistics. Chief of Department James O'Neill and Deputy Commissioner of Operations Dermot Shea, who run the CompStat meetings, are engaging commanding officers, and other key precinct operations managers, in vibrant and productive discussions that evaluate the commanders' use of the resources in the geographical commands to address crime trends, chronic conditions and emerging spikes in violent crime that require a prompt response. There is still a drive for police activity, but for activity that is productively focused on people known to be involved in violence and serious crime and on locations where that crime takes place.

## CHANGE IN THE MARIJUANA ARREST POLICY

The department is also assessing arrest policy and looking for ways to reduce arrests where practicable. In late 2014, the NYPD revised its policies with respect to marijuana "in plain view." Formerly, people found with marijuana in plain view were arrested. Effective in November 2014, the department is no longer making "plain view" arrests in most cases for amounts of 25 grams or less and is issuing Criminal Court summonses instead. People smoking marijuana or trafficking in marijuana are still arrested, as are those found to be in possession of more than 25 grams. Because





of this and other policy changes in the past few years, marijuana arrests under the statute that covers both smoking and plain view have fallen from more than 50,000 in 2011 to approximately 25,000 in 2014. The NYPD is currently examining other options for reducing arrests, including changing arrest policies for some transit and traffic offenses. Where the department can reasonably reduce arrest interventions it is prepared to so.

The NYPD's past metrics, tactics and crime control strategies have been effective against crime but they may not always have represented the most efficient use of department resources or the optimum way to engage with local neighborhoods. More enforcement is not the only answer to reducing crime, especially in a time when crime is already steeply reduced and some neighborhoods are increasingly alienated from the police. To achieve continued and sustained gains against crime, disorder and fear the NYPD will refocus its approach, as well as develop new approaches to policing. A sustainable model for this new policing approach requires the NYPD to accomplish three important and far-reaching changes in past practice:

1. Replace numbers-driven enforcement with targeted enforcement and localized police service.
2. Provide patrol officers with the time, the skills and the motivation to engage more fully with community partners.
3. Build on community connections and relationships to help shape and execute strategies to contend with the remaining violence and the remaining violent actors in the city's neighborhoods.

The New York City Police Department set the standard for reversing the violent crime wave that reached a peak in 1990. New York's finest will be at the forefront of American policing again as we develop a holistic approach to the countering crime and rebuilding the trust and confidence of the public.

## The Neighborhood Policing Model

### CONNECTING PATROL OFFICERS TO SECTORS AND NEIGHBORHOODS

In most NYPD precincts today as many as 50 percent of the assigned officers are working in specialty and administrative units. These units include anti-crime units that seek to apprehend robbers, burglars and other offenders, conditions units that work to identify and correct chronic conditions, street narcotics units (SNEUs) that interdict street drug dealing, traffic units, and domestic violence units. The heavy reliance on specialized units within the precinct has resulted in the understaffing of the patrol function and of the sector cars that answer calls for service. This understaffing has been exacerbated by a reduction in overall NYPD uniformed headcount from about 40,300 in the year 2000 to about 34,900 in 2014, or approximately 5,400 fewer officers.

Currently, only about 7,200 officers are assigned to answer calls for service in the 77 precincts. In the busier precincts, officers are tightly scheduled, responding to job after job until the close of their respective tours of duty. In a sense, the post of patrol officer has itself become a specialized function because officers have so little time to devote to patrol functions other than calls for service. Most patrol officers do not have time during their tours to learn their sectors thoroughly, to meet people who are not making calls for service, to identify problems and conditions that need remedy, to work at correcting those conditions, or to familiarize themselves sufficiently with the local population to able to exercise informed discretion about whom to arrest, whom to summons, whom to warn, and whom to take home to their parents. This disconnect is often worsened by the common practice of assigning officers to different sectors – areas within the precinct – on different days, so that they are not always working the same ground and learning about it.



