

# New York City Police Department

## Annual Firearms Discharge Report



# 2014



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# 2014

William J. Bratton

Police Commissioner

New York City Police Department, October 2015

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## *In Memoriam*

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December 20, 2014

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December 20, 2014

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# Part I: Overview

## Introduction

One of the most traumatic and life-changing incidents that can occur in the course of a police officer's career is the line-of-duty discharge of his or her firearm. In an effort to guarantee that these incidents only occur when necessary, and thus prevent avoidable Member of Service (MOS) and civilian trauma, the Department began collecting in-depth data of police related firearms discharges in 1971. Today, the Department records all officer-related discharges, whether purposeful, accidental, or, more rarely, criminal, as well as discharges of a police firearm by a third party.

Analysis of this data over more than four decades has indelibly altered the way that officers respond to, engage in, and assess the need for firearms discharges. By making oversight manifest, the Department has made it clear that each and every discharge is a matter of immediate concern. When recordkeeping began in 1971, 12 officers were shot and killed by another person, and 47 officers were shot and injured. In turn, officers shot and mortally wounded 93 subjects, with a further 221 subjects injured by police gunfire. In 2014, by contrast, two officers were shot and killed by another person, and six were injured (three by gunshot)<sup>1</sup>, while police shot and mortally wounded eight subjects and injured 14. Information gleaned from these reports has initiated a Department-wide tactical, strategic, and cultural shift with regard to how officers use and control their firearms. The Department has made restraint the norm.

Today, these reports serve as a statistical engine for the development of training, the adoption of new technology, and the deployment of Department resources. New instructional scenarios are implemented as a result of this analysis and new hardware—from bullet-resistant vests to conducted energy weapons—has been introduced.

Tracking how, when, where, and why officers discharge their weapons is an invaluable tool for working towards the Department's ultimate goal of guaranteeing that, for every discharge, no option existed other than the use of a firearm.

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<sup>1</sup> Of these officers shot and injured or killed, three officers were unable to return fire. Therefore, because the events were not classified as firearms discharge incidents, the details are not analyzed in this report. Nevertheless, the officers shot are tallied in Appendix B.

## Use of Force

Police officers are among a select few to whom society has granted the right to use force in the course of their duty. Under New York State law, police may use force to effect an arrest or prevent an escape, as well as to protect life and property. With certain very specific exceptions, a private citizen's ability to resort to force is limited to self-defense and is also predicated on first exhausting all attempts at retreat. Police, on the other hand, are not only obligated to stand their ground, but required to pursue fleeing perpetrators and use force, if necessary, to terminate that flight.

An officer's role encompasses service, crime control, and order maintenance; the last two regularly require officers to issue instructions and orders. Compliance in these matters is not optional. The vast majority of police encounters involve nothing more than words, but when words are insufficient—when people choose to ignore or actively resist police—officers have an ascending array of force options to compel others to submit to their lawful authority.

These options extend from professional presence up through verbal force, physical force, non-impact weapons (e.g., pepper spray), conducted energy weapons, impact weapons (e.g., batons), and deadly physical force. All of these are tools at the officer's disposal. The officer is under no obligation to move sequentially from one to the next; he or she may transition from verbal force to pointing a firearm—or vice versa—if the situation dictates.

Federal case law (*Tennessee v. Garner*, 471 U.S. 1 (1985) and *Graham v. Connor*, 490 U.S. 386 (1989)) delineates a standard of "objective reasonableness" that restricts an officer's prerogative to compel or constrain another citizen. But *Tennessee v. Garner* affirmed an officer's right to use force against certain suspects, stating that if a fleeing suspect were to inflict or threaten anyone with serious physical harm, the use of deadly force would "pass constitutional muster."

The New York State Penal Law, for its part, allows an officer to use physical force only when he or she "reasonably believes such to be necessary" to effect arrest, prevent escape, or defend a person or property from harm. Additionally, the state limits an officer's ability to exercise deadly physical force even further. Penal Law §35.30(1) provides that police may only use deadly physical force against a subject in three instances:

- 1) When the subject has committed or is attempting to commit a felony and is using or about to use physical force against a person, or when the subject has committed or is attempting to commit kidnapping, arson, escape, or burglary;
- 2) When an armed felon resists arrest or flees; and
- 3) When the use of deadly physical force is necessary to defend any person from "what the officer reasonably believes to be the use or imminent use of deadly physical force."

The use of deadly physical force, then, is properly restricted by statute. But NYPD policy represents an even more stringent guideline, and the Department goes further than the law in its efforts to control the use of force by its personnel. State law, for example, allows the use of deadly physical force to protect property

(e.g., to prevent or terminate arson or burglary); the Department does not. Additionally, according to the laws of New York State, it is lawful for an officer to shoot at the driver of a vehicle who is using the vehicle so that it poses an imminent threat of deadly physical force. Such a firearms discharge would violate Department guidelines, however.

NYPD policy emphasizes that “only the amount of force necessary to overcome resistance will be used,” and “excessive force will not be tolerated,” (Patrol Guide 203-11). Regarding the use of deadly physical force, Department policy states, “uniformed members of the service should use only the minimal amount of force necessary to protect human life,” (Patrol Guide 203-12).<sup>2</sup>

## **Guidelines for the Use of Firearms**

To ensure that officers use only the minimal amount of force, the Department has nine rules that guide a New York City police officer in his or her use of deadly physical force. They are as follows:

- 1) Police officers shall not use deadly physical force against another person unless they have probable cause to believe they must protect themselves or another person present from imminent death or serious physical injury.
- 2) Police officers shall not discharge their weapons when, in their professional judgment, doing so will unnecessarily endanger innocent persons.
- 3) Police officers shall not discharge their weapons in defense of property.
- 4) Police officers shall not discharge their weapons to subdue a fleeing felon who presents no threat of imminent death or serious physical injury to themselves or another person present.
- 5) Police officers shall not fire warning shots.
- 6) Police officers shall not discharge their firearms to summon assistance except in emergency situations when someone’s personal safety is endangered and unless no other reasonable means is available.
- 7) Police officers shall not discharge their firearms at or from a moving vehicle unless deadly physical force is being used against the police officer or another person present, by means other than a moving vehicle.
- 8) Police officers shall not discharge their firearms at a dog or other animal except to protect themselves or another person from physical injury and there is no other reasonable means to eliminate the threat.
- 9) Police officers shall not, under any circumstances, cock a firearm. Firearms must be fired double action at all times.

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<sup>2</sup> In October 2015, the Department announced the implementation of a new series of Patrol Guide procedures concerning the use-of-force, from physical force to firearms discharges. This new series will revise and replace 203-11 and 203-12.

## Reasonableness

An officer's permission to use force is not unlimited. According to the law, as well as the Department's regulations, officers may exercise only as much force as they believe to be reasonably necessary.

Police officers are regularly exposed to highly stressful, dangerous situations. The risks they face and the experience they gain are appreciated and conceded by those who write and interpret the law. In *Brown v. United States*, 256 U.S. 335 (1921), Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr. noted that "detached reflection cannot be demanded in the presence of an uplifted knife." Sixty-eight years later, in *Graham v. Connor*, 490 U.S. 386 (1989), the Supreme Court wrote that "The 'reasonableness' of a particular use of force must be judged from the perspective of a reasonable officer on the scene, rather than with the 20/20 vision of hindsight." And in *People v. Benjamin*, 51 NY2d 267 (1980), the New York State courts observed that "it would, indeed, be absurd to suggest that a police officer has to await the glint of steel before he can act to preserve his safety."

These rulings explicitly acknowledge the strain under which officers make life-or-death use-of-force decisions. The law should and does provide latitude for those who are delegated the authority to enforce the law and maintain public order.

## Training

Latitude is not unrestricted discretion; rather, it is an admission that reasonableness is fluid. In order to make the right decision about whether and how to use deadly force, an officer in these situations relies on nerve, judgment, skill, and most importantly, training. It is training that sets the officer apart from the civilian, and is an anchor in those dangerous situations that most people never face.

## Investigation and Review Process

The New York City Police Department recognizes the serious nature of police-involved firearms discharges and seeks to record and evaluate every incident. The mandate for recordkeeping was first published in Department Order SOP 9 (s. 1969), but the intervening forty years have greatly refined the NYPD's process. Today, investigations are conducted in accordance with two guiding documents: 1) Patrol Guide Procedure 212-29; and 2) a handbook entitled, "The Firearms Discharge Investigation Manual; The NYPD Guide to the Preparation of a Shooting Incident Report."

## The Shooting Team<sup>3</sup>

When an officer discharges his or her firearm, whether on or off-duty, or when a firearm owned by an officer is discharged by another person, a patrol supervisor responds to the incident, takes command of

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<sup>3</sup> Beginning in June of 2015, the NYPD abolished the shooting team model and replaced it with an investigatory unit, known as the Force Investigation Division (FID) dedicated to officer-involved shootings. The investigation and reporting process described below was applicable to 2014, however.

the scene, and secures and inspects the involved officer's firearm. He or she also immediately notifies the desk officer, who in turn notifies the patrol borough command and operations. A Patrol Borough Shooting Team, led by a shooting-team leader in the rank of captain, is then dispatched. The shooting team is an ad hoc entity that may be comprised of personnel from investigatory units, community affairs units, the Emergency Service Unit, the Firearms and Tactics Section, and/or any other personnel whose training or expertise may prove valuable to the pending investigation.

The shooting-team leader, under the supervision of an inspector, undertakes an in-depth examination of the discharge incident, beginning by contacting and conferring with the district attorney. In many cases, including nearly every case in which a subject is killed or injured, the district attorney will advise that any officer who fired should not be interviewed, in order to preserve the integrity of the grand jury process. Whether or not the district attorney allows an interview, the shooting-team leader will, in every instance, direct the officer who fired to prepare a Firearms Discharge/Assault Report, or FDAR.

If a discharge causes death or injury, the officer who fired is required to submit to an Intoxilyzer 5000EN test to determine whether there is any alcohol in their system. He or she is also automatically reassigned to an administrative position for a minimum of three consecutive work days. Investigations into discharges that cause death or injury are supervised by executives in the rank of chief.

If the discharge incident appears legally or administratively problematic, or if malfeasance is suspected, the shooting-team leader, in conjunction with personnel from the Internal Affairs Bureau, will remove the shooting officer's weapon and modify or suspend his or her duty status. An officer's weapon must also be removed in all instances of self-inflicted injury (absent extenuating circumstances).

