



POLICE DEPARTMENT

STATEMENT OF FINDINGS

ONE POLICE PLAZA SECURITY PLAN

Project Identification:

CEQR No. 04NYPD002M

Lead Agency:

New York City
Police Department

Date Issued:

August 28, 2007

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A. INTRODUCTION

This Statement of Findings has been prepared in accordance with the environmental review requirements of Article 8 of the New York State Environmental Conservation Law, the State Environmental Quality Review Act (SEQRA), the implementing regulations set forth in 6 NYCRR Part 617, and the New York City Rules of Procedure for City Environmental Quality Review (CEQR) and Executive Order 91 of 1977 as amended. The New York City Police Department (NYPD), acting as lead agency, issued a Notice Of Completion of the Final Environmental Impact Statement (FEIS) for the One Police Plaza Security Plan on August 1, 2007.

The Notice of Positive Declaration and Intent to Prepare a Draft EIS were issued on April 8, 2005 and the Draft Scoping Document for the Preparation of a Draft EIS was issued on April 21, 2005. The public, governmental agencies, community boards, and elected officials were invited to comment on the Draft Scoping Document either in writing or at the public scoping hearing held on May 24, 2005. The comment period on the Draft Scoping Document remained open until June 4, 2005. The comments received during the comment period were incorporated into the Final Scoping Document, which was issued in June 2006.

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The Draft Environmental Impact Statement (DEIS) was certified as complete on July 28, 2006 and was published and distributed for review. The issuance of the DEIS was followed by two public hearings that were held on September 14, 2006 and October 4, 2006. Written comments on the DEIS were requested and were received and considered by the Lead Agency until October 24, 2006. The NYPD prepared a Final Environmental Impact Statement (FEIS), which addressed all substantive comments made on the DEIS. The FEIS was certified as complete, and a Notice of Completion was issued on August 1, 2007.

After considering the FEIS for no less than 10 days after the issuance of the Notice of Completion, the NYPD has adopted this Statement of Findings.

B. DESCRIPTION OF THE ACTION

Introduction and Background

The NYPD, lead agency for the project, prepared an Environmental Assessment Statement (EAS) in January 2004 pursuant to an order issued on August 1, 2003 by New York State Supreme Court Justice Walter B. Tolub in *Chatham Green, Inc. et al. v. Bloomberg et al.* (Index No. 107569/03). NYPD then issued a negative declaration, which was subsequently challenged in a second lawsuit, *Chatham Towers, Inc. et al. v. Bloomberg et al.* (Index No. 107761/04). In an opinion dated October 15, 2004, Justice Tolub found that the EAS did not take a “hard look” as required by law, specifically for the technical areas of Community Facilities and Services, Socioeconomic Conditions, Neighborhood Character, Traffic and Parking, and Transit and Pedestrians. Justice Tolub directed the preparation of an Environmental Impact Statement (EIS).

Although the NYPD maintains that the EAS and negative declaration were adequate in all respects, in light of Justice Tolub’s determination, the NYPD prepared an EIS in accordance with SEQRA and the regulations promulgated pursuant thereto at 6 NYCRR Part 617 and CEQR.

The EIS includes review and analysis of certain impact categories identified in the *CEQR Technical Manual*. The EIS contains a description and analysis of the action and its environmental setting; the environmental impacts of the action; identification of any significant adverse environmental effects that cannot be avoided through incorporation of corrective measures into the action; a discussion of alternatives to the action; the identification of any irreversible and irretrievable commitments of resources that would be involved in the action upon implementation; and a description of any necessary mitigation measures proposed to minimize significant adverse environmental impacts.

