



POLICE DEPARTMENT

**NOTICE OF COMPLETION OF A FINAL ENVIRONMENTAL IMPACT STATEMENT**  
**ONE POLICE PLAZA SECURITY PLAN**  
**CEQR# 04NYPD002M**

**Project Identification:**  
CEQR No. 04NYPD002M

**Lead Agency:**  
New York City  
Police Department

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Pursuant to City Environmental Quality Review (CEQR), Mayoral Executive Order No. 91 of 1977, CEQR Rules of Procedure of 1991 and the regulations of Article 8 of the State Environmental Conservation Law, State Environmental Quality Review Act (SEQRA) as found in 6 NYCRR Part 617, a Final Environmental Impacts Statement (FEIS) has been prepared for the action described below. Copies of the FEIS are available for public inspection at the New York City Office of Environmental Coordination. The FEIS is also available online through a link from the homepage of the New York City Police Department at <http://www.nyc.gov/html/nypd> under the "Recent Press Releases/News" section of the website. A public hearing on the Draft Environmental Impact Statement (DEIS) was held on September 14, 2006 and October 4, 2006. Written comments on the DEIS were requested and were received and considered by the Lead Agency until October 24, 2006. The FEIS incorporates responses to the public comments received on the DEIS and additional analysis conducted subsequent to the completion of the DEIS.

## A. INTRODUCTION

The New York City Police Department (NYPD) has prepared a Final Environmental Impact Statement (FEIS) for the security plan established following the events of September 11, 2001 in order to protect City, State, and Federal facilities in the “civic center” portion of lower Manhattan which were, and continue to be, considered potential targets. These security measures included the installation of attended security checkpoint booths, planters, bollards and hydraulically-operated delta barriers to restrict the access of unauthorized vehicles from the roadways situated adjacent to the civic facilities located near NYPD headquarters at One Police Plaza.

This FEIS has been prepared in conformance with applicable laws and regulations, including Executive Order No. 91 of 1977, as amended, and the New York City Environmental Quality Review (CEQR) regulations, and follows the guidance of the *CEQR Technical Manual*, October 2001.

The FEIS contains a description and analysis of the action and its environmental setting; the environmental impacts of the action, including its short and long term effects, and typical associated environmental effects; identification of any significant adverse environmental effects; a discussion of alternatives to the action; the identification of any irreversible and irretrievable commitments of resources that would be involved in the action; and a description of any necessary mitigation measures proposed to minimize significant adverse environmental impacts.

It bears noting that certain streets proximate to One Police Plaza were closed in 1999, as indicated in an EAS, dated April 2, 1999, prepared by the New York City Department of Transportation at the request of the NYPD (CEQR No. 99DOT011M). Following the issuance of the EAS in 1999, a negative declaration was issued on May 13, 1999. These pre-September 11, 2001 street closures, listed below, are not part of the action but are considered as part of the No-Action condition in this FEIS:

- § Madison Street between Avenue of the Finest and Pearl Street (full closure)
- § Avenue of the Finest between Madison Street and Park Row (full closure except for motor vehicles destined to the municipal garage)
- § Pearl Street between Park Row and Madison Street (partial closure - southbound direction only)

As part of another unrelated action, in early 2001, an EAS was prepared for the Public Safety Answering Center II (CEQR No. 01NYP002M), to be located in an existing building at 109-113 Park Row. The EAS analyzed the closure of the 400-space municipal garage to the public, and a negative declaration was issued on June 12, 2001. The garage was then officially closed to the public on June 30, 2001. However, following the events of September 11, 2001, the NYPD decided not to go forward with the above-mentioned project and the building remained vacant. The municipal garage was rehabilitated and re-opened to NYPD authorized vehicles in April

2004. As the closure of the municipal garage occurred prior to the post-9/11 security plan, it is also included in this FEIS as part of the No-Action condition.

As the action is currently in place, the analysis considers an Analysis year of 2006.

## **B. PROJECT PURPOSE AND NEED**

While the New York City Police Department headquarters at One Police Plaza had been considered a sensitive location at risk of attack and requiring implementation of certain security measures, following the events of September 11, 2001, the NYPD determined that there was a need for heightened security, including the establishment of a “secure zone” around its headquarters.

In the wake of the September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks, NYPD’s Counter Terrorism Bureau conducted security assessments of numerous potential terrorist targets within New York City, including government and law enforcement facilities. Experience and research demonstrate that terrorists avoid “hardened” targets, which are targets that have been reinforced with barriers and other deterrents that make the target less vulnerable and accessible to attack. In assessing the security of One Police Plaza, the Counter Terrorism Bureau concluded that the “secure zone” created around the building immediately following the terrorist attacks should be maintained to prevent the possibility of a vehicle bomb attack on NYPD Headquarters.