Each shooting investigation is thorough and exhaustive, and includes canvasses, witness interviews, subject interviews, evidence collection, crime-scene sketches and investigation, hospital visits, and firearms/ballistics analyses. Afterwards, all available investigatory results are collated into a Shooting Incident Report and forwarded to the Chief of Department, ordinarily within 24 hours of the incident.

## **The Shooting Incident Report**

A preliminary report (usually written within eight hours of the incident) outlines, as much as possible, the shooting incident; however, the rapidly evolving nature of shooting investigations means the report is unavoidably preliminary. The primary means of mitigating this is the use of the Firearms Discharge Investigation Manual.

The manual, in its current incarnation, is a 72-page instruction booklet that provides a template by which shooting-team leaders can produce accurate, data-rich Shooting Incident Reports in a timely manner. It ensures that pertinent questions are asked and relevant avenues of investigation are pursued, even in the wake of a dynamic, sometimes chaotic, incident. Firearms discharges, especially those that occur during adversarial conflict, can be tremendously complex events. The Firearms Discharge Investigation Manual functions as a checklist, promoting both uniformity and specificity.

Each Shooting Incident Report should end with a statement, made with appropriate caveats, assessing whether or not the discharge was consistent with Department guidelines and whether or not the involved officers should be subject to Departmental discipline. Often, if involved officers have not been interviewed, the shooting-team leader may not make a determination, but rather state that the investigation is ongoing. This does not preclude the shooting-team leader from offering a tentative determination or from commenting on the apparent tactics utilized during the incident.

## **The Final Report**

Within 90 days of the incident, the commanding officer of either the precinct of occurrence or the applicable Borough Investigation Unit prepares a finalized version of the Shooting Incident Report. This final report is a reiteration of the original, but includes any clarifications or re-evaluations that may have been developed in the meantime. Because of the speed with which the initial report is prepared, tentative data are unavoidable. Accordingly, the final report will contain material that was not initially available to the shooting team leader (e.g., detective's case files, forensic results, and medical reports).

When discharges that occur during adversarial conflict involve injury or death to a subject, the final report often cannot be finished within the 90-day period. Instead, the final report must wait until the investigation into the incident has been completed, or at least until the district attorney from the county of occurrence has permitted the officer or officers who discharged to be interviewed. At times, it must wait even longer, until all relevant legal proceedings have been concluded.

If a final report is delayed, whether because of ongoing legal proceedings or incomplete investigations, the Borough Investigation Unit submits monthly interim status reports. Once the final report is finished, it is forwarded, through channels, to the Chief of Department.

## **Review**

After a firearms discharge has been investigated, the final report prepared, and after the district attorney's office has determined whether the incident requires prosecutorial action, the NYPD initiates a tertiary examination to assess the event from a procedural and training perspective and, if necessary, to impose discipline. This third layer of oversight is the purview of the Firearms Discharge Advisory Board and the Firearms Discharge Review Board.

## **The Borough Firearms Discharge Advisory Board**

The review of firearms discharges is two-tiered and conducted at the patrol borough and executive levels. Members of the borough Firearms Discharge Advisory Board (FDAB) are supervisors assigned to the patrol borough command, in which the incident occurred, with oversight over the precinct. This board further scrutinizes the incident with the benefit of new material contained in the final report. Based on the accumulated evidence, the patrol borough FDAB issues preliminary findings regarding whether or not the officer's actions violated the Department's firearms guidelines or use-of-force policy. The preliminary

findings, along with a preliminary disciplinary recommendation, are appended to the final report and presented to the Chief of Department's Firearms Discharge Review Board (FDRB) for determination.

### **The Chief of Department's Firearms Discharge Review Board**

The FDRB issues determinations concerning the tactics used during the incident, the propriety of the officer's actions, and the disciplinary action to be taken. The FDRB gives due consideration to, and often concurs with, the original recommendations of the shooting-team leaders and the subsequent findings and recommendations of the borough Advisory Board, but in some cases it overrides, alters, or clarifies the preceding assessments and arrives at new, more accurate findings or more appropriate disciplinary results.

The Chief of Department then produces a Final Summary Report, which is a single document that memorializes and synthesizes the whole exhaustive investigation-and-review process. It is then presented to the Police Commissioner.

### **The Police Commissioner**

The final decision in all matters related to these incidents rests with the Police Commissioner. Using the recommendations from both the Advisory and the Review Boards, the Police Commissioner makes a final determination regarding the incident. Once the Commissioner has issued this final determination, the incident is considered closed. The results of the 2014 findings are published throughout this report.



## Anatomy of a Firearms Discharge Investigation




Figure 1

<b>Glossary</b>	
Officer	A uniformed member of the New York City Police Department of any rank.
Subject	A person engaged in adversarial conflict with an officer or a third party, which results in a firearms discharge.
Civilian	A person who is not the subject of an adversarial conflict, but is a crime-victim, bystander, and/or injured person.
Firearms Discharge	An incident in which an officer discharges any firearm, or when a firearm belonging to an officer is discharged by any person, excluding discharges during authorized training sessions, lawful target practice, or at a firearms safety station within a Department facility.
Intentional Discharge – Adversarial Conflict	An incident in which an officer intentionally discharges a firearm in defense of self, or another, during an adversarial conflict with a subject, including those inside the scope of the officer’s employment but outside Department guidelines. This does not include a discharge against an animal attack.
Mistaken Identity Discharge	An incident in which an officer intentionally discharges a firearm at another law-enforcement officer whom the discharging officer mistakenly believes to be a criminal. This does not include crossfire incidents in which a discharging officer unintentionally strikes another officer.
Intentional Discharge – Animal Attack	An incident in which an officer intentionally discharges a firearm in defense of self, or another, against an animal attack, including those inside the scope of the officer’s employment but outside Department guidelines.
Intentional Discharge – No Conflict	An incident in which an officer intentionally discharges a firearm to summon assistance, including those inside the scope of the officer’s employment but outside Department guidelines.
Unintentional Firearms Discharge	An incident in which an officer discharges a firearm without intent, regardless of the circumstance.
Unauthorized Use of a Firearm	An incident in which an officer intentionally discharges a firearm without proper legal justification and/or outside the scope of the officer’s employment, or an incident in which an unauthorized person discharges an officer’s firearm. This includes suicides.
Use/Threaten the Use of a Firearm	A contributing factor to a firearms discharge in which a subject discharges or threatens to discharge a firearm by displaying a firearm or what reasonably appears to be a firearm, or by simulating a firearm or making a

	gesture indicative of threatening to use a firearm.
Firearm	A pistol, revolver, shotgun, or rifle, including a variation of any of these (e.g., a sawed-off shotgun).
Imitation Firearm	Any instrument that is designed to appear as if it were a firearm, or modified to appear as if it were a firearm, including air pistols, toy guns, prop guns, and replicas.
Use/Threaten the Use of a Cutting Instrument	A contributing factor to a firearms discharge in which a subject cuts, stabs, or slashes a person with any cutting instrument or threatens or attempts to do the same while armed with a cutting instrument or what reasonably appears to be a cutting instrument.
Cutting Instrument	Any knife, razor, sword, or other sharp-edged object such as a broken bottle.
Use/Threaten the Use of a Blunt Instrument	A contributing factor to a firearms discharge in which a subject strikes another person with a blunt instrument or threatens or attempts to do the same while armed with a blunt instrument or what reasonably appears to be a blunt instrument.
Blunt Instrument	Any bat, stick, pipe, metal knuckles, or object which, when used as a weapon, can cause blunt-force injury to a person, including motor vehicles and unbroken bottles.
Use/Threaten the Use of Overwhelming Physical Force	An incident in which an unarmed subject physically attacks a person or threatens or attempts to do the same, and by doing so puts the victim at risk of serious physical injury or death, including gang assaults, attempts to push a person from a roof or train platform, and attempts to take an officer's firearm.

Historical Snapshot, 2004-2014											
	2004	2005	2006	2007	2008	2009	2010	2011	2012	2013	2014
<b>Adversarial Conflict</b>	51	59	59	45	49	47	33	36	45	40	35
<b>Animal Attack</b>	26	32	30	39	30	28	30	36	24	19	18
<b>Unintentional Discharge</b>	27	25	26	15	15	23	21	15	21	12	18
<b>Mistaken Identity</b>	0	0	1	0	0	1	0	0	0	0	0
<b>Unauthorized use of a Firearm</b>	5	6	8	6	3	4	6	2	6	2	4
<b>MOS Suicide/Attempted Suicide</b>	5	3	3	6	8	3	2	3	9	8	4
<b>Total</b>	<b>114</b>	<b>125</b>	<b>127</b>	<b>111</b>	<b>105</b>	<b>106</b>	<b>92</b>	<b>92</b>	<b>105</b>	<b>81</b>	<b>79</b>

Figure 2


**Adversarial Conflict, 2004-2014**

Figure 3


**Animal Attack, 2004-2014**

Figure 4


**Unintentional Discharges, 2004-2014**

Figure 5


**Total Discharge Incidents, 2004-2014**

Figure 6

<b>2013 v. 2014 Snapshot</b>			
<b>Category</b>	<b>2013</b>	<b>2014</b>	<b>Change</b>
Intentional Discharge - Adversarial Conflict	40	35	-12.50%
Intentional Discharge - Animal Attack	19	18	-5.26%
Unintentional Discharge	12	18	50.00%
Unauthorized Use of a Firearm	10	8	-20.00%
<b>Total Firearms Discharges</b>	<b>81</b>	<b>79</b>	<b>-2.47%</b>
Total Officers Firing	98	104	6.12%
Total Shots Fired	248	282	13.71%
Total Officers Shot and Injured by Subjects	3	2	-33.33%
Total Officers Shot and Killed by Subjects	0	2	***.***%
Total Subjects Shot and Injured by Officers during ID-AC	17	14	-17.65%
Total Subjects Shot and Killed by Officers during ID-AC	8	8	0.00%

Figure 7

**2014 by Category****Intentional Discharge - Adversarial Conflict**

Subject Used/Threatened Use of a Firearm	23
Subject Used/Threatened Use of a Cutting Instrument	8
Subject Used/Threatened use of a Blunt Instrument or Vehicle	3
Subject Used/Threatened use of Overwhelming Physical Force	1
<b>Total</b>	<b>35</b>

**Intentional Discharge - Animal Attack**

Dog Attack	18
Other Animal Attack	0
<b>Total</b>	<b>18</b>

**Unintentional Discharge**

During Adversarial Conflict	2
Handling/Cleaning Firearm	16
<b>Total</b>	<b>18</b>