It bears noting that, in an unrelated action, certain streets proximate to One Police Plaza were closed in 1999, as indicated in an EAS, dated April 2, 1999, prepared by the New York City Department of Transportation at the request of the NYPD (CEQR No. 99DOT011M). Following the issuance of the EAS in 1999, a negative declaration was issued on May 13, 1999. These pre-September 11, 2001 street closures, listed below, are not part of the action but are considered as part of the No-Action condition in this EIS:

- Madison Street between Avenue of the Finest and Pearl Street (full closure)
- Avenue of the Finest between Madison Street and Park Row (full closure except for motor vehicles destined to the municipal garage)
- Pearl Street between Park Row and Madison Street (partial closure - southbound direction only)

As part of another unrelated action, in early 2001, an EAS was prepared for the Public Safety Answering Center II (CEQR No. 01NYP002M), to be located in an existing building at 109-113 Park Row. The EAS analyzed the closure of the 400-space municipal garage to the public, and a negative declaration was issued on June 12, 2001. The garage was then officially closed to the public on June 30, 2001. However, following the events of September 11, 2001, the NYPD decided not to go forward with the above-mentioned project and the building remained vacant. The municipal garage was rehabilitated and re-opened to NYPD authorized vehicles in April 2004. As the closure of the municipal garage occurred prior to the post-9/11 security plan, it is also included in this EIS as part of the No-Action condition.

With-Action Condition

Following the events of September 11, 2001, a security plan was implemented that resulted in the installation of attended security checkpoint booths, planters, bollards, and hydraulically-operated delta barriers to restrict the access of unauthorized vehicles from the roadways adjacent to the civic facilities located near One Police Plaza, including NYPD Headquarters, the New York State Supreme Court, and the United States Courthouse. All but two sets of barriers were installed by the NYPD. Security barriers located at the intersection of Park Row and Foley Square and at Pearl Street on the west side of Park Row were installed by the United States Marshals Service (“USMS”) and are not part of the NYPD’s action. The security checkpoint locations for vehicular access have been installed by the NYPD at the following locations:

- Park Row, west of Worth Street
- Park Row, near the Brooklyn Bridge
- Pearl Street at Foley Square
- Pearl Street on the west side of Park Row
- Pearl Street at St. James Place
- Madison Street at St. James Place
- Avenue of the Finest at Pearl Street
- Rose Street at Frankfort Street
- Northbound Park Row Brooklyn Bridge off-ramp

Four of the above checkpoints also include sally ports - two delta barriers on the same roadway that allow a vehicle to be immobilized for inspection. Sally ports have been erected at the following checkpoints:

- Madison Street at St. James Place
- Pearl Street at St. James Place
- Avenue of the Finest at Pearl Street
- Park Row west of Worth Street

As a result of these security measures, the following streets within immediate proximity to One Police Plaza are open only to authorized vehicles:

- Park Row, between approximately Worth Street and the Brooklyn Bridge
- Pearl Street, between Foley Square and St. James Place
- Madison/Rose Streets, between Frankfort Street and St. James Place
- Avenue of the Finest
- Northbound Park Row Brooklyn Bridge off-ramp

As discussed above, the street closures resulted in restricted access for commercial and private vehicles on streets adjacent to NYPD headquarters and other nearby civic buildings. Authorized NYPD and government personnel and emergency vehicles are permitted through the checkpoints after undergoing appropriate scrutiny. Residents of the Chatham Green Houses seeking vehicular access to the Chatham Green parking lot along Park Row are permitted through the checkpoint at Park Row at Worth Street after displaying valid identification, but are not permitted into the security zone through any other checkpoint. Commercial vehicles, such as delivery trucks, are only permitted through the checkpoint at Park Row and Worth Street after displaying valid identification, passing through the barricade, and then pulling into a truck inspection area where they are inspected by USMS officers who utilize, among other security measures, bomb sniffing dogs.

With the exception of areas immediately adjacent to the NYPD headquarters at One Police Plaza, pedestrian access within the security perimeter is not restricted. Iron fencing and barriers are located around the perimeter of One Police Plaza to restrict pedestrian access. In addition, the stairway leading from Police Plaza to Madison Street is closed to pedestrians.