## **C. PROJECT DESCRIPTION**

As discussed above, following the events of September 11, 2001, a security plan was implemented that resulted in restricted use streets and the installation of attended security checkpoint booths, planters, bollards, and hydraulically-operated delta barriers to restrict the access of unauthorized vehicles from the roadways situated adjacent to the civic facilities located near One Police Plaza, including NYPD Headquarters, the New York State Supreme Court, and the United States Courthouse. All but two sets of barriers were installed by the NYPD. Security barriers located at Park Row and Foley Square and at Pearl Street on the west side of Park Row, were installed by the United States Marshals Service (“USMS”) and are not part of the NYPD’s action. Security checkpoint locations for vehicular access have been installed at the following locations:

- § Park Row, west of Worth Street
- § Park Row, near the Brooklyn Bridge
- § Pearl Street at Foley Square
- § Pearl Street on the west side of Park Row
- § Pearl Street at St. James Place
- § Madison Street at St. James Place
- § Avenue of the Finest at Pearl Street

- § Rose Street at Frankfort Street
- § Northbound Park Row Brooklyn Bridge off-ramp

Four of the above checkpoints also include sally ports - two delta barriers on the same roadway that allow a vehicle to be immobilized for inspection. Sally ports have been erected at the following checkpoints:

- § Madison Street at St. James Place
- § Pearl Street at St. James Place
- § Avenue of the Finest at Pearl Street
- § Park Row west of Worth Street

As a result of these security measures, the following streets within immediate proximity to One Police Plaza are open only to authorized vehicles:

- § Park Row, between approximately Worth Street and the Brooklyn Bridge
- § Pearl Street, between Foley Square and St. James Place
- § Madison/Rose Streets, between Frankfort Street and St. James Place
- § Avenue of the Finest
- § Northbound Park Row Brooklyn Bridge off-ramp

As discussed above, the street closures resulted in restricted access for commercial and passenger vehicles on streets adjacent to NYPD headquarters and other nearby civic buildings. Authorized NYPD and government personnel and emergency vehicles are permitted through the checkpoints after displaying appropriate identification. Residents of Chatham Green seeking vehicular access to the Chatham Green parking lot along Park Row are permitted through the checkpoint at Park Row at Worth Street after displaying valid identification, but are not permitted into the security zone through any other checkpoint. Commercial vehicles, such as delivery trucks, are only permitted through the checkpoint at Park Row and Worth Street after displaying valid identification and after passing through the barricade must pull into a truck inspection staging area where they are inspected by USMS officers who utilize, among other security measures, bomb-sniffing dogs.

With the exception of areas immediately adjacent to the NYPD headquarters at One Police Plaza, pedestrian access within the security perimeter is not restricted. Iron fencing and barriers are located around the perimeter of One Police Plaza to restrict pedestrian access. In addition, the stairway leading from Police Plaza to Madison Street is closed to pedestrians.

### **No-Action Condition**

For analysis purposes, under the No-Action condition, it is assumed that the One Police Plaza security plan is not in place, that the roadways are open with the 1999 NYPD street closures and municipal garage closure in place, and that transportation services would continue as they were prior to September 11, 2001. For the purposes of this EIS, the analysis year is 2006 (Build Year).

### **With-Action Condition**

Under the With-Action condition, the One Police Plaza security plan is in effect so that the roadways in the vicinity of One Police Plaza are closed to unauthorized vehicular traffic along with all the security plan features described above currently in place. Therefore, the EIS has analyzed any potential impacts due to the security measures by comparing the No-Action condition to the With-Action condition.

Prior to September 11, 2001, six Metropolitan Transit Authority (“MTA”) New York City Transit bus routes used Park Row in one or both directions, including the M9, M15, M103, X25, X90, and the B51. The BM1, BM2, BM3, and BM4 express bus routes were also rerouted around Park Row after September 11, 2001. These buses were rerouted around the security zone after the street closures were put in place. Recently three routes (M103, M15, and B51) have returned to Park Row. Although these MTA buses have returned to their original route down Park Row, for conservative analysis purposes, this will not be analyzed as part of the With-Action condition in the EIS. Instead, the rerouting of the M103, M15, and B51 buses to their original route will be analyzed as mitigation and discussed in detail in Chapter 11, “Mitigation.”

## **D. REQUIRED APPROVALS**

### **Environmental Review (SEQRA and CEQR)**

Pursuant to the State Environmental Quality Review Act (SEQRA) and its implementing regulations, New York City has established rules for its City Environmental Quality Review (CEQR). The environmental review provides a means for decision-makers to systematically consider environmental effects along with other aspects of project planning and design, to evaluate reasonable alternatives, and to identify and, when practicable, mitigate significant adverse environmental effects.