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In effect, the current deployment system renders patrol officers by turns unrecognized by the people who live in their sectors, unable to make much significant change in those sectors, and unaccountable for helping, or working with, New Yorkers who have not called 911. Unintentionally and inadvertently, the current patrol model has had the consequence of isolating NYPD officers from the communities they serve. The past focus on hard enforcement metrics has left police officers with the impression that they have only three options when they encounter a problem: issue a summons, make an arrest, or walk away. To establish an alternative approach, New York City police officers must be given time to get to know the people who live in their sectors and to truly understand the people, conditions and problems that drive the crime, disorder and fear in those sectors. With this kind of knowledge and understanding as a base, the department and its officers can initiate a range of solutions and strategies to counter the individuals and crimes that drive a command's day-to-day criminal activity and quality-of-life conditions.

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## **IMPLEMENTING THE NEIGHBORHOOD POLICING PLAN**

To bridge the gap between our patrol officers and local neighborhoods, Chief of Department James O'Neill is leading the design and piloting of a highly localized Neighborhood Policing Plan.

Under this plan, the police will be working intensively at the very local level – not just at the precinct level – but at the level of sectors within the precinct. The plan calls for a new deployment model in NYPD precincts. The Department will be reducing the specialty units in precincts and re-deploying personnel as patrol officers, who will be assigned to steady sectors. For years, the NYPD has been asking and expecting officers to engage with the community, but has never given them the time to do it. Under the plan, more patrol officers will ease the burden of radio runs and allow time for new types of police work

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The Neighborhood Policing Plan establishes an entirely new set of expectations for patrol officers—to follow up on past crimes, meet with community members, and work as active problem solvers in their assigned sectors—and it provides them with sufficient time in their daily schedules to perform these functions. The officers will know their sectors, the citizens they serve, the problem areas and the problem people. The pilot seeks to achieve further reductions in crime through enhanced community engagement, more efficient resource coordination, and a significantly increased role for the officer on patrol. It also opens opportunities for vastly improved police/community relations because it offers something to both the community residents and the police officers. Citizens will see that the police are responding to them and their concerns, and officers doing this kind of work will experience more satisfaction than they did chasing a steady stream of calls.

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The 100th and 101st precincts in Queens South and 33rd and 34th precincts in Manhattan North are being restructured and re-staffed to pilot the new Neighborhood Policing Plan. In the



pilot precincts, the officers assigned to patrol cars will function as generalists, proactively engaging the community and taking professional responsibility for the safety of their respective assigned neighborhoods. Officers will be assigned to steady sectors, working in the same neighborhoods each day and will be held accountable for crime, community relations, quality-of-life enforcement, traffic conditions and the investigation of many misdemeanor crimes. To staff this model, some precinct specialty units will be scaled back or eliminated, and the functions they perform transferred to the patrol officers. Anti-crime units will remain and in some cases be reinforced.

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Just as precinct commanders are given wide latitude to tackle crime problems in their commands, patrol officers will have the time and the latitude to address sector conditions in ways other than answering calls for service. Patrol officers may spend this time with the community and neighborhood leaders identifying and working in collaboration with them or with other agencies to address quality-of-life conditions and persistent criminal activity. Like precinct commanders, the officers will be expected to take responsibility for a specific piece of geography, which is not possible now with officers moving from sector to sector and restricted to answering calls for most of a tour. The officers will be allotted a minimum of 33 percent of their respective tours or about two hours and 20 minutes each eight-hour tour to engage in proactive and problem-solving activities.

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The sectors within the pilot precincts have been reconfigured to form four to five large sectors from as many as seven or eight smaller ones.

Under current practice, these smaller sectors were rarely, if ever, fully staffed with a car in each sector. Under the new model, each of the four sectors will be consistently staffed by a two-officer car, and on some shifts two such cars, on each of the three 8-hour tours. The new sector borders have been aligned as much as possible with actual neighborhood demarcations. The sector officers will serve each day in their assigned sectors, with the same officers staffing the same shifts and rarely leaving the sector while on duty. Each day, they will be answering calls for service and working to correct conditions and otherwise address sector problems.

## THE NEIGHBORHOOD COORDINATING OFFICERS

Two neighborhood coordinating officers (NCOs), working as a team, will be assigned to each sector, responsible for monitoring crime trends and reporting those trends to the other officers in the sector. The NCOs will be instrumental in identifying problems and conditions, in leading the other sector officers to address problems, and in connecting with neighborhood residents. They will organize efforts to correct conditions in a given sector, mapping out plans and enlisting sector officers in putting the plans into effect. NCOs will answer calls for service for some part of their shifts to keep them abreast of current conditions in the sector, but their primary functions will be community contact and cooperative planning, intensive analysis of sector conditions, the gathering of intelligence about crime and criminals in the sector, and targeted enforcement efforts.