C. REQUIRED APPROVALS

Environmental Review (SEQRA and CEQR)

Pursuant to SEQRA and its implementing regulations, New York City has established rules for CEQR. The environmental review provides a means for decision-makers to systematically consider environmental effects along with other aspects of project planning and design, to evaluate reasonable alternatives, and to identify and, when practicable, mitigate significant adverse environmental effects.

New York City Local Law Number 24 of 2005

Local Law 24 of 2005, approved by the Mayor in March of 2005, amends the New York City Department of Transportation (“DOT”) regulations to state that “except as otherwise provided by law, it shall be unlawful for any person to close any street, or a portion thereof, within the jurisdiction of the [DOT] commissioner, to pedestrian or vehicular traffic without a permit from the commissioner.” In the event of closure of a publicly mapped street that is used for vehicular or vehicular and pedestrian access for more than 180 days, the commissioner shall issue or cause to be issued a community reassessment, impact and amelioration (CRIA) statement that has been approved by the commissioner or other government entity initiating the street closure. The

CRIA statement shall be delivered to both the community board and the council member in whose district the street closure is located on or before the 210th day of the closure. However, the requirement for the issuance of the CRIA statement may be satisfied by delivery of an environmental assessment statement, environmental impact statement, or similar document required by law to be prepared for the street closure. The Local Law requires that a public forum be held. The law applies retroactively to street closures for security reasons that were commenced prior to enactment of the law. Therefore, in addition to satisfying the court order, this EIS was prepared in satisfaction of the CRIA requirement pursuant to Local Law 24 of 2005. The CEQR process described above, which includes public review and hearings, fully satisfies the CRIA requirements including the public forum requirement.

D. IMPACTS OF THE ACTION AND MITIGATION

Introduction

The FEIS includes descriptions of existing and past environmental conditions for the Action Area and surrounding study areas, plus assessments of the impacts of the Action. The assessment is based on a comparison of conditions with and without the Action. For analysis purposes, under the No-Action condition, it is assumed that the One Police Plaza security plan is not in place, that the roadways are open with the 1999 NYPD street closures and municipal garage closure in place, and that transportation services would continue as they were prior to September 11, 2001. For the purposes of the EIS, the analysis year is 2006 (Build Year). Under the With-Action condition, the One Police Plaza security plan is in effect so that the roadways in the vicinity of One Police Plaza are closed to unauthorized vehicular traffic along with all the security plan features described above currently in place. Therefore, the EIS analyzed any potential impacts due to the security measures by comparing the No-Action condition to the With-Action condition. The assessments were performed for a full range of impact categories: land use, zoning, and public policy, community facilities, socioeconomic conditions, urban design and visual resources, neighborhood character, traffic and parking, transit and pedestrians, air quality, and noise.

No significant adverse impacts were identified for land use, zoning and public policy; community facilities; socioeconomic conditions; visual resources; parking; and air quality. Significant adverse impacts were identified for urban design, neighborhood character, traffic, transit and pedestrians, and noise. For these latter six categories, the impacts and suggested mitigation measures are identified below.

Urban Design

The security plan has altered the urban design of the security zone area, yielding a significant adverse impact. According to the *CEQR Technical Manual*, in terms of streetscape elements, a significant adverse impact would result if an action would add to, eliminate, or alter a critical feature of a streetscape. According to the NYPD's Counter Terrorism Bureau, the security measures implemented around One Police Plaza and adjacent civic buildings are necessary to protect these buildings that are considered potential terrorist targets. The terrorist attacks on the World Trade Center on September 11, 2001 have resulted in greater security measures being implemented all over the City, particularly in Lower Manhattan due to the large number of government offices and financial institutions located there. Security devices such as jersey barriers, French barriers, delta barriers, bollards, and concrete planters, although typically not aesthetically pleasing, have become part of the landscape of the City after September 11, 2001. The area surrounding the New York Stock Exchange and Metro Tech in Brooklyn, for example, have implemented similar security plans where public streets have been closed to unauthorized traffic and security features have been installed. Although the action has affected streetscape elements within the security zone, these security features are considered necessary to protect potential terrorist targets and these features will remain in place as long as a potential terrorist threat exists.