**Unauthorized Use of Firearm**

Suicide	4
Attempted Suicide	0
Unauthorized Person Discharged Officer's Firearm	0
Other	4
<b>Total</b>	<b>8</b>
<b>Total Firearms Discharges</b>	<b>79</b>

Figure 7A

## 2014 Firearms Discharge Scope

2014 Firearms Discharge Scope	
New York Population (U.S. Census, 2013)	8,405,837
NYPD Average Annual Uniformed Staffing	34,857
Total Radio Assignments	4,802,694
Radio Assignments Involving Weapons	66,723
Gun Arrests	4,779
Criminal Shooting Incidents	1,172
Adversarial Conflict: Total Number of Officers Who Intentionally Fired	58
Adversarial Conflict: Total Number of Firearms Discharge Incidents	35
Subjects Shot and Injured during ID-AC	14
Subjects Shot and Killed during ID-AC	8
Officers Shot and Injured during ID-AC	2
Officers Shot and Killed	2

Figure 8

## 2014 Report

### Total Firearms Discharges

In 2014, the Department experienced a continuation in the overall decline in discharge incidents (See Figure 2). In fact, 2014 saw the lowest recorded level of discharge incidents since recording began in 1971. In particular, the most serious category of discharges (Intentional Discharge – Adversarial Conflict) also mirrors this trend, down 31% since 2004, and 13% since 2013 (See Figure 7). In a city of 8.4 million, from a Department of approximately 35,000 uniformed officers, 58 officers were involved in a total of 35 incidents of intentional firearms discharges during adversarial conflict, resulting in 14 injured subjects, and eight killed (See Figure 8).

These data are a testament to police officers' restraint, diligence, and honorable performance of duty. But they also show that, over the past four decades, attacks on both police and citizens have steadily declined. The drastic reduction in violent crime over the past 25 years is sociologically reflexive: as crime decreases, criminals and police enter into less criminal conflict.

This report is subdivided into five categories. Each category is analyzed based only on the information in that category, allowing the Department to understand specific types of incidents and adjust training and policy to continue to reduce them. Nevertheless, the relatively small sample studied for the report (79 discharge incidents, 35 in the Adversarial Conflict category) can limit the predictive value and conclusions that may be derived.

The report contains information compiled from preliminary and final Shooting Incident Reports, detective case files, medical examiner's reports, Firearms Discharge Assault Reports, arrest and complaint reports, Firearms Analysis Section reports, Firearms Discharge Review Board findings, and previous Annual Firearms Discharge Reports.

Because of rounding, some charts may not precisely equal 100%.

### Categories

- **Intentional Discharge – Adversarial Conflict:** when an officer intentionally discharges his or her firearm during a confrontation with a subject
- **Intentional Discharge – Animal Attack:** when an officer intentionally discharges his or her firearm to defend against an animal attack
- **Unintentional Discharge:** when an officer unintentionally discharges his or her firearm
- **Unauthorized Use of a Firearm:** when an officer intentionally discharges his or her firearm outside the scope of his or her employment, or when another person illegally discharges an officer's firearm
- **Mistaken Identity:** when an officer intentionally fires on another officer in the mistaken belief that the other officer is a criminal subject



The possibility of a sixth category, *Intentional Discharge – No Conflict*, exists, but its occurrence is extremely uncommon. *Intentional Discharge – No Conflict* involves an officer discharging his or her firearm to summon assistance. Because of the rarity of this type of discharge, it is not regularly tracked in the annual report, but is addressed on an as-it-occurs basis. In 2014, no such discharge occurred; no such discharge has occurred in more than a decade.

## Part II: Intentional Discharge – Adversarial Conflict

## Overview

There were 35 incidents of intentional firearms discharge during adversarial conflict (ID-AC) in 2014, constituting a 13% decrease from 2013 (See Figure 7). In total, 58 officers were involved in these incidents, a 5% increase from the previous year.

Thirty-five subjects were involved in ID-AC incidents in 2014, 22 of whom were shot in the course of the conflict, a 12% decrease overall from 2013 (See Figure 7). While the number of subject deaths as a result of ID-AC incidents was maintained in 2014 from 2013 (eight vs. eight), the number of subject injuries decreased by 18%.

Two officers were shot and injured by criminals in ID-AC incidents 2014, one fewer than 2013, and significantly lower than the 13 incidents recorded in 2012. Both officers were shot in separate ID-AC incidents; neither officer suffered a wound that could have been mitigated by a bullet-resistant vest<sup>4</sup>. No officer was struck by crossfire in 2014, and, despite two line-of-duty deaths by firearm in 2014,<sup>5</sup> no officer died during an ID-AC incident.

On 11 occasions, officers intervened in attacks on civilians (six in firearms attacks and three in stabbings). On one occasion, officers interrupted a subject who was firing indiscriminately into a crowd.

## Dates and Times of Discharges


The distribution of ID-AC incidents was extremely consistent throughout the year. With the exceptions of December, which had one, August, which had three, and May, which had five, either two or four incidents were recorded in every month (See Appendix E).

ID-AC incidents were most likely to occur on a Sunday (ten incidents), and least likely to occur on a Tuesday or Wednesday (two incidents each). This is in contrast to 2013, which recorded Sunday as the day with the fewest number of incidents.

In 2014, more than half (57%) of the incidents occurred during the third platoon (between 3:30 pm and 11:30 pm), consistent with 2013 which recorded 55% (See Figure 9).

Ten, or 17%, of the officers had been working more than eight hours at the time of the incident.

**ID-AC Incidents by Tour, 2014**



*Figure 9*

<sup>4</sup> One officer was shot and injured during the execution of an arrest warrant in 2014. The officer was hit in the vest and survived. Because the officer was unable to return fire, this incident is not reported in this analysis.

<sup>5</sup> Detectives Ramos and Liu were ambushed and unable to return fire. Therefore, that incident is not counted in this section but the officer deaths are discussed in Appendix A and, along with the above injured officer, are tallied in Appendix B.

## Locations of Discharges

In 2014, all 35 ID-AC incidents occurred within the borders of New York City. More than half of 2014's incidents occurred in Brooklyn, while nearly a quarter occurred in the Bronx (See Figure 10).

ID-AC incidents occurred in 25 separate precincts, eight of which had multiple incidents. The 71<sup>st</sup> and 75<sup>th</sup> precincts had the most incidents at three each; this is a decrease from 2013, when a single precinct recorded five incidents.

### ID-AC Incidents by Borough




Figure 10

and location of police involved shootings; this proportionality is visible at the borough level in figure 12. Despite this correlation, the number of ID-AC incidents (35) is comparatively small against the backdrop of City-wide criminal shootings, with police involved in only 3% of total shootings for the city in 2014 (See Figure 13).

### Locations of Criminal Shootings

The locations of ID-AC incidents largely correspond with wider geographic crime patterns, which can be seen when comparing ID-AC locations to locations of criminal shootings. Figure 11 depicts the 35 ID-AC incidents overlaying the locations of the 1,172 criminal shootings that occurred in New York City in 2014. The map shows that police firearms discharges occur in those areas of the city already suffering from high gun violence.

Since the introduction of this map in the 2007 Firearms Discharge Report, this correlation has been preserved. The frequency of criminal gun activity within New York City directly, and proportionally, affects the frequency

# ID-AC Incidents vs Criminal Shooting Incidents




Figure 11

ID-AC Incidents vs Criminal Shooting Incidents, Percentage by Borough




Figure 12

ID-AC Incidents vs Criminal Shooting Incidents, Frequency by Borough




Figure 13

## Location Type

At 69%, the majority of ID-AC incidents occurred outdoors, and primarily on streets or sidewalks (See Figure 14). Thirty-one ID-AC incidents were within the jurisdiction of patrol precincts, and four were on New York City Housing Authority (NYCHA) property.

Of these four ID-AC incidents that occurred on NYCHA property, two were in Brooklyn (one in the Bushwick houses and one in the Farragut houses), one in the Bronx (in the Patterson houses), and one in Manhattan (in the Washington houses).

### ID-AC Incidents by Location Type





Figure 14

## Reasons Officer Involved

Officers become involved in ID-AC incidents for a variety of reasons. Mirroring 2013, at 98%, the vast majority of the ID-AC incidents involved officers who were on-duty. The single officer who became involved while off-duty intervened to protect fellow officers who were in pursuit of a suspect. The majority of officers (72%) were in uniform, and most (91%) were assigned to the Patrol or Housing Bureaus.

The majority of officers (63%) were either on uniformed foot posts or in sector cars assigned to respond to calls for service from the public when they became involved in ID-AC incidents (See Figure 15). Although officers assigned to plain-clothes, anti-crime, and conditions units represent a small proportion of the Department's uniformed personnel, 26% of ID-AC incidents involved these officers. This is almost certainly attributable to their mandate to proactively seek criminals rather than answer calls for service. The variety of scenarios that precipitated the involvement of these officers in ID-AC encounters is indicative of an officer's need for perpetual vigilance.

**On-Duty Officer Assignment Type Per Incident, ID-AC Incidents***Figure 15*

As discussed, the variety of situations precipitating officers becoming involved in ID-AC incidents was broad. The most common was encountering armed subjects or shots fired while on routine patrol (26%) (See Figure 16). The “Pick Up: Other” category includes three instances of furtive behavior, one instance of reckless driving, and one instance of theft of service on an MTA bus as the precipitating factors of ID-AC encounters. Forty-seven percent of incidents occurred as a result of pick-up assignments (situations that officers encounter on patrol without being directed to a location by a dispatcher); when inclusive of the three incidents involving on-duty officers who experienced an attack or robbery, this percentage climbs to 56%.



### Situations Precipitating On-Duty ID-AC Incidents




Figure 16

### Threat Type

Department policy requires officers who intentionally discharge their firearms during ID-AC incidents to do so only as a means of defending themselves or others from imminent serious physical injury or death.

The subjects involved in ID-AC incidents utilized a variety of weapons when confronting officers. Twenty-three subjects in 23 incidents possessed firearms: 15 were semi-automatic pistols, seven were revolvers, and one incident involved a subject armed with a shotgun. Cutting instruments were predominantly knives, although in one instance officers were attacked—and two were seriously injured—with a hatchet. Two of the three blunt instruments in that category were moving vehicles (See Figure 17).