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The NCOs will be engaging community residents in each of the sectors in genuinely collaborative efforts, sharing responsibility for gathering information, identifying problems, and jointly planning local measures to address crime and other issues in the sector. The NCOs will work a varied schedule depending on precinct conditions and on their appointments and other commitments with community members. The NCOs and the





patrol officers assigned to each steady sector will report to a sergeant responsible for managing multiple steady sectors. The patrol sergeants, in turn, will be overseen by lieutenants functioning as platoon commanders.

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The NCOs, who have been selected from among the high performing officers in each of the pilot precincts, have received specialty training in several key areas. First, they completed the Detective Bureau’s course for newly assigned investigators, covering all facets of professional investigation and providing techniques and skills necessary to both the novice and the seasoned investigator. Second, they have been instructed in the Special Operations Lieutenant course, which covers accident prone locations, tow operations, CCTV cameras, cabarets and licensed premises, crime prevention, domestic violence, policing in the public housing developments, illegal van enforcement, nuisance abatement, pawn shops and second-hand dealers, peddlars, street narcotics enforcement and transit and subway policing. The NCOs have also received training in working with community residents, mediation, organizational skills, public speaking, crime analysis and managing social service resources through social service agencies and contractors.

## **SUPPORT FOR NCOS AND SECTOR OFFICERS**

To maintain, and even improve, response times to calls for service, even as sector officers are sometimes engaged in other activities, the neighborhood policing model also assigns a precinct-wide team of two-person response cars in addition to the sector cars and the NCOs. These response cars will pick up calls in sectors throughout the precinct when the sector workload becomes too heavy or when the sector cars are engaged in other kinds of operations, such as working with the NCOs to correct conditions. The response cars

are a critical part of the plan because they ensure reliable and timely response to calls for service no matter what other operations may be under way in a given sector.

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As the pilot project goes into effect, the NYPD will be using technology to enable and empower the new sector patrol officers in the pilot and all police officers throughout the city to fight crime in new ways. With significant funding support from Mayor de Blasio and Manhattan District Attorney Cyrus Vance, the Department is rolling out a mobility platform that will make the NYPD the most technologically advanced department in the nation, providing a smart phone for every officer and a tablet for every patrol car. With these tools, patrol officers will be able to retrieve vast amounts of data from the NYPD’s various databases and perform many administrative functions in the field. As new mobile apps connect officers to other city agencies, the officers will become community touch points, who can use – and help citizens use – a wide range of public and private services. (See the Technology Section of this Plan of Action for more information about the NYPD’s mobility platform).

Newly formed, neighborhood-focused work groups will be established to help guide the NCO’s work and the work of the sector patrol officers during the 33 percent of tour not devoted to radio calls. The NCOs and sector officers will organize regular meetings between sector officers and residents from their respective sectors. These work groups will be genuine problem-solving sessions in which neighbors and police officers collaborate on plans and strategies. Precincts will also convene community dialogues to find effective ways to collaborate with the people who live and work in the neighborhoods. This will be local government at the most local level. (See the Trust section of this Plan of Action for further details about the neighborhood work groups.)



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As sector officers and NCOs learn about their sectors – and about the people who live in, work in and visit them – they will be able to focus enforcement efforts on the small percentage of people who commit most of the crime and develop a degree of detailed knowledge about crime and disorder that is largely unprecedented. Where pockets of violence and crime remain in New York City, the NYPD will be relying heavily on what these officers can learn from their new community contacts about specific crimes, broader crime patterns and general criminal activity.

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The neighborhood policing plan’s emphasis on local policing and citizen participation and satisfaction is a major shift from past practice – a full pivot to policing with the community, and not just for it. The plan seeks to provide a structure for finding some common ground on which to build a safer and fairer future:

- Officers in the same sector every day, with the time to engage
- Officers with data at their fingertips to inform their actions
- Officers working with residents on a regular basis on community-identified issues and problems

Properly staffed and equipped, the neighborhood-policing plan – the sector plan – can form the foundation of a new understanding between police and communities, finding common ground on local ground.