## **New York City Local Law Number 24 of 2005**

Local Law 24 of 2005, approved by the Mayor in March of 2005, amends the New York City Department of Transportation (“DOT”) regulations to state that “except as otherwise provided by law, it shall be unlawful for any person to close any street, or a portion thereof, within the jurisdiction of the [DOT] commissioner, to pedestrian or vehicular traffic without a permit from the commissioner.” In the event of closure of a publicly mapped street that is used for vehicular or vehicular and pedestrian access for more than 180 days, the commissioner shall issue or cause to be issued a community reassessment, impact and amelioration (CRIA) statement that has been approved by the commissioner or other government entity initiating the street closure. The CRIA statement shall be delivered to both the community board and the council member in whose district the street closure is located on or before the 210th day of the closure. However, the requirement for the issuance of the CRIA statement may be satisfied by delivery of an environmental assessment statement, environmental impact statement, or similar document required by law to be prepared for the street closure. The Local Law requires that a public forum be held. The law applies retroactively to street closures for security reasons that were commenced prior to enactment of the law. Therefore, in addition to satisfying the court order, this EIS is being prepared in satisfaction of the CRIA requirement pursuant to Local Law 24 of 2005. The CEQR process described above, which includes public review and hearings, will fully satisfy the CRIA requirements including the public forum requirement.

## **E. WITH-ACTION CONDITION**

### **Land Use, Zoning and Public Policy**

Overall, the With-Action condition has not resulted in any significant adverse effects on land use, zoning, or public policy. Land uses within the security zone and surrounding study area have not substantially changed from the 2001 baseline year to the With-Action condition. The action has not altered any zoning regulations and has not resulted in any structure that does not conform or comply with the existing underlying zoning. In addition, the action has not altered nor does it conflict with any public policy or plan that had been created previously to or after September 11, 2001. Consequently, the action has not resulted in any significant adverse impacts on land use, zoning, and public policy.

### **Community Facilities and Services**

As the action has not and would not result in additional population in the area and would not directly alter a health care facility in the area, no significant impacts on health care facilities or other community facilities in the study area have occurred or would occur in the future. However, as discussed in Chapter 3, “Community Facilities,” as a direct response to a court order, an analysis of access to emergency facilities was prepared. Although there were differences in the opinions of NY Downtown emergency room and emergency medical service

staff on whether access to the emergency room has been hindered by the street closures, response times indicate that responses to emergencies in the study area have not been affected by the street closures. Although response times within the study area have increased slightly between 2000 and 2005, the same is true for Manhattan as a whole as well as Citywide. Therefore, no significant adverse impacts to emergency facility access have occurred as a result of the street closures.

As discussed in detail in Chapter 3, “Community Facilities”, the street closures have not impacted police or fire service delivery within the study area. Both the NYPD and FDNY will continue to evaluate area operations on a regular basis and continued adjustments to resources will be made, if necessary. Therefore, no significant adverse impacts on FDNY and NYPD services have occurred or are expected as a result of the action.

## **Socioeconomic Conditions**

### ***Indirect Residential Displacement***

According to the *CEQR Technical Manual*, indirect displacement of a residential population can occur when an action increases property values and thus rents throughout a study area, making it difficult for some current residents to continue to afford to live in the community. There is no evidence that the action has resulted in any secondary residential displacement. While rents and home values have, in general, increased throughout the study area, these increases appear to be a result of normal economic trends, are consistent with trends throughout Lower Manhattan, and are therefore not directly attributable to the security plan.

### ***Indirect Business Displacement***

Indirect business displacement is the involuntary displacement of businesses that results from a change in socioeconomic conditions created by a proposed action. The typical issue for indirect business displacement is when an action increases property values and rents, thereby making it difficult for some categories of business to remain at their current locations. Although the action has limited accessibility to some parts of the study area, there is no evidence that the limit in accessibility has resulted in any secondary business displacement. While property values have, in general, increased throughout the study area, and commercial rents have slightly decreased, these changes are not unique to the study area and appear to be a result of normal economic trends. As these changes are consistent with trends throughout Lower Manhattan, they are therefore not directly attributable to the security plan. The results of the business survey are, at most, inconclusive. While registering individual beliefs, the survey results show that respondents in the study area are almost evenly split as to whether the barriers have had an effect on local businesses. While most respondents in Historic Chinatown attributed a decline in business as compared to neighboring areas to the barriers, businesses east of the Bowery, which also borders the barriers, largely indicated that the barriers have not had an impact. The survey results are also not supported by objective economic measures identified in the *CEQR Technical Manual* such as property values and vacancy rates. The security zone has also not adversely affected the

viability of the Chinatown retail and restaurant sectors, which continue to be a major draw for both residents and tourists.

### ***Adverse Effects on Specific Industries***

According to the *CEQR Technical Manual*, it may be possible that a given action could affect the operation and viability of a specific industry, not necessarily tied to a specific location. The streets affected by the action provide approaches to the Historic Chinatown core for customers and clientele of the tourist-oriented shops and restaurants that are the mainstay of the economy of Chinatown. According to the guidelines of the *CEQR Technical Manual*, the action would not have an adverse impact on a specific industry because it would neither significantly impact the business conditions for any industry or category of businesses within or outside of the study area, nor would it indirectly reduce employment or impair the economic viability of a specific industrial sector or business category. Although there are some complaints that Chinatown has suffered disproportionately in terms of tourist activity, that would appear to be an effect of the September 11 attacks, which has been felt throughout the tourism industry and not just in Chinatown, and the effect seems to have lessened with time. It should also be noted that the increase in international visitors to the City in the past two years (2005-2006) is a positive development for the City's tourism industry.