However, although these security measures are necessary, the temporary and unaesthetic nature of the security features has resulted in a negative alteration of the streetscape within the security zone. Therefore, a significant adverse impact to urban design has resulted.

The security plan elements have not blocked public views to any visual resources, including view corridors, vistas, historic landmarks, historic districts, and open spaces within the study area. The installed streetscape elements that comprise the physical elements of the NYPD security plan do not preclude views of visual resources given the low heights of the bollards, jersey barriers, French barricades, and concrete planters and modest size of the security checkpoint booths. Consequently, the security plan has not adversely impacted visual resources within the study area.

Mitigation measures have been identified for these urban design impacts, which, if implemented would fully mitigate these impacts. The Lower Manhattan Development Corporation (LMDC) issued a report in 2004 entitled *Chinatown Access and Circulation Study* which included recommendations for improving Park Row. These recommendations were intended to address the closure of Park Row by making it more pedestrian friendly and aesthetically pleasing.

Some of these recommendations relating to streetscape improvements include the following:

- Install a landscaped esplanade along Park Row, including attractive paving, trees, shrubs, planters, etc.
- Install improved street fixtures, including benches, lighting, and barriers. Attractive trash receptacles may be placed at appropriate locations away from security sensitive areas.
- Improve pedestrian wayfinding signage along Park Row and other routes through the area.

Coordination with NYPD and the U.S. Marshals Service regarding security measures for the Police Headquarters building and the federal court buildings would be required. The implementation of the above elements would significantly improve the streetscape of the security zone thereby enhancing the urban design and fully mitigating the security plan's urban design impact. These measures will be implemented to the maximum extent practicable. While it is expected that these mitigation measures would fully mitigate urban design impacts caused by the action, they will be reassessed after the Chatham Square reconfiguration is complete and the Park Row improvements are in place.

Neighborhood Character

The action has altered the neighborhood character within the security zone area. While there is still pedestrian traffic, vehicular traffic is lighter (within the security zone), and the security presence is an additional characteristic of the area. The area within the security zone has become isolated from the surrounding neighborhoods by the limiting of vehicular access. The streets within the security zone, before they were closed, particularly Park Row, were more active through streets connecting the Financial District to Chinatown and the Civic Center area. This reduction in vehicular traffic and activity within the security zone has created an abandoned quality, which is in contrast to the active and lively surrounding area. The closure of public streets and the addition of the security elements have introduced a forbidding and unaesthetic quality to the area. The action has created a disconnect between the security zone area and the surrounding neighborhood. Despite this negative alteration, these security features are considered necessary to protect potential terrorist targets and will remain in place as long as a potential terrorist threat exists.

There has been an increase in security, generally, within the study area around City Hall and other government and office buildings as a result of the September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks. These security measures include an increase of security officers outside these buildings as well as jersey barriers, bollards, delta barriers, and planters along sidewalks. These security measures have altered the character of the City, particularly in Lower Manhattan. Consequently, the One Police Plaza security plan is not a unique feature that has altered the character of the surrounding area. Although the action has resulted in increases in traffic and noise around the perimeter of the security zone, this has not altered the defining neighborhood characteristics of the study area, as this area has always been heavily trafficked. However, mitigation measures for traffic, transit and pedestrians, and urban design impacts would be fully or partially mitigated and, therefore, any impact on neighborhood character would also be mitigated.

Traffic

The diverted traffic that has resulted from the implementation of the security plan has resulted in significant adverse impacts at certain intersections within the study area. The results of the analyses show that diverted traffic has created significant traffic impacts (see Table S-1), with three impacted intersections in the AM, midday, and PM peak periods.