### Threat type - ID-AC Incidents




Figure 17

### Officer Restraint

Officers discharged a total of 201 rounds during ID-AC incidents in 2014, an increase of 24% from 2013 when 162 rounds were fired, but still 39% lower than the total of 331 recorded in 2012. The majority of officers fired five or fewer rounds (77%). The most common number of rounds fired by an officer was one (41%). No individual officer fired more than 12 times, or was required to reload his or her firearm during an incident (See Figure 18).

Restraint is also apparent when analyzing the number of shots fired per ID-AC incident as opposed to per officer. The most common number of rounds fired during any incident was also one (43%); this figure includes two fatal shootings in which only one round was fired (See Figure 19). The most rounds fired during any one incident was 29.

**Rounds Fired per ID-AC Officer**




Figure 18

**Rounds fired per ID-AC Incident**




Figure 19

## Objective Completion Rate

The Department does not consider hit percentages, in part because it is often unknown (e.g., in cases when a subject flees), and also because of the widely varying circumstances among incidents. Instead, the objective completion rate per incident is employed, as it is both more accurate and more instructive. Like combat itself, the objective completion rate per incident is pass/fail. When an officer properly and lawfully perceives a threat severe enough to require the use of his or her firearm, and fires at a specific threat, the most relevant measure is whether he or she ultimately stops the threat. This is the objective completion rate, and it is determined irrespective of the number of shots the officer fired at the subject. The objective completion rate is used for statistical purposes and is not a factor in individual investigations.

In 2014, officers hit at least one subject in 22 of the 35 ID-AC incidents, for an objective completion rate of 63%. Because the subject of one incident was not apprehended, the objective completion rate may be higher. During six incidents in 2014 in which officers were fired upon, officers hit at least one subject in four of those six incidents, for an objective completion rate of 66%; all six subjects were apprehended in the wake of these encounters. In a further incident of returned fire from officers, the subject was unapprehended. As such, the objective completion rate may again be higher than listed here.

## Officer Firearms

In 2014, every officer involved in ID-AC incidents (both on and off-duty) discharged their on-duty service firearm: 30 were Glocks, 15 were Smith & Wessons, and 13 were Sig Sauers. Department regulations allow officers to carry their on-duty service firearms while off-duty, and authorized off-duty firearms as secondary weapons while on-duty. No officer reported a firearms malfunction.

## Shooting Technique

Utilizing a two-handed grip, standing, carefully lining up a target and using the firearm's sights is not always practical during adversarial conflict. Of the officers who reported how they held their firearms: 63% utilized a two-handed, supported position, and the rest fired with one hand. Of the officers who reported their stance: 56% were standing, 33% were moving, and 11% were seated.

Lack of cover can be a factor in the need for a firearms discharge, because a protected defensive position may allow officers to better control the pace of an incident. Only three officers reported that they were able to take cover during ID-AC incidents, one behind a vehicle, one behind a display rack, and the remaining incident unspecified.

Twenty-six officers provided information about how far they were from their targets during ID-AC incidents.

Although officers are trained to fire on a target from as far away as seventy-five feet, all but one officer reported that he was 15 feet or fewer from the target at the time of the shooting (See Figure 20).

Twenty-eight officers provided information about light conditions at the time of their ID-AC encounters: 36% reported poor or dark lighting, and 10% of these reported that they were able to use their flashlights.

## Officer Pedigree

Of the 58 officers who intentionally discharged their firearms during ID-AC incidents in 2014, four were female (7%) and 54 were male (93%); 18% of the Department's uniformed personnel are female and 82% are male.

Considering current data and data from prior years, no discernible pattern emerges with regard to the likelihood that an officer of any particular race will become involved in an ID-AC incident (See Figure 21).

**ID-AC Distance to Target  
(in feet)**




Figure 20

There is a greater likelihood that officers in the rank of police officer and those with fewer years of service will become involved in ID-AC incidents. Officers in the rank of police officer were involved in 88% of ID-AC incidents in 2014, although they accounted for 65% of the uniformed members of service. Similarly, officers with ten years of service or less were involved in 82% of ID-AC incidents, although they accounted for 54% of uniformed members of the service. These officers are more likely to be assigned to patrol roles and assignments that increase their chances of being involved in an ID-AC incident over those of longer tenured officers or officers of higher rank (See Figures 22 & 23).

### Race, ID-AC Officers v. Department Staffing




Figure 21

### Years of Service, ID-AC Officers v. Department Staffing




Figure 22

### Rank, ID-AC Officers v. Department Staffing




Figure 23

## Subject Pedigree

There were 34 apprehended subjects involved in ID-AC incidents in 2014, and one incident that involved an un-apprehended subject, who is known by sex and race.

Of the 35 subjects, 33 were male and two were female. Known subject ages ranged from 16 to 49, but a single incident involved an 86-year-old perpetrator, giving a median age range of 51 (or 32 exclusive of the outlier). Forty-seven percent were 26 years of age or younger.

The race of a criminal suspect is determined by eyewitness reports, usually that of the victim(s). The race of a subject is determined by a subject's self-identification, existing government-issued documentation, racial/ethnic physical characteristics, medical examiner reports, or other factors.

The race of subjects involved in ID-AC incidents corresponds to the race of subjects involved in criminal shootings (See Figure 24). Similarly, victims of criminal shootings tend to come from the same communities as the suspects. Among criminal-shooting victims identified by race in New York City in 2014, 75% were black, 21% were Hispanic, 2% were white, and 2% were Asian or other.

### Criminal Shooting Suspects vs ID-AC Subjects, by Race




Figure 24

### Prior Arrests

Generally, a subject's arrest history is unknown to the officer at the onset of an incident. Nevertheless, arrest history is pertinent because it is indicative of a subject's propensity for criminal conduct and capacity for violence when confronting a police officer. It can evince itself in a subject's bearing, actions, and reactions. An arrest history, pending charges, or parole/probation status may also make a subject more willing to confront a police officer in an attempt to avoid arrest.

One subject was un-apprehended and his criminal history could not be identified. Of the known subjects, three had no criminal history, one of whom suffered from mental illness and was not in possession of her correct prescription medication at the time of the incident. The remaining two subjects without criminal histories were in the process of committing crimes when the shootings occurred; one pointed a firearm at an officer and one had just stabbed a civilian and was advancing on responding officers in a menacing manner.

Of the 31 subjects with a criminal history, 27 had multiple prior arrests, ranging from two to 26. These arrests were for numerous offenses, including murder, robbery, and assault. The median number of prior arrests for ID-AC subjects was seven.

## Officer Deaths

No officers were killed during ID-AC incidents. Two officers were assassinated by a perpetrator in 2014, but because the officers did not discharge their firearms during the incident, the details of this event are not included statistically in this report.

## Officer Injuries

Five officers were injured in the course of ID-AC incidents<sup>6</sup>. Two were struck by a subject's bullets, one of whom was able to return fire causing the subject to flee. One officer sustained lacerations and a fractured skull as a result of an assault with a crowbar, and one officer sustained wounds to his head and another to his arm as a result of an assault with a hatchet.

## Bullet-Resistant Vests

All 57 on-duty officers who were involved in ID-AC incidents in 2014 were wearing bullet-resistant vests. The single off-duty officer involved in an ID-AC incident was not wearing his vest. No officer was struck in the torso by a subject's weapon, and as such, no case of an officer being saved by their vest was recorded in ID-AC incidents 2014<sup>7</sup>.

## Subject Deaths

Of the 34 known subjects involved in ID-AC incidents in 2014, eight were killed by police gunfire. This figure is maintained from 2013, but down 50% from 2012 when 16 subjects were shot and killed by police officers. The number of subjects shot and killed in 2014 represents, along with 2013 and 2010, the lowest number recorded since the Department began collecting in-depth statistics in 1971. Seven of the eight subjects had prior arrest histories, and, of the six toxicology reports available at time of writing, four showed the presence of narcotics or alcohol. Six of the eight were armed with cutting instruments and two were armed with firearms. Narratives describing the eight ID-AC incidents in which subjects were killed can be found in Appendix C.

## Subject Injuries

Thirteen subjects were shot and injured by police gunfire in 2014, 13 of whom had prior arrests. Nine were armed with firearms, two were armed with cutting instruments, one was using a vehicle as a weapon, and one was unarmed but physically attacking the officer.

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<sup>6</sup> One officer was shot and injured during the execution of an arrest warrant in 2014. The officer was hit in the vest and survived. Because the officer was unable to return fire, this incident is not reported in this analysis.

<sup>7</sup> Ibid.

## **Bystander Deaths and Injuries**

Two bystanders were injured by police bullets in 2014 in two separate incidents during ID-AC incidents. One was struck in the left upper thigh and the other in the lower right back; both were subsequently listed as stable. In a separate incident, a victim of a violent assault was inadvertently struck and killed by police gunfire when officers attempted to prevent the perpetrator from attacking others.

## **Discipline**

Even when intentional firearms discharges are deemed justifiable in a court of law, they are still reviewed by the Department for tactical errors and violations of procedure. Discipline in these cases does not always relate to the actual discharge of the firearm, but can result from a violation of other Department procedures. Additionally, all officers who discharge their firearms are sent to a firearms retraining course, regardless of the circumstances of the discharge.

Of the four investigations that have been completed at the time of this report, three were determined to have been in compliance with Department procedures and the law, and one was found to be in violation of Department guidelines. Thirty-one cases are pending.

## **Summary**

There were 35 ID-AC incidents in 2014, involving 58 officers who discharged their firearms. These conflicts involved 34 known subjects and one un-apprehended subject, including seven subjects who fired directly at officers.

In 2014, there were 1,391 victims of criminal shootings in New York City. The number of intentional firearms discharges by police, comparatively, is very small, but every time an officer discharges a firearm he or she risks inflicting injury or death on subjects, fellow police officers, or innocent bystanders. And in 2014, two bystanders were injured and one was killed by police gunfire. Because of this, the Department ensures that each incident is thoroughly investigated and analyzed in order to reduce these events, thereby reducing the likelihood of harm to civilians and officers alike.

There were, on average, 34,857 uniformed officers employed by the NYPD in 2014. Of them, only 58 (0.17%) intentionally discharged a firearm at a subject.

Other instructive metrics involve comparing the number of ID-AC incidents to the number of high risk radio runs, or to the number of arrests of armed suspects made by officers each year. Over the course of 2014, officers responded to more than 4.5 million calls for service, of which more than 65,000 involved weapons. Of the thousands of weapons arrests that resulted from these encounters, 4,779 were gun-related. Officers also had millions of additional interactions with the public, including reasonable suspicion encounters, car stops, and violation stops, and further, escorted thousands of emotionally disturbed persons to hospitals and care facilities. In the overwhelming majority of incidents in which officers took an armed subject or an emotionally disturbed person into custody, they did not fire their weapons.