### **Urban Design/Visual Resources**

The security plan has altered the urban design of the security zone area, yielding a significant adverse impact. According to the *CEQR Technical Manual*, in terms of streetscape elements, a significant adverse impact would result if an action would add to, eliminate, or alter a critical feature of a streetscape. According to the NYPD's Counter Terrorism Bureau, the security measures implemented around One Police Plaza and adjacent civic buildings are necessary to protect these buildings that are considered potential terrorist targets. The terrorist attacks on the World Trade Center on September 11, 2001 have resulted in greater security measures being implemented all over the City, particularly in Lower Manhattan due to the large number of government offices and financial institutions located there. Security devices such as jersey barriers, French barriers, delta barriers, bollards, and concrete planters, although typically not aesthetically pleasing, have become part of the landscape of the City after September 11, 2001. The area surrounding the New York Stock Exchange and Metro Tech in Brooklyn, for example, have implemented similar security plans where public streets have been closed to unauthorized traffic and security features have been installed. Although the action has affected streetscape elements within the security zone, these security features are considered necessary to protect potential terrorist targets and these features will remain in place as long as a potential terrorist threat exists.

However, although these security measures are necessary, the temporary and unaesthetic nature of the security features has resulted in a negative alteration of the streetscape within the security zone. Therefore, a significant adverse impact to urban design has resulted. Chapter 11, "Mitigation," provides a description of measures to be developed to mitigate the urban design



impacts.

The security plan elements have not blocked public views to any visual resources, including view corridors, vistas, historic landmarks, historic districts, and open spaces within the study area. The installed streetscape elements that comprise the physical elements of the NYPD security plan do not preclude views of visual resources given the low heights of the bollards, jersey barriers, French barricades, and concrete planters and modest size of the security checkpoint booths. Consequently, the security plan has not adversely impacted visual resources within the study area.

### **Neighborhood Character**

The action has altered the neighborhood character within the security zone area. While there is still pedestrian traffic, vehicular traffic is lighter (within the security zone), and the security presence is an additional characteristic of the area. The area within the security zone has become isolated from the surrounding neighborhoods by the limiting of vehicular access. The streets within the security zone, before they were closed, particularly Park Row, were more active through streets connecting the Financial District to Chinatown and the Civic Center area. This reduction in vehicular traffic and activity within the security zone has created an abandoned quality, which is in contrast to the active and lively surrounding area. The closure of public streets and the addition of the security elements have introduced a forbidding and unaesthetic quality to the area. The action has created a disconnect between the security zone area and the surrounding neighborhood. Despite this negative alteration, these security features are considered necessary to protect potential terrorist targets and will remain in place as long as a potential terrorist threat exists.

There has been an increase in security, generally, within the study area around City Hall and other government and office buildings as a result of the September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks. These security measures include an increase of security officers outside these buildings as well as jersey barriers, bollards, delta barriers, and planters along sidewalks. These security measures have altered the character of the City, particularly in Lower Manhattan. Consequently, the One Police Plaza security plan is not a unique feature that has altered the character of the surrounding area. Although the action has resulted in increases in traffic and noise around the perimeter of the security zone, this has not altered the defining neighborhood characteristics of the study area, as this area has always been heavily trafficked. However, as discussed in Chapter 11, "Mitigation," traffic, transit and pedestrians, and urban design impacts would be fully or partially mitigated and, therefore, any impact on neighborhood character would also be mitigated.

### **Traffic and Parking**

This chapter analyzes the effects of diverted traffic that has resulted from the implementation of the security plan on the Lower Manhattan street network during the weekday AM, midday, and PM peak hours. The results of the analyses show that diverted traffic has created significant traffic impacts (see Table NOC-1), with three impacted intersections in the AM, midday, and PM peak periods. Chapter 11, "Mitigation," of this EIS provides a description of measures to be

developed to mitigate the traffic impacts.

While parking conditions, both off-street and on-street, remain very competitive and the availability of curbside parking for shoppers and others is very limited, these conditions did not result from the With-Action condition. In addition, the security plan neither creates demand for public parking nor has it eliminated off-street public parking supply. As such, no significant adverse impacts on parking have occurred as a result of the implementation of the security plan.

<b>TABLE NOC-1 Summary of Impacted Intersections</b>				
<b>Signalized Intersections</b>		<b>AM</b>	<b>MD</b>	<b>PM</b>
<b>Pearl Street @</b>	Frankfort Street	<b>X</b>	<b>X</b>	<b>X</b>
	Robert F. Wagner Sr. Place	<b>X</b>	<b>X</b>	
<b>Chatham Square @</b>	Worth Street	<b>X</b>	<b>X</b>	<b>X</b>
	Mott Street			<b>X</b>
<b>X</b> impacts to one or more movements in the peak hour.				