TABLE S-1
Summary of Impacted Intersections

Signalized Intersections		AM	MD	PM
Pearl Street @	Frankfort Street	X	X	X
	Robert F. Wagner Sr. Place	X	X	
Chatham Square @	Worth Street	X	X	X
	Mott Street			X
X impacts to one or more movements in the peak hour.				

A traffic mitigation plan was therefore developed to address these impacts. This traffic mitigation plan, which will be implemented to the maximum extent practicable, incorporates some of the recommendations from LMDC's *Chinatown Access and Circulation Study* for the reconfiguration for Chatham Square. Other mitigation measures associated with this plan include signal timing changes and the implementation of exclusive left-turn and right-turn phases.

In summary, the proposed traffic mitigation plan would fully address all impacts at three intersections in the AM peak hour, two in the midday, and three in the PM peak hour. Three out of 4 intersections impacted by the action would no longer be impacted with the implementation of the proposed mitigation plan. However, two unmitigable impacts would remain at the intersection of Pearl Street and Robert F. Wagner Sr. Place in the AM and midday peak hours. Measures were therefore evaluated to address these impacts. However, signal timing adjustments to return this approach to its No-Action condition would be impractical as they would result in new or worsened impacts on other approaches and a reduction in pedestrian crossing times. Increasing capacity of roadways through changes to curbside regulations or modifications to lane striping was also found to be ineffective, as was widening the approach to achieve an additional lane. The action's impact to westbound Robert F. Wagner Sr. Place left-turn movement and eastbound at Pearl Street in the AM and midday peak hours, respectively, would therefore remain unmitigated. The reconfiguration of Chatham Square as well as all other traffic mitigation plans would be implemented by the New York City Department of Transportation and/or through the New York City Department of Design and Construction.

Transit and Pedestrians

Transit

The security plan has not generated additional demand for bus service. The local and express bus system has changed in conjunction with both the security plan as well as other Lower Manhattan street closures. Prior to implementing the security plan in 2001, Park Row hosted the M9, M15, M103, B51, X25, X90, BM1, BM2, BM3, and BM4 bus routes. After the security plan was implemented, these routes continued to operate, albeit with some modifications to route and stop locations due to the street closures. The detour at Park Row has added approximately 1

to 7 minutes to the travel times for these bus routes. There have been substantial increases in overall travel time for these bus routes, and these increases have resulted in significant adverse impacts on bus operations for the M15 and M103 routes, especially in the AM peak hour and in the southbound direction for all peak hours.

In May 2005, the M103 bus returned to its original route via Park Row as a 90-day trial. The test was expanded in November 2005 when the M15 and B51 buses also returned to their original routes via Park Row to/from City Hall. The M9 remains on its current diverted route as the closure of Vesey Street after September 11, 2001 eliminated the important eastbound portion of this route, necessitating its formal relocation along Pearl Street. The reintroduction of the M15, M103, and B51 buses to Park Row mitigated the increases in travel times these bus routes have experienced due to the action. The re-routing of the buses along Park Row has restored bus service within the area so that it is close to what it was in the baseline condition, prior to the streets being closed. The rerouting of the buses along Park Row has therefore mitigated bus service impacts.

Pedestrians

The security plan has neither generated any new pedestrian trips nor will it generate any pedestrian congestion on sidewalks. However, traffic diversions associated with the vehicular restrictions have resulted in an increase in the numbers of vehicle turning movements at some crosswalks, while decreasing or eliminating all such movements at other crosswalks within the security zone. The results of the pedestrian analysis in the EIS of high accident locations indicate that the action may have created a high pedestrian accident location at the intersection of Worth Street and Broadway.

In coordination with DOT, it was determined that a leading pedestrian interval will be implemented at the intersection of Worth Street and Broadway to improve pedestrian conditions at this intersection. The leading pedestrian interval would change the signal phasing at this intersection that would allow for the pedestrian phase to begin before the green phase for motor vehicle traffic traversing east-west on Worth Street. This signal timing modification will allow pedestrians a head start to cross in the crosswalk of the intersection.