## **Dismantling Violent Gangs and Crews**

As overall crime rates have declined, group-involved shootings and homicides, which are particularly pronounced in the city’s housing developments, are claiming a greater share of all violent crime in the city. Gang and crew – or group – activity is a key driver of violent crime across all five boroughs. A relatively small number of gang and crew members account for a relatively large number of shootings and homicides. The NYPD is bringing the full range of its capabilities to bear against these violent criminal networks. In 2014, the takedowns of such gangs as the Six-Four Goons, MMG, 280, 3 Staccs, Hoodstarz, Addicted to Cash, Macballas, and GS9, among others, demonstrate the NYPD’s continued efforts to keep New York’s streets clear of violent gangs and crews.

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While gangs and crews have long been drivers of violent crime, many groups have also developed robust and highly effective credit card theft operations over the past decade. The NYPD has traditionally built conspiracy, firearms trafficking and narcotics trafficking cases against these crews to remove repeat violent offenders from neighborhoods. The recent gang and crew involvement in grand larceny and credit card fraud has opened other opportunities to move against these violent actors with a variety of grand larceny and fraud charges.



The year 2014 was the second lowest year for shooting incidents since NYPD began tracking shootings in 1994, but the Department believes that significant progress is still possible in further reducing shooting incidents. In 2014, 74 percent of the all shootings in New York City took place in Brooklyn and the Bronx, with Brooklyn accounting for 44 percent and the Bronx 30 percent. While citywide shootings have declined from nearly 1,600 to fewer than 1,200 since 2003, the Bronx's share of citywide shootings has grown from 24 percent to 30 percent.

The NYPD is retooling and refining its gang and group investigation model. The Department is conducting more task-force-style investigations, teaming up personnel from its various bureaus to provide cross-bureau competencies and skills in attacking entrenched violent groups. It is also incorporating a focused deterrence component called NYC Ceasefire, which seeks to reach young people involved in group violence with a clear message: help is available to them from social service providers, but they must stop the violence or face vigorous sanctions from police and prosecutors. Chief of Department James O'Neill and Deputy Commissioner of Collaborative Policing Susan Herman have taken the lead in managing the combination of these elements to establish a focused deterrence approach to the violent crime that remains in New York City. This model, based on the work of criminologist David Kennedy, has been implemented in cities across the country and typically leads to less enforcement and less incarceration while re-establishing trust in the police.

**“The NYPD is retooling and refining its gang and group investigation model. The Department is planning to conduct more task-force-style investigations, teaming up personnel from its various bureaus to provide cross-bureau competencies and skills in attacking entrenched violent groups.”**

## **THE NEW MODEL FOR INVESTIGATIONS INTO VIOLENT CREWS**

A new inter-bureau investigative gang and crew task force model is being established, structured similarly to the task force previously used to apprehend the GS9 gang. In July 2014, the NYPD and the Special Narcotics Court agreed to build a case against GS9, a crew connected to roughly 100 shootings in Brooklyn. Bureaus across the Department pooled their resources in a GS9 taskforce to quickly develop a comprehensive conspiracy case and to conduct targeted enforcement actions against the crew. The success of the GS9 take-down clearly demonstrated the power and effectiveness of inter-bureau collaboration and set the standard for how these cases will be structured in the future. A task force model for major conspiracy cases will be increasingly employed because it encourages and rewards collaboration and brings different approaches, expertise and capabilities to the table. At every point during the GS9 investigation, all the investigators working on the case had a comprehensive understanding of GS9's activities from drugs to social media, to violent activity to credit card fraud.

Deputy Commissioner of Operations Dermot Shea has led the development of a ranking system for gangs and crews that will target the most disruptive groups first. As in the GS9 case, in future investigations, the Detective Bureau's Grand Larceny Division, detectives from the precinct squad, officers from the Patrol Services Bureau, field intelligence officers from the Intelligence Bureau, and narcotics and gang units in the Organized Crime Control Bureau will all work together. The Juvenile Justice Division (JJD) and the Real Time Crime Center (RTCC) will provide weekly briefings for the task forces on key intelligence developments. JJD and RTCC will also participate in the task forces' strategy meetings to address the various facets of gang investigations, as they did in the GS9 case.