### **Transit and Pedestrians**

This chapter analyzes the effects of the security plan on bus services and pedestrian activity. The security plan has not generated additional demand for bus service or additional pedestrian activity. The local and express bus system has changed in conjunction with both the security plan as well as other Lower Manhattan street closures. Prior to implementing the security plan in 2001, Park Row hosted the M9, M15, M103, B51, X25, X90, BM1, BM2, BM3, and BM4 bus routes. After the security plan was implemented, these routes continued to operate, albeit with some modifications to route and stop locations due to the street closures. The detour at Park Row has added approximately 1 to 7 minutes to the travel times for these bus routes. There have been substantial increases in overall travel time for these bus routes, and these increases have resulted in significant adverse impacts on bus operations for the M15 and M103 routes, especially in the AM peak hour and in the southbound direction for all peak hours. Chapter 11, “Mitigation,” of this EIS provides a description of measures to be developed to mitigate the bus transit impacts.

The security plan appears to have resulted in a significant adverse safety impact on pedestrian conditions at the Broadway/Worth Street intersection. Chapter 11, “Mitigation,” of this EIS provides a description of measures to be developed to mitigate the adverse pedestrian safety impacts. The security plan has not generated any new pedestrian trips nor has it interrupted existing pedestrian activity and no significant adverse impacts on pedestrian flow conditions

have occurred or are anticipated as a result of the action.

## **Air Quality**

Air quality analyses were undertaken to determine the potential for impacts under the action. These impacts can be either direct or indirect. Direct impacts come from stationary sources, such as emissions from heating systems. Indirect impacts are defined as the potential for emissions due to mobile sources/vehicles generated by the action. Pollutants that are examined for mobile sources are carbon monoxide (CO) and respirable particulate matter (PM10 and PM2.5).

The potential for mobile source impacts on CO concentrations was determined for the 2006 analysis year using the currently accepted methodologies. Modeling was based on the traffic analyses for three study area intersections. The results of these analyses showed that the maximum CO concentrations with the action did not exceed National Ambient Air Quality Standards (NAAQS) or impacts defined by the *City Environmental Quality Review (CEQR) Technical Manual*, as there were no exceedances of NAAQS or any increases in CO concentrations that are more than half the difference between the No-Action concentrations and the CO standard.

Analyses were performed to determine the potential for impacts from respirable particulate matter (PM10 and PM2.5). The results of these analyses disclosed that the future maximum predicted 24-hour and annual average particulate matter concentrations would not result in any violations of the PM10 and PM2.5 standards.

## **Noise**

After performing a comprehensive screening of numerous potentially impacted intersections, a total of 2 intersections were monitored for potential noise impacts under the action. The analysis examined the potential for impacts from traffic diversions under the With-Action condition. The analysis showed that there are significant adverse impacts at the intersections of Worth Street and Baxter Street and Worth Street and Mulberry Street in the AM peak period. The projected noise level increases are 3.5 dBA and 4.1 dBA respectively, at the two intersections, and the *CEQR Technical Manual* describes a significant increase as an increase of 3.0 dBA. Therefore, these increases have resulted in a significant adverse impact on noise. Other than rerouting of traffic, no mitigation measures are feasible since the impacts occur outdoors, and noise barriers would not be considered practical or cost effective at these locations. The rerouting of the M103, M15, and B51 bus routes back onto Park Row has been proposed as a mitigation measure. This would reduce the level of impact slightly, but would not eliminate it. Therefore, these impacts would remain unmitigated.

## **F. MITIGATION**

### **Urban Design**

The With-Action condition has resulted in a significant adverse impact on urban design within the security zone area. The Lower Manhattan Development Corporation (LMDC) issued a report in 2004 entitled *Chinatown Access and Circulation Study* which included recommendations for improving Park Row. These recommendations are intended to address the closure of Park Row by making City-owned areas more pedestrian friendly and aesthetically pleasing.

Some of these recommendations relating to streetscape improvements include the following:

- Install a landscaped esplanade along Park Row, including attractive paving, trees, shrubs, planters, etc.
- Install improved street fixtures, including benches, lighting, and barriers. Attractive trash receptacles may be placed at appropriate locations away from security sensitive areas.
- Improve pedestrian wayfinding signage along Park Row and other routes through the area.

Coordination with NYPD and the U.S. Marshals Service regarding security measures for the Police Headquarters building and the federal court buildings would be required. The implementation of the above elements would significantly improve the streetscape of the security zone thereby enhancing the urban design and fully mitigating the security plan's urban design impact. In addition, although the action has not resulted in indirect socioeconomic impacts, these streetscape enhancements would improve pedestrian conditions which may increase the number of patrons to study area businesses. While it is expected that these mitigation measures would fully mitigate urban design impacts caused by the action they should be reassessed when the Chatham Square reconfiguration is complete and the Park Row improvements are in place.

### **Traffic**

Traffic diversions that have occurred as a result of the With-Action condition have resulted in significant adverse traffic impacts at 4 signalized intersections in one or more peak periods. These impacted locations are listed in Table NOC-2. A traffic mitigation plan was therefore developed to address these impacts. This traffic mitigation plan would incorporate some of the recommendations from LMDC's *Chinatown Access and Circulation Study* for the reconfiguration for Chatham Square. Other mitigation measures associated with this plan include signal timing changes and the implementation of exclusive left-turn and right-turn phases.