## Part III: Intentional Discharge – Animal Attack

## Overview

Department policy requires officers who intentionally discharge their firearms during animal attacks to do so only to defend themselves or others from the threat of physical injury, serious physical injury, or death, and to use their firearm only as a last resort to stop an animal attack. Officers are equipped with non-lethal tools that can be used to cope with animal attacks, including batons and OC spray, but these options are not always feasible or effective. Emergency Service Unit personnel carry restraining devices to keep animals at a safe distance, as well as CO<sub>2</sub> pistols and rifles capable of firing tranquilizer darts containing Ketaset, a veterinary anesthetic, and Animal Care and Control is also available to assist officers in capturing dangerous dogs or other animals. In rapidly evolving situations, however, when officers may not have prior knowledge that a dog is present, these options are not always prudent or possible.

There were 18 intentional firearms discharges during an animal attack (ID-AA) in 2014, a 5% decrease from 2013. All 18 were on-duty incidents, one of which involved both on and off-duty members. A total of 20 officers discharged their firearms. Two incidents involved two shooting officers, and 16 incidents involved one shooting officer.

A total of 24 animals were involved, all of them dogs; there were two incidents involving two dogs and two incidents involving three dogs. Two officers were bitten. One officer and one civilian were shot during ID-AA incidents. Of the 24 dogs involved, nine were killed. An additional nine dogs were injured. Sixteen of the dogs were Pit Bulls, one was a Chow-chow, and one was a Rottweiler.

**ID-AA Incidents by Tour**




Figure 25

These numbers do not encompass all dog attacks on officers or civilians; only incidents involving intentional firearms discharges by police officers are included. In 2014, police officers responded to thousands of calls for service involving dogs and other animals, and they encountered many more while on patrol, executing search warrants, or investigating complaints—incidents that were not processed through 911 or 311.

## Dates and Times of Discharges

ID-AA incidents occurred fairly evenly throughout the year in 2014. March had the most incidents with three, and December had no incidents.

ID-AA incidents occurred most often on Friday (six incidents), with four on Tuesday, three on Monday, and between one and two on Thursday, Saturday, and Sunday; there were no incidents on Wednesday. The majority of these incidents occurred during the third platoon, between 1530 in the afternoon and 2330 at night (See Figure 25).

# ID-AA Incidents




Figure 26

Locations of Discharges

All 18 ID-AA incidents in 2014 took place within New York City—17 within the jurisdiction of patrol precincts and one on New York City Housing Authority (Brooklyn) property. No incidents took place within the Metropolitan Transportation Authority transit system. In 2014, Brooklyn and Queens accounted for the most ID-AA incidents (six incidents each) (See Figure 27). ID-AA incidents occurred in 13 separate precincts, including one precinct that had three incidents (75 precinct) and three precincts that had two incidents (44, 47, 73, and 101 precincts). Nine ID-AA incidents occurred outdoors, and nine occurred indoors. More incidents occurred inside of residential locations and their common areas than any other location type; this category includes both outdoor (e.g. courtyards) and indoor (e.g. hallways) locations (See Figure 28).

ID-AA Incidents by Borough




Figure 27

ID-AA Incidents by Location Type




Figure 28

Reasons Officer Involved

Officers became involved in ID-AA incidents for a variety of reasons. All 20 officers were on-duty at the time of the incident. Fifteen officers were in uniform and five officers were attired in plainclothes. Twelve were assigned to the Patrol Services Bureau, three were assigned to the Narcotics Division, two were

assigned to the Housing Bureau, two were assigned to the Warrants Section, and one was assigned to the Emergency Services Unit.

Officers were assigned to a variety of duties when they became involved in ID-AA incidents, the most common of which was uniformed patrol (12 officers) (See Figure 29).

### On-Duty Officer Assignment, ID-AA Incidents




Figure 29

The most common single reason that led to officers becoming involved in ID-AA incidents were search warrants, comprising six (33%) of the 18 total animal attack incidents. The second largest category, “Radio Run – Other,” comprises two different types of 911 calls that precipitated ID-AA incidents: three disputes and one wellness check. The single vertical patrol took place in the confines of a New York City Housing Authority location (See Figure 30).

### Situations Precipitating ID-AA Incidents




Figure 30

## Officer Restraint

A total of 44 rounds were fired by officers during ID-AA incidents in 2014, a decrease of 17% from 2013, when 53 rounds were fired. The majority of officers fired either one or two rounds. The most common number of rounds fired was one. No officer fired more than five times, or was required to reload his or her firearm during an incident (See Figure 32).

Restraint is also apparent when analyzing the number of shots fired per ID-AA incident. In 44% of incidents, only one round in total was fired. The most rounds fired during any incident were six (See Figure 31).

### Rounds Fired per ID-AA Incident




Figure 31

## Objective Completion Rate

In 2014, officers struck at least one animal during 15 ID-AA incidents, for an objective completion rate of 83%. This is significantly higher than the objective completion rate for ID-AC incidents. A likely explanation for this higher rate of completion is that, where listed, officers involved in ID-AA incidents were predominantly between one and five feet from the animal when they fired.

## Firearms

All 20 officers who fired during ID-AA incidents in 2014 utilized their service 9mms—12 were Glocks, four were Smith & Wessons, and four were Sig Sauers. One officer reported a malfunction during an animal attack incident.

## Shooting Techniques

Utilizing a two-handed grip, standing, and lining up a target using the firearm's sights is the preferred method of discharging a firearm, but the fast-paced nature of dog attacks often makes this impossible. Seventeen of the 20 officers who discharged their firearm during an animal attack incident reported their grip. Forty-one percent utilized a two-handed supported grip, while the remaining 59% reported that they held their firearm with one hand. Of the 15 officers who reported on their use of sights, 27% were able to employ them during the incident, and 73% were unable. Fourteen officers reported their stance; 13 were standing and one was moving.

All but one officer reported his or her distance; all of these officers discharged their firearms when the dogs were between zero and six feet away; 63% fired when the dog was within two feet or closer. Three officers were able to take cover during an animal attack; two were behind ballistic shields, and one was behind a police vehicle.

Fifteen officers reported on light conditions; eight reported adequate light, four reported poor or dark lighting, and three reported that they used their flashlights.

## Officer Pedigree

Of the 20 officers who intentionally discharged their firearms during ID-AA incidents in 2014, one was female and 19 were male; 18% of the Department's uniformed personnel are female and 82% are male.

Considering current data and data from prior years, no discernable pattern emerges with regard to the likelihood that an officer of any particular race will become involved in an ID-AA incident. There is a greater likelihood that officers in the ranks of police officer or detective and those with fewer years of service will become involved in ID-AA incidents. These officers are more likely to be assigned to respond to calls involving animal attacks, to conduct vertical patrols, to effect arrests, and to conduct other assignments that are more likely to precipitate ID-AA incidents (See Figures 33 & 34).

**Rounds Fired per ID-AA Officer**




Figure 32

**Race, ID-AA Officers vs Department Staffing**




Figure 33

**Years of Service, ID-AA Officers vs Department Staffing**




Figure 34



**Rank, ID-AA Officers vs Department Staffing**




Figure 35

**Incident Outcomes**

As of June 2015, the Firearms Discharge Review Board has issued findings in 11 ID-AA incidents, and found no violation of Department firearms guidelines in any. As such, no corrective action or re-training was recommended for any of the officers involved. Seven cases are pending.

## Part IV: Unintentional Discharge

## Overview

There were 18 incidents of unintentional firearms discharges in 2014, a 50% increase from 2013, when there were 12. All eighteen incidents involved a single officer, and all except one resulted in a single discharge; in the outlying incident two rounds were fired.

Four incidents resulted in injuries to four officers, in the left hand, pinky finger, left leg, and right buttock, respectively. One bystander was shot and killed as a result of an alleged unintentional discharge. That officer has been indicted and, at the time of this report, he is currently on trial.

Eight unintentional discharges occurred while the officer was off-duty, and 10 occurred on duty. Six occurred outside (two in the parking lot of department facilities, two in vehicles, one in a public parking lot, and one on a street), and 12 occurred inside (five inside officers' residences, four inside Department stationhouses, two inside residences during radio runs or vertical patrol, and one at a hospital firearm safety station).

## Non-Adversarial Unintentional Discharges

Non-adversarial unintentional discharges occur when an officer is loading or unloading, cleaning, or otherwise handling a firearm. In 2014, 16 of the 18 total unintentional discharges were non-adversarial, and therefore fall into this category.

### Loading/Unloading

Two of the unintentional discharge incidents that occurred in 2014 were related to loading/unloading. One officer was off-duty and was reloading her off-duty firearm when the slide unlocked and initiated a discharge. The second officer was on-duty, within the confines of a hospital, and was attempting to unload her service firearm at a designated safety station when the discharge occurred. Although current policy incentivizes the use of firearms safety stations by not defining discharges at NYPD safety stations as unintentional discharge incidents, this does not apply to safety stations in civilian locations, and as such, this incident has been included in the total.

### Handling

The remaining 14 non-adversarial unintentional discharges were a result of handling unrelated to loading/unloading. Five of these incidents transpired during firearm cleaning, and resulted in two injuries to officers (left hand and pinky finger). Three of the incidents occurred off-duty in private residences, and two incidents occurred on-duty in precinct stationhouses. Of the remaining nine, two occurred in vehicles while the firearm was holstered, two occurred when an officer was holstering his service weapon, one when an officer was removing his un-holstered off-duty weapon from his waistband, and one occurred

during the recovery of a subject's weapon from a vehicle door. Finally, three occurred in the course of general handling, with one of these incidents resulting in the death of a bystander.

## **Adversarial Unintentional Discharges**

Unintentional discharges during adversarial conflict or animal attack occur during the course of lawful police conduct and are brought about either wholly, or in part, by aggravating factors, such as a suspect grabbing an officer's firearm, an officer losing his or her balance, or when an officer's shooting hand is struck by an object. In 2014, just two of the 18 total unintentional discharges occurred during an adversarial conflict or animal attack.

In the first incident, while clearing an apartment in response to a radio run, an ESU officer entered a utility room and was struck in the helmet by an unknown object. The strike caused the officer to lose grip of his firearm, and in the attempt to secure his grip discharged one round.