Noise

Project-generated increases in noise exceed the impact criterion of 3.0 dBA between two intersections during the peak AM period: 1) Worth Street at Baxter Street and 2) Worth Street at Mulberry Street. The projected noise level increases are 3.5 dBA and 4.1 dBA respectively, at the two intersections under With-Action conditions. Rerouting the M103, M15, and B51 bus routes back onto Park Row was proposed as a mitigation measure. This reduced the level of impact by about 0.4 dBA, with resulting noise level increments of 3.1 dBA at Worth Street at Baxter Street and 3.7 dBA at Worth Street at Mulberry Street. While this mitigation measure reduced the impacts along Worth Street slightly, it has not eliminated them. No other method of mitigation is feasible. Due to the needs for pedestrian access and the distance between intersections, noise barriers would not be a feasible solution along these roadways. Portions of Chatham Towers and other residential buildings at the intersections of Worth/Baxter Streets and Worth/Mulberry Streets, as well as Columbus Park, are affected by this increase in noise levels.

The overall noise levels would decrease with distance from Worth Street. Other than rerouting of traffic, no mitigation measures are feasible since the impacts occur outdoors, and noise barriers would not be considered practical or cost effective at these locations. Therefore, these impacts would remain unmitigated. Project-diverted traffic in the midday and PM peak hours has not caused noise level impacts.

E. UNAVOIDABLE ADVERSE IMPACTS

As described above in the sections on traffic and noise, some of the Action's significant adverse environmental impacts proved to be unmitigable, and are therefore considered as unavoidable adverse impacts.

F. ALTERNATIVES

Four alternatives to the With-Action condition were considered in this EIS, to examine whether there are reasonable and practicable options that avoid or reduce action-related significant adverse impacts and still allow for the achievement of the stated goals and objectives of the With-Action condition.

No-Action Alternative

The No-Action Alternative assumes that the security plan would not be implemented and all streets that were closed to unauthorized traffic after September 11, 2001 would be open.

In the wake of the September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks, NYPD's Counter Terrorism Bureau conducted security assessments of numerous potential terrorist targets within New York City, including government and law enforcement facilities. Experience and research demonstrate that terrorists avoid "hardened" targets, which are targets that have been reinforced with barriers and other deterrents to make the target less vulnerable and accessible to attack. In assessing the security of One Police Plaza, the Counter Terrorism Bureau concluded that the "secure zone" created around the building immediately following the terrorist attacks should be maintained to prevent the possibility of a vehicle bomb attack on NYPD Headquarters. Securing these potential terrorist targets would not be possible under No-Action Alternative. For security reasons, the No-Action Alternative would therefore not be feasible.

No Unmitigable Traffic Impacts Alternative

As discussed above, all significant adverse traffic impacts that have resulted from the action would be fully mitigated with the exception of the unmitigated impact at the intersection of Pearl Street and Robert F. Wagner, Sr. Place. The No Unmitigable Traffic Impacts Alternative proposes to mitigate traffic impacts at the intersection of Pearl Street at Robert F. Wagner Sr. Place, by re-opening Avenue of the Finest between Pearl Street and Park Row. This would ease congestion focused at Pearl Street and Robert F. Wagner Sr. Place by allowing vehicles destined to the City Hall area to access it without having to detour around the security zone. Passenger vehicles traveling along this proposed right-of-way would only be able to travel westbound on

Avenue of the Finest. Security checkpoints would be moved north on Park Row to allow vehicles to travel freely onto Park Row from Avenue of the Finest. The opening of Avenue of the Finest along with minor signal timing adjustments would mitigate this impact back to No-Action conditions.