In summary, as shown in Table NOC-2, the proposed traffic mitigation plan would fully address all impacts at two intersections in the AM peak hour, two in the midday, and three in the PM peak hour. Three out of 4 intersections impacted by the action would no longer be impacted with the implementation of the proposed mitigation plan. However, two unmitigable impacts would remain at the intersection of Pearl Street and Robert F. Wagner Sr. Place in the AM and midday

peak hours. Measures were therefore evaluated to address these impacts. However, signal timing adjustments to return this approach to its No-Action condition would be impractical as they would result in new or worsened impacts on other approaches and a reduction in pedestrian crossing times. Increasing capacity of roadways through changes to curbside regulations or modifications to lane striping was also found to be ineffective, as was widening the approach to achieve an additional lane. The action's impact to westbound Robert F. Wagner Sr. Place left-turn movement and eastbound at Pearl Street in the AM and midday peak hours, respectively, would therefore remain unmitigated. The reconfiguration of Chatham Square as well as all other traffic mitigation plans would be implemented by the New York City Department of Transportation and/or the New York City Department of Design and Construction.

<b>TABLE NOC-2 Summary of Mitigated Intersections</b>				
<b>Signalized Intersections</b>		<b>AM</b>	<b>MD</b>	<b>PM</b>
<b>Pearl Street @</b>	Frankfort Street	<b>X</b>	<b>X</b>	<b>X</b>
	Robert F. Wagner Sr. Place	<b>U</b>	<b>U</b>	
<b>Chatham Square @</b>	Worth Street	<b>X</b>	<b>X</b>	<b>X</b>
	Mott Street			<b>X</b>
<b>X:</b> All impacts fully mitigated. <b>U:</b> One or more unmitigated impacts in the peak period.				

## **Transit and Pedestrians**

### *Bus Service*

The results of the analysis of local bus conditions in the With-Action condition show that the street closures significantly impacted bus service. With the rerouting of the M103, M15, M9, B51, X25, X90, BM1, BM2, BM3, and BM4 bus routes, there have been substantial increases in overall travel time, which has resulted in significant adverse impacts on bus operations, especially in the AM peak hour and in the southbound direction for all peak hours. In May 2005, the M103 bus returned to its original route via Park Row as a 90-day trial. The test was expanded in November 2005 when the M15 and B51 buses also returned to their original routes via Park Row to/from City Hall. The M9 remains on its current diverted route as the closure of Vesey Street after September 11, 2001 eliminated the important eastbound portion of this route, necessitating its formal relocation along Pearl Street. The reintroduction of the M15, M103, and B51 buses to Park Row would mitigate the increases in travel times these bus routes have experienced due to the action. The re-routing of the buses along Park Row has restored bus service within the area so that it is close to what it was in the baseline condition, prior to the

streets being closed. The rerouting of the buses along Park Row has therefore mitigated bus service impacts.

### *Pedestrians*

The security plan has neither generated any new pedestrian trips nor will it generate any pedestrian congestion on sidewalks. However, traffic diversions associated with the vehicular restrictions have resulted in an increase in the numbers of vehicle turning movements at some crosswalks, while decreasing or eliminating all such movements at other crosswalks within the security zone. As discussed in Chapter 8, “Transit and Pedestrians,” the results of the analysis of high accident locations indicate that the action may have created a high pedestrian accident location at the intersection of Worth Street and Broadway.

In coordination with DOT, it was determined that a leading pedestrian interval will be implemented at the intersection of Worth Street and Broadway to improve pedestrian conditions at this intersection. The leading pedestrian interval would change the signal phasing at this intersection that would allow for the pedestrian phase to begin before the green phase for motor vehicle traffic traversing east-west on Worth Street. This signal timing modification will allow pedestrians a head start to cross in the crosswalk of the intersection.

### **Noise**

Project-generated increases in noise exceed the impact criterion of 3.0 dBA between two intersections during the peak AM period: 1) Worth Street at Baxter Street and 2) Worth Street at Mulberry Street. The projected noise level increases are 3.5 dBA and 4.1 dBA respectively, at the two intersections under With-Action conditions. Rerouting the M103, M15, and B51 bus routes back onto Park Row has been proposed as a mitigation measure. This would reduce the level of impact by about 0.4 dBA, with resulting noise level increments of 3.1 dBA at Worth Street at Baxter Street and 3.7 dBA at Worth Street at Mulberry Street. While this mitigation measure would reduce the impacts along Worth Street slightly, it would not eliminate them. No other method of mitigation is feasible. Due to the needs for pedestrian access and the distance between intersections, noise barriers would not be a feasible solution along these roadways. Project-diverted traffic in the midday and PM peak hours would not cause noise level impacts. Portions of Chatham Towers and other residential buildings at the intersections of Worth/Baxter Streets and Worth/Mulberry Streets, as well as Columbus Park, are affected by this increase in noise levels. The overall noise levels would decrease with distance from Worth Street. Other than rerouting of traffic, no mitigation measures are feasible since the impacts occur outdoors, and noise barriers would not be considered practical or cost effective at these locations. Therefore, these impacts would remain unmitigated.