In the second incident, an off-duty officer was the victim of a violent robbery, during which a struggle for the officer's firearm ensued. As a result of this struggle, two rounds were discharged.

## **Firearms**

Of the 18 firearms that were unintentionally discharged in 2014, nine were the officer's service weapons, seven were authorized off-duty firearms, one was a legally owned private firearm, and one was a suspect's recovered firearm. Nine of the firearms were Glocks, five were Smith and Wesson, two were Sig Sauers, one was a Colt, and one was a Davis.

## **Officer Pedigree**

Of the 18 officers who unintentionally discharged firearms in 2014, 16 were male and two were female; 82% of the Department's uniformed personnel are male and 18% are female.

Although the percentages of white and black officers involved in unintentional discharge are, to varying extents, at odds with their representation within the Department, the sample size of officers involved in unintentional discharges is just 18, or 0.05% of the Department's uniformed personnel. These figures are therefore not useful in determining the likelihood that an officer of any particular race will become involved in an unintentional firearms discharge (See Figure 36).

### Race, Unintentional Discharges v. Department Staffing




Figure 36

Officers with fewer years of service were more likely to be involved in unintentional firearms discharges. Of the officers with five years of service or fewer, two had graduated from the Police Academy less than a year before the discharge occurred (See Figure 37).

### Years of Service, Unintentional Discharges v. Department Staffing




Figure 37

Of the officers involved, 16 were police officers, one was a sergeant, and one was a captain (See Figure 38).

Rank, Unintentional Discharges v. Department Staffing




Figure 38

Incident Outcomes

The Department investigates all unintentional firearms discharges thoroughly. Of the investigations that have been completed at the time of this report (September 2015), the Firearms Discharge Review Board found that officers were in violation of Department guidelines in thirteen cases and committed no violation in one. The recommended discipline for involved officers ranged from none to *Charges and Specifications*. Retraining on relevant tactics was recommended in nine cases. Five cases are pending. In the case of the discharge that caused the bystander’s death, that investigation is on hold and the case is tentatively deemed as an unintentional discharge pending the outcome of the criminal trial.

## Part V: Unauthorized Use of a Firearm

## Overview

There were eight firearms discharges in 2014 that were determined to be unauthorized, a 20% decrease from 2013, when ten unauthorized use of a firearm incidents were recorded. Four incidents were officer suicides, one was an unintentional discharge by an officer unfit for duty, one was an officer firing at an unoccupied vehicle, one was an officer firing into the air, and one was an officer firing at an adjacent vehicle resulting in critical injuries to a passenger.

## Officer Pedigree

Of the eight officers who were involved in unauthorized firearms discharges in 2014, one was female and seven were male; four were white, two were black, one was Hispanic, and one was Asian. One had between zero and five years of service, three had between six and ten years of service, two had between 11 and 15 years of service, and two had more than 20 years of service. Five officers held the rank of police officer, two were detectives, and one was a sergeant.

Because the sample size of officers involved in unauthorized firearms discharges is only eight, or 0.02% of the Department's uniformed personnel, these statistics are not useful in determining the likelihood that an officer of any particular pedigree will become involved in an unauthorized firearms discharge.

## Suicide

Four police officers committed suicide by firearm in 2014, including two apparent suicides; all four suicides were committed off-duty (See Figure 39\*).

The Department and a number of external organizations provide mental health resources specifically targeted to uniformed members of the service who may be at risk for suicide. Department resources include the Employee Assistance Unit, the Counseling Services Unit, the Chaplain's Unit, the NYPD Helpline, and the Psychological Evaluation Unit. External resources include Police Officers Providing Peer Assistance (POPPA), the Police Self Support Group, and Columbia Cares (COPE). The Department actively promotes these resources to all uniformed police members of the service.

*\*Because of the focus of this report Figure 39 depicts officer suicides by firearm only. Suicides or attempted suicides by other methods were not included.*



### Police Officer Suicides by Firearm, 2004-2014




Figure 39

### Discharges by Other than an Officer

There were no incidents of unauthorized use of a firearm in 2014 in which someone other than an officer discharged an officer's gun.

### Incident Outcomes

The Department investigates all incidents of unauthorized use of a firearm thoroughly. In the rare case of an unauthorized discharge other than suicide, the disciplinary process will be initiated against the officer discharging the weapon, and/or the officer charged with the security of the weapon. In cases of serious misconduct, officers are arrested, suspended, and eventually terminated for their actions.

As of the time of this report, the Firearms Discharge Review Board has found that three officers violated Department guidelines during an incident involving the unauthorized use of a firearm in 2014. Two cases were suicide and one was an officer discharging his firearm into the air. The remaining five cases are pending. In the case of an officer discharging his firearm into a vehicle, causing injury to two bystanders, that officer has plead guilty to attempted murder and is serving 9 years.

## Part VI: Mistaken Identity

## Overview

The Department defines an incident of mistaken identity as one in which a New York City police officer fires on any law-enforcement agent in the mistaken belief that the subject officer is a criminal and poses an imminent physical threat. Mistaken identity incidents are distinguished from crossfire incidents in that the shooting officer is intentionally firing on the targeted officer. Unintentional crossfire incidents and accidental discharges resulting in injury or death to fellow officers are not included in this category. Unauthorized discharges, in which an officer injures or kills another officer in a criminal manner (e.g., domestic incidents), are also excluded. This definition comports with the 2010 New York State Task Force on Police-on-Police Shootings' definition of "Police-on-Police Confrontations."

## 2014 Incidents

In 2014 there were no incidents of mistaken identity.

## Appendices

## Appendix A – Tribute

### **DETECTIVE FIRST GRADE WENJIAN LIU**

*84 Precinct*



On December 20, 2014, Police Officer WenJian Liu and his partner, Police Officer Rafael Ramos, both assigned to the 84 Precinct, were sitting in their patrol car performing duty in the 79 Precinct as a Critical Response Vehicle (CRV) Post at the corner of Tompkins and Myrtle Avenues. A man approached their RMP and unprovoked, assassinated Police Officer Liu and his partner, Police Officer Ramos. Shortly thereafter, the gunman took his own life.

Police Officer Liu first joined the New York City Police Department as an auxiliary police officer. He was sworn in as a New York City police officer in July 2007. After completing training at the Police Academy, he was assigned to the 73 Precinct. One year later, he was transferred to the 84 Precinct.

He is survived by his wife, Pei Xia Chen, and his parents, Xiu Yan Li and Wei Tang Liu. Police Officer Liu held an Associate in Applied Science degree in Accounting from the City University of New York. On December 27, 2014, Police

Commissioner William J. Bratton posthumously promoted Police Officer Wen Jian Liu to Detective First Grade.

### **DETECTIVE FIRST GRADE RAFAEL L. RAMOS**

*84 Precinct*



On December 20, 2014, Police Officer Rafael L. Ramos and his partner, Police Officer Wen Jian Liu, both assigned to the 84 Precinct, were sitting in their patrol car performing duty in the 79 Precinct as a Critical Response Vehicle (CRV) Post at the corner of Tompkins and Myrtle Avenues. A man approached their RMP and unprovoked, assassinated Police Officer Ramos and his partner, Police Officer Liu. Shortly thereafter, the gunman took his own life.

Police Officer Ramos joined the New York City Police Department in August 2009, as a School Safety Agent assigned to the 122 Precinct School Safety Unit, on Staten Island. In January 2012, he was sworn in as a New York City police officer fulfilling his life-long dream of becoming one of New York's Finest. He began his career as an officer assigned to the 79 Precinct as part of the command's Impact Zone. In November 2013, Police Officer Ramos was transferred to the 84 Precinct.

Police Officer Ramos is survived by his wife, Maritza; two sons: Justin, 18, and Jaden, 13; his mother, Julia Romero; and sister, Cindy Ramos. He was a prominent member of his church, the Christ Tabernacle Church in Glendale, Queens, and was near completion of his bachelor's degree in Religion at Faith Evangelical College and Seminary.

On December 27, 2014, during his funeral, Police Commissioner William J. Bratton posthumously promoted Police Officer Ramos to Detective First Grade, as well as making him an honorary chaplain of the 84 Precinct. Additionally, the Faith Evangelical College and Seminary posthumously awarded him his Bachelor of Arts degree in Religion.

## Appendix B – Historical Data 1971-2014

### Officers Shot and Injured by Subjects, 1971-2014




Figure 40

### Officers Shot and Killed by Subjects, 1971-2014




Figure 41

## Subjects Shot and Injured, 1971-2014




Figure 42

## Subjects Shot and Killed by Officers, 1971-2014




Figure 43

## Total Shots Fired, 1971-2014




Figure 44

## Total Shooting Incidents involving Officers, 1971-2014




Figure 45



## Appendix C: Firearms Training

### Overview

NYPD firearms training emphasizes that the ultimate goal of every police officer is to protect life. This means all lives: those of bystanders, victims, subjects, and other officers. One of the realities of police work, however, is the contradiction that can arise when it becomes necessary to protect life by using deadly physical force.

According to the New York State Penal Law, and in keeping with the Patrol Guide restrictions delineated previously in this Report, an officer may use deadly physical force when he or she has probable cause to believe that such force is necessary to protect the officer or other persons present from imminent death or serious physical injury. This includes instances in which a subject is in possession of an object that, because of its appearance and the manner in which the subject holds or uses it, gives the officer a reasonable belief that the object is capable of imminently causing death or serious physical injury.

### Shoot to Stop

Once an officer has determined that deadly physical force is warranted and necessary, the goal of using such force is not to kill, but to stop. Police officers are trained to use deadly physical force to “stop the threat” – i.e., to end the subject’s ability to threaten imminent death or serious physical injury to the officer or another person. If, for example, a missed shot nevertheless causes a subject to cease and desist, then that one errant round is all that is necessary. If a subject is injured and surrenders, then shooting to stop has been accomplished. But sometimes the only means of stopping a subject is one that results in the subject’s demise. Stated explicitly, however, police officers do not “shoot to kill” – they are trained to shoot to stop.

### Weapons Control

NYPD firearms training also emphasizes weapons control. With regard to shooting technique, the mechanics of pistol shooting in a controlled environment include proper grip, sight alignment, sight picture, trigger control, and breath control. All of these require a degree of concentration and fine motor skills, both of which are unfortunately the first factors impacted in a combat scenario. Training can mitigate this, but officers must be taught to rely on mechanical actions that employ gross motor skills and have as few components as possible.