The proposed opening of Avenue of the Finest to one-way westbound traffic was reviewed and evaluated by NYPD's Counter Terrorism Bureau. The result of this evaluation determined that the opening of Avenue of the Finest to passenger vehicles would not provide sufficient stand-off distance from NYPD headquarters. Therefore, this alternative is not feasible, as it would not meet the goals and objectives of the action.

Community-Suggested Alternative #1: Relocation of Police Headquarters

This alternative was developed in response to suggestions during the public scoping process to explore alternative locations for police headquarters. No specific site has been identified for this possible relocation, although Randalls Island or Governors Island have been suggested because their placement in the East River is thought to provide natural geographical security. The Relocation Alternative would fall far short of the objectives of the action. Moreover, given the concentration of other government facilities in the "civic center" portion of Lower Manhattan which continue to be considered potential terrorist targets and for which security measures would have to be maintained, the adverse impacts resulting from the action may not be entirely avoided should police headquarters be relocated from One Police Plaza. This alternative is therefore not feasible, as it would not meet the goals and objectives of the action.

Community-Suggested Alternative #2: Chatham Green Access Alternative

Under this alternative, the existing security checkpoint would be moved south on Park Row to establish a free-flowing vehicle entrance/exit to the Chatham Green parking lot. Currently, the security checkpoint is located just south of the corner of Park Row and Chatham Square. All vehicles wishing to access the Chatham Green parking lot must pass through this checkpoint, before entering the parking lot via Park Row. This procedure allows screening of vehicles before they enter the security zone, as control of these vehicles within the zone is not feasible. Vehicles can currently exit the parking lot via either the same location on Park Row, or Pearl Street (northbound).

Under this alternative, the current checkpoint on Park Row would be moved approximately 125 feet to the south in an effort to establish a free-flowing entrance/exit to the Chatham Green parking lot. A 30-foot-wide two-lane access point to the parking lot, with a right-in/right-out, would be provided at the current location on Park Row. The current parking lot exit along Pearl Street would be sealed off and a turnaround would be established at the southeast corner of the parking lot, so that all vehicles would have to exit the parking lot via Park Row. This would result in the elimination of approximately 6 dedicated parking spaces along the Pearl Street side of the parking lot. However, those spaces could be replaced with some minor modifications to the parking lot's layout.

Like the action, this alternative would also result in significant adverse traffic, noise, and urban design impacts, and the mitigation measures for the action would also be required for this Chatham Green Access Alternative.


This proposed alternative was reviewed and evaluated by NYPD's Counter Terrorism Bureau and it was determined that this alternative would not allow sufficient stand-off distance between NYPD headquarters and the Chatham Green Houses parking lot. As this stand-off distance would be substantially reduced to an unsafe level, this alternative would not achieve the objectives of NYPD's Counter Terrorism Bureau to protect government facilities in the "civic center" portion of Lower Manhattan that continue to be considered potential terrorist targets. This alternative is not feasible, as it would not meet the goals and objectives of the action.

G. CERTIFICATION OF FINDINGS

Having considered the relevant environmental impacts, facts, and conclusions disclosed in the FEIS and weighed and balanced relevant environmental impacts with social, environmental, public health, economic, and other essential considerations as required in 6 NYCRR 617.11, the New York City Police Department certifies that;

- The requirements of 6 NYCRR Part 617 have been met;
- Consistent with social, environmental, economic, and other essential considerations from among the reasonable alternatives thereto, the action to be approved is one that avoids or minimizes adverse environmental impacts to the maximum extent practicable;
- Consistent with social, environmental, economic, and other essential considerations, the adverse environmental impacts revealed in the FEIS will be avoided or minimized to the maximum extent practicable by incorporating as conditions to the decision those mitigative measures that were identified as practicable.

The FEIS and these Findings constitute the written statement of facts and the environmental, social, economic and other factors and standards that form the basis of this decision, pursuant to Section 617.11(d)(5) of the SEQRA regulations.



Inspector Anthony Tria
Capital Construction
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August 28, 2007

Date

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