**“In future investigations, the Detective Bureau's Grand Larceny Division, detectives from the precinct squad, officers from the Patrol Services Bureau, field intelligence officers from the Intelligence Bureau, and narcotics and gang units in the Organized Crime Control Bureau will all work together.”**



## NYC CEASEFIRE: GROUP VIOLENCE INTERVENTION

In concert with more targeted and better coordinated investigations, the NYPD is adding another component in the fight against gangs and crews. In early December 2014, the Department launched NYC Ceasefire, the NYPD's first effort to employ all of the elements of the focused deterrence model designed by criminologist David Kennedy to address group-involved homicides and shootings. The NYC Ceasefire initiative has been launched in all ten precincts of Brooklyn North as well as the 67<sup>th</sup> Precinct and 69<sup>th</sup> Precinct in Brooklyn South.

**“The NYC Ceasefire initiative has been launched in all ten precincts of Brooklyn North as well as the 67<sup>th</sup> Precinct and 69<sup>th</sup> Precinct in Brooklyn South.”**

The Department conducted a comprehensive review of all gang- or crew-related deaths and shootings in the subject precincts, compiled a list of everyone involved in the shootings and constructed a network analysis of the group dynamics among shooters and gang members. The NYPD convened a partnership of all relevant law enforcement agencies, including the United States Attorney, the Kings County District Attorney, the New York City Law Department, the Kings County Sheriff, Federal Pre-Trial and Probation, New York State Parole, and New York City Probation, enlisting their active participation in an unprecedented enforcement effort. The Department also engaged several social service agencies and community partners.

**“The NYPD convened a partnership of all relevant law enforcement agencies, including the United States Attorney, the Kings County District Attorney, the New York City Law Department, the Kings County Sheriff, Federal Pre-Trial and Probation, New York State Parole, and New York City Probation, enlisting their active participation in an unprecedented enforcement effort.”**

## INITIAL ENFORCEMENT AND CALL-IN

A group “take down”, similar to the GS9 take down mentioned above, was conducted in the Ceasefire project area and multiple members of two gangs were arrested. The take down sent a strong and persuasive message to remaining gang members, and to those on the periphery of gang activity, that the police and their partners can act decisively and effectively against them. The demonstration action was followed by a “call-in” in December 2014 and second call-in in March 2015. At the call-ins, representatives of the gangs and crews were asked to attend in-person meeting with law enforcement officials, social service agencies and community representatives to hear three messages:

- A powerful moral message against violence from clergy, bereaved parents of young men killed in gang shootings, former gang members who have reformed and foresworn violence and other credible and respected community members.
- A credible message from the members of an unprecedented law enforcement partnership about the consequences of further violence.
- A genuine offer of assistance from social service providers, making help available for those who want it.

Following the call-ins, NYC Ceasefire repeated these messages at the homes of group and gang members who did not attend the call-ins.

## FOLLOW-UP ENFORCEMENT ACTION

Under the Ceasefire approach, if violence and homicide recur after the call-in, follow-up enforcement actions focus on two groups: the group responsible for the new homicide and the group that has been identified as the most violent group in the area. The Department identifies the active members of both groups and then, drawing on the law enforcement resources of the partnership of state, local, and federal agencies, coordinates enforcement efforts against every group member in each of the groups. Group members experience an organized response to any and all crimes their members may be committing whether that is selling drugs, carrying weapons or violating



probation or parole. Where possible, the partnership increases restrictions on probation or parole conditions for group members. The model is one of outreach and assistance, followed by targeted enforcement should the outreach fail. Follow-up enforcement actions have taken place following a recurrence of violence after the December and March call-ins.

**“Under the Ceasefire approach, if violence and homicide recur after the call-in, follow-up enforcement actions focus on two groups: the group responsible for the new homicide and the group that has been identified as the most violent group in the area.”**

NYC Ceasefire is being monitored closely and should it prove effective, will be expanded to other borough commands in the city. The focused deterrence approach will also be employed in developing new strategies for countering other crimes, including domestic violence.