## NYPD Pistols

There are three semi-automatic 9mm pistol models that are authorized as on-duty service weapons for NYPD officers: the Glock 19, the Sig Sauer P226, and the Smith & Wesson 5946. These weapons are equipped with 15 round magazines, and, with one round in the chamber, each firearm is capable of holding 16 total rounds. Additionally, there are several weapons authorized for off-duty carry, such as the Glock 26, the Smith & Wesson 3914, and the Beretta 8000D Mini Cougar. Some officers carry .38 caliber revolvers. These officers are senior members whose weapons have been grandfathered in; revolvers have not been issued as service weapons since 1992. Current NYPD service pistols are all “double action only,” meaning they have a two-stage trigger pull for each round fired (unlike single-action weapons, which can be “cocked,” resulting in a one-stage trigger pull). Additionally, all NYPD weapons are modified to have a heavier-than-stock 12 pound trigger pull; this diminishes the likelihood of unintentional discharges. The NYPD uses a 124-grain, hollow-point bullet that is designed to prevent over-penetration and ricochets.

Because combat stress can contribute to the impairment of fine motor skills, and because of the relative imprecision of pistols, police officers are taught to shoot for center mass – usually, the torso. In cases in which a subject uses cover and presents only a portion of his or her body, officers are trained to use the geometric center of the exposed portion as a target.

The human body’s center mass is the largest area available as a point of aim. The torso represents approximately one third of a human’s surface area, compared to nine percent for an arm or 18 percent for a leg. The torso is also the most stationary portion of the body; extremities are much smaller and less static and therefore a far less certain target. Additionally, shooting a subject in an extremity is far less likely to stop him or her than a shot to the center mass. A leg wound, for example, does little to prevent a subject from continuing to use a knife or gun (See Figure 46).

**Center Mass**



*Figure 46*

## **Appendix D: Subjects Killed During ID-AC Incidents**

### **Incident 1**

On Saturday April 12, 2014, at approximately 1117 hours, four officers responded to a radio run at an address known to the Department. The male caller had informed the 911 operator that he had shot his daughter and dog, and that he was going to kill himself. Two officers arrived initially, and upon reaching the front stoop of the residence the lead officer observed the perpetrator approaching them armed with a shotgun. Both officers retreated to street level and were approximately 10 feet away from the front door when the perpetrator exited the residence still armed. The perpetrator ignored repeated commands by officers to drop his weapon and aimed at one of the officers. Said officer discharged two rounds from his service firearm, striking the perpetrator at least once in the abdomen, causing him to fall to the ground; the perpetrator was subsequently secured by responding personnel. Inside the residence the officers discovered an injured dog and a female victim of an apparent gunshot.

Both the female victim—determined to be the perpetrator's daughter—and perpetrator were transported to the hospital where both would subsequently succumb to their injuries. The animal was transported to a veterinary hospital and was not found to be seriously injured. Subject toxicology yielded no presence of narcotics or alcohol.

### **Incident 2**

On Friday May 16, 2014, at approximately 1350 hours, an individual known to the Department committed a gunpoint robbery at 1302 2nd avenue. During the event an employee secreted a GPS device into the package taken by the perpetrator, who then fled the store. Two officers, having responded to a radio assignment, arrived at the location of the crime and, accompanied by the store manager, initiated a canvass of the area for the suspect; their search was supplemented with location information transmitted to them by personnel at the NYPD Real Time Crime Center who were receiving data from the GPS device. At this stage, operating under the belief that the suspect was travelling in a motor vehicle, officers coordinated the interception and blocked the route of the GPS device. After being alerted by the Real Time Crime Center that the signal was stopped in traffic all involved officers converged on the signal's location and four RMP vehicles were parked in close proximity to the suspect. At this point five officers exited their vehicles and began to canvass through the stopped traffic. One officer, having identified the suspect, and with five fellow officers surrounding the vehicle, began ordering the suspect to raise his hands. The suspect, refusing to comply with repeated orders to remain still, reached to the floor and produced a black semi-automatic pistol. On witnessing this movement, several of the officers relocated to safer positions and aimed their service weapons at the subject. Again ignoring repeated orders to comply, the subject aimed his weapon at one of the officers, causing four of the responding officers to discharge their firearms, resulting in the subject's demise. The subject's firearm was removed from the vehicle and, upon investigation, was found to be loaded with eight live rounds. Subject toxicology revealed the presence of narcotics.

**Incident 3**

At approximately 2048 hours on Sunday, May 18, 2014, inside an apartment within the confines of the 70<sup>th</sup> precinct, a female victim sustained a violent unprovoked attack at the hands of her husband, during which she was stabbed in the chest with a cutting instrument. The victim then fled with her children while the perpetrator returned to his apartment. In response, seven officers arrived on the scene and discovered the injured victim between two parked cars. Six of these officers then proceeded to the perpetrator's apartment where they found smoke emanating from under the door. With the safety of neighbors and the subject of paramount concern, and with the arrival time of ESU uncertain, the officers began to force entry into the apartment while simultaneously beginning the evacuation of surrounding neighbors. The officers then entered the apartment where, on opening the door of the back bedroom, observed the suspect beginning to advance on them armed with scissors. The suspect was ordered to drop his weapon but refused and continued to advance. As a result, a single officer discharged his firearm causing the subject to drop to one knee. In spite of further warnings the subject returned to his feet and continued to advance, forcing a second officer to discharge his weapon. The perpetrator was subsequently disarmed and pronounced dead by paramedics. Subject toxicology revealed the presence of alcohol.

**Incident 4**

At approximately 1922 hours on Monday, September 29, 2014, six officers responded to a 911 call about a knife assault in progress within the confines of the 70<sup>th</sup> precinct. Upon arrival at the apartment in which the assault was audibly ongoing the officers met a civilian who was attempting to gain entry. He was successful in doing so and entered the apartment before the officers could prevent him. The officers followed the civilian in a tactical formation and observed a second male, armed with a knife, exit a back bedroom, make a stabbing motion towards the first civilian, and advance on the officers. Orders of compliance were unheeded and as the perpetrator continued to advance, three officers were forced to discharge their service weapons, killing the subject but also striking the civilian. With the threat neutralized, the officers moved deeper into the apartment where a female and her two children were discovered hiding in a bathroom and were removed to safety. The male civilian was discovered bleeding from apparent stab and gunshot wounds, and although transported rapidly to hospital he subsequently succumbed to his injuries. The toxicology results were unavailable at the time of writing this report.

**Incident 5**

At approximately 1927 hours on Friday, October 3, 2014, seven officers responded to a 911 call for an armed dispute, occurring within the confines of the 61<sup>st</sup> precinct. The first two officers on the scene were met by a female who informed them that her son was in her apartment armed with four knives and threatening to kill her. The officers had responded to the same address earlier in the evening, as the subject had choked his mother but fled before the police arrived. With no access through the front door according to the female victim, the officers moved to the rear of the building where they observed the suspect on an upper level. Upon being challenged by the armed officers, the suspect re-entered the

building and locked the door behind him. The officers, supported by recently arrived colleagues, unlocked the door with a key and entered the apartment. The officers discovered the suspect seated on the couch with four knives in front of him. When ordered by the officers to raise his hands, he instead grabbed the knives (two in each hand) and stood. The suspect then began daring the officers to shoot him before advancing towards them. The officers retreated until they could go no further and one was forced to discharge his service weapon, striking the subject in the chest. The subject was removed to the hospital where he was pronounced DOA. The toxicology results were unavailable at the time of writing this report.

#### **Incident 6**

At approximately 1359 hours, on Thursday October 23, 2014, four officers, present in front 162-10 Jamaica Ave, were asked by an independent party to pose for a photograph. Immediately after the photo was taken an individual removed a hatchet from his backpack and ran towards the police officers, proceeding to swing the weapon at them, and striking one on the forearm and one on the side of the head. The two uninjured officers unholstered and discharged their firearms at the perpetrator striking him a minimum of six times and causing his demise. A bystander in proximity to the event was also injured by another's stray bullet. Subject toxicology yielded no presence of narcotics or alcohol.

#### **Incident 7**

At approximately 0726 hours, on October 26, 2014, four officers responded to a radio call at New York Queens Hospital, where, upon arrival, they met with security personnel. The officers were informed that approximately four hours previously, a recent patient had approached a nurse demanding syringes, and, on being challenged by security officers, produced and brandished a knife. The hospital provided information on the suspect to the officers who then proceeded to the suspect's address. On arrival, the suspect was observed in front of the building but, on being challenged, moved down an adjacent walkway. Officers moved to surround the suspect and, on noticing one of the officers following him, he lunged with a box cutter before continuing. It was at this point that the suspect noticed a second officer moving towards him from the opposite direction of the walkway and ignoring directions moved towards the officer the with box-cutter in hand. Said officer then discharged his service firearm two times, striking the subject, who was pronounced dead on removal to the hospital. Subject toxicology revealed the presence of narcotics.

#### **Incident 8**

At approximately 0135 hours on Tuesday, December 9, 2014, an individual entered 770 Eastern Parkway and stabbed a man who had been praying inside the location. An officer posted to a nearby location, aware of the situation due to noise and witness information, began to move toward the location, whereupon he observed a victim with a head injury; a congregated crowd clarified that the perpetrator was still within the building. The officer called for backup and entered the location where he found the suspect, still armed with a knife, in a common area. The officer, along with newly arrived colleagues, gave verbal commands

but despite initial signs that the suspect was willing to comply he instead proceeded to roam the common area freely. The suspect then doubled back, and while still ignoring commands came within 3-4 ft. of an officer who was then forced to discharge his firearm; the suspect was removed to the hospital and pronounced DOA. Subject toxicology revealed the presence of narcotics.