## **G. ALTERNATIVES**

Four alternatives to the With-Action condition were considered in this EIS, to examine whether there are reasonable and practicable options that avoid or reduce action-related significant adverse impacts and still allow for the achievement of the stated goals and objectives of the With-Action condition.

### **No-Action Alternative**

The No-Action Alternative assumes that the security plan would not be implemented and all streets that were closed to unauthorized traffic after September 11, 2001 would be open.

In the wake of the September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks, NYPD's Counter Terrorism Bureau conducted security assessments of numerous potential terrorist targets within New York City, including government and law enforcement facilities. Experience and research demonstrate that terrorists avoid "hardened" targets, which are targets that have been reinforced with barriers and other deterrents to make the target less vulnerable and accessible to attack. In assessing the security of One Police Plaza, the Counter Terrorism Bureau concluded that the "secure zone" created around the building immediately following the terrorist attacks should be maintained to prevent the possibility of a vehicle bomb attack on NYPD Headquarters. Securing these potential terrorist targets would not be possible under No-Action Alternative. For security reasons, the No-Action Alternative would therefore not be feasible.

### **No Unmitigable Traffic Impacts Alternative**

As discussed in Chapter 11, "Mitigation," all significant adverse traffic impacts that have resulted from the action would be fully mitigated with the exception of the unmitigated impact at the intersection of Pearl Street and Robert F. Wagner, Sr. Place. The No Unmitigable Traffic Impacts Alternative proposes to mitigate traffic impacts at the intersection of Pearl Street at Robert F. Wagner Sr. Place, by re-opening Avenue of the Finest between Pearl Street and Park Row. This would ease congestion focused at Pearl Street and Robert F. Wagner Sr. Place by allowing vehicles destined to the City Hall area to access it without having to detour around the security zone. Passenger vehicles traveling along this proposed right-of-way would only be able to travel westbound on Avenue of the Finest. Security checkpoints would be moved north on Park Row to allow vehicles to travel freely onto Park Row from Avenue of the Finest. The opening of Avenue of the Finest along with minor signal timing adjustments would mitigate this impact back to No-Action conditions.

The proposed opening of Avenue of the Finest to one-way westbound traffic was reviewed and evaluated by NYPD's Counter Terrorism Bureau. The result of this evaluation determined that the opening of Avenue of the Finest to passenger vehicles would not provide sufficient stand-off distance from NYPD headquarters. Therefore, this alternative is not feasible, as it would not meet the goals and objectives of the action.

### **Community-Suggested Alternative #1: Relocation of Police Headquarters**

This alternative was developed in response to suggestions during the public scoping process to explore alternative locations for police headquarters. No specific site has been identified for this possible relocation, although Randalls Island or Governors Island have been suggested because their placement in the East River is thought to provide natural geographical security. The Relocation Alternative would fall far short of the objectives of the action. Moreover, given the concentration of other government facilities in the “civic center” portion of Lower Manhattan which continue to be considered potential terrorist targets and for which security measures would have to be maintained, the adverse impacts resulting from the action may not be entirely avoided should police headquarters be relocated from One Police Plaza. This alternative is therefore not feasible, as it would not meet the goals and objectives of the action.

### **Community-Suggested Alternative #2: Chatham Green Access Alternative**

Under this alternative, the existing security checkpoint would be moved south on Park Row to establish a free-flowing vehicle entrance/exit to the Chatham Green parking lot. Currently, the security checkpoint is located just south of the corner of Park Row and Chatham Square. All vehicles wishing to access the Chatham Green parking lot must pass through this checkpoint, before entering the parking lot via Park Row. This procedure allows screening of vehicles before they enter the security zone, as control of these vehicles within the zone is not feasible. Vehicles can currently exit the parking lot via either the same location on Park Row, or Pearl Street (northbound).

Under this alternative, the current checkpoint on Park Row would be moved approximately 125 feet to the south in an effort to establish a free-flowing entrance/exit to the Chatham Green parking lot. A 30-foot-wide two-lane access point to the parking lot, with a right-in/right-out, would be provided at the current location on Park Row. The current parking lot exit along Pearl Street would be sealed off and a turnaround would be established at the southeast corner of the parking lot, so that all vehicles would have to exit the parking lot via Park Row. This would result in the elimination of approximately 6 dedicated parking spaces along the Pearl Street side of the parking lot. However, those spaces could be replaced with some minor modifications to the parking lot’s layout.

Like the action, this alternative would also result in significant adverse traffic, air quality, noise, and urban design impacts, and the mitigation measures for the action described in Chapter 11 would also be required for this Chatham Green Access Alternative.

This proposed alternative was reviewed and evaluated by NYPD’s Counter Terrorism Bureau and it was determined that this alternative would not allow sufficient stand-off distance between NYPD headquarters and the Chatham Green Houses parking lot. As this stand-off distance would be substantially reduced to an unsafe level, this alternative would not achieve the objectives of NYPD’s Counter Terrorism Bureau to protect government facilities in the “civic



center” portion of Lower Manhattan that continue to be considered potential terrorist targets. This alternative is not feasible, as it would not meet the goals and objectives of the action.