## **IMPLEMENTING A CENTRAL COMMAND MODEL**

Currently, the detective squads assigned to the 77 NYPD precincts report through a separate chain of command to the Detective Bureau. Narcotics, gang and vice investigative units, in each of the eight patrol boroughs, also report through separate chains of command to the Organized Crime Control Bureau. It has long been debated in the NYPD whether a more unified and geographically-based chain of command, bringing investigative resources together with patrol resources in each patrol borough, would be a more efficient and more accountable way of managing investigations and crime in general. In the 1990s, the Department experimented with such a model in Patrol Borough Brooklyn North in what was known as SatCom, short for Strategic and Tactical Command. Under the SatCom model, all investigative units in Brooklyn North reported to the two-star chief serving as the patrol borough commander. The SatCom experiment ran from 1995 to 2005, but the decision was never made to adopt the model across the city, and eventually the model was dropped in Brooklyn North as well.

**“It has long been debated in the NYPD whether a more unified and geographically-based chain of command, bringing investigative resources together with patrol resources in each patrol borough, would be a more efficient and more accountable way of managing investigations and crime in general.”**

The Department’s leaders perceive significant challenges in coordinating the investigations of various violent groups and gangs under the current organizational structure. Because all of the investigative units and squads are reporting to different bosses, there are recurring concerns about whether the Department is taking the fullest possible advantage of its extensive investigative resources and whether investigations, especially the more lengthy ones, are targeting the most violent and dangerous criminals. Accordingly, under a pilot program in Patrol Borough Queens South, which is separate and distinct from the Neighborhood Policing Plan pilot, the NYPD is again experimenting with a unified borough-based command called Central Command or CentCom.

Beginning Summer 2015, the CentCom model will be implemented in Patrol Borough Queens South. The patrol borough commander will manage both the precinct detective squads, formerly assigned to the Detective Bureau, and the narcotics, gang, and vice units, formerly assigned to the Organized Crime Control Bureau. The patrol borough commander will be able to coordinate all of the borough’s investigative and operational activities to address critical issues, and especially violent crime, in the borough command. Currently two one-star chiefs report to the three-star borough commander, one managing patrol operations and the other managing administration. A third one-star chief will now be assigned as the investigative commander in the pilot command. Two inspectors will report to this investigative chief, managing respectively detective squad investigations and gang, narcotics and vice investigations. Broader career path units such as Vice, Narcotics, Gang, Domestic Violence and Anti-Crime – all of which can lead to an NYPD detective shield and a place in a precinct detective squad – will be maintained, but will fall under a command structure that is borough and precinct focused. The realignment of investigative resources in Queens South will test the effectiveness of this geographically based strategy for possible application throughout the city.





**“The patrol borough commander will manage both the precinct detective squads, formerly assigned to the Detective Bureau, and the narcotics, gang, and vice units, formerly assigned to the Organized Crime Control Bureau. The patrol borough commander will be able to coordinate all of the borough’s investigative and operational activities.”**

### **DISMANTLING THE SILOS OF INFORMATION WITHIN THE NYPD**

To support the new patrol and investigative models and the focused deterrence approach, the NYPD is breaking down the data silos that currently impede the sharing of information within the Department’s command structure. While the problems of siloed information can be partially remedied at the operational level by working relationships among members of joint investigative task forces, by implementing the Neighborhood Policing Plan, and through programs like NYC Ceasefire, these problems must also be addressed at the technological level. Recent advances in the technology of data storage, dissemination and analytics provide the Department with a set of new tools and possibilities. Integrating detective case data with the Department’s Crime Data Warehouse has the potential to build stronger cases,

allow officers to quickly establish links between associates and criminal networks, and dramatically increase clearance rates.