## Appendix E – Subject Injury & Race




Figure 47

Subjects Wounded by Officers, 2009-2014					
Year	White	Black	Hispanic	Asian	Total
2009	0	14	6	0	20
2010	3	9	3	1	16
2011	2	10	7	0	19
2012	1	9	3	0	13
2013	1	12	4	0	17
2014	0	8	6	0	14

Figure 48

Subjects Killed by Officers, 2009-2014					
Year	White	Black	Hispanic	Asian	Total
2009	0	8	4	0	12
2010	2	1	4	1	8
2011	4	2	3	0	9
2012	2	11	2	1	16
2013	0	6	2	0	8
2014	2	4	2	0	8

Figure 49



## Appendix F – Incident Breakdown Tables

Firearms Discharge Incidents by Day, 2014					
Day	ID-AC	ID-AA	Unintentional	Unauthorized	Total
Monday	5	3	5	1	14
Tuesday	2	4	1	0	7
Wednesday	2	0	3	2	7
Thursday	4	2	3	2	11
Friday	6	6	2	0	14
Saturday	6	1	3	2	12
Sunday	10	2	1	1	14
<b>Total</b>	<b>35</b>	<b>18</b>	<b>18</b>	<b>8</b>	<b>79</b>

Figure 50

Firearms Discharge Incidents by Month, 2014					
Month	ID-AC	ID-AA	Unintentional	Unauthorized	Total
January	4	1	2	0	7
February	2	1	1	0	4
March	2	3	4	0	9
April	2	2	2	3	9
May	5	2	2	1	10
June	4	2	1	2	9
July	2	1	0	0	3
August	3	1	2	0	6
September	4	2	1	0	7
October	4	2	0	0	6
November	2	1	2	1	6
December	1	0	1	1	3
<b>Total</b>	<b>35</b>	<b>18</b>	<b>18</b>	<b>8</b>	<b>79</b>

Figure 51

<b>Firearm Discharge Incidents by Borough, 2014</b>					
<i><b>Borough</b></i>	<i><b>ID-AC</b></i>	<i><b>ID-AA</b></i>	<i><b>Unintentional</b></i>	<i><b>Unauthorized</b></i>	<i><b>Total</b></i>
<b>Bronx</b>	8	4	6	0	<b>18</b>
<b>Brooklyn</b>	18	6	1	1	<b>26</b>
<b>Manhattan</b>	4	1	1	0	<b>6</b>
<b>Queens</b>	5	6	5	3	<b>19</b>
<b>Staten Island</b>	0	1	2	0	<b>3</b>
<b>Outside City</b>	0	0	3	4	<b>7</b>
<b>Total</b>	<b>35</b>	<b>18</b>	<b>18</b>	<b>8</b>	<b>79</b>

Figure 52

Firearm Discharge Incidents by Precinct, Manhattan, 2014					
Precinct	ID-AC	ID-AA	Unintentional	Unauthorized	Total
1st Precinct	0	0	0	0	0
5th Precinct	0	0	0	0	0
6th Precinct	0	0	0	0	0
7th Precinct	0	0	0	0	0
9th Precinct	0	0	0	0	0
10th Precinct	0	0	0	0	0
13th Precinct	0	0	0	0	0
Midtown South	0	0	0	0	0
17th Precinct	0	0	0	0	0
Midtown North	0	0	0	0	0
19th Precinct	1	0	0	0	1
20th Precinct	0	0	0	0	0
Central Park	0	0	0	0	0
23rd Precinct	1	0	0	0	1
24th Precinct	0	0	0	0	0
25th Precinct	1	0	0	0	1
26th Precinct	1	0	0	0	1
28th Precinct	0	0	0	0	0
30th Precinct	0	0	0	0	0
32nd Precinct	0	1	0	0	1
33rd Precinct	0	0	0	0	0
34th Precinct	0	0	0	0	0
MNTF*	0	0	1	0	1
<b>Total</b>	<b>4</b>	<b>1</b>	<b>1</b>	<b>0</b>	<b>6</b>

Figure 53

\*Manhattan North Task Force.

Firearm Discharge Incidents by Precinct, Bronx, 2014					
Precinct	ID-AC	ID-AA	Unintentional	Unauthorized	Total
40th Precinct	1	0	0	0	1
41st Precinct	1	0	1	0	2
42nd Precinct	0	0	0	0	0
43rd Precinct	1	0	2	0	3
44th Precinct	0	2	1	0	3
45th Precinct	0	0	1	0	1
46th Precinct	1	0	0	0	1
47th Precinct	0	2	0	0	2
48th Precinct	1	0	1	0	2
49th Precinct	2	0	0	0	2
50th Precinct	1	0	0	0	1
52nd Precinct	0	0	0	0	0
<b>Total</b>	<b>8</b>	<b>4</b>	<b>6</b>	<b>0</b>	<b>18</b>

Figure 54

Firearm Discharge Incidents by Precinct, Brooklyn, 2014					
Precinct	ID-AC	ID-AA	Unintentional	Unauthorized	Total
60th Precinct	0	0	0	0	0
61st Precinct	1	0	0	0	1
62nd Precinct	0	0	0	0	0
63rd Precinct	0	0	0	1	1
66th Precinct	0	0	0	0	0
67th Precinct	1	0	0	0	1
68th Precinct	0	0	0	0	0
69th Precinct	2	0	0	0	2
70th Precinct	2	0	0	0	2
71st Precinct	3	0	0	0	3
72nd Precinct	0	0	0	0	0
73rd Precinct	0	2	0	0	2
75th Precinct	3	3	1	0	7
76th Precinct	0	0	0	0	0
77th Precinct	2	1	0	0	3
78th Precinct	0	0	0	0	0
79th Precinct	0	0	0	0	0
81st Precinct	2	0	0	0	2
83rd Precinct	0	0	0	0	0
84th Precinct	1	0	0	0	1
88th Precinct	0	0	0	0	0
90th Precinct	1	0	0	0	1
94th Precinct	0	0	0	0	0
<b>Total</b>	<b>18</b>	<b>6</b>	<b>1</b>	<b>1</b>	<b>26</b>

Figure 55

Firearm Discharge Incidents by Precinct, Queens, 2014					
Precinct	ID-AC	ID-AA	Unintentional	Unauthorized	Total
100th Precinct	0	0	0	0	0
101st Precinct	0	2	0	0	2
102nd Precinct	0	1	0	0	1
103rd Precinct	2	0	0	0	2
104th Precinct	0	0	1	0	1
105th Precinct	0	1	0	1	2
106th Precinct	0	0	1	0	1
107th Precinct	0	0	1	0	1
108th Precinct	0	0	0	1	1
109th Precinct	1	1	0	0	2
110th Precinct	1	0	1	0	2
111th Precinct	0	0	1	1	2
112th Precinct	0	0	0	0	0
113th Precinct	0	1	0	0	1
114th Precinct	1	0	0	0	1
115th Precinct	0	0	0	0	0
<b>Total</b>	<b>5</b>	<b>6</b>	<b>5</b>	<b>3</b>	<b>19</b>

Figure 56

Firearm Discharge Incidents by Precinct, Staten Island, 2014					
Precinct	ID-AC	ID-AA	Unintentional	Unauthorized	Total
120th Precinct	0	1	1	0	2
121st Precinct	0	0	0	0	0
122nd Precinct	0	0	1	0	1
123rd Precinct	0	0	0	0	0
<b>Total</b>	<b>0</b>	<b>1</b>	<b>2</b>	<b>0</b>	<b>3</b>

Figure 57

Firearm Discharge Incidents by Precinct, Outside City, 2014					
Precinct	ID-AC	ID-AA	Unintentional	Unauthorized	Total
New Jersey	0	0	0	1	1
Rockland	0	0	1	1	2
Suffolk	0	0	2	0	2
Westchester	0	0	0	2	2
<b>Total</b>	<b>0</b>	<b>0</b>	<b>3</b>	<b>4</b>	<b>7</b>

Figure 58

Firearm Discharge Incidents by Location, 2014					
	ID-AC	ID-AA	Unintentional	Unauthorized	Total
Within City	35	18	15	4	72
Outside City	0	0	3	4	7
<b>Total</b>	<b>35</b>	<b>18</b>	<b>18</b>	<b>8</b>	<b>79</b>

Figure 59

Firearm Discharge Incidents by Officer Duty Status, 2014					
Status	ID-AC	ID-AA	Unintentional	Unauthorized	Total
On-Duty	34	18	10	1	63
Off-Duty	1	0	8	7	16
<b>Total</b>	<b>35</b>	<b>18</b>	<b>18</b>	<b>8</b>	<b>79</b>

Figure 60

## ID-AC Incidents, 2014

#	Subject Weapon	Officers Involved	Rounds Fired	Subjects	Subject Injury	Subject Gender	Subject Race	Subject Age
1	Firearm	2	4	1	Gunshot	M	H	31
2	Firearm	1	1	1	None	M	B	17
3	Firearm	1	1	1	None	M	B	21
4	Vehicle	5	19	1	None	M	B	39
5	Cutting instrument	1	1	1	Gunshot	F	B	35
6	Firearm	2	7	1	None	M	B	28
7	Firearm	1	3	1	Gunshot	M	H	22
8	Firearm	1	1	1	None	F	B	44
9	Firearm	1	1	1	None	M	B	26
10	Firearm	1	2	1	Killed	M	W	86
11	Firearm	1	1	1	Gunshot	M	B	24
12	Firearm	1	5	1	Gunshot	M	B	23
13	Firearm	4	29	1	Killed	M	H	45
14	Firearm	2	15	1	Gunshot	M	H	23
15	Cutting instrument	2	4	1	Killed	M	B	39
16	Firearm	1	2	1	None	M	B	16
17	Firearm	1	1	1	None	M	B	20
18	Firearm	1	6	1	Gunshot	M	B	23
19	Firearm	2	19	1	None	M	H	Unknown
20	Vehicle	1	1	1	Gunshot	M	H	38
21	Firearm	1	1	1	None	M	B	28
22	Cutting instrument	2	2	1	Gunshot	M	H	34
23	Firearm	2	5	1	None	M	H	24



ID-AC Incidents, 2014								
<b>24</b>	Firearm	3	13	1	Gunshot	M	B	22
<b>25</b>	Firearm	1	1	1	None	M	B	26
<b>26</b>	Physical Force	1	1	1	Gunshot	M	H	28
<b>27</b>	Firearm	1	4	1	Gunshot	M	B	19
<b>28</b>	Cutting instrument	3	18	1	Killed	M	H	47
<b>29</b>	Cutting instrument	1	1	1	Killed	M	W	28
<b>30</b>	Cutting Instrument	2	19	1	Killed	M	B	32
<b>31</b>	Cutting instrument	1	2	1	Killed	M	B	29
<b>32</b>	Firearm	1	3	1	None	M	B	22
<b>33</b>	Firearm	4	5	1	Gunshot	M	B	25
<b>34</b>	Blunt Instrument	2	2	1	Gunshot	M	B	19
<b>35</b>	Cutting instrument	1	1	1	Killed	M	B	49

Figure 61

New York City Police Department

**William J. Bratton,**  
**Police Commissioner**