## **H. UNAVOIDABLE ADVERSE IMPACTS**

Unavoidable adverse impacts occur when a proposed action would result in significant adverse impacts for which there are no reasonably practicable mitigation measures, and for which there are no reasonable alternatives. For this project, these include unavoidable adverse effects on traffic and noise.

### **Traffic**

At the intersection of Pearl Street and Robert F. Wagner Sr. Place, the action results in impacts to the westbound Robert F. Wagner Sr. Place left-turn movement in the AM Peak hour and the eastbound approach in the midday peak hour. Measures were therefore evaluated to address these impacts. However, signal timing adjustments to return this approach to its No-Action condition would be impractical as they would result in new or worsened impacts on other approaches and a reduction in pedestrian crossing times. Increasing capacity through changes to curbside regulations or modifications to lane striping was also found to be ineffective, as was widening the approach to achieve an additional lane. The action’s impact to westbound Robert F. Wagner Sr. Place left-turn movement and eastbound at Pearl Street in the AM and midday peak hours, respectively, would therefore remain unmitigated.

### **Noise**

Project-generated increases in noise exceed the impact criterion of 3.0 dBA between two intersections during the peak AM period: 1) Worth Street at Baxter Street and 2) Worth Street at Mulberry Street. The projected noise level increases are 3.5 dBA and 4.1 dBA respectively, at the two intersections under With-Action conditions. Rerouting the M103, M15, and B51 bus routes back onto Park Row has been proposed as a mitigation measure. This would reduce the level of impact by about 0.4 dBA, with resulting noise level increments of 3.1 dBA at Worth Street at Baxter Street and 3.7 dBA at Worth Street at Mulberry Street. While this mitigation measures would reduce the impacts along Worth Street slightly, it would not eliminate them. No other method of mitigation is feasible. Due to the needs for pedestrian access and the distance between intersections, noise barriers would not be a feasible solution along these roadways. Project-diverted traffic in the midday and PM peak hours would not cause noise level impacts. Portions of Chatham Towers and other residential buildings at the intersections of Worth/Baxter Streets and Worth/Mulberry Streets, as well as Columbus Park, are affected by this increase in noise levels. However, the peak AM hour is not a peak period for park utilization. The overall noise levels would decrease with distance from Worth Street. Other than rerouting of traffic, no mitigation measures are feasible since the impacts occur outdoors, and noise barriers would not

be considered practical or cost effective at these locations. Therefore, these impacts would remain unmitigated.


## **I. GROWTH-INDUCING ASPECTS OF THE ACTION**

As set forth in the *CEQR Technical Manual*, growth-inducing aspects of a proposed action generally refer to “secondary” impacts of an action that trigger further development. These include proposals that add substantial new land use, new residents, or new employment that could induce additional development of a similar kind or support uses (e.g., stores to serve new residential uses). Actions that introduce or greatly expand infrastructure capacity (e.g., sewers, central water supply) might also induce growth, although this could be an issue only in limited areas of Staten Island and perhaps Queens, since in most areas of New York City infrastructure is already in place and its improvement or expansion is usually proposed only to serve existing or expected users.

As the action has not added a new land use, new residents or new employment, there are no growth-inducing aspects associated with the action.

## **J. IRREVERSIBLE AND IRRETRIEVABLE COMMITMENT OF RESOURCES**

Resources, both natural and man-made, have been expended in the construction and operation of the security plan elements. These resources include the building materials used during construction of checkpoint booths; energy in the form of gas and electricity consumed during the construction and operation of these security elements; and human effort to develop, construct and operate various elements of the security plan. These are considered irretrievably committed because their reuse for some other purpose would be highly unlikely.



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Inspector Anthony T. Tria  
Capital Construction  
New York City Police Department

August 1, 2007  
Date

cc. Honorable Sheldon Silver, Speaker, New York State Assembly  
Honorable Christine Quinn, Speaker, New York City Council  
Honorable Scott M. Stringer, Manhattan Borough President  
Honorable Alan J. Gerson, Council Member  
Honorable John Liu, Council Member  
Honorable Rosie Mendez, Council Member  
Honorable Martin Connor, State Senator  
Honorable Nydia Velasquez, Member of Congress  
Noah Pfefferblit, District Manager, Community Board 1  
Susan Stetzer, District Manager, Community Board 3  
Robert Kulikowski, New York City Office of Environmental Coordination  
Marjorie Bryant, New York City Department of Transportation  
Steven Weber, New York City Department of Transportation  
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Christopher Reo, New York City Law Department  
Heidi Rubinstein, New York City Law Department  
Daniel Green, New York City Law Department  
Joseph Guccione, United States Marshal Service  
Irene Chang, Lower Manhattan Development Corporation  
Gary Heath, New York City Department of Environmental Protection  
Ted Orosz, Metropolitan Transportation Authority, New York City Transit  
Norm Silverman, Metropolitan Transportation Authority, Bus Division Honorable