**“The merger of these Department databases, coupled with the distribution of mobile devices to all NYPD officers, will enable the delivery of critical and actionable intelligence. Mobile technology also will give the Department the capacity to quickly and easily share information with other city agencies.”**

Platforms like the Domain Awareness System, COGNOS and Palantir all sit on top of, and draw data from, the NYPD Crime Data Warehouse, but none of these systems has access to the Detective Bureau’s Electronic Case Management System (ECMS). The case files of the Detective Bureau contain a wealth of information that would significantly benefit all NYPD investigators’ search and discovery. The merger of these Department databases, coupled with the distribution of mobile devices to all NYPD officers, will enable the delivery of critical and actionable intelligence. Mobile technology also will give the Department the capacity to quickly and easily share information with other city agencies. (The Technology Section and the Trust Section of this Plan of Action have more on the potential of the NYPD’s Technology)

## **Broader Deterrence Programs**

**“A comprehensive set of other deterrence programs, in addition NYC Ceasefire, will be a critical component in the NYPD crime fighting portfolio.”**

The New York City Police Department is widely respected for its relentless focus on its crime prevention mission. Yet, the Department has not realized the full potential of either diversion efforts or focused deterrence. A comprehensive set of other deterrence programs, in addition NYC Ceasefire, will be a critical component in the NYPD crime fighting portfolio. There have been promising steps in the direction of using these diversion and deterrence options more fully.

- The Juvenile Robbery Intervention Program (JRIP) is among the noteworthy initiatives. Under JRIP, juvenile robbery offenders are identified for intensive intervention by the Department. These offenders are told that the Department has prioritized their cases and that continued criminal involvement will lead to serious sanctions. Simultaneously, the Department identifies social services for the offenders and works with their families to ensure that they stay in school and use the services offered.

- The Department has participated in forums hosted by the Department of Probation and the New York State Department of Corrections and Community Supervision (DOCCS) for individuals returning from prison or entering supervision to impress upon them the consequences of continued



criminal behavior. In these forums, participants are informed of their individual legal exposure should they engage in violence and are also offered social services should they need assistance.

- Department has partnered with several social service providers in an effort to connect more homeless individuals to services in lieu of arrest.

## THE FUTURE OF CRIMINAL DETERRENCE IN THE NYPD

Over the past year, the NYPD has made significant progress in developing a robust set of initiatives and has taken a leadership role in designing and implementing new ways to address problems of crime and disorder outside the criminal justice system.

**“NYPD and the BRC engage in joint training, follow joint protocols, and regularly conduct joint patrols in the subway system, offering homeless individuals who have committed minor violations access to quality services.”**

- Working with the Department of Homeless Services, the Metropolitan Transportation Authority and the Bowery Residents Committee (BRC), the Department has significantly expanded its homeless outreach program. For the first time, the NYPD and the BRC engage in joint training, follow joint protocols, and regularly conduct joint patrols in the subway system, offering homeless individuals who have committed minor violations access to quality services on a no-refusal basis. Many homeless people have accepted offers to connect them with services and been successfully placed with social service providers in lieu of arrest.
- Working with Mayor de Blasio’s Task Force on Behavioral Health and the Criminal Justice System, the Department is implementing a training program for officers on patrol in the Manhattan North and Bronx Borough Commands to help them better identify and respond to people with mental health or substance abuse problems.
- Tied the training effort above, the Department has worked with the Department of Health and Mental Hygiene to establish the first Public Health Diversion Center, a 24/7 drop-off facility

located in northern Manhattan. This center has been established for the sole purpose of accepting police referrals of people with behavioral health issues who commit minor violations. Officers from Manhattan North and the Bronx will be bringing subjects to the center in lieu of arrest.

- The Department collaborated with the Brooklyn and Manhattan district attorneys and the Center for Court Innovation to launch Project Reset, a post-arrest diversion initiative for 16- and 17-year olds who have committed nonviolent misdemeanors.

**“The Department has worked with the Department of Health and Mental Hygiene to establish the first Public Health Diversion Center, a 24/7 drop-off facility located in northern Manhattan.”**

All of these initiatives will decrease the Department’s reliance on arrest, as well as to improve interactions between officers and people who have committed minor violations. On a broader level, the new programs will enhance the public’s sense that government is working to address important problems, not with a single agency taking responsibility, nor with only one approach, but with the NYPD marshaling the resources of other agencies. These efforts recognize that an arrest for criminal conduct should be only one of multiple options when officers encounter minor offenders who may suffer from behavioral health problems.

**“These efforts recognize that an arrest for criminal conduct should be only one of multiple options when officers encounter minor offenders who may suffer from behavioral health problems.”**

The Department, as noted above, will expand NYC Ceasefire to other neighborhoods suffering from group-related violence, and it will also be adapting the NYC Ceasefire approach to other types of crimes.

- The Department will ensure that focused deterrence strategies are viewed throughout the Department as new tools, not as a replacement for other enforcement efforts.



- The Department will also take steps to include these strategies in Police Academy training, in the Department's CompStat system of accountability for crime control, and in the Department's engagement with communities.

- The Department will explore new opportunities for diverting appropriate cases from the traditional criminal justice process, whenever other approaches will be more effective in producing public safety and enhancing the public's respect for the rule of law.

## KEEPING KIDS SAFE

**"The NYPD is working to build a cohesive and structured strategy to tackle the complex and multifaceted problem of youth crime."**

The NYPD is working to build a cohesive and structured strategy to tackle the complex and multifaceted problem of youth crime. The arrest of an "at-risk" youth not only emotionally damages the youth's family and the support system surrounding the youth, but also signals that that youth committed a criminal act against a fellow New Yorker. The factors that push young people towards criminal activity and crews are highly complex. If the NYPD is unable to offer alternative positive outreach programs to those youth and their families, the Department may have devote a greater amount of resources investigating them for committing crimes at a later time. Finding ways to prevent youths from becoming first time, or repeat, offenders might set the stage for significant crime reductions in the future.

**"The NYPD is conducting a comprehensive review of existing procedures and strategies for the use of youth officers assigned to precincts and frequently working in schools; of school safety agents, civilian personnel who wear uniforms and conduct the bulk of school security functions; and of school sergeants, police personnel who oversee the school safety agents."**

- Working as part of the Mayor's leadership team, the NYPD is conducting a comprehensive review of existing procedures and strategies for the use of youth officers assigned to precincts and frequently working in schools; of school safety agents, civilian personnel who wear uniforms and conduct the bulk of school functions; and of school sergeants, police personnel who oversee the school safety agents. This review has been undertaken with an eye toward reducing the number of police enforcement action that take place within the schools and generally improving the school climate. In the past three years, arrests by school safety personnel are down 50 percent and summonses down 60 percent.

- To ensure that the various bureaus of the NYPD have a comprehensive understanding of the trends and activities of at-risk juveniles in their commands, the Juvenile Justice Division will provide support in identifying at-risk youth citywide, by resident precinct, on the OMNIFORM portal. A Juvenile Justice Division tab has already been established on the Chief of Department website for this purpose. Precinct youth officers can use this resource to quickly and efficiently check the "at risk" youths residing in their precincts.

**"To ensure that the various bureaus of the NYPD have a comprehensive understanding of the trends and activities of at-risk juveniles in their commands, the Juvenile Justice Division will provide support in identifying at-risk youth citywide, by resident precinct."**



## The Way Forward

The NYPD is taking the next step in the ever-evolving history of New York City policing. Recognizing the accomplishments of the past 25 years and the extraordinary crime declines achieved in those years, the Department has also recognized that it needs to change the way it does business in this new century. While it is a desirable outcome in itself that the police build bridges to the communities they serve, it also is becoming increasingly clear that future gains against crime will require a more complete and more localized alliance with the city's neighborhoods than has previously been achieved. The new Neighborhood Policing Plan, now being piloted in four precincts, is the NYPD's central vision of how to accomplish that goal. It's a bold and dramatic departure from past practice. But it is a necessary one.

**"Future gains against crime will require a more complete and more localized alli-**

**ance with the city's neighborhoods than has previously been achieved. The new Neighborhood Policing Plan, now being piloted in four precincts, is the NYPD's central vision of how to accomplish that goal.**

In the mid-1990s, with the development of CompStat and an array of innovative policing strategies and tactics, the NYPD helped transform the way police fight crime in America and the world. In the next decade, in the wake of the 911 attacks, it led the way in building a municipal counterterrorism capability that is second to none. Now, it is taking on the challenge of police/community relations with series of profound reforms to how police work in the neighborhoods of the city. These changes will have as significant and far-reaching consequences as the reforms of the mid-1990s or the post-911 era. A safer and fairer city will result